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ABSTRACT
Neo-Quinean and Neo-Aristotelian Metaontology:
On Explanation, Theory Choice, and the Viability of
Ontological Inquiry

By

LACEY Micheál Vincent

Doctor of Philosophy

This thesis is an exercise in comparative metaontology. I am centrally concerned with
how one might choose between competing metaontological theories. To make my
project tractable, I compare two contemporary metaontological approaches dominant
in the literature: neo-Quineanism (N-Q) and neo-Aristotelianism (N-A). Peter van
Inwagen, a representative of N-Q, claims that ontological inquiry should be conducted
in the quantifier-variable idiom of first-order predicate logic; to know what exists, or
what a theory says exists, we read our commitments off the regimented sentences that
we affirm as true. E.J. Lowe, a representative of N-A objects to N-Q and claims that
ontology should be done directly; that it is a mostly a priori activity which is the
indispensable intellectual foundation for all rational inquiry. Both metaontological
accounts are questionable and there seems to be no decisive way to choose between
them. I claim, however, that considerations concerning the explanatory nature of
ontology is a key and under-studied factor with respect to ontological method, pointing
a way to a possible candidate for metaontological theory choice. I conclude that van
Inwagen’s N-Q metaontology is wanting in many respects and further, that he does not
provide adequate reasons to dispense with explanation as a feature of ontological
inquiry. While explanatory considerations are central to Lowe’s N-A metaontology, I
claim that the best that can be hoped for with his particular approach is a form of
explanatory antirealism.
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INTRODUCTION
Metaontology is the new
black. We can no longer get
away with simply worrying
about what there is, now we
have to worry about what
ontological questions are all
about in the first place.
(Cameron 2008, 1)
Worries about contemporary
ontology begin as worries
about its epistemology. (Sider
2009, 2)
I see a serious threat to
philosophy in the increasingly
unquestioned assumption that
academic philosophers should
conform to a scientific model
of research. Indeed, the very
idea of conducting “research”
in philosophy—other than,
perhaps, into its history—is
more than a little absurd,
because
engaging
in
philosophy is not a matter of
producing
evidence-based
information
about
some
subject matter. Rather, it is a
matter of achieving insight and
understanding about matters
with which, in some sense, all
of us are already perfectly
familiar. (Lowe 2008, 274)

Introduction
Ontology, broadly speaking, is an inquiry into the nature of being. While this
is not a particularly illuminating definition, any further attempt to precisify its nature
invariably prejudices one conception above another. In one sense, prior even to what
method is to be employed in answering ontological questions, one needs to be clear on
what ontological questions are being asked, or what phenomenon

1

is being

The term “phenomenon” has been used widely in philosophy and is variously understood. I use it in a
basic, non-philosophically loaded sense throughout the thesis.
1

1

investigated. W.V. Quine, for instance, considered the central ontological question to
be what is there? (Quine 1948). Jonathan Schaffer prefers the question what is
fundamental? (Schaffer 2009). Kit Fine thinks the central ontological question should
be what is real? (Fine 2009). In various ways E.J. Lowe embraces each of these
questions with an added emphasis on the question how are things? (Lowe 2006). An
ontologist, then, may be interested in each of these questions, and more besides, but
there is a tendency to prioritize one above the others.
But such questions are not part of ontology proper; rather, they frame
ontological inquiry. This framing is the proper purview of metaontology. The term
“meta-ontology” was introduced to the philosophical lexicon by Peter van Inwagen in
a 1998 paper by the same name. He says:
Quine has called the question ‘What is there?’ “the ontological question”. But
if we call this question by that name, what name shall we use for the question,
‘What are we asking when we ask “What is there?”’? Established usage, or
mis-usage, suggests the name “the meta-ontological2 question”, and this is the
name I shall use. I shall call the attempt to answer the meta-ontological
question “meta-ontology” and any proposed answer to it a “meta-ontology”.
(van Inwagen, 1998, 233)

While this distinction provided a structure to an already existing self-reflective
practice, the term “metaontology” has continually broadened to include a range of
issues relevant to ontological inquiry. Van Inwagen’s definition of “meta-ontology”
above is distinctly semantic, concerned with the meaning of the term being.
“Metaontology”, as I use the term, concerns the subject matter, methods and general
practice of ontological inquiry. How we conceive of the proper target and methodology
of ontology impacts on how ontological inquiry is conducted. But divisions among
subsections in philosophy are at best loose and overlapping. Just as meta-philosophy
is part of philosophy, so too is metaontology part of ontology. The distinction,
however, is analytically helpful.
This thesis is an exercise in comparative metaontology. I am centrally
interested in the viability of ontological inquiry, with how one should conduct
2

The term is now so widely used that the hyphen is largely dropped.
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ontological inquiry, and with how one might choose between competing
metaontological theories.
Regarding the first matter, the viability of ontological inquiry, even those who
are actively engaged ontologists are sometimes doubtful about its worth. As Saatsi
remarks: ‘Contemporary metaphysics is heavily concerned with its methodology and
epistemic status. This is for a good reason: in the virtual absence of experiments,
predictions, and empirical feedback, it is far from clear how metaphysical theories and
views can be rationally justified’ (Saatsi 2017, 163). Moreover, the nature of
ontological questions often strikes one as a little more than strange. Karen Bennett,
reflecting on this oddity, says:

Some of the things we metaphysicians think about strike others—and, in some
moods, ourselves—as a triﬂe silly. Are there numbers? If I say that my shirt is
blue, am I committed to the existence of a universal, namely blueness? If you
have two objects, are you guaranteed to also have a third object entirely
composed of the ﬁrst two? And so on and so forth.’ (Bennett 2009, 38)

It takes quite a bit of training before one is in a position to appreciate the sense and
subtlety that accompany the arguments and reasons for positing such strange entities,
whether or not one in fact does appreciate them after training. Stephen Yablo notes
that even after lengthy schooling, ‘one feels just a teensy bit ridiculous pondering the
ontological status of these things’ (Yablo 1998, 230). He remarks further that there is
a

natural cast of mind that has trouble taking questions like these seriously. Some
would call it the natural cast of mind… A line of research aimed at determining
whether Chicago, April, Spanish, etc. really exist strikes this cast of mind as
naive to the point of comicality. It's as though one were to call for research into
whether April is really the cruellest month, or Chicago the city with the big
shoulders, or Spanish the loving tongue. (Yablo 1998, 230)3
M.B. Willard gives a more humorous and poetic rendering of this position: ‘The metaphysician wakes
in the night with a start. Her dreams had been full of angels dancing on pins. She ponders that while her
metaphysical ancestors had tried to count the angels dancing on pins (or so it is said), she and her
colleagues have little to no agreement as to whether there are pins, and an increasingly nagging worry
that they themselves are nothing but pin-heads’ (Willard 2013, 2).
3

3

Many philosophers are more directly critical about the state of contemporary
ontology. Bas van Fraassen, in a rather graphic phrase, claims that we are ‘living with
a dead metaphysics’ (van Fraassen 2002, 02) and proceeds to claim that contemporary
metaphysicians are not engaged in the important and deep philosophical questions that
vexed philosophers through the ages. Others have been equally hostile. James
Ladyman et al., for example, claim that ‘standard analytic metaphysics (or ‘neoscholastic’ metaphysics as we call it) contributes nothing to human knowledge and,
where it has any impact at all, systematically misrepresents the relative significance of
what we do know on the basis of science’ (Ladyman et al., 2007, vi - vii).4 Further,
they remark that
…contemporary analytic metaphysics, a professional activity engaged in by
some extremely intelligent and morally serious people, fails to qualify as part
of the enlightened pursuit of objective truth, and should be discontinued. We
think it is impossible to argue for a point like this without provoking some
anger. Suggesting that a group of highly trained professionals have been
wasting their talents—and, worse, sowing systematic confusion about the
nature of the world, and how to find out about it—isn’t something one can do
in an entirely generous way. (Ladyman et al. 2007, vi)

Not all critics consider analytic metaphysics a problematic pursuit in and of itself, but
such diatribes are emblematic of the concern that has provoked ontologists to become
more methodologically self-conscious. Methodological concerns, of course, played an
important role in much of Twentieth Century philosophy. Ryle famously stated that he
and his colleagues were ‘in for a near-lifetime of enquiry into [their] own title to be
enquirers’ (Ryle 1970, 10). The rise of ontology from an alarmingly deflationary
period has provoked again serious methodological worries; worries which have
engendered the rise of literature in metaontology.
This brings us to my second concern: if ontological inquiry is to be pursued,
what methods and procedures should govern such a practice? In one sense, this is

The term “neo-Scholastic metaphysics” refers to the neo-Aristotelian tradition. But Ladyman et al. are
equally hostile to the kind of metaphysics neo-Quineans engage in. In fact, any metaphysics that is not
motivated by current best science (however such a programme might be worked out) falls under their
critique. I return to Ladyman et al. at various junctures throughout the work.
4
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perhaps not the correct question to ask. Perhaps there is no singular way ontology
should be done and that competing conceptions and varying methods enhance and
deepen our understanding of ontological problems, whatever of their solutions. While
there may be some truth in this, it also threatens to make ontological inquiry somewhat
arbitrary and makes it difficult to speak about progress, as many are wont to do. What
is worse, I claim, is that it can lead those with opposing metaontologies away from
fruitful ontological debate. Such is the case, for example, with E.J. Lowe and Peter
van Inwagen.
These two eminent ontologists, who endorse competing metaontologies, were,
by all accounts, good friends. Van Inwagen’s wife remarks:

What bound these two men in such a special friendship? First and foremost,
Jonathan and Peter respected the love and dedication each other had for
philosophy, and specifically metaphysics... Although they were also both kind
people, when the quality of work was involved, they could not —and I mean
COULD not — compromise. (Bolduc 2019, 33).

It is a more interesting fact that despite this friendship, and though they are each
foremost in the field of metaphysics and ontology, their metaontological views are so
disparate that they rarely engaged directly with each other in their own academic
work.5 Van Inwagen opines:

In point of fact, despite our warm personal friendship and our great respect for
each other’s work—our respect for the philosophical craftsmanship of the
other’s work, a thing in which we both delight—there is almost nothing in
philosophy that we agree about, and this is particularly true of that part of
philosophy that we both love above all others, metaphysics. (van Inwagen
2018, 144)

And it is equally the case with respect to their ontological works. Van Inwagen goes
on to say that:

5

A notable exception is a direct exchange in a 1996 paper entitled “Why is There Anything at All?”

5

In my own work, there are very few references to Jonathan’s work; the few
such references that do exist, I believe, are all citations whose purpose was to
establish that someone held a certain view, that a certain philosophical position
was in fact occupied.
In Jonathan’s book Forms of Thought there is no reference to my work at all,
although I have written extensively on most of the topics he discusses. And this
is how things should be, for our metaphysical views are so far apart that neither
of us can make any real use of the other’s work. If, for example, Jonathan’s
four-category ontology6 is anything like right, then all my work in metaphysics
is fundamentally wrong, wrong from the ground up. And if the positions I
defended in ‘A Theory of Properties’ (2004)7 are anything like right, then the
four-category ontology is wrong from the ground up. Each of us would be hard
put to it to find a single substantive sentence in the writings of the other that he
agreed with. (Ibid)

This is a rather astonishing state of affairs, though I disagree slightly with van
Inwagen’s assessment above. It is not that their metaphysics is so different that they
don’t engage with the other’s work, but that their meta-metaphysics and meta-ontology
are so different.
Lowe agrees that he and van Inwagen have little to offer one another on
ontological matters, though he does not say so directly against van Inwagen. Rather,
his view is directed at the founder of the position van Inwagen endorses, W.V. Quine.
He claims, for instance, that: ‘I think that Quine ultimately has nothing intelligible to
say about ontology – as I conceive of it – and would happily accept that charge, on the
grounds that ontology, thus conceived, is an impossible enterprise’ (Lowe 2009, 204).
Some of Lowe’s criticisms of Quinean metaontology are specific to Quine’s doctrines.
Others, we will see, are equally applicable to van Inwagen and anyone endorsing some
core Quinean metaontological principles. I find the lack of ontological and
metaontological exchange between Lowe and van Inwagen both remarkable and
unfortunate. It provokes, I think, even further questions as to the viability of
Lowe’s four-category ontology features centrally in his work and while introduced in chapter two, is
discussed extensively in chapter four in connection with his theory of character.
7
Van Inwagen’s theory of properties, what I will call character, is the subject matter of chapter three.
6
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ontological inquiry. It also magnifies the importance of the challenging question
regarding how ontology should be done?
But Lowe and van Inwagen are just two philosophers amongst a vast array of
ontologists and metaphysicians who propose, not only disparate first-order theories,
but also contrasting second-order metaontological positions. A variety of perspectives
were compiled in a seminal metaontological work called Metametaphysics: New
Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (2009). 8 For example, we can find views,
broadly known as neo-Carnapian, that treat ontological matters as being relative to
different incommensurable frameworks of inquiry. Simplifying, this loosely antirealist
position, which comes in varying degrees of deflation about ontological inquiry,
maintains that there are no objective answers to (some) ontological debates. Certain
ontological disputes are viewed as merely verbal, with disputants talking past each
other, each from within their own respective framework. Eli Hirsch, working within
the neo-Carnapian tradition, proposes the following example of a merely verbal
dispute:

Look at your hand while you are clenching it, and ask yourself whether some
object called a fist has come into existence.... The first thought must come to
mind when we ask this question is this: There can’t be anything deep or
theoretical here. The facts are, so to speak, right in front of our eyes. Our task
can only be to remind ourselves of relevant ways in which we describe these
facts in our language[;] to ‘command a clear view of the use of our words’, as
Wittgenstein put it, that is, a clear view of how the relevant concepts operate.
(Hirsch 2002, 67)

Most philosophers, including Hirsch, however, are nuanced enough in their position
not to extract global claims about the practice of ontology from such local examples.
Whether or not ontological disputes, or some portion of them, can be resolved through
an analysis of language, it has proved inordinately difficult to provide semantic criteria

Just as the terms “ontology” and “metaphysics” are sometimes used to mark out a specific discipline,
and at others used interchangeably, so it is with the terms “metametaphysics” and “metaontology”. We
see in the title of this work, for example, a conflation among domains. Throughout this thesis, I generally
use such terms interchangeably, making it explicit when I deviate.
8

7

that could adequately adjudicate between what is a substantive ontological position
and what is a superficial debate.
Of the various metaontological approaches, however, what I find most
compelling are those metaontologists who endorse realist ontological views. Just as
William James in his Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) chose to study extreme
examples to identify important characteristics of the religious experience, so too it
seems a profitable strategy to choose competing realist metaontological perspectives;
that is, those who treat ontological claims as being substantive. With this in mind, and
to make the task of identifying how ontology should be done more tractable, I chose
to contrast two metaontological positions, neo-Quineanism and neo-Aristotelianism.
A central motivation for choosing neo-Quineanism is due to the influence of
Quine on ontology since the middle of the last century. Quine is often seen as the
saviour of ontology, rescuing it from the logical positivists who sought to extirpate
metaphysics from rational discourse and replace it with what might be called scientific
philosophy. In this regard, Hilary Putnam asks: ‘“How come,” the reader may wonder,
“it is precisely in analytic philosophy—a kind of philosophy that, for many years, was
hostile to the very word “ontology”— that Ontology flourishes?”’ (Putnam 2005, 78).9
While it is important to note that this “hostility” was not endemic in analytic
philosophy form its inception, 10 Putnam’s answer is as follows: ‘If we ask when
Ontology became a respectable subject for an analytic philosopher to pursue, the
mystery disappears. It became respectable in 1948, when Quine published a famous
paper titled “On What There Is.” It was Quine who single-handedly made Ontology a
respectable subject’ (Ibid.). Van Fraassen is another who subscribes to this view:

However, we need to be careful with generalizations. As Zimmerman and Loux note: ‘the earliest
movement in the tradition - the logical atomism of Russell and the early Wittgenstein - was thoroughly
metaphysical in its orientation’ (Loux and Zimmerman 2005, 1). Even though the metaphysics of
Russell and Wittgenstein was minimal in comparison with the perceived speculative extravagance of
the British Idealists to which they were reacting, logical atomism was still an attempt to provide an
ontological account of the nature of reality. The seemingly pervasive anti-metaphysical character of
analytic philosophy was, in fact, quite a short-lived period. It emerged most forcefully with the rise
logical positivism in the 1930s and continued with ordinary language philosophy, both of which made
the extirpation of metaphysics central to their respective philosophical strategies.
10
Analytic philosophy, like philosophy generally, is variously understood. A number of works have
shone light on the difficulty of articulating what the precise origins of analytic philosophy were and
what analytic philosophy now amounts to. See Dummett (1994), Biletzki and Matar (1998) and Gloch
(2008) for interesting analyses on this matter.
9
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Analytic ontology was introduced by Willard van Orman Quine, in his justly
celebrated essay “On What There Is”. It begins with a critique of traditional
metaphysics. But then it restates the great question What is there? in hygienic
form. To answer this question is the aim of ontology which can now be pursued
in a scientifically respectable way. (van Fraassen 2002, 11)

Quine is seen by many to have been so influential in regenerating ontology as a
legitimate practice that Gideon Rosen insouciantly declares that ‘It is only a slight
exaggeration to say that in our understanding of what metaphysics is and how it is
possible, we are all Quineans now’ (Rosen 2013, 552).11 Though many disagree with
this claim, it does highlight what, for some at least, is the perceived hegemony of the
Quinean approach to ontology in analytic philosophy.
Quine, however, held some extreme positions, the nature and consequences of
which are highly contested. Rather than get bogged down in a mire of exegetical issues,
I chose van Inwagen as a more contemporary representative of a neo-Quinean position.
I do not suggest that van Inwagen is more faithful to Quine than others, or that he is
representative of all contemporary neo-Quineans. He does, however, profess (1998,
2009) to be a staunch defender of Quine’s ontological method and given that he is
accredited with introducing the term “metaontology”, thus circumscribing a “new”
field of study, he was a natural candidate to choose. Van Inwagen, however, endorses
some extreme metaontological views of his own, among the most important of which,
I argue, is that ontological theories can do no explanatory work, a point I return to
below.
Neo-Aristotelianism, the second metaontological view I chose, rather than
being a uniform movement (if there ever is such a thing in philosophy), is best
characterised as a cluster of related themes defined almost as much by its debt to
Aristotle as by its reaction to neo-Quinean metaontology. The debt to Aristotle is often
tenuous and amounts to being inspired in a loose way by the subject and methodology
of Aristotle’s work. More elegantly put, Novotný and Novák say this heterogenous
position is ‘characterized by a greater or lesser affinity to the methods and doctrines
of Aristotle and/or the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition’ (Novotný and Novák, 2014,
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Rosen, as I understand him, meant this loosely to mean that ontology is a legitimate form of inquiry,
not that all ontologists follow Quines metaontological practice discussed in Chapter One.
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6). It is best understood, then, not yet as a tradition, but as a school of thought related
by, what Wittgenstein called, ‘family resemblances’ (Wittgenstein [1953]2009, 36).
While there are a variety of incompatible ontological positions within this school, there
is, I claim, enough similarity among some broad themes to at least warrant the label
“neo-Aristotelian”. And while it is not a uniform movement, I agree with Feser who
claims that ‘While it would certainly be an overstatement to say that a full-scale revival
of Aristotelianism is currently underway, it does seem that some of the various strands
of thought… are at least beginning to coalesce into something like a self-conscious
movement’ (Feser 2013, 2).12
There are a growing number of neo-Aristotelians in contemporary analytic
ontology. Among those that could be profitably contrasted with van Inwagen’s neoQuinean metaontology are Kit Fine (1994, 2001, 2009, 2012), Jonathan Schaffer
(2009, 2017), Tuomas Tahko (2011, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2018), and William
Vallicella (2003, 2004, 2014). While each have contributed to a defence of neoAristotelianism in significant ways, I chose to focus on Lowe for several reasons.
Lowe, as a foremost defender of neo-Aristotelian ontology, is bold and
unapologetic in his tone regarding the indispensability of ontology as a foundation for
all other intellectual inquiry. His central concern is to provide a metaphysical
foundation for the sciences (Lowe 2006). This rather ambitious strain, as well as a
refreshing directness in his attempts to address fundamental questions about the
practice of ontology, make him an interesting test case for the viability of ontological
inquiry. Perhaps my central reason for focusing on Lowe, however, is due to his vocal
rejection of neo-Quinean metaontology, thus making him a suitable candidate for
comparison with van Inwagen. I don’t consider Lowe to be representative of the whole
neo-Aristotelian tradition, but he is a self-professed neo-Aristotelian (Lowe 2011) and
shares broad affinities with other of his Aristotelian compatriots.
My third concern in this thesis is how one might choose between competing
metaontological positions. Few have proffered anything like objective criteria that
could help us judge the merits of one metaontological approach above another. There
is, at times, an alarming lack of argument for proposed positions and at others, notably
12

We might identify the following, for example, as broadly neo-Aristotelian in various ways: Kit Fine
(1994), Oderberg (2007), Nagel (2012), Novotny and Novak (2012), Schaffer (2009) Brian Ellis (2002).
Nancy Cartwright (1992), John Heil (2003), Peter Simons (2018), Kathrin Koslicki (2018), Tuomas
Tahko (2012), Barry Miller (2012), William Vallicella (2014), Michael Rea (2002), Gary Rosenkrantz
(2002), Edward Feser (2018), Michael Loux (2002) but there are significantly many more.
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from van Inwagen, simple declarations of incomprehension on the one hand, and
insistence on the other. It is unclear at this level of generality what criteria could be
appealed to for metaontological theory choice. Van Inwagen’s claim, mentioned
above, concerning the role of explanation in ontology, seems like a potential candidate
in this regard for he claims that his proposed neo-Quinean method leads only to
descriptive theories. That is to say, he claims that there is an intimate connection
between his method and the non-explanatory theories that are developed as a
consequence of employing his method. This contrasts dramatically with Lowe’s
traditional neo-Aristotelian approach, which does purport to develop theories to
explain puzzling features of the world. It is my contention, then, that one’s perspective
on the nature and role of explanation in ontology is a central metaontological criterion
for theory choice. Magnifying this claim through a dedicated and extensive analysis of
competing metaontological positions is, I contend, a significant contribution to the
metaontological literature. 13 If you maintain that there are features of the world
demanding of ontological analysis and explanation, then there is reason to reject neoQuinean metaontology and adopt something resembling the neo-Aristotelian
approach, what I call the theory-building approach, following van Inwagen (van
Inwagen 2015, 51).
That being said, what constitutes an explanation in ontology is a complex
matter. Traditionally, explanation has been the purview of the philosophy of science,
but there is little consensus even there regarding the nature of explanation. To
complicate matters further, explanation in metaphysics is often conflated with
metaphysical explanation, creating somewhat of a terminological muddle.
Metaphysical explanation, such as grounding, is thought to be a form of explanation
distinctive of metaphysics, but explanation, traditionally, is understood as an
epistemological matter. If there is a distinctive kind of metaphysical explanation, it is
not entirely evident what it amounts to or in what way it relates to explanation in
everyday discourse or explanation in the sciences. Anna-Sofia Maurin concurs, saying
‘Exactly what a metaphysical explanation is, is mostly left somewhat vague’ (Maurin
13

Jonathan Schaffer has done some important work in this regard, though he conflates explanation in
metaphysics with grounding explanation. He claims, for instance: ‘There is a tension in contemporary
metaphysics. On the one hand the Quinean view of the discipline remains dominant… On the other
hand there has been a revival of interest in questions of what is fundamental, and a revival of interest in
traditional metaphysics. The tension is that the postpositivist Quinean view is (by design) unsuited for
the traditional questions. The revival of traditional metaphysics demands a revival of the traditional
Aristotelian view, which involves concepts one will not ﬁnd in Quine or Carnap. (Schaffer, 2009; 354).
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2019, 1574). And Naomi Thompson recognises that ‘the notion of metaphysical
explanation is itself opaque, and has received little attention in the literature’
(Thompson 2019, 395). A large part of this thesis, then, is concerned with the nature
of explanation in metaphysics and its connection to metaontology and theory choice.
I argue that van Inwagen’s metaontology is not only problematic on its own merits,
but lacks appeal given its inability to produce explanatory theories. Lowe’s arguments
concerning the idea that ontology can in fact explain is more persuasive. However, this
does not lead to a wholesale endorsement of Lowe’s metaontology, at least not as he
would wish it to be endorsed. Running against Lowe’s realist commitments, I argue
that the best we can hope for on his metaontological approach is a form of explanatory
antirealism.
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter one provides an exposition and
critique of van Inwagen’s neo-Quinean metaontology. Van Inwagen consolidates his
metaontology into five distinct, but related, theses. The first three of these concerns
his conception of being, or at least, how he understands the use of the term “being”.
Each of these, he claims, support the fourth thesis, that being or existence is expressed
by the existential quantifier of first-order predicate logic. All four, he argues, support
the fifth thesis 14 which is an endorsement of Quine’s criterion of ontological
commitment. This criterion is touted as a strategy to discern the ontological
commitments of theories that are accepted as true; that is, to discern what there is, or
what a theory says there is. I demonstrate that each of the theses are controversial and
van Inwagen provides limited and unconvincing arguments in their favour. To these
five theses, I extrapolate several more from his work, each of which, I claim, have a
bearing on his ontological practice. The most central of these additional theses
concerns his claim that ontological theories do no explanatory work. There are no
phenomena, he argues, that admit of ontological explanation, and he associates his
ontological method, as mentioned above, with the capacity to provide only descriptive
accounts. He does not, however, provide an account of what an ontological
“explanation” amounts to, nor does he refine the scope of his claim. While I present
his case in this chapter, I postpone a discussion of the nature of explanation in ontology
to Chapter Five.

“Theses” is a poorly chosen term and this fifth “thesis” is better construed as a rule or strategy for
discerning the ontological commitments of a theory.
14
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Chapter Two provides an analysis of Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian metaontology.
While Lowe speaks in bold and forthright ways about ontological method, it is
surprisingly difficult to articulate his view concisely. He does not provide a structure
that is as manageable and succinct as van Inwagen’s neo-Quinean metaontology. Lowe
proffers various characterisations of ontological inquiry that are difficult to discuss in
isolation from one another. Nonetheless, to make an analysis of his approach tractable,
I extract from his copious works nine metaontological theses central to his view.
Essentially, Lowe argues that metaphysics is at the heart of philosophy, and ontology
is at the core of metaphysics. Metaphysics, for Lowe, is first philosophy, prior to, and
thus underscoring, all other intellectual disciplines. Ontology must be done directly,
not through some other medium such as linguistics or logic which he claims is the
hallmark of neo-Quinean ontology. Ontology, for Lowe, is also essentially modal,
dealing first with what is possible and only subsequently, with the aid of the sciences,
with what is actual. Its task is to discover the categories of being which is accomplished
by identifying the essences of entities which are known through real definitions. There
is much to unpack in his systematic approach, and while problematic in certain
respects, notably on certain epistemological matters regarding modal knowledge, I
argue that he provides a more promising way to do ontology.
As a point of methodological departure, it is often claimed that ‘We need to do
metaphysics in order to do metametaphysics’ (Bennett 2009, 43) (see also Sider 2014,
98; Benovsky 2017, 31). I don’t entirely agree with this claim, for there is value to
studying metaontological issues in their own right; this thesis, in fact, is such a study.
Nonetheless. it will be instructive to discuss a first-order problem to illustrate how
each philosopher engages in ontological inquiry on the basis of the priors set out in
their metaontology. I mentioned above that there was very little overlap in the work of
Lowe and van Inwagen. Both, however, provide a theory of universals and this is the
topic I choose to illustrate their respective metaontologies at work, so to speak. The
problem of universals, or what I call the problem of character, is the idea that there
are familiar concrete objects (trees, houses, people) that not only are charactered, or
have features (colour, shape, texture), but also share character with other familiar
concrete objects. An analysis of their respective approaches to this longstanding and
vexed problem serves to magnify the differences in their respective metaontologies.
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Chapter Three focuses on van Inwagen’s approach to the problem of character.
Van Inwagen, however, denies that there is any ontological problem here and, thus,
nothing to explain. He does, rather counterintuitively, provide a theory of universals
however. This theory is a direct result of his neo-Quinean method outlined in Chapter
One. He claims that his theory of universals is ‘very nearly vacuous’ (van Inwagen
2014, 175). The claim to vacuity doesn’t mean the theory is without pinch or
implication. Indeed, there is an implicit indictment in his theory of all other accounts
of properties that claim to be anything more than vacuous themselves. Van Inwagen
also considers his account to be non-explanatory. It is at best, he claims, descriptive. I
agree that it is both non-explanatory and almost vacuous, but contend that they are
among the central reasons to reject, rather than adopt, his theory. And insofar as this
theory is a direct result of his metaontology, there is reason to reject that too.
In Chapter Four, I turn my attention to Lowe’s theory of character. Lowe is a
systematic thinker (in the sense of being preoccupied with building a comprehensive
system of thought) and his theory of character is inextricably bound up with his diverse
ontological commitments and metaphysical views. There is a lot of theoretical
machinery that requires unpacking to understand his theory of character and much of
this chapter is taken up with such an explication. This chapter reveals the extent to
which Lowe employs primitive postulates in what he calls his four-category ontology,
which is the metaphysical framework that houses his theory of character. He
recognises that his account is less parsimonious than its rivals, yet he argues that it
provides greater explanatory power for a range of diverse phenomena. Lowe implicitly
employs forms of metaphysical explanation in his account of character, but I postpone
a discussion of the legitimacy of such explanation until Chapter Five.
In the final chapter, Chapter Five, I explore the nature of explanation in
ontology. My concern in this chapter is with whether metaphysical or ontological
theories explain under any suitable sense of “explanation”. Essentially, I want to know
whether ontological theories have the epistemological credentials to do any
explanatory work. Explanation, however, is variously understood. The literature on
explanation has traditionally been the purview of the philosophy of science and it is
reasonable to look there for insight into its nature. While exploring some central
themes from this extensive and complex literature, the relationship between
explanation and understanding emerges as a central feature of the debate. I argue that
14

understanding is the central ingredient of explanatory theories in ontology, that neither
explanation nor understanding in ontology need be factive, and that explanatory
theories in ontology have invariably agent-relative features.
Inference to the best explanation is arguably a central feature of ontological
inquiry; a method Lowe employs, and van Inwagen claims leads only to bad
metaphysics. I claim that there is value to this kind of reasoning in ontology but insist
that the theoretical virtues employed in determining theory choice are not truthconducive, but pragmatic. Relying on work from Chapter Four, I demonstrate that
primitives play a significant role in (traditional) ontological theories. While primitives
alone cannot do any explanatory work, I claim that they are expected to carry too much
of the explanatory burden of the theories in which they feature. Because I can discern
no objective way to choose between primitive posits, once minimum criteria are met,
and because they cannot be substantiated directly by empirical means, I advocate for
a position I call lightweight explanatory antirealism.
Explanation in this thesis is relevant to metaontology because of the close
connection that has been identified between explanation and methodology. I am
concerned more with metaontological theory choice than with ontological theory
choice. One’s position on the nature of explanation in ontology, I contend, is a criterion
to aid in choosing which metaontological approach is to be preferred. I argue that van
Inwagen does not do enough to motivate the idea that there can be no kind of
ontological explanation. But Lowe does not demonstrate with sufficient rigour that
explanatory realism is the best way to construe the kind of ontological explanations he
provides. Lowe’s traditional theory-builder approach, I claim, is a preferable way to
tackle ontological issues but for reasons I defend, a version of ontological antirealism
is the most reasonable position. Either way, explanatory considerations can feature as
a criterion of metaontological theory choice.
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CHAPTER 1. NEO-QUINEAN METAONTOLOGY:
PETER VAN INWAGEN
Here, I think, we have reached
the heart of the matter. Those
who
profess
and
call
themselves
metaphysicians
disagree about the proper
method of metaphysics (van
Inwagen 2015, 20).
In short, what goes on in the
Ontology
Room
is
philosophical argument – the
presentation of arguments for
and against the positions under
dispute (van Inwagen 2018,
206).
Stay out of the explanation
business. Here endeth the
lesson (van Inwagen 2014,
217).

1.0 Introduction
Van Inwagen rightly claims that he is ‘responsible for metaphysicians’ having
come to think in terms of a distinction between “ontology” and “meta-ontology” –
ontology being the discipline that asks the question “What is there?” and metaontology
being the discipline that asks the question, ‘What are we asking when we ask “What
is there?”?’ (van Inwagen 2014, 19). 15 The term “metaontology”, however, has
continued to evolve beyond this rather narrow definition to include a variety of matters
that have a bearing on ontological inquiry. Van Inwagen too extends its meaning in
later works. For example, he says: ‘Ontology proper… is the investigation of what
there is, and meta-ontology addresses the two questions, “What does “there is” mean?”
and “What methods should be employed in the investigation of what there is?” (van
Inwagen 2014, 200; my italics). I use the term “metaontology”, as mentioned in the
Introduction, to cover issues concerning the subject matter, methods and general
practice of ontological inquiry. With this extended use in mind, in what follows I
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Though as noted in the Introduction to this thesis, while ontology is concerned with being, it is
debatable whether ontological inquiry is reducible to the rather vague question “what is there?”
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discuss various aspects of van Inwagen’s work that have a direct bearing on his
ontological approach.
Van Inwagen is a self-professed neo-Quinean.16 He emphasizes, however, that
it is Quine’s method,17 not his ontology that he endorses. In fact, he says: ‘I agree
entirely with Quine about the nature of being and the method one should use in trying
to determine what there is. I disagree with him almost entirely about what there is’
(van Inwagen 2001, 3). He self-identifies as a Neo-Quinean to the extent that he counts
himself among those ontologists ‘who venerate Quine’s “On What There Is”18 as the
foundational document of their ontological method’ (van Inwagen 2016, 07). 19 He
consolidates his neo-Quinan metaontology into five theses 20 (van Inwagen 1998,
2009), each of which is controversial. The theses are:

1. Being is not an activity (Non-activity). (van Inwagen 1998, 233; 2009, 476).
2. Being is the same as existence (Bexistence). (van Inwagen 1998, 235; 2009,
480).
3. Being/Existence is univocal (Univocity). (van Inwagen 1998, 236; 2009, 482).
4. The single sense of being or existence is adequately captured by the existential
quantifier of formal logic (Quantification). (van Inwagen 1998, 237; 2009,
492).
5. The criterion of ontological commitment (COC). (van Inwagen 1998, 246;
2009 500).
Thesis 5, insofar as it is a single thesis, is the only one from van Inwagen’s list that is
strictly methodological. The others could be considered semantic or epistemological
insofar as they are concerned with how “being” and “existence” are to be understood.
The fourth thesis links the conception of being propounded in the first three theses
Van Inwagen rejects many of Quine’s theses and endorses more than several that Quine would have
vehemently opposed; it is not always clear to what extent the neo-Quinean label fits. This matter will
arise at various points through the chapter.
17
Though he thinks that Quine’s 1946 paper entitled “Nominalism” is a better exposition of Quine’s
metaontology (van Inwagen 2014, 120).
18
The relevant details of this paper will emerge throughout the chapter.
19
He goes on to say: ‘Philosophers being the contentious lot they are, however, it is perhaps not
astonishing that the arguments and theses of the neo-Quineans have not commanded universal assent.
Arguments that purport to show that neo-Quineanism is a ﬂawed approach to ontology have been
appearing in the literature with increasing frequency’ (van Inwagen 2016, 7).
20
“Theses” is a poorly chosen term and doesn’t quite fit “thesis” five, which is at best a conglomerate
of theses, but is more accurately construed as a method or strategy.
16
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with the existential quantifier of predicate logic, which is the language best suited to
ontological discourse, according to van Inwagen. The first four theses are intended to
provide support for the legitimacy of the fifth thesis. Each of these five theses are
discussed in turn in section 1.2 below.
Van Inwagen endorses certain extreme positions. Among his more radical
views is the claim that neither metaphysics nor ontology are explanatory enterprises.
Just as naturalism 21 is arguably at the core of Quine’s systematic approach to
philosophy, I argue that the claim that neither metaphysics nor ontology are capable
of explaining is a core feature of van Inwagen’s metaontology. I thus add this nonexplanation thesis to van Inwagen’s metaontological theses, though a fuller discussion
of the role of explanation in ontology is postponed until Chapter Five. Related to his
views on explanation in ontology are two more theses. The first is the claim that
ontologists can only provide arguments and the second, concerns van Inwagen’s denial
that being is hierarchical, or that there are levels of being. These additional theses,
discussed in section 1.3, below are as follows:
6. Ontology can’t explain (Non-Explanation). (van Inwagen 2014, 17; 2016, 68)
7. Being has no ontological structure (Flatology). (van Inwagen 2015)
8. Ontologists can only provide arguments (Argument). (van Inwagen 2016, 70)

In Chapter Three we will see an illustration of his metaontology in connection with
the first-order problem of character. In the following section, I begin with some of van
Inwagen’s broad views concerning metaphysics and ontology before I begin a fuller
analysis of his core metaontological theses. Section 1.2 deals with van Inwagen’s five
theses and various objections to them. Section 1.3 concerns the three additional theses
I propose are central to his metaontological commitments. While the purpose of this
chapter is primarily expository, I argue at various junctures against some of van
Inwagen’s core metaontological commitments. I conclude with the claim that there is
too much constriction, arbitrariness, and predilection in van Inwagen’s metaontology
to warrant its adoption by the wider community of ontological scholars.

The term “naturalism” is variously understood and is discussed in some detail in section 1.2.5.1
below.
21
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1.1 Some Preliminaries
When it comes to the nature and methodology of metaphysics, as distinct from
ontology, van Inwagen is not particularly perspicacious. In his most general
characterisation of metaphysical methodology, he refers to the work of William
James:
William James has said, “Metaphysics means only an unusually obstinate
attempt to think clearly and consistently.” While this will hardly do as a
deﬁnition of metaphysics, it is not a bad statement of the only method we
metaphysicians have. A fuller attempt to answer this question can only take the
form of a series of footnotes to this statement – can only be an attempt at a
statement of what a metaphysician’s obstinate attempt to think clearly and
consistently should involve. (van Inwagen 2014, 22)

There is nothing in this quotation that would be of value in distinguishing
metaphysics from any other philosophical discipline, or more broadly, any intellectual
pursuit whatsoever. The breadth of the methodological principle, and the claim that it
is the only available method metaphysicians have, is telling insofar as it highlights the
difficulty in refining anything that is methodologically distinct to metaphysical
inquiry.22 When pressed on what he means by “metaphysics” he opines: ‘I have no
interesting answer to this question’ (van Inwagen 2014, 17).23
Van Inwagen has an unfortunate and unhelpful tendency to subjectivize his
responses to important questions,24 often indicating with italics that it is his view, and
one that may not compel others. He even refrains from prescribing to others how
metaphysical inquiry should be conducted: ‘But then what method or methods should
metaphysicians employ? I would not presume to dictate to other metaphysicians how

22

See Bennett (2015) who claims that there is no distinctive problem that metaphysics faces for
‘metaphysics is too continuous with, and too embedded in, other areas of philosophy’ (Bennett 2015,
25).
23
In his introductory textbook on metaphysics he claims: ‘Unfortunately, it is unlikely that a definition
of metaphysics can convey anything useful. The nature of metaphysics is best explained by example’
and goes on to say: ‘When I was introduced to metaphysics as an undergraduate, I was given the
following definition: metaphysics is the study of ultimate reality. This still seems to me to be the best
definition of metaphysics I have seen’ (van Inwagen 2009a, 1-2).
24
For instance: ‘But I’ll say a few things about what I try to do when I’m doing (what I call)
metaphysics’ (van Inwagen 2014, 23).
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they ought to proceed – or not beyond urging them to make an unusually obstinate
effort to think clearly and consistently’ (van Inwagen 2014, 25). This is perhaps
instructive from a metametaphysical perspective in the sense that it might suggest an
implicit tendency towards methodological pluralism, or perhaps relativism.25 Beyond
extracting that possibility, I’m inclined to consider this subjective mode of speech
merely rhetorical. Van Inwagen, we will see below, is vehemently opposed to certain
metaphysical and ontological positions. Frequently, his objections rest on a critique of
the methods used to develop those positions. If he is not willing to instruct others on
how metaphysics ought to be done, some of these objections lose critical force. As I
mentioned above, however, even if he is reticent in positively prescribing methods, he
is emphatic at times about what methods ought not to be employed.
Despite his reticence on methodology, he goes on to claim that the subject
matter of metaphysics is unified by a certain set of questions that require him to think
in certain ways. That is: ‘there is a certain kind of thinking such that, in every case of
a question I call metaphysical, when I attempt to answer that question I ﬁnd myself
engaging in that kind of thinking… It seems, moreover, that only the questions I call
metaphysical call for that kind of thinking’ (van Inwagen 2014, 17). Again, not so
illuminating for those seeking methodological procedures.
While he lacks fecundity and precision on matters concerning the nature and
methodology of metaphysics, 26 he is emphatic, if not dogmatic, about what
metaphysics should not be, and oddly more insistent about the nature and methodology
of ontology. What he claims metaphysics should not be, in fact, cannot be, is an
explanatory enterprise and what goes for metaphysics, in this regard, goes for
ontology. Importantly, he claims that the methods he employs in ontology yield no
explanatory theories. We will be in a better position to see why he thinks
metaphysicians should ‘Stay out of the explanation business’ (van Inwagen 2014, 217)
after his proposed metaontological theses are discussed, to which I now turn.

25

See Keller (2017) on this matter in connection with the view called philosophical individualism.
Van Inwagen is continually listed as one of the top metaphysicians in the world; he has written a
textbook on metaphysics (2015) as well as countless papers and several books on metaphysical issues,
has edited a compendium on metaphysics (1998) and is the author of the Stanford Encyclopaedia entry
on metaphysics. He clearly knows about the nature of metaphysics and is intimately associated with the
various methods his peers employ; he is just reticent, perhaps appropriately so, about describing its
nature and prescribing how it should be done.
26
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1.2 Van Inwagen’s neo-Quinean Metaontological Theses
This section comprises a discussion of van Inwagen’s five metaontological
theses. The first four theses, as mentioned, are relevant because they refine the subject
matter of ontology, being, in a distinctive, yet controversial, manner. Each of the first
four theses also serve as a ground for the methodological commitments of thesis five.
1.2.1 Thesis 1: Being is Not an Activity (Non-Activity)
This first thesis, that being is not an activity, was not explicitly stated in any of
Quine’s works, but van Inwagen assures us that Quine would have accepted it among
his convictions (van Inwagen 2009, 475). The following explication of this thesis can
appear somewhat tangential, but it is part of what van Inwagen wishes to exclude from
his conception of being and is thus worthy of discussion. In later works (2014) he
refers to this thesis with the more apposite term modes of being, the meaning of which
will become clear as we proceed; it is perhaps more relevant to section 1.2.2 in
connection with Alexius Meinong. Essentially, Non-Activity is intended to safeguard
thesis four: that the existential quantifier of predicate logic captures the single sense of
being.
He attributes the conviction that being is an activity, that it is something things
do, to certain philosophers in the existential-phenomenological tradition, notably
Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. Van Inwagen rejects this idea and quotes J.L.
Austin who said ‘The word27 is a verb, but it does not describe something that things
do all the time, like breathing, only quieter—ticking over, as it were, in a metaphysical
sort of way’ (Austin 1962, 68). Implicit in this quotation is the claim that the verb
“being” is distinct from other verbs, a matter I return to below. He thus implicitly
endorses some version of the thesis that being does not function as a regular verb.
Van Inwagen claims that Heidegger and Sartre endorse a thick conception of
being and van Inwagen, as with most of the analytic tradition, endorses a thin
conception of being. The thin conception is somewhat deflationary about existence,

Van Inwagen notes that Austin made the remark about the verb “exists” but given that van Inwagen
considers being and existence largely synonymous, the remark equally fits. Austin goes on to say: ‘It is
only too easy to start wondering what, then, existing is. The Greeks were worse off than we are in this
region of discourse—for our different expressions ‘to be’, ‘to exist’, and ‘real’ they made do with the
single word… We have not their excuse for getting confused on this admittedly confusing topic’ (Austin
1962, 68).
27
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though van Inwagen wouldn’t describe it as such; he would say it is the only sensible
conception.28 He identifies this thin conception as essentially Quinean29 and defines it
as follows: ‘The thin conception of being is this: the concept of being is closely allied
with the concept of number: to say that there are Xs is to say that the number of Xs is
1 or more—and to say nothing more profound, nothing more interesting, nothing
more” (van Inwagen 2001, 4).30 The purported relation between existence and number
will become clearer in section 1.2.1 in connection with the existential quantifier of
predicate logic. The general idea is that quantifying over X is equivalent to claiming
that X exists.
Van Inwagen recognises that those in the existential-phenomenological
tradition would view this thin conception, as far as they would venture to view it at all,
‘as a travesty, an evisceration of the richness of being’ (van Inwagen 2001, 4). He
claims:
Those who have a “thick” conception of being are bound to regard what I have
said (and all that I shall say) as jejune, simplistic and deserving of all the other
deprecatory terms writers on “fundamental ontology” would apply to analytical
philosophers who venture to say anything about being if they mentioned them
at all. I cannot hope to convert them to an allegiance to a thin conception of
being. (van Inwagen 2009, 478)

He only hopes to persuade those who are torn between such conceptions. This
admission is interesting insofar as the case, it seems, is not won over by argument.
The thick31 conception of being, according to van Inwagen, is explicated as
follows. Humans engage in a variety of activities, and arguably, other non-human
28

Van Inwagen attributes the distinction between thick and thin conceptions of being to Wilfried
VerFecke (van Inwagen 2009, 478).
29
Precisely, he says: ‘Quine’s meta-ontology – and mine: he has formulated it; it is mine only in that I
have read his work and have been convinced by it – is the highest development of what might be called
the “thin” conception of being’ (van Inwagen 2001, 4).
30
This is reminiscent of Gottlob Frege’s work who stated that ‘existence is analogous to number.
Afﬁrmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number nought’ (Frege 1980, 65). I return
to this point below in connection with Univocity.
31
There is another related use of the division where some employ the distinction to refer to ordinary
and philosophical uses of quantificational discourse, discussed further below. Kit Fine, for instance
employs the distinction thusly: ‘Both the ordinary person and the philosopher, on this view, are making
a quantificational statement about chairs when they claim that there are chairs. But whereas the ordinary
person is using the quantifier in a thin, ontologically neutral sense, the philosopher is using the quantifier
in a thick, ontologically loaded sense’ (Fine 2009, 163; italics added).
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things do also. I may converse about metaontology, for example, but conversing is
more general than conversing about metaontology; producing vocal sounds is more
general than conversing and so on until one reaches the most general activity - being
for such philosophers. He loosely formalises this claim as: some activity A is more
general than B if engaging in B entails engaging in A. He attributes to Sartre the
position that the most general activity entities engage in are not of the same kind.
Humans and artefacts, for example, differ: the most general activity an artefact such
as a table undergoes is in some sense just being there (être en-soi); it is just there
‘undergoing externally induced modifications’ (van Inwagen 2014, 54-55). The most
general thing we humans do, under this conception, is being conscious; conscious of
choosing or acting (être pour-soi).
Van Inwagen acquiesces to the idea that there may be a most general activity
humans engage in, but he does not think that it is an activity different from any other
concrete existent; it is “lasting” or “living” or “enduring” or “getting older” or some
such thing (van Inwagen 1998, 234). While there is some relationship between these
terms and being, he claims that ‘it is just wrong to call this activity “existing” or
“being” or “être” or to use any word for it that contains a root that is related to “être”
or “esse” or “existere” or “to on” or “einai” or “Sein” or “be” or “am” or “is”’ (van
Inwagen 1998, 234). The relationship between “living” and “being”, he contends, is
structurally no different from the relationship between colour or shape, or some such
predicate, and being. He recognises that there is an enormous difference between, say,
Socrates and a table. The difference, however, does not consist in our having vastly
‘different sorts of being (Dasein, dass sein, “that it is”); it consists rather in our having
vastly different sorts of natures (Wesen, was sein, “what it is”). If you prefer, what the
table and I are like is vastly different’ (van Inwagen 1998, 235).
He claims that though being is univocal, a contentious point discussed below,
there are many types of nature. In fact, what Sartre and Heidegger (and the early
Russell) are guilty of, he claims, is precisely to ascribe ‘to the “being” of things
features of those things that should properly be ascribed to their natures. That is why
they deny that being is the most barren32 and abstract of all categories’ (van Inwagen
2009, 478). But van Inwagen, at least where Heidegger is concerned, seems to

32

This is a reference to Georg Wilhelm Hegel whom Heidegger considers representative of the
highpoint of a tradition he wishes to reject.
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misconstrue the nature of his project. 33 Heidegger, who is notoriously difficult to
interpret even for those sympathetic with his views, 34 does not quite provide an
account of being. Rather, he is trying to identify how it is we might even address the
nature of being. In doing so, he does distinguish different ways things are and here van
Inwagen is on target: humans are the kinds of creatures for whom being is a concern;
this is the most general and essential feature we have, or activity we engage in, and
differs from, say, a table. But that just means that we should inquire first into the nature
of our being such that we can then get a handle on how to address Being proper. This
Being with an uppercase “B” captures a sense of being that is metaphysically deeper
than being with a lowercase “b”, a sense typically rejected by analytic philosophers.
Van Inwagen recognises he has not provided substantial arguments against the
thick conception. He writes: ‘As we have seen, however, existence or existing is not
an activity. (Or have we seen this? I have at any rate asserted it: that it is so is simply
Thesis 1.)’ (van Inwagen 2009, 486). And he doesn’t expect to convert those who
endorse a thick conception of being to his thin conception (Ibid., 478). It is not
especially strong grounds for rejecting a whole tradition.
Not all philosophers in the analytic tradition subscribe to this thin conception,
though most evidently do. William Vallicella, 35 for example, while endorsing the
distinction at hand, subscribes to a thick conception of being in his efforts to rejuvenate
what he calls “ontotheology”.36 For Vallicella, Being itself requires analysis; Being,
that is, itself has a nature. The true meaning of being-qua-being, he argues, is not only
a matter of depth, it is something that is not expressible in the quantifier-variable
idiom. He argues that this position has been dominant throughout the history of
Western philosophy which reached its apotheosis in the work of Thomas Aquinas. In
a poetic critique of the thin conception, Vallicella says, under the thin conception of
being:

Existence or Being is not a deep or rich or mysterious topic as it is in Thomas
and Heidegger and their followers. It harbours no metaphysical plenitude. It is

At least, his (1998) criticism suggests this. He seems to understand Heidegger’s project perfectly well
in “Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment” (2009).
34
See, for example, the introductions in (Polt 1999) and (Mulhall 2005), both of which support this
claim.
35
Vallicella also cites Barry Miller as a comrade endorsing the thick conception (Vallicella 2014, 46).
36
By “Ontotheology” he seems to mean that Being is itself a being; an intriguing, but opaque idea.
33
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not an appropriate target of religious or quasi-religious attitudes. Existence as
the logical quantity someness is presumably not ﬁt to be the cynosure of
Eckhartian fascination. (Vallicella 2014, 48)37
While I’m sympathetic to aspects of Vallicella’s project, discussing it would
take us too far afield.38 The important point is that Being itself was a meaningful focus
of analysis among medieval scholars like Thomas Aquinas, not merely what we mean
when we use the term, which arguably lends a semantic rather than ontological bent to
the discussion.39 It is somewhat surprising to find few neo-Aristotelians in the analytic
tradition subscribing to the thick view of being, especially since many are influenced
by this scholastic tradition. Lowe, we will see in the next chapter, seems to concur with
van Inwagen that being is not an activity, or that there are no modes40 of being, so there
is little need to analyse the matter further. 41 The thin conception of being will be
fleshed out in the next few sections.

1.2.2 Thesis 2: Being is the Same as Existence (Bexistence)
The thesis that “being” is identical to “existence”, or Bexistence, is central to
van Inwagen’s neo-Quinean metaontology. It safeguards the thesis, so he believes, that
existence is expressed by the existential quantifier of predicate logic, discussed below
in section 1.2.4. There, he extends the claim that not only is there synonymy between
the verb “exist(s)” and the verb phrase “there are”, but also between the quantifier term
He reinforces the point elsewhere: ‘Why is the thin theory important? It is important because, if
correct, it puts paid to a vast amount of philosophy of Being or existence, philosophy that is not merely
of theoretical interest but also of practical, “existential”, and religious interest’ (Vallicella 2014, 50).
38
It’s debatable whether Vallicella’s project is feasible. While it might appear a strange thing to pursue,
Vallicella wants to know to what category existence belongs. It appears strange, as existence does not
initially present itself as the kind of thing that would fit into a category; that is, if existence is thought
of as a universal category that includes everything and excludes nothing, it is a categorial distinction
not worth having. One naturally thinks that existence must be assumed for there even to be a category
of any kind. Nonetheless, there is a sense, perhaps a religious sense, or something in the vicinity, in
which the project is possibly workable.
39
Van Inwagen, remember, defines the question of metaontology in semantic terms where, as well as
the proper methods of ontology, it is concerned with what we mean by “what there is?”
40
We must be careful not confuse the sense of mode here with the use Lowe makes of the term in his
four-category ontology discussed in the following chapter. The term mode in that context refers to ways
things are, to particular concrete properties of familiar concrete particulars (akin to what are often called
tropes), but these ways are not modes in the sense of activity discussed above. It does, however, raise
intriguing possibilities for connecting the ideas even if Lowe would object to such a project.
41
For example, in his major work More Kinds of Being, he claims that ‘I most emphatically do not wish
the title of this study to convey the impression that I postulate different kinds of existence, as opposed
merely to different kinds of thing that exist. “Exist” is univocal’ (Lowe 2009a, 4).
37
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“some”. An important reason for pressing the synonymy of “there are” and “exists” is
to put the burden of existential force on the existential quantifier, not terms occupying
the subject or predicate position in a sentence. What is more important to the neoQuinean, then, is not merely the conflation of being and existence and some, but rather
that each are seen to be ontologically loaded such that when the terms are employed,
they are each ineluctably commissive. This thesis, we will see, both Quine and van
Inwagen consider almost trivial.
In support of Bexistence, van Inwagen claims: ‘Following Quine,42 I deny that
there is any substance to the distinction: to say that dogs exist is to say that there are
dogs, and to say that Homer existed is to say that there was such a person as Homer.
In general, to say that things of a certain sort exist and to say that there are things of
that sort is to say the same thing’ (van Inwagen 2009, 480).43 What is built into this
claim, however, as mentioned above, is the existentially loaded sense of both terms. It
is debatable whether both, or indeed either, require this reading and a possible neutral
construal is discussed below.
He opposes his view to a position endorsed by neo-Meinongians, 44 among
others, who argue that one could legitimately include entities within the domain of
being but exclude the very same entities from the domain of existence. That is, one
can meaningfully claim “there are things that don’t exist” in a non-contradictory way.
Meinong subscribed to a theory of intentionality; that thoughts, beliefs and desires, for
example, are always directed at, or are about, some object: one doesn’t merely love,
one loves something, one’s wife or child perhaps; one doesn’t merely desire, one
desires something, whether that object is a concrete object, such as a mansion in the
country, a putative abstract object such as wisdom, or even something fantastical such
as the fountain of youth. While a particular wife or child, or any spatiotemporal entity,
may have existence (Existenz), abstract items such as universals and propositions have

Quine claims, for example, that ‘It has been fairly common in philosophy early and late to distinguish
between being, as the broadest concept, and existence, as narrower. This is no distinction of mine; I
mean “exists” to cover all there is, and such of course is the force of the quantifier’ (Quine 1969, 99100).
43
This may seem as if it is peculiarly parochial to English speakers, but even though there are
differences in other languages, he claims that it does not amount to a significant philosophical
difference.
44
And Alexius Meinong himself, but the term “neo-Meinongian” incorporates philosophers who depart
with some of Meinong’s theses but endorse the claim that there are things that are, or have being, but
that don’t exist. See, for example Terence Parsons (1980), Edward N. Zalta (1988) and Dale Jacquette
(2015).
42
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subsistence (Bestand) in Meinong’s proposed vernacular. He also countenanced items
that had neither being nor existence; certain objects of thought that are beyond being
(see Meinong 1904; Priest 2005).45
While intentionality is a central motivation for neo-Meinongians, Quine had
no time for such a theory. From his naturalistic stance, he spoke of ‘the baselessness
of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a science of intention’ (Quine 1960, 221).
Quine was more concerned with issues of reference raised by the so-called problem of
negative singular existential statements, a specific issue within the broader context of
singular terms and their referent. He christened this problem “Plato's beard” and
characterizes the issue as follows: ‘Non-being must in some sense be, otherwise what
is it that there is not? This tangled doctrine might be nicknamed Plato’s beard;
historically it has proved tough, frequently filing the edge of Ockham’s razor’ (Quine
1948, 21).46 “Ockham’s razor” refers to the tenet that one should postulate as few
entities as possible 47 for the sake of ontological parsimony; positing non-existing
entities very quickly engenders a profligate universe of things.48
To take some examples of this issue, it might meaningfully be declared that
“Pegasus does not exist” or that “there are no such things as ghosts”. The neoMeinongian claim is that both Pegasus and ghosts must in some sense be, or we could
not make sense of the statement including those terms. The concern emerges because
45

In fact, Tim Crane argues that this last point is the only real difference between the Quinean and the
Meinongian. The Quinean rejection of different modes of being, he claims, is only terminological: ‘For
the Quinean can distinguish between concrete and abstract objects, just as the Meinongian can
distinguish between existing and subsisting objects. Each of them will agree that there are such objects,
but the Quinean will say that the abstract objects exist as much as the concrete ones do. The Quinean
and the Meinongian can agree about what has being, they just disagree about how to use the word
“exist”’ (Crane 2011, 52-53).
46
An elegant rendering of the position was articulated by Russell, though he later distanced himself
from the view: ‘There is only one kind of being, namely being simpliciter, and only one kind of
existence, namely, existence simpliciter. Being is that which belongs to every conceivable term, to every
possible object of thought … Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimeras, and four-dimensional
spaces all have being, for if they were not entities of a kind, we could make no propositions about them
… For what does not exist must be something, or it would be meaningless to deny its existence; and
hence we need the concept of being, as that which belongs even to the non-existent’ (Russell 1903,
427).
47
Not all philosophers are averse to an ontologically profligate universe. Neo-Aristotelians, such as Kit
Fine (2009) and Jonathan Schaffer (2009), argue that Ockham should be understood as referring to
fundamental entities; that it is perfectly fine to have a profligate universe of things, once there are few
fundamental entities.
48
Craig (2014, 2016) convincingly argues, however, that the consequence of treating the existential
quantifier as ontologically loaded leads to a profligate universe of spurious entities: if “there are” and
“exists” are not ontologically commissive, then we need not be concerned with holes, or Pegasus or any
number of entities we don’t intend to exist by the sentences we employ. Why a desert landscape is
preferable to a profligate universe seems to rest on aesthetic judgements, on ontological taste. I’ll return
to both of these points below, as well as in Chapter Five.
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of the assumption that for sentences to be meaningful, each of the terms in the subject
position must be meaningful, and to be meaningful they must refer to, or denote,
something. Intrinsic to the claim is that we can ascribe properties to entities that don’t
exist; it seems perfectly natural to say “Pegasus is a winged horse” without
countenancing the existence of Pegasus. I’ll return to this point in a moment.
Russell’s theory of descriptions (1905) paved the way to deflating the neoMeinongian position by showing that sentences that appeared to refer to non-existent
entities could be regimented in a way that avoids such reference. For example, there
are evident referential issues in the problem sentence: “The present king of France is
bald”. It’s problematic because there is no way to ascribe a truth value to the
proposition consistently: it seems evidently false as there is no king of France, thus he
cannot be bald, but claiming it is false seems to endorse the claim that there is a king
of France and that king of France is not bald; claiming it’s true, suggests that there is
a king of France that is bald. Russell’s ingenious method was to regiment the
ambiguous sentence in the quantifier-variable idiom such that the proposition the
sentence expresses, according to Russell, is made manifest; the proposition could be
read formally as: (∃x)(Kx ∧ ((∀y)((Ky → (x = y)) ∧ Bx) or semi-formally as “for some
x, x is a king and for every y, if y is a king then x = y, and x is bald”. This theory aims
to show that sentences suggestive of ontological commitment need not be taken at face
value; that seemingly subject-predicate sentences are actually disguised existential
sentences. While this is not conclusive reason to reject neo-Meinongianism, by
offering a paraphrase for problematic sentences it demotivates one reason the neoMeinongian has for postulating non-existing entities.
What Russell did for descriptions, such as “The Present King of France”, Quine
did for proper names. 49 Names, according to Quine are just disguised definite
descriptions. The proper name “Pegasus” is a disguised way of referring to ‘the
winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon’ (Quine 1948, 27). Quine proposes
that we then dispense with the definite description by Russell’s method just mentioned.
The point is, he claims, ‘we need no longer labor under the delusion that the
meaningfulness of a statement containing a singular term presupposes an entity named
by the term’ (Quine 1948, 28). Quine, we will see, puts the referential burden only on

This is not to endorse their approach or suggest they are without problems, but space doesn’t permit
a fuller discussion. See Haack (1978) for a treatment of some of these issues.
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the variables of predicate logic, which is bound by the existential quantifier, discussed
in section 1.2.4.
The important point for the neo-Quinean, I claim, and as mentioned above, has
less to do with the conflation of being and existence and more to do with the purported
existential force of each term. That is, Bexistence could be endorsed, yet neither term
considered ontologically commissive. This is the position of Graham Priest, discussed
in section 1.2.4 below.
Everyday language seems to contravene Bexistence; it is filled with examples
of locutions that employ “exist” and “there are” which do not seem to be ontologically
loaded. For example:
(1) There are characters in the bible that didn’t exist, while there are others that
did.50
(2) There are lots of things we think about that don’t exist.
(3) Various gods and goddesses existed in Greek mythology.

Each of these sentences appear true in unambiguous ways with a noncommissive reading of “there are” and “exists”. By affirming that the sentences are
true, the speaker need not be committed to the existence of non-existent thoughts, or
gods and goddesses or certain characters in the bible that didn’t exist. 51 Natural
language affords flexibility in expression allowing, as Azzouni (2011) claims, thought
and discussion to be about52 things without referring to those things, for one can’t refer
to what doesn’t exist. Usage of “there are” and “exist” in the above sentences are,
according to Azzouni, ‘ontically irrelevant’ (Azzouni 2010). He claims that ‘[t]here is
no consensus among philosophers about the ontic significance of the practice in
ordinary language of prefixing noun phrases with inflected forms of “there be” (“there
are,” “there is,” and so on). One position (that I'm partial to) is that phrases such as
“There are Bs,” are one and all - semantically speaking - ontically neutral’ (Azzouni

As Crane elaborates: ‘We have good reason to think that Solomon and Jesus existed; but less reason
to think that Abraham and Moses did. From this we might generalize to the claim I call (S): (S) Some
characters in the Bible existed and some did not’ (Crane 2013, 17).
51
Craig reinforces this point: ‘“There are fictional characters” is no more ontologically committing than
a sentence like “There’s at least one thing that you overlooked: his lack of compassion”, i.e. not
committing at all’ (Craig 2016, 102).
52
The use of “about” requires precisification which is outside the scope of this chapter. But the intuitive
idea, I take it, is somewhat clear. Routley (1980) and Crane (2011) also endorse theses along these lines.
50
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2007, 204). The linguistic items making up Bexistence do not convict one to any object
simply in virtue of the meaning of those terms. Context, tone, emphasizing expressions
such as “really” – so-called rhetorical indicators – are what indicates commissive
intention, not simply the “there are” and “exist”. In fact, Tim Crane, resting on
linguistic research, highlights that:
Syntactically speaking, “there is” is not a quantifier. “There” functions as what
linguists call an expletive – a word that fills a syntactic gap but has no semantic
function – and “is” is the third-person singular present tense form of the verb
to be. Linguists call sentences beginning “there is …” existential sentences (see
McNally in press; Moro 2007; Sawyer 1973). This title, and the occurrence of
the verb to be in these sentences might suggest that the function of these
sentences is purely to say that something exists (or is, or has being). (Crane
2011, 61)
He goes on to say, however, that the ascription “existential sentences” carries no
ontological weight; the linguist’s claim is divorced from metaphysics.
Even with these concerns, van Inwagen opines that Bexistence is so obvious he
says he doesn't know how to argue for it.53 In fact, the only thing that comes close to
an argument is the claim that to deny the equivalence of being and existence leads to
problematic equivocations, such as committing to the existence of that which is not.
Recognising his difficulty in providing an argument, he proposes a humorous story in
place of a lengthy case-by-case refutation of putative non-existence objects.

One day my friend Wyman told me that there was a passage on page 253 of
Volume IV of Meinong’s Collected Works in which Meinong admitted that his
theory of objects was inconsistent. Four hours later, after considerable fruitless
searching, I stamped into Wyman’s study and informed him with some heat
that there was no such passage. “Ah”, said Wyman, “you’re wrong. There is
such a passage. After all, you were looking for it: there is something you were

He says explicitly: ‘Since I know of no way of arguing for the identity of being and existence (other
than a case-by-case examination and refutation of all known attempts to give examples of non-existent
objects), I shall have to try to find some means other than argument of persuading you to see things as
I do’ (van Inwagen 1998, 235).
53
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looking for. I think I can explain your error; although there is such a passage,
it doesn’t exist. Your error lay in your failure to appreciate this distinction”. I
was indignant. (van Inwagen 1998, 236).
He goes on to say that his ‘refusal to recognize a distinction between existence
and being is simply my indignation, recollected in tranquillity and generalized’ (van
Inwagen 1998, 236). Again, argument is not the driving force of his philosophical
position.
I will return to this matter in section 1.2.4 in the context of interpretations of
the existential quantifier. There, I argue that the existential quantifier, and thus being
and existence, need not be ontologically commissive, whatever the possible conflation
of the terms.

1.2.3 Thesis 3: Being is Univocal (Univocity)
The thesis that being is univocal is the standard view in contemporary analytic
ontology. The central claim of Univocity is that there is only one sense to existence,
and because existence is identical with being (Bexistence), there is only one sense to
being. We saw above that those working in the existential-phenomenological tradition
may be more sympathetic to equivocal notions of being, but the view is endorsed by
several estimable figures from analytic philosophy. Hilary Putnam, for example, in
Ethics Without Ontology, claims that those who subscribes to this thesis are
‘wandering in Cloud Cuckoo Land’ (Putnam 2005, 100). Those who object to the
thesis are in good philosophical company, 54 at least historically, for Aristotle also
stated that ‘being is spoken of in many ways.’ He states further that:

[T]here are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one
starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others
because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process
towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or
productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to

Van Inwagen also highlights the appeal of equivocity for undergraduates: ‘This is evidently an
extremely attractive position. Undergraduates fall effortlessly into it…’ (van Inwagen 1998, 237).
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substance, or negations of some of these things or of substance itself. (Aristotle;
Meta.1003b510)55

There is ambiguity regarding whether Aristotle is arguing for different species of
being, or only different ways the term “being” can be used. Perhaps he is even arguing
for both positions. It might be quipped that “being is said in many ways” is also said
in many ways, for Aristotelian scholars disagree on this point.56 In the former sense,
the passage could mean that while Socrates is, and his snubbed nose also is, they each
exist in distinct and irreducible ways, the latter as ontologically dependent on the
former. Whatever position Aristotle is actually endorsing in the above passage, van
Inwagen rejects each of them.
If being is not univocal, Aristotle might be asked “how are the various kinds
of being that exist in distinct and irreducible ways related to one another?” And further,
“how might there be a science of being qua being should there be different kinds of
being?” Though these may not be insurmountable challenges it is interesting to note
that contemporary neo-Aristotelians generally endorse univocity. E.J. Lowe, for
example, states that ‘My “Aristotelianism” does not involve the notion that individuals
or particulars are in any sense “more real” than sorts or kinds, or that they somehow
enjoy a more fundamental species of existence – for “exist”, I believe, is perfectly
univocal’ (Lowe 2009, 163).57
Putnam, as mentioned above, denies Univocity. He claims that ‘the idea that
“exist” has a unique and determinate meaning, one cast in stone, so to speak, is
mistaken (Putnam 2005, 02). But Putnam is by no means the only contemporary
philosopher to deny this. Perhaps the most famous figure, or at least the most quoted,
endorsing equivocity was Gilbert Ryle who averred:

It is perfectly proper to say, in one logical tone of voice, that there exist minds
and to say, in another logical tone of voice that there exist bodies. But these
expressions do not indicate two different species of existence .... They indicate
Aristotle also claims: ‘Such things as signify the schemata of predication are said to be per se. For to
be signifies in the same number of ways as these are spoken of (Met. 1017a23). See Kung (1986) for a
detailed treatment of this issue.
56
For various interpretations of Aristotle on whether being is equivocal, or at least not univocal, see
Berti (2002).
57
I will show in chapter four that Lowe is at times ambiguous regarding the fundamental status of
different categories.
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two different senses of ‘exist’, somewhat as ‘rising’ has different senses in “the
tide is rising”, “hopes are rising”, and “the average age of death is rising”. A
man would be thought to be making a poor joke who said that three things are
now rising, namely the tide, hopes and the average age of death. It would be
just as good or bad a joke to say that there exist prime numbers and
Wednesdays and public opinions and navies; or that there exist both minds and
bodies. (Ryle 1951, 195)

Ryle, then, does think we can employ the notion of existence in different ways without
subscribing to different species of existing. Van Inwagen does not find this compelling.
An implication of Ryle’s proposal (according to Ryle) is that those who would apply
the term “exist” univocally to a variety of categories (to minds and bodies, say) should
be committed to a variety of corresponding species of existence. But, as van Inwagen,
notes, this does not follow. Endorsing Univocity, van Inwagen rejects the claim that
there are modes of being. Everything, every thing, exists and what exists, exists in the
same way. There’s no reason to suppose that applying the term “exists” to two different
types of entities from two different categories requires one to endorse two types of
existence any more than saying that “knives” exist and “forks” exist commit one to
two types of being. Individual items of cutlery may not comprise a category, but the
analogy, I think, stands.
Again, it is important to highlight that van Inwagen’s denial of modes of being
is not quite based on argument; at least not on any significant one. It brings us back to
his insistence that being is not an activity (non-activity). For if “exist” or “rise” comes
in varieties, it must be due to some activity of the bearer of that property – similarly it
is due to the activity of the mind and the activity of the body, whatever constitutes the
most general activity of such supposed entities. (van Inwagen 2009, 486).
Van Inwagen claims that, regarding Univocity, ‘it is very hard to convince
anyone who subscribes to it that it is false, or even that it is not obviously true. But it
is false’ (van Inwagen 1998, 236).58 Other than insistence, the best argument he can
Interestingly, Putnam makes the same claim regarding equivocity, one incorporating his “Cuckoo
Land” comment mentioned above: ‘I know I will not convince true believers, but if I can inoculate some
readers against this particular disease I shall be more than happy. What we see in this brief account of
the revival of Ontology within the supposedly chaste precincts of analytic philosophy is something that
I have been trying to point out from my second lecture in this series: that once we assume that there is,
somehow fixed in advance, a single “real,” a single “literal” sense of “exist”—and, by the way, a single
“literal” sense of “identity”—one which is cast in marble, and cannot be either contracted or expanded
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summon has to do with the supposed relationship between existence and number. It is
worthwhile quoting his argument in full:

Perhaps the following consideration will show why it is at least not obviously
true. No one would be inclined to suppose that number-words like ‘six’ or
‘forty-three’ mean different things when they are used to count different sorts
of object. The very essence of the applicability of arithmetic is that numbers
may count anything: if you have written thirteen epics and I own thirteen cats,
then the number of your epics is the number of my cats. But existence is closely
tied to number. To say that unicorns do not exist is to say something very much
like saying that the number of unicorns is 0; to say that horses exist is to say
that the number of horses is 1 or more. And to say that angels or ideas or prime
numbers exist is to say that the number of angels, or of ideas, or of prime
numbers, is greater than 0. The univocacy of number and the intimate
connection between number and existence should convince us that there is at
least very good reason to think that existence is univocal. (van Inwagen 1998,
236)59

Van Inwagen credits Frege, who formally recognised the relationship between number
and existence, for the bones of this argument (van Inwagen 2009, 483). This might be
a compelling argument if one has already accepted that being and existence are
identical, and that being is not an activity. But I have shown that there is reason to
reject these theses. He maintains, given that he knows of no arguments for the
equivocity of being ‘that is even faintly plausible’, and given that the above argument
remains unopposed, ‘[w]e must therefore conclude that existence is univocal…’ (van
Inwagen 1998, 237).

without defiling the statue of the god, we are already wandering in Cloud Cuckoo Land. That
assumption is implicit in Quine’s procedure from the start…’ (Putnam 2005, 84-85). This is perhaps a
problem for the philosophy of disagreement, but it is significant that such diametrically opposed
positions on such foundational matters appear to be based less on argument, and more on intuition,
conviction, or prejudice.
59
Quine too found the notion absurd: ‘There are philosophers who stoutly maintain that “exists” said of
numbers, classes, and the like and “exists” said of material objects are two usages of an ambiguous term
“exists”. What mainly baffles me is the stoutness of their maintenance. What can they possibly count
as evidence?’ (Quine 1969, 99-100).
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But his argument has not been left unopposed. Typically, however, those who
argue against it take issue with Non-activity or Bexistence. As mentioned, if the
identity of being and existence is rejected and non-existing entities admitted, or indeed,
if either or both of the relevant terms are construed as neutral, then existence seems to
have little to do with quantifying and the purported relationship between existence and
number is questionable. That is, we could count entities, “six impossible things”,
without committing to the existence of impossible things. The neo-Meinongian, for
example, can seem to count things that don’t exist: “there were nine companions in the
fellowship that left Rivendell”.
It’s also not so clear that we can count objects from different categories, a point
made by Enrico Berti:

We cannot, in fact, count the objects contained in a room, if they belong to
different genera. We can count, for instance, persons, tables, chairs, books. In
the Aristotelian language they are substances. But we cannot count, together
with them, the colours of the tables, the weight of the books, the actions or the
feelings of the persons, though we must admit that each of these things does
exist and is at least one instantiation of its class.’ (Berti 2001, 192)

That is to say, while we can perhaps superficially count the number of colours in a
room, it is not clear colours have determinate identity and existence conditions such
that they permit of number in any precise sense. It is difficult to identify, for example,
how many shades of red a particular object exhibits.
A final point, made by William Vallicella (2014), is that while it may be valid
to conclude that “exists” functions as a “number-word” with respect to general terms,
it is not clear it does with respect to singular terms. For instance, to say “horses exist”
might be equivalent to “the number of horses is not zero”, but it’s not evident that my
horse “Arkle exists” is equivalent to “the number of Arkle is not zero”. It is more
natural to treat “exists” here as a first-level predicate. But there are many complications
with these issues that space does not permit of treatment.60
60

Vallicella (2014) provides an extensive critique of the thin conception of being which, he claims,
houses two ‘dogmas’: that there are no modes of being and that existence is instantiation (2014, 46).
However, his critique rests on nuances that are applicable to Quine, Russell and Frege who, in one way
or another, consider existence a second-order property. It’s unclear if this applies directly to van
Inwagen who, considers existence to be a first-order property of objects.
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Univocity, as mentioned, is clearly the dominant position in contemporary
analytic ontology. We will see in the next section how van Inwagen connects this
notion with the existential quantifier of predicate logic.

1.2.4 Thesis 4: The Single Sense of Being or Existence is Adequately Captured by the
Existential Quantifier of Formal Logic (Quantification)
I mentioned in the introduction that the first three theses concerned the sense
of being and were not directly methodological. They do, however, according to van
Inwagen, lend support to thesis five, which is distinctly methodological. Thesis four,
Quantification, is somewhat intermediary and links the conception of being
propounded in the first three theses with the criterion of ontological commitment
expressed in the fifth thesis. In this section, I briefly articulate Quantification as van
Inwagen understands it. Subsequently, I discuss three positions which challenge
Quantification and each of which, I claim, provide a more compelling alternative.
Quantification is another thesis van Inwagen finds uncontroversial. But it is
controversial. So controversial, in fact, that Sider claims that ‘The central question of
metaontology is that of whether there are many equally good quantifier meanings, or
whether there is a single best quantifier meaning. It is a question about nature’s joints;
it is a question of how much quantificational structure the world contains’ (Sider 2009,
397).61
Van Inwagen, resting on the previous theses, aims to show in Quantification
that the existential quantifier of predicate logic represents standard quantified
statements of ordinary English. 62 He claims that ‘understanding of the (objectual)
quantifier-variable idiom resides in our ability to translate sentences couched in it into
quantificational idioms of which we have a prior grasp, viz. those of ordinary
language’ (van Inwagen 1981, 36). 63 Just as the “plus” sign “(+)” in mathematics
In the same paper he makes the emphatic claim that ‘every serious theory of the world that anyone
has ever considered employs a quantificational apparatus, from physics to mathematics to the social
sciences to folk theories. Quantification is as indispensable as it gets’ (Sider 2009, 417).
62
And Quine concurs: ‘Now I grant that the meaning of quantification is covered by the logical rules;
but the meaning which those rules determine is still that which ordinary usage accords to the idioms
“there is an entity such that”, “an entity exists such that”, etc. Such conformity was the logistician's
objective when he codified quantification; existential quantification was designed for the role of those
common idioms’ (Quine 1939, 65).
63
The only other way, a way he rejects, is stipulation. He avers that his answer ‘to the question, “What
is the correct understanding of quantification?” proceeds by showing how to introduce variables and the
quantifiers into our discourse as abbreviations for phrases that we already understand. (This, I believe,
61
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represents “sum” of ordinary English, the symbols “∀” and “∃” represent quantifiers,
and a variable, such as “x”, represents third person pronouns of natural language.64
When a quantifier is linked to a variable, such as “∃(x)”, we have a quantifier phrase
with ensuing brackets representing the scope of the quantifier. 65 Following Quine
(1940), van Inwagen highlights in intricate detail how to introduce the quantifiervariable idiom to replace English phrases (van Inwagen 1998, 2009). I shan’t
reproduce the lengthy process here,66 but leaving aside some intricacies, we can at least
take it as standard that that, where D is a dog and B is brown, we can regiment “There
is at least one brown dog” as “∃x(Dx ∧ Bx)”.
This much is relatively uncontroversial. Among the important questions that
need to be addressed are: when we have the quantifier-variable idiom, does the

is the only way - other than ostension - in which one can explain the meaning of any word, phrase, or
idiom.)’ (van Inwagen 2000, 237).
64
There are other noteworthy issues in predicate logic and its relation to ordinary everyday usage.
Azzouni highlights that the disjunctive and conjunctive symbols, while truth functional in logic, may
not be in ordinary usage (Azzouni 2010, 219). So too there are difficulties with material implication:
‘Consider the horseshoe, “,” of classical logic and its traditional truth table. There has been a lot of
discussion (over the years) about the misfit between the ordinary English “if ... then,” which fails to be
truth-functional, and the horseshoe, which is. Interestingly, one way in which the horseshoe fails to fit
ordinary English is that statements of the form (A ⊃ B) are true when the antecedent A is false. This, in
turn, translates into generalizations of the form (x)(Px ⊃ Qx) being true when there are items in the
domain that P doesn't hold of (although Q holds of all the rest, if any). Philosophers sometimes try to
justify regimenting “if... then,” with the horseshoe by the purported convenience and simplicity of the
resulting truth-functionality. But this, actually, is pretty dubious, if only because the decision-procedural
advantages of having truth tables available for some sentences is one that, in practice, doesn't buy us
very much: The decision procedure in question is very time-consuming-and of limited applicability’
(Azzouni 2010, 217). The focus in this section, however, will be on the existential quantifier.
65
Just as there is only one quantifier, according to van Inwagen, there is also just one type of variable:
‘There is au fond only one “style” or “sort” of variable. Different styles or sorts of variables are a mere
notational convenience…And ‘unsorted’ variables are what we must start with, for a variable is in
essence a third-person-singular pronoun, and there is only one-third-person-singular pronoun, and it has
only one meaning. We do not have one third-person singular pronoun for talk about objects in one
logical category and another for talk about objects in another’ (van Inwagen 2002, 187). Leaving aside
issues with “he” and “she”, which van Inwagen realises, don’t fit neatly in his account, we will see in
the following chapter that Lowe finds it necessary to introduce a variety of variables to represent
different types of entities; “it” just doesn’t cut it for him.
66
For a shortened version, working backwards, with the existential quantifier representing “some” or
“at least one” and variables representing third person pronouns:
‘∃x x is a dog
is an abbreviation for
It is true of at least one thing that itx is such that itx is a dog.
That is,
It is true of at least one thing that it is such that it is a dog.
That is,
It is true of at least one thing that it is a dog.
That is,
At least one thing is a dog.
That is,
There is at least one dog’ (van Inwagen 1998, 240-241).
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quantifier capture the supposed single sense of existence which was claimed in the
previous section? Or are there several different senses to the quantifier depending on,
say, context, or the entities being talked about? And further, regardless of how many
senses the quantifier may have, one privileged sense as van Inwagen and Sider (2009)
argue, or many, as Hirsch (2002) and Putnam (2005) maintain, does it, or need it,
capture the sense of existence as understood in the first three theses? Most importantly,
must the existential quantifier be ontologically loaded? It is not clear that it must and
I’m sympathetic with the view that a neutral reading is preferable, a position discussed
below. Whatever my inclination, the point is that there is reason to be cautious about
what Azzouni calls the triviality thesis; that the objectual existential quantifier trivially
follows from Bexistence and Univocity.67 That is, both van Inwagen and Quine claim
the existential quantifier only has one interpretation, the objectual one, and it is trivial
because it is traceable to terms in ordinary English. Quine phrases it this way:

What there are, according to a given theory in standard form, are all and only
the objects that the variables of quantification are meant in that theory to take
as values. This is scarcely contestable, since “(x)”68 and “(∃x)” are explained
by the words “each object x is such that” and “there is an object x such that”.
Some languages may have no clear equivalent of our existential phrase “there
is”, nor of our quantifiers; but surely there is no putting the two asunder. (Quine
1986, 89)

This is far from trivial, as is Bexistence upon which it rests. Azzouni agrees
and concludes that ‘despite appearances, Quine has no argument—at least no argument
deserving the name “trivial”— for his taking the first-order objectual existential
quantifier to be the sole conveyer of ontological commitment (in regimented
languages)’ (Azzouni 2004, 79). This matter is discussed further in the following
section and I’ll return to the triviality thesis below in connection with van Inwagen’s
idea of the ontology room.

In Azzouni’s own words: ‘The argument for the triviality of Quine’s criterion, thus, seems to be this:
The ordinary language idiom “there is” carries ontological commitment, and this idiom is
(straightforwardly) regimented as the (objectual) first-order existential quantifier’ (Azzouni 2004, 53).
68
“(X)” is an older variant of “∀x”.
67
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In the following three sections, I discuss three objections to Quantification:
neutral quantification, quantifier variance, and substitutional quantification, each of
which, I argue, is in various ways more compelling. Substitutional quantification is
perhaps the earliest rival to the objectual construal of quantification. Susan Haack,
however, notes that they need not be put in competition; she encourages a more
‘tolerant’ (Haack 1978, 42) view which permits a use for both depending on need and
circumstance.

1.2.4.1 Neutral Quantification
Graham Priest, in his paper with a telling title, “The Closing of the Mind: How
the Particular Quantifier Became Existentially Loaded Behind our Backs” (2008),
quickly traces the history of quantified expressions in logic from Aristotle through to
Quine. Earlier versions of quantified logic, he informs us, did not construe the
quantifier as being existentially or ontologically loaded. He quotes Frege and Pierce
as examples of those endorsing this unloaded sense, each of whom independently
developed the modern sense of quantification in logic.69 It was with the introduction
of symbolic logic, centrally with the work of Russell, that the ontologically loaded
sense was concretised. Quine reinforced this claiming that ‘the existential quantifier,
in the objectual sense, is given precisely the existential interpretation and no other…’
(Quine 1969, 107).
It has remained almost a dogma since anything other than the single sense is
often met with bewilderment and professions of incomprehension. Bill Lycan, for
instance writes:

I have to take my place amongst those who find Relentlessly (i.e., genuinely or
primitively) Meinongian quantification simply unintelligible. However, in
saying this, I am not using the term ‘unintelligible’ in its sneering postWittgensteinian sense. So far as I am able to introspect, I am not expressing
any tendentious philosophical qualm. (For this reason, my use of the term may
be irrevocably misleading.) I mean that I really cannot understand Relentlessly

69

Though Franz Brentano might be credited before him to have made manifest the connection between
quantification and existence.
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Meinongian quantification at all; to me it is literally gibberish or mere noise.
(Lycan 1979, 290)70

David Lewis accuses Richard Routley, who endorses a neutral quantifier, to
‘quantify without quantifying’,71 that is, to say there are things that don’t exists where
“there are” is not commissive:

For when he quantifies neutrally he is not quantifying in the one and only way
there is to quantify, since ex hypothesi the one way is the loaded way. This we
find altogether unintelligible. Now Routley may unabashedly plead guilty to
the charge of being beyond our dogma-blinded understanding. And there we
reach a standoff. (Lewis 1990, 27-27)72
And one final example: ‘Noneism73 remains in a standoff with those, including myself,
who find noneist quantification unintelligible’ (Terry Horgan 2007, 620).
Yet, this seeming dogmatism leading to professions of unintelligibility strains
credulity. In the absence of substantial or knockdown arguments, other readings, when
charitably interpreted, should be at least comprehensible. Even more so considering
that this dogmatism that Quine seems to have enshrined appears to be based more on
rhetoric than argument. Priest, for example, claims that:
…there is absolutely no argument given as to why quantification is
existentially committing. Quine simply assumes that the domain of
quantification comprises existent objects – or what comes to the same thing,
that the particular quantifier is to be read as “there is”. No argument is given
for this: it is stated simply as a matter of dogma. (So if neither names, nor
predicates, nor quantifiers are ontologically committing, what is? To say that
something exists, of course! Quine, one might say, is one of those philosophers

70

Quoted from (Priest 2008, 42).
At least on one reading of Routley: Lewis provides two interpretation of how Routley’s neutral theory
of quantification could be understood, at least “understood” enough to make it intelligible (see Lewis
1990).
72
He goes on to say: ‘He says we are blind, we say he is hallucinating’ (Lewis 1990, 30).
73
“Noneism” refers to Meinong, discussed above, or positions endorsed by Meinongians.
71
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who have united in ruining the good old word “exist”.) At any rate, if Russell
used bad arguments for the view, Quine uses none at all. (Priest 2008, 52)74

Priest, then, following Routley, does not think that the quantifier should be read
so as to capture the supposed single sense of existence. While Priest subscribes to
Bexistence, he rejects Quantification. The existential, or particular, quantifier should
be read only as “some”, a term that is quantificational, but not, or not necessarily,
ontologically loaded.75
The idea of a domain plays an important role for those opposing
Quantification. A domain is what the quantifier ranges over; it is a domain of
quantification and for the neo-Quinean that domain contains only real existent things.
However, as Crane notes, ‘In a traditional terminology, the domain of quantification
was called the universe of discourse’ (Crane 2011, 57) and there are various types of
discourse. In providing a semantics for quantifiers, a domain must be specified and in
this respect Azzouni highlights: ‘One can’t read ontological commitments from
semantic conditions unless one has already smuggled into those semantic conditions
the ontology one would like to read off’ (Azzouni 2004, 55). That is, the neo-Quinean
has smuggled in objectual quantification; once that is done, every other reading of “∃”
seems wrong. Without the objectual semantics, quantifying is just that: quantifying;
discourse about quantities. A domain of discourse need not be commissive and we can
stipulate those items that are relevant to the domain.76
For example, one can read ∃x(Dx ∧ Bx) as “For some brown dog in the domain
of discourse”. This allows for the possibility that we are discussing objects that don’t
exist, that exist in a different domain of discourse – such as fictional discourse. We

William Lane Craig concurs: ‘Amazingly, it turns out that virtually no arguments are offered by
[Quineans] for the truth of their criterion’ (Craig 2016, 98).
75
The appellation “particular quantifier” contrasts appropriately with the universal quantifier (∀) which
is not typically considered ontologically loaded. Lowe concurs with this reading and claims that: ‘The
concept of existence is not, contrary to widespread dogma, expressed by the misnamed “existential
quantifier”, “∃”, which ought instead to be called the particular quantifier and has no existential import’
(Lowe 2011, 122). He adduces examples from Through the Looking Glass where the red Queen says
she thinks of six impossible things before breakfast. Plainly, Lowe says, ‘these are not six existent
things. “At least one x”, like “exactly six xs”, express quantity, but not existence’ (Lowe 2011, 122123).
76
Craig concurs and puts the point neatly: ‘Now some theorists, including Quine, have maintained that
such objectual semantics for sentences we take to be true commits us ontologically to all or at least
some of the objects in the domain. This claim is misconceived. There is no reason to limit one’s domain
of quantification to existing objects or to think that it must include existing objects’ (Craig 2016, 107108).
74
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can read ∃x(Ux ∧ Fx), where U is a unicorn and F represents flying, as “For some
flying unicorn in the domain of discourse” – a claim which doesn’t commit us to the
existence of unicorns. This is not incredible; it is on the face of it a sensible and natural
reading. Routley (1980) 77 introduces the symbol “P” to represent the particular
quantifier: (Px)(Dx ∧ Ex) where “D” is a dog and “E” an existence predicate such that
the quantified expression reads “For some x, x is a dog and x exists”. Azzouni proposes
something similar to Routley in that he introduces an existence predicate but doesn’t
see the need to introduce a new quantifier as he refuses to see “∃” as existentially
loaded. This move is prohibited under an objectual reading for objects in the domain
are presupposed to exist by the existential quantifier; adding an existence predicate
would be redundant.78
Crane provides an example of how we might conceive of quantifying over nonexistent objects in this manner:

What does it mean, then, to quantify over non-existent objects? It is to have
non-existent objects of thought in the universe of discourse, where a universe
of discourse is a specific generalization of the idea of an object of thought: viz.
all the things relevant to what we are talking about. So to have an object of
thought in the universe of discourse is to have it among the things relevant to
what we are talking about. These things can be ‘values’ of the variables bound
by the quantifiers, just in the sense that things can be true or false of these
objects of thought. So, when evaluating “some biblical characters did not exist”
we look for something in the domain (biblical characters) of which we can
predicate non-existence. And lo! We find one: Abraham. Abraham is, then, a
value of the variable’ (Crane 2011, 59).

It appears to me eminently reasonable to allow for this nuance in articulating
ontological commitments. The constriction of a domain of objects appears to implicitly
Routley changed his name to “Sylvan” and is found as such in the bibliography.
Neo-Meinongians employ different strategies and here again there does not appear to be formal
reasons why they can’t regiment their ontology coherently. Maria Reicher avers: ‘In the systems of
Terence Parsons, Edward N. Zalta and Dale Jacquette, for instance, “there is an x such that … x…” is
expressed by “∃x(…x…)”, whereas “there exists an x such that … x…” is expressed by “∃x(E!x &
…x…)”, where “E!” is the existence predicate (Parsons 1980, Zalta 1983, Zalta 1988, Jacquette 1996).
“Some things do not exist” could thus be rendered in logical notation as follows: “∃x(¬E!x)”; “Pegasus
does not exist” as “¬E!p”; and so forth’ (Reicher 2019).
77
78
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favour nominalist commitments, a point I will return to in subsequent chapters
concerning truthmaker theory as an alternative criterion of ontological commitment. It
is preferable, I think, to have a more neutral construal of the quantifier to make sense
of philosophical as well as everyday discourse. At least, it seems reasonable to be
permitted the choice.79

1.2.4.2 Quantifier Variance
Another objection to Quantification is the idea that there is no single sense of
the quantifier; rather, there are many quantifiers with none being privileged above
others to cut nature at her joints. Another way of saying this is that the existential
quantifier is semantically indeterminate. I mentioned Putnam 80 and Hirsch above
proposing the idea that the existential quantifier has numerous readings. Putnam, for
example, claims that ‘what logicians call “the existential quantifier,” the symbol
“(∃x),” and its ordinary language counterparts, the expressions “there are,” “there
exist” and “there exists a,” “some,” etc., do not have a single absolutely precise use
but a whole family of uses’ (Putnam 2005, 37). In what follows, I’ll discuss Hirsch’s
programme of quantifier variance who heavily relies on Putnam’s work.
Though Hirsch identifies himself as a Carnapian,81 or at least recognises that
his quantifier variance view is one motivated by Carnap’s work, there are obviously

Quine, in From a Logical Point of View, recognises the philological objection to treating “there are”
as having a fixed meaning. That is, he recognises that ‘the idiomatic use of “there is” in ordinary
language knows no bounds comparable to those that might reasonably be adhered to in scientific
discourse painstakingly formulated in quantificational terms.”’ (Quine 1961, 106). He appears to claim,
however, that in the service of clarity and parsimony, we are free to adopt any notational form that
‘eliminates philosophical perplexity’, importantly, ‘without loss of content germane to the scientific
enterprise’ (Ibid.).
80
Putnam (2005) argues from a pragmatic standpoint that extensions of the meanings of “there is” and
“exists” can be a matter of convention; that in certain debates, such as ontological issues of composite
objects, numbers or universals, it makes equal sense to adopt any of the standard logically consistent
approaches. Van Inwagen again claims not to understand: ‘I invite those interested in Putnam’s thesis
to read those pages and to decide whether they understand them. If these pages do make sense, then he’s
on to something (and something of considerable philosophical importance), and I’ve missed it because
my ability to follow a philosopher’s reasoning falls short of the level of comprehension required by
Putnam’s text (or perhaps because I am so strongly prejudiced against the idea that the meaning of
“there is” can be a matter of convention that I have managed to convince myself that Putnam isn’t
making sense when he’s making perfect sense). And, of course, if those pages don’t make sense, he’s
not on to anything. I leave it to the reader to judge’ (van Inwagen 2009, 491-492).
81
A distinguishing feature of Rudolf Carnap’s work that is relevant here involves the employment of
linguistic frameworks and the kinds of questions that can be asked in relation to chosen frameworks.
Internal questions, Carnap proposes, are questions which could legitimately be asked within a given
framework. Mathematicians, for example, could legitimately ask within their domain of discourse
whether there are any prime numbers between 10 and 20. Asking a question from outside the framework,
79
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important difference between them. Carnap, for example is often classed as a
metaphysical antirealist, and is considered as such by Hirsch. On the other hand,
Hirsch is emphatic about his realism; he believes there is a language independent and
objective world - a view Carnap, perhaps, would find too metaphysical - but there may
be two or more equally good ways to describe it. His quantifier variance thesis amounts
to the claim that there is no ‘metaphysically privileged sense of the quantifier’ (Hirsch
2010, 82), a thesis directly opposing Quantification.
This can be fleshed out with reference to the so-called special composition
question (SCQ). 82 The question concerns the existence conditions for composite
entities and asks: under what conditions do some x’s compose some y? There are three
standard responses representing points on a spectrum: universalism, nihilism and
restrictivism. The first, universalism, has notable representatives such as David Lewis
(1986), who claim that any arbitrary number of objects always compose some further
object, such as Obama’s ear and the Leaning Tower of Pisa. Nihilism involves the idea
that some number of objects never compose some further object and has such
philosophers in its ranks as Cian Dorr (2002) and Ted Sider (2013). The third,
restrictivism, is the view that everyday objects are composed of constituent parts, but
it does not countenance arbitrary concoctions of objects, such as Donald Trump’s hair
and the Eiffel Tower. Uriah Kriegel (2008) is a representative of this position. Van
Inwagen is a restrictivist of sorts; he endorses a view he calls organicism which
amounts to the claim that there are no composite objects unless that object is an
organism (van Inwagen 1990).83
Hirsch’s criticism is semantic in nature.84 He argues that (SCQ) amounts to
nothing more than a verbal dispute; that there is nothing substantive being discussed.

an external question, leads to nonsense, in Carnap’s view. A philosopher, recognising the mathematician
asks about prime numbers, may ask from outside the mathematician’s domain of discourse, whether
numbers exist? This question lacks any real sense, according to Carnap and such external questions
engender metaphysical speculation, an activity he vehemently discourages as nonsense. The only
legitimate kind of external question, according to Carnap, was a pragmatic one relating to the utility of
a given framework. See Carnap (1950).
82
Putnam claims that ‘to ask whether mereological sums really exist would be stupid. It is, in my view,
a matter of convention whether we say that mereological sums exist or not’ (Putnam 2005, 27).
83
Ted Sider quips ‘Van Inwagen himself also dispensed with tables and chairs, but departed from the
nihilists by admitting people and other living things into his ontology. (Why he spared the living few
could tell.)’ (Sider 2009, 384).
84
This is different to, say, Karen Bennet (2009) who does think there may be a correct answer, but she’s
epistemically sceptical about the possibility of knowing the right answer. She also thinks that all the
relevant empirical information is in; people are just trading theoretical virtues to bolster their position.
So, restrictivism may accommodate the data more simply, nihilism more parsimoniously and
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Proponents, he argues, are just using different linguistic frameworks to represent the
same empirical data. They are using the existential quantifier in different contexts. The
verbal dispute could be resolved if discussants in the universalist framework
recognized that, in the framework of the nihilist, the nihilist’s existential claims are
true and the same goes for each of the positions. One of the hallmarks of a verbal
dispute is when the dispute dissolves when this intellectually charitable act is done.
Interestingly, one of the reasons why Carnap was motivated to endorse
different frameworks was because of the emergence of different types of logics. Frege
attempted to reduce mathematics to logic, and not the other way around, because he
saw logic as the very essence of rational thought. Because it is so fundamental, he
argued, there’s no place outside of logic from which to judge logic; calling logic into
question is like trying ‘to wash the fur without wetting it’ (Frege 1884, 36). Carnap
extended this point to wider issues in the philosophy of science but the point here is
that that there are legitimate reasons why the existential quantifier might be interpreted
differently; neither dogmatism nor stipulation are acceptable to most parties in the
debate and ordinary language doesn’t apodictically support the objectual view. Threats
of relativism, incommensurability and anti-realism are challenges quantifier variant
theorists must address, but these may not be insurmountable. It’s at least a viable
competitor to Quantification.

1.2.4.3 Substitutional Quantification
In this section, I will only touch upon substitutional quantification as another
example of opposition to Quantification. Van Inwagen, unsurprisingly, doesn’t
understand this kind of quantification. He makes the further claim, however, that no
one can understand it, presumably because no one can understand that which is
nonsensical. He claims that ‘Substitutional quantification is meaningless’ (van
Inwagen 2004, 124) and that ‘neither I nor anyone else understands substitutional
quantification’ (van Inwagen 1981, 285).
It is not quite clear what he doesn’t “understand”, for the general idea is rather
simple. Instead of variables in a quantified expression referring to objects in a domain
of quantification, the variables, or dummy letters, refer to linguistic items which may
universalism in a more uniform manner. I’ll return to a brief discussion of Bennet’s position, which she
calls “epistemicism” in chapter five.
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or may not have instances. The ontological status of the referent of the linguistic items
is deferred, and so, then, is one’s ontological commitment to such putative objects.
Thus, rather than reading “(∃x)Fx” as “for at least one object, x, in the domain, D, Fx”
where “∃” is understood objectually, it is read as “at least one substitution instance of
“F…” is true”, sometimes written as “(∑x) Fx”.85 Whether the substitution instance
exists depends on other factors, namely the truth conditions for such instances. Quine
would see this as an improper abdication or evasion of ontological responsibility, but
it does have advantages. For instance, Susan Haack highlights what she finds is an
embarrassment to an objectual interpretation of the quantifier. That is, it seems that
claims for a simple theorem of predicate logic “(∃x)Fx v ~Fx” that ‘there is at least one
object which is either F or not F’ (Haack 1978, 50). She considers it embarrassing
given that whether something exists or not should not be a matter for logic to decide.
Substitutional quantification is not without its problems and leads to its own issues,
such as what can appropriately serve as the replacement for substitution instances. The
important point for present purposes is not to defend substitutional quantification, but
to identify another credible challenge to Quantification.86

1.2.5 Thesis 5: The Criterion of Ontological Commitment (COC)
Thesis five, Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment, is the only one of
the five theses that is distinctly methodological, though each of the other theses, van
Inwagen argues, leads naturally and inexorably to it. Yet I have shown that the
previous four theses, Non-activity, Bexistence, Univocity and Quantification, were in
various ways questionable. If my analysis is correct, there is already reason to be
doubtful about the value of COC. I argue further in this section that COC is equally
questionable on its own terms and there is little compelling reason to adopt this strategy
as an indispensable tool for ontological inquiry. This is magnified by the various
constrictions van Inwagen imposes on COC, discussed in the following sections.
Taken from Susan Haack’s philosophy of Logics (1978, 42).
Craig (2014) claims that van Inwagen should not only understand substitutional quantification, but
that it is not as much a threat to his criteria of ontological commitment which, Craig argues, is different
to Quine’s. Quine, he contends, locates ontological commitment more with bound variables than the
existential quantifier, summed up in his slogan ‘to be is to be the value of a [bound] variable’ (Quine
1948, 34). Substitutional quantification challenges the idea that in the domain of quantification, there
must be real objects; Craig claims that van Inwagen doesn’t require this supposition. It’s an interesting
difference, but not one van Inwagen would welcome. It is perhaps not so valuable to distinguish the
existential quantifier from the variable it binds, for they are each quite meaningless by themselves.
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In one sense, COC is best thought of, not as a single thesis, but as a cluster of
related theses. 87 In another, more precise sense, it is better construed as a rule or
strategy. As a strategy, it is argued, it can be employed to identify the ontological
commitments of a theory.88 This is distinct from being a strategy for identifying what
exists; it is only intended to show what a theory says exists. Quine tells us that this
point is often overlooked: ‘I look to variables and quantification for evidence as to
what a theory says that there is, not for evidence as to what there is; but the point can
be missed…’ (Quine 1960, 224). COC, then, applies to discourse; to sentences or sets
of sentences (theories) and only indirectly to those who affirm those sentences as true,
and more indirectly again as to what might exist. This strategy plays a central role for
van Inwagen who claims ‘If these “rules” are not followed, then – so say those of us
who are adherents of Quine’s meta-ontology – it is almost certain that many untoward
consequences of the disputed positions will be obscured by imprecision and wishful
thinking’ (van Inwagen 2009, 506).
There are several ways to divide the various stages of this strategy. In chapter
3, I divide the strategy into five stages. For convenience, in this section, I analyse four
stages in depth. The four stages are as follows:

(5a)

Take sentences from outside of philosophy, the truth of which you
affirm.

(5b)

Regiment these sentences in the quantifier-variable idiom.

(5c)

Paraphrase, if possible, unwanted ontological commitments.

(5d)

Identify the values of the variables that render the theory true.

In the following four sections I discuss each of these stages in turn.

Van Inwagen says at one point: ‘[T]here is in an important sense no such thing as Quine’s criterion
of ontological commitment. That is, there is no proposition, no thesis, that can be called “Quine’s
criterion of ontological commitment”—and this despite the fact that several acute and able philosophers
have attempted to formulate, or to examine possible alternative formulations of, “Quine’s criterion of
ontological commitment” (van Inwagen 2000, 235).
88
Charles Chihara, in fact, identifies four ways Quine articulates the nature of his proposed criterion:
‘We have thus been given four answers to our question “What is the criterion of ontological commitment
a criterion of?” It is a criterion for determining what a theory (a) presupposes that there is; (b) explicitly
presupposes that there is; (c) implies that there is; (d) says that there is. Now do these all come to the
same thing? I should think not’ (Chihara 1973, 93).
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1.2.5.1 (5a) Take sentences from outside of philosophy, the truth of which you affirm
Van Inwagen, then, claims that COC is the best strategy for discerning what
there is. The first part of this strategy requires the ontologist to begin with sentences
that are affirmed as true. It is these sentences that will then be regimented in first-order
predicate logic. Neither Quine nor van Inwagen think that ontology can discern what
there is directly, so to speak. This is in marked contrast to philosophers such as Lowe,
discussed in the next chapter, who endorses the idea that ontology has a sui generis
subject matter and method and must be done directly.
For Quine, the sciences are the ultimate arbiter of what there is, and it is for
this reason, sentences from the sciences, notably physics, are privileged among all
others. This deference to science forms part of his naturalistic convictions. Van
Inwagen, however, rejects Quine’s naturalism and broadens the reservoir of sentences
that can be regimented.89 However, in a rather peculiar move, he prohibits sentences
from within philosophy. While I don’t endorse Quine’s extreme naturalism, discussed
presently, I don’t see how van Inwagen can draw any precise line between
philosophical assertions and those of other disciplines, or, indeed, of assertions made
in everyday discourse. Nor do I see any legitimate grounds, should a clear distinction
be available, for prohibiting philosophical assertions. This matter, as well as the role
of naturalism in Quine’s version of COC, deserves a fuller treatment.
For Quine, naturalism plays a pivotal role in his whole approach to
philosophy. 90 In fact, Putnam claims that naturalism is more central to Quine’s
metaontology than the methodology van Inwagen extolls. He says:
I think it is fair to say that from Word and Object on, the argumentation of “On
What There Is” ceases to do very much work for Quine, and what does the real
Though Quine at one point claimed that the scientist ‘is indistinguishable from the common man in
his sense of evidence, except that the scientist is more careful’ (1957, 233). Nonetheless, it is the
sciences that limn the structure of reality, according to Quine.
90
It’s interesting that what Karl Popper (1959, 1963) christened the “demarcation problem”, which
preoccupied much of the philosophy of science since its inception, was largely abandoned by the 1970’s.
Though Laudan is thought to have unofficially buried the problem in his 1983 paper “The Demise of
the Demarcation Problem”, the death knell sounded much earlier, in large amount due to the influence
of Quine. I briefly discuss Quine’s rejection of first philosophy below, but while he rejects any suprascientific standpoint from which to judge scientific practice, it’s worthwhile noting that van Fraassen
claims that Quine’s project ‘can only proceed on the basis of some understanding of science, of how
science answers its questions. Thus analytic ontology presupposes a philosophy of science’ (van
Fraassen 2002, 11). When I refer to “science” in this context it is with the acknowledgement that it is
not an entirely clear matter what constitutes such a discipline.
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work is a premise he shares with such philosophers as Bernard Williams and
Simon Blackburn and Paul Churchland, the premise that it is only our best
scientific theory of the world that says anything we can take seriously about
what there is. (Putnam 2005, 83)

Though naturalism arguably serves as a backdrop to much of his philosophy,
naturalism is not a precise doctrine. David Papineau, for example, remarks that the
‘term “naturalism” has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy’ and
claims further that it ‘would be fruitless to try to adjudicate some official way of
understanding the term. Different contemporary philosophers interpret “naturalism”
differently’ (Papineau, 2015). 91 Even so, it is generally considered the dominant
viewpoint in contemporary analytic philosophy. 92 Central to Quine’s naturalism, at
least, is a rejection of “first-philosophy”, the idea that the sciences are the ultimate
arbiter of what there is (while ontology is perhaps the ultimate arbiter of what a theory
says there is) and that there is no place outside of the sciences from which its
foundations can be judged. He asseverated:
…my position is a naturalistic one; I see philosophy not as an a priori
propaedeutic or groundwork for science, but as continuous with science. I see
philosophy and science in the same boat – a boat which, to revert to Neurath’s
figure as I so often do, we can rebuild only at sea while staying float in it. There
is no external vantage point, no first philosophy. (Quine 1969, 126-127)93
De Caro and Macarthur claim that ‘Naturalism has become a slogan in the name of which the vast
majority of work in analytic philosophy is pursued, and its preeminent status can perhaps be appreciated
in how little energy is spent in explicitly defining or explaining what is meant by scientific naturalism,
or in defending it against possible alternatives’ (De Caro and Macarthur 2004, 2).
92
The following are examples that help substantiate this claim. Michael Rea opens one of his major
works with the claim that ‘Philosophical naturalism has dominated the Western academy for well over
a century. It is not just fashionable nowadays; it enjoys the lofty status of academic orthodoxy’ (Rea
2002; 2). Echoing this claim, Jack Ritchie states ‘…if you were to ask a contemporary philosopher in
the English-speaking world… to classify her philosophical position, I would wager that the most
common answer would be: “I’m a naturalist”. It is certainly the answer I would give. Naturalism is the
current philosophical fashion, at least in this part of the world’ (Ritchie 2006, 1). Further, Papineau
declares ‘For better or worse, “naturalism” is widely viewed as a positive term in philosophical circles—
few active philosophers nowadays are happy to announce themselves as “non-naturalists”’ (Papineau
2015). While some philosophers, such as Plantinga, find such claims overly strong given that they often
neglect much of the thought outside of analytic philosophy (Plantinga, 2006; 29), I think even he would
concede that it is de rigueur within analytic departments of philosophy.
93
And elsewhere, he says his naturalism ‘sees natural science as an inquiry into reality, fallible and
corrigible but not answerable to any supra-scientific tribunal, and not in need of any justification beyond
observation and the hypothetico-deductive method’ (Quine 1981, 72).
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And what goes for philosophy goes for metaphysics: ‘I see metaphysics, good and bad,
as a continuation of science, good and bad’ (Quine 1988, 117). 94 There are many
complications accompanying Quine’s radical views that we need not address here. The
important point is that, while science and philosophy differ only by degrees of
generality in Quine’s view, to discern what there is, we look to our best theories, and
those theories are invariably scientific, with physics at the apex. Thus, while ontology
discerns what a theory says there is, it does so in a parasitic, potentially symbiotic, way
by regimenting our best theories.
Van Inwagen, on the other hand, is not a naturalist in any substantial sense,
though he remarks, while ‘[m]ost of my philosophical convictions… are regrettably
close to those of the typical naturalist’, he goes on to say that ‘most of my philosophical
work is simply irrelevant to naturalism’ (van Inwagen 2006, 77). While he
acknowledges that most analytic philosophers are naturalists, he makes the further
point that often, analytic philosophers are ‘propogandists for naturalism, team players,
proselytising enthusiasts’ and goes on to argue that ‘the explanation of these facts…
must be psychological or sociological or something of that order. It is certainly not
logical or philosophical, not even in part’95 (van Inwagen 2006, 75).96
The sciences, he contends, do not inform his work except as an important
repository of sentences to be mined for their ontological worth. 97 He avers: ‘If

In this regard, he claims: ‘The issue over there being classes seems more a question of convenient
conceptual scheme; the issue over there being centaurs, or brick houses on Elm Street, seems more a
question of fact. But I have been urging that this difference is only one of degree. (Quine 1953, 46)
95
Van Inwagen is a Christian and with respect to the doctrines he subscribes to he claims that ‘These
beliefs of mine are obviously inconsistent with naturalism; if I belonged to the Federated Society of
People Who Are Naturalists Because They Are So Smart, and if I publicly confessed these beliefs, I
should certainly be expelled. But these beliefs don't play any role in my philosophical work’ (van
Inwagen 2006, 77).
96
Putnam provides a damning criticism of the atmosphere surrounding the hegemony of naturalism:
‘…philosophers – perhaps even a majority of all the philosophers writing about issues in metaphysics,
epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language – announce in one or another
conspicuous place in their essays and books that they are “naturalists” or that the view or account being
defended is a “naturalist” one; this announcement, in its placing and emphasis, resembles the placing of
the announcement in articles written in Stalin’s Soviet Union that a view was in agreement with
Comrade Stalin’s; as in the case of the latter announcement, it is supposed to be clear that any view that
is not “naturalist” (not in agreement with Comrade Stalin’s) is anathema, and could not possibly be
correct. A further very common feature is that, as a rule, “naturalism” is not defined’ (Putnam, 2004,
59).
97
He’s critical also of various attempts that have been made by analytic philosophers to naturalise parts
of philosophy, making the rather extreme claim that they tend to be ‘vague, pretentious, amorphous,
programmatic, and have not achieved anything of value’, though he does not cite any particular works
in support of his claim (van Inwagen 2006, 77).
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metaphysics has nothing to offer the sciences, the sciences98…have a great deal to
offer metaphysics. Many scientiﬁc discoveries are not only relevant to metaphysics
but of inestimable metaphysical importance…’ (van Inwagen 2014, 20). He says
elsewhere, however, that ‘I suppose I am enough of a Wittgensteinian to think that it
is not possible for very much of what we say “in the midst of life” to be false’ (van
Inwagen 2014, 09).
Whereas the sciences hold varying degrees of objectivity or intersubjectivity,
everyday discourse, insofar as there is such a category of discourse, is more
questionable on this front. In a certain respect, it is more intuitive to let the sciences
do the heavy lifting in identifying the nature of the world, appreciating there may be
parts of the world not amenable to scientific investigation. Van Inwagen seems to
relativize ontological claims to the person who utters statements affirmed as true. It is
curious why one would think that such a proposal could aid in ‘limning the true and
ultimate structure of reality’ (Quine 1960, 221). Part of van Inwagen’s reason is related
to his account of ontology as a non-explanatory enterprise and part of it is to do with
his perhaps unworkable position on propositions uttered inside and outside the
ontology room. The “ontology room” is discussed in the next section and his views on
the non-explanatory nature of ontology in section 1.3.

1.2.5.2 (5b) Regiment the chosen sentences in the quantifier-variable idiom
The quantifier-variable idiom is van Inwagen’s preferred way of speaking of
Quine’s canonical language, which for both is first-order predicate logic with identity.
Quine claims that ‘The common man’s ontology is vague and untidy in two ways. It
takes in many purported objects that are vaguely or inadequately defined. But also,
what is more significant, it is vague in its scope; we cannot even tell in general which
of those vague things to ascribe to a man’s ontology at all, which things to count him
as assuming’ (Quine 1981, 9). It is evident that natural language can at times be
cumbersome for identifying ontological truths: names can be ambiguous, definite
descriptions may not capture the sense of a name they replace, singular terms do not

He does not think this a problem: ‘I think that philosophy in general, and metaphysics in particular,
have very little to offer to the natural sciences. (Philosophy and metaphysics are none the worse for that
– just as sociology is none the worse for having nothing to offer to astrophysics.)’ (van Inwagen 2019,
25).
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seem to consistently refer. For Quine, reference lies solely with the variables of
predicate logic. In fact, he avers:

I hold rather that the question of the ontological commitment of a theory does
not properly arise except as that theory is expressed in classical quantificational
form, or insofar as one has in mind how to translate it into that form. I hold this
for the simple reason that the existential quantifier, in the objectual sense, is
given precisely the existential interpretation and no other: there are things
which are thus and so.’ (Quine 1969, 106)

Van Inwagen concurs, but to appreciate his reasons for this, it is necessary to
discuss his conception of the “ontology room”.
‘David Lewis’, he reminds us, ‘spoke of “the philosophy room,” and the term
has gained some currency. But in philosophy’s house there are many rooms, and one
of them, more austere in design and more sparsely furnished than perhaps any of the
others, is the ontology room’ (van Inwagen 2014, 1).99 Those who enter the ontology
room must be prepared to discuss ontological claims in the quantifier-variable idiom
as proposed by Quine. Van Inwagen considers this move so essential that he refuses
to engage in ontological debate with those who do not accept the terms of admission.
He quotes Ernest Gellner as one such philosopher who emphatically refuses entry to
this demanding room:
The dreadful thing is, I haven’t even tried to be a serious, card-carrying
nominalist. I have never tried to eliminate “quantification” over abstract
objects from my discourse. I shamelessly “quantify over” abstractions and
deny their existence! I do not try to put what I say into canonical notation, and
do not care what the notation looks like if someone else does it for me, and do
not feel in the very least bound by whatever ontic commitments such a
translation may disclose. (Gellner 1979, 203)

He goes on to say: ‘Adjoining the ontology room is the meta-ontology room. That is where we are
now. One remark that I have heard more than once in the meta-ontology room is that I have no right to
call the ontology room by that name; I ought to call it the Quinean ontology room or some such. Well,
we all have a right to our opinions, however ill-judged they may be’ (van Inwagen 2014, 1).
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Though van Inwagen “permits” the author the freedom to remain outside the ontology
room, he does not think that much by way of good philosophy can come from the
hallways or lecture rooms where natural language is the vehicle of metaphysical
discourse. 100 He would be willing, however, to discuss metaontology with the
recalcitrant philosopher:
[Gellner’s] statement amounts to a refusal to enter the Ontology Room, a
refusal to play by Quine’s rules – which a philosopher is, of course, perfectly
free to refuse to do. And I, for my part, am perfectly free to refuse to discuss
ontology with that philosopher. And I would refuse to discuss ontology with
that philosopher – on the ground that I am very nearly certain (little is entirely
certain in life) that the discussion would be a waste of my time. (van Inwagen
2018, 203)

I mentioned in the Introduction that part of motivation for this thesis is the pressing
need to explore criteria for theory choice amongst competing metaontologies precisely
because once a metaontology is chosen, there is little ensuing discourse on first-order
problems, as shown in the above quotation.
A central feature of the ontology room is that it is a particular context of
utterance and van Inwagen contrasts this with a different context of utterance, “the
business of everyday life”.101 He claims:

Sentences that express a certain proposition when uttered, say, in a court of law
or a meeting of the board of directors of an architectural firm or aboard the
Clapham omnibus may express a different proposition when uttered in the
ontology room. Or so I say. And it is propositions, not sentences, that are true
or false – or at any rate, sentences are true or false only vicariously: in virtue
of the truth-values of the propositions they express. If, therefore, a sentence

He claims: ‘Natural language and its grammar are very complicated things and they did not evolve
(or they were not conferred on us by God or whatever the right story of their genesis may be) in order
that the grammar of natural language might serve as a reliable guide in philosophical speculation. Maybe
natural (or “ordinary”) language is, as Austin said, the first word. It is certainly (as he conceded) not the
last word’ (van Inwagen 2008, 58).
101
Van Inwagen does not provide any precise account of what this context is, but appeals, rather to the
obvious and intuitive understanding of discourse that goes on in “ordinary” discourse. ‘“The ordinary
business of life” comprises a vast number of contexts of utterance…’ (van Inwagen 2014, 4).
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expresses different propositions in different contexts of utterance, and if in
some contexts of utterance it expresses true propositions and in others false
propositions, there is no out-of-context answer to the question whether that
sentence is true or false. (van Inwagen 2014, 3-4)

To unpack this quotation, let us call propositions expressed inside the ontology room
“inside” propositions and those expressed outside, the “outside” propositions. To help
make sense of the distinction an example will be helpful.
Van Inwagen, as mentioned above, endorses a position on the special
composition question he calls organicism (van Inwagen 1990). That amounts to the
claim that the only extant composite objects are organisms; all other composite objects
are particulars arranged x-wise. Chairs, for example, do not exist, according to van
Inwagen; there are only particulars arranged chairwise. This extreme doctrine is
argued for in his Material Beings. It is natural enough to think that the sentence “there
are chairs” expresses the same proposition both inside and outside the ontology room;
that what “there are chairs” means when uttered “outside” is that there are particles
arranged chairwise (if you subscribe to organicism). Another possible reading is that
the inside and outside propositions are distinct propositions but one of them, perhaps
the less refined outside proposition, is false. It is simply wrong, if you believe that
there are no composite objects that are not organisms, to claim in any circumstances
that “x is a chair”; there aren’t any chairs. An ordinary language philosopher, on the
other hand, might reject the inside proposition in favour of the idea of a “Moorean
fact”; that any philosophical thesis that gainsays the obvious should be rejected. Van
Inwagen rejects each of these options. He claims that the inside and the outside
proposition are distinct, yet each is true in the relevant context of utterance.
Reinforcing and extending Quine’s claim above he avers:
But – I say – not only are the inside and the outside propositions distinct, but it
is only in the ontology and meta-ontology rooms that anyone has ever so much
as considered the inside proposition. In my view, only metaphysicians (or at
any rate only people who have been exposed to discussions of the metaphysics
of artifacts) have ever considered – ever entertained, ever grasped, ever held
before their minds – the inside proposition. (van Inwagen 2014, 6)
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How then, he asks, if the metaphysical concern never enters the thought of the nonphilosopher can she be said to have expressed a certain proposition? He goes on to
say:
When my wife said to me yesterday, “The chair you said you’d carry upstairs
is still in the living room,” what she asserted was (I say) true. True without
qualification. True when taken straightforwardly and literally. True tout court.
True simpliciter. True full stop. True period. Not “true in the loose and popular
sense but false in the strict and philosophical sense,” but just true. When my
hard-headed cynic said, “Chairs exist,” what he said was true – true without
qualification (etc.). (van Inwagen 2014, 10)

The ontology room is governed by the strict rules of predicate logic and van Inwagen
is clear that when he utters the sentence “chairs exist” in the ontology room, it is false;
there are no chairs in his ontology. Yet, when he utters the sentence outside, he sees
no contradiction, just the same sentence expressing a different proposition in a
contrasting context of utterance. He claims ‘The beliefs that I have inside and outside
the ontology room about the kinds of things that exist are, in fact, exactly the same. In
particular: wherever I am, I accept both the outside proposition and the denial of the
inside proposition’ (van Inwagen 2014, 10). But what, then, does the outside
proposition express? What is his wife passive aggressively102 asserting when she says:
“The chair you said you’d carry upstairs is still in the living room”? Given the use he
wishes to make of the distinction between inside and outside propositions concerning
the reservoir of legitimate sentences permitted access to the ontology room, it is
unsatisfactory that he gives no substantial answer to this question.103

That’s how I imagine her demeanour.
His evasive answer is: ‘“Well, then,” asks the exasperated interlocutor, “what proposition is the
outside proposition if it’s not the proposition that that there are things that are arranged chairwise?” And
I reply: “It’s the proposition that ‘Chairs exist’ expresses when it is used in the ordinary business of life.
You speak English, don’t you? If you do, you know what proposition that is.” I suspect that this reply
will not satisfy Trenton, as I’ll call the exasperated interlocutor. I suspect that what Trenton wants me
to do is to offer a philosophical paraphrase of ‘Chairs exist’ (in its ordinary-business-of-life sense) –
something like ‘There are things that are arranged chairwise’ but which, unlike that sentence, does
express the outside proposition. But, by the nature of the case, I can’t do that: any sentence that would
count as a philosophical paraphrase of ‘Chairs exist’ (etc.) would not express the outside proposition’
(van Inwagen 2014, 11).
102
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He suggests that whatever the outside proposition expresses, it is metaphysically
neutral. But this, I argue, raises problems for the kinds of sentences that are chosen to
be regimented. What is the value of choosing sentences expressing a proposition that
are affirmed as true, if we simply dispense with the proposition and manipulate the
sentence? What exactly is being regimented? We apply truth values to propositions, as
he says above; only incidentally to sentences expressing those propositions. But if the
outside proposition (“there are chairs”) remains true, yet the inside proposition (“there
are chairs”) false, I don’t see how one can achieve this dissonant mental state with
equilibrium; without secretly saying “I’ll get the object to which you think you refer,
even though it doesn’t really exist”. It would unduly deprive one of the pretentious
philosophical smugness to know what is really true.
More importantly, however, the connection with the supposed single sense of
the existential quantifier and the everyday meaning of “there are” and “exists” is called
into question. The point was argued at length above that they are each, in van
Inwagen’s view, ontologically committing, and trivially so, such that there is no other
viable reading. But if “chairs exist”, and its supposed equivalent “there are chairs”, are
ontologically committed to chairs, without qualification, tout court, then it’s not clear
(i) what the outside proposition expresses (for there are no chairs), and, depending on
what the outside proposition does express (ii) whether “there are” is ontologically
commissive in that setting. If van Inwagen’s wife is not committed to the existence of
chairs (ontologically speaking) when she utters “there are chairs”, does “there are”
mean something different? Rather than thinking of the sentence functioning
indexically, is it not more sensible to think of “there are” as ontologically neutral? If
it has this reading outside the ontology room, and van Inwagen wants to tie his
technical terms to ordinary language, can “there are”, and thus the existential
quantifier, not have different readings?
I do not wish to create a caricature of van Inwagen’s position on composition.
Van Inwagen (1990) claims that when his wife refers to chairs, that she is referring to
a region of space, R, that is filled by something; that she and van Inwagen have the
same empirical data, but that van Inwagen is making just a subtle ontological point,
one that isn’t relevant to her assertion outside the ontology room. However, insofar as
van Inwagen rests the legitimacy of COC on ordinary language assertions, I find little
to commend COC as a strategy discerning what (a theory says) there is. And to the
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extent that he tries to drive a wedge between philosophical assertions and every other
kind of assertion, the former being excluded from the reservoir of sentences amenable
to regimentation, I find his version of COC wanting, bordering on arbitrariness and
limited for ontological purposes. I will highlight below, and show in chapter three, that
COC is not able to play the role of deciding between competing theories, a role
accorded by both van Inwagen and Quine.

1.2.5.3 (5c) Paraphrase, if possible, unwanted ontological commitments
There are two main problems with van Inwagen’s notion of paraphrase,
problems that equally afflict Quine’s account. The first of these issues concerns the
proposed asymmetry between the sentence that requires paraphrasing and the resultant
paraphrase. This leads to a problem known as “Alston’s dilemma”. A second issue,
which is discussed in greater detail in chapter 3, concerns the background criteria,
one’s ontological bias if you will, that seem to govern the paraphrastic process. This
section briefly addresses both matters.
It was shown that van Inwagen thinks that discourse outside the ontology room
does not exhibit clear, if any, ontological commitments. The point was expressed by
Quine above when speaking of the vagueness of the common man’s ontology. He goes
on to say that ‘a fenced ontology is just not implicit in ordinary language. Various
turns of phrase in ordinary language that seem to invoke novel sorts of objects may
disappear under such regimentation. At other points new ontic commitments may
emerge. There is room for choice, and one chooses with a view to simplicity in one’s
overall system of the world’ (Quine, 1981, 9–10).
Because of the intrinsically obfuscating nature of natural language, then,
sentences require regimentation according to Quine and van Inwagen. But such
regimentation is not a mechanical procedure; not only are there choices of logics in
which to regiment, and different interpretations of logical quantifiers as shown above,
but there are various ways one might choose to interpret and paraphrase a given
sentence. What, then, is the correct paraphrase, and what does the ontologist hope to
achieve by paraphrasing?
It is natural to think that a paraphrase should reveal the ontological
commitments of a sentence; what Alston (1958) calls ontological reduction. That is,
that the purpose of paraphrase is to reveal the underlying commitments of a sentence
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by rephrasing it in a more perspicuous manner. This is how Lowe construes the matter,
consequently finding the procedure redundant:

If a paraphrase means the same as what it is supposed to paraphrase—as it had
better do, if it is to be any good—then it carries the same ‘ontological
commitments’ as whatever it is supposed to paraphrase, so that constructing
paraphrases cannot be a way of relieving ourselves of ontological
commitments. We cannot discover those commitments simply by examining
the syntax and semantics of our language, for syntax and semantics are very
uncertain guides to ontology. In short, I see no reason to place any confidence
in Quine’s famous criterion. (Lowe 2008, 17)
And this is essentially an expression of Alston’s dilemma: Either the paraphrased
sentence and the paraphrase mean the same thing and thus have the same ontological
commitments, or they mean something different, thus the paraphrase is not an
acceptable rendering of the first. Either way, ontological commitments cannot be
avoided in this manner. To take a simple example, take two sentences:

1. There are three holes in this piece of cheese.
2. This piece of cheese is triply perforate.104

If the second sentence is an adequate reduction of the first, and the first expresses a
commitment to holes, then so does the second sentence: a commitment to holes has
not been dispensed with by a reconfiguration of words. If the second sentence is not
an adequate paraphrase, the ontological commitments of the first sentence remains
untouched, therefore there is no reason to think that in either case ontological reduction
can dispense with ontological commitments. Or for the person affirming a claim,
Alston avers: ‘It is a question of what he says, not of how he says it. Hence he cannot
repudiate his admission by simply changing his words’ (Alston 1959, 13).105 He brings
this idea out with a simple example:
A standard example, discussed in depth in “Holes” by Stephanie and David Lewis, but taken from
(van Inwagen 2014, 137).
105
A point reinforced by Amie Thomasson: ‘a theory does not avoid commitment to any entities by
avoiding use of certain terms or concepts’ (2007, 167).
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A man who was afraid of policemen would be reassured if he were convinced
that there are no policemen. But he would not be reassured if he were
convinced that one could express all one's beliefs in a language which took not
policemen, but rather policemanship, as values of variables (that one could
avoid locutions like “There is a policeman around the corner” in favor of
“Policemanship is exemplified around the corner”). (Alston 1958, 13)

But this natural rendering of paraphrase, what we might call the symmetrical or
synonymous reading of paraphrase, is not how either Quine or van Inwagen conceives
of the operation. Neither think that the purpose of paraphrase is revelatory: how could
it be, for neither think that sentences of everyday discourse make ontological
commitments as such; that only occurs in the quantifier-variable idiom, in the ontology
room. Quine states rather dramatically:

We do not claim synonymy. We do not claim to make clear and explicit what
the users of the unclear expression had unconsciously in mind all along. We do
not expose hidden meanings, as the words “analysis” and “explication” would
suggest; we supply lacks. We fix on the particular functions of the unclear
expression that make it worth troubling about, and then devise a substitute,
clear and couched in terms to our liking, that fills those functions. Beyond those
conditions of partial agreement, dictated by our interests and purposes, any
traits of the explicans come under the head of “don’t-cares”. (Quine 2013, 238)

For van Inwagen and Quine, then, there is no requirement for the paraphrased sentence
and the paraphrase to either mean the same thing or to carry the same ontological
commitments. Paraphrasing is not a mechanical procedure; it is a creative process that
permits one to rephrase a given sentence if one wishes; if holes aren’t desired in one’s
ontology for example. We saw above that for Quine, parsimony played a decisive role
in choosing what fits into one’s ontology. Van Inwagen proposes three criteria:

I concede, therefore, that avoiding ontological commitment by the method of
ontological reduction is something that can’t be done. What can be done,
however, is to remove merely apparent ontological commitments by
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paraphrase. One will succeed in this endeavor if (a) the original sentence seems
to imply the existence of so-and-so’s (which, for one reason or another, one
wishes not to affirm the existence of), (b) it is evident that the paraphrase does
not imply the existence of so-and-so’s (and hence does not mean the same as
the original), and (c) the ontological reduction could (in principle) be used for
all the same purposes as the original in the business of everyday life. (van
Inwagen 2014, 148)
The proposed criteria are not precise. The “original business of everyday life”, for
example, requires precisification. It’s not clear that sentence 1 and 2 above mean
precisely the same thing in “the original business of everyday life” any more than
“there is a chair” means “there are particles arranged chairwise”. We are brought back
to the issue mentioned in the preceding section: the link between the paraphrased
sentence and the paraphrase is not clear, especially given his claim that there are two
distinct contexts of utterance. How it is these contexts are to be bridged is not evident,
nor is the motive for wanting a bridge given that there are two distinct propositions.
Van Inwagen can perhaps avoid Alston’s dilemma by claiming that the purpose of
paraphrasing is only to dispense with seeming ontological commitments. If it is only
due to language use that a criminal believes in policemen, then paraphrasing away the
apparent reference to police may in fact put him at ease. But the situation is not the
same in the case of his wife and the chairs she speaks of. It is not, he claims, that his
wife makes only apparent reference to chairs; what she says is true without
qualification.106
A question I’ll return to in Chapter Three and Five is on what grounds does
one want to dispense with some ontological item such as holes? A contrast is often
made between Quine’s preference for “desert landscapes” and Meinong’s preference
for “jungles”. Quine, we saw above, appeals to parsimony as a virtue to assist in
cultivating a barren ontology, but it is not evident that parsimony, or any of the
theoretical virtues, are truth conducive in science, never mind philosophy (allowing
for the distinction). It will be shown that van Inwagen wants to be a nominalist, but he
can’t find a nominalistically acceptable paraphrase that dispenses with reference to
106

Van Inwagen spends a great deal of time in Material Beings (1990) defending his view against
various misrepresentations of it. I have some sympathy with his defences, but for reasons already given,
I find them ultimately unsatisfactory.
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abstract objects. Yet, he makes the curious claim that even if he could, that wouldn’t
be enough. Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment is touted by both Quine and
van Inwagen to be a strategy for deciding between competing ontologies. On the basis
of the seeming prejudice with respect to what should be paraphrased away, it is looking
less capable of providing this much needed service.

1.2.5.4 (5d) Identify the values of the variables that render the theory true
This final part of the strategy has been discussed already at various junctures of this
chapter so this section will be mainly an effort to bring those strands together. Quine
has various formulations of the claim that the referential force of a statement lies with
the variables in the quantifier-variable idiom, each with a slightly different emphasis
and each questionable on various grounds. For example, he claims:

To be is, purely and simply, to be the value of a [bound] variable. (Quine 1948,
32)107

. . . a theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound
variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the
affirmations made in the theory be true. (Quine 1948, 33)

To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the value
of a variable. (Quine 1931, 13)

We are convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if, and only if, the
alleged presupposition has to be reckoned among the entities over which our
variables range in order to render one of our affirmations true. (Quine 1948,
13)

Haack more accurately articulates Quine’s famous phrase: ‘Perhaps I may rewrite Quine’s slogan:
to be said to be is to be the value of a variable bound by an objectual quantifier; it’s less memorable,
but truer, that way! Notice, though, that Quine’s criterion now begins to look oddly oblique: as if one
discovered that a theory which says there are so-and-so’s is ontologically committed to so-and so’s by
first translating it into predicate calculus notation, and then appealing to the objectual interpretation of
the quantifiers to show that its existential theorems say that there are so-and-so’s’ (Haack 1978, 49).
107
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Whatever the subtleties between these claims,108 and the respective issues with each,109
the general thrust is clear: Quine removes the referential force and ontological
responsibility from both predicates and names, and relies solely on the variables of the
regimented sentences as a link between language and the world, or between word and
object. Quine seems to think that if names are eliminable then that is proof of their
ontological innocence. However, he also seems to have shown that variables
themselves are eliminable (Quine 1995) which casts doubt on at least one of his
reasons for dispensing with names for ontological purposes.
For van Inwagen, as shown above, a variable is simply a third person pronoun
and there is little mystery, he thinks, beyond that. In our final regimented sentences,
whatever the variable refers to in a true sentence, the theory is committed to. Enough
work has been done to throw caution on accepting his five theses without labouring
the point further. I return to the matter briefly in the next chapter in connection with
Lowe’s views on the role of variables. Lowe, we will see, is markedly critical of the
neo-Quinean view that one type of variable is sufficient for ontological purposes.

1.3 Three Additional Theses
Van Inwagen’s metaontology, as well as its shortcomings, should by now be
clear. In this section, I address three further theses relevant to his metaontology. I will
be particularly brief as they will each receive further treatment in Chapter Five. The
first, and most important, is his claim that neither metaphysical nor ontological theories
do any explanatory work. It is, I claim, central to his whole view of the ontological
project. Subsequently, I discuss thesis number six, flatology, where van Inwagen
objects to the idea that the world has ontological structure. Finally, I discuss his
contention that all the ontologist can do is offer arguments for various positions. This
is of interest, not only because it constrains the role of the ontologist, but because many
philosophers have considered explanations to be forms of argument, yet van Inwagen
denies ontological arguments are explanations.
108

I mentioned above that Chihara (1973) thought that each formulation had different implications.
For example, the inclusion of “must” in the second quotation suggests an intensional idiom rather
than an extensional idiom which Quine demanded. And Craig, making a different point, claims, ‘if
ontological commitment means that one is committed to those entities which must exist if the sentences
of a certain class are to be true, then it follows that we have no ontological commitments, since, given
the creativity of paraphrase, none of the postulated entities must exist’ (Craig 2016, 103).
109
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1.3.1 Thesis 6: The Non-Explanatory Nature of Ontology (Non-Explanation)
Van Inwagen is emphatic in his claim that neither metaphysicians nor
ontologists should attempt to explain. He avers:
I deny that explanatory theories have any place in metaphysics… But not all
theories are explanations. I have written a paper called “A Theory of
Properties” (van Inwagen 2004), but the “theory” presented in that paper does
not purport to explain anything – that is, it does not purport to explain how
something-or-other can be the case. It does not, for example, purport to explain
how it can be that two objects that are not identical in number are nevertheless
identical in some respect – identical in color, identical in shape, and so on. (Van
Inwagen 2018, 205)
In fact, he instructs all metaphysicians to ‘Stay out of the explanation business’ (van
Inwagen 2014, 217). I critically assess his theory of properties in Chapter Three and
discuss in detail the possible role of explanation in ontology in Chapter Five. Here, I
will just briefly sketch his rather extreme claim.
Unfortunately, van Inwagen doesn’t define the scope of his claim that
metaphysicians should refrain from providing explanations; that he is so emphatic
suggests that he intends it to be all embracing. Nor does he provide an account of what
he means by “explanation”. The term “explanation” is variously understood in the
different philosophical literatures in which it features. While analysis of the nature of
explanation has largely been the province of the philosophy of science in the twentieth
century, there is little consensus as to its nature even there (see, e.g., Newton-Smith
2000, 132).
One sense in which van Inwagen objects to explanations in the ontology room
is related to the more specific sense of metaphysical explanation. Metaphysical
explanation typically refers to non-causal relations, but this, I argue in Chapter Five,
is an unnecessary constriction. It is at times conflated with grounding relations, but
again, this conflation muddies the waters Explanation in metaphysics, as in most
disciplines, is standardly regarded as an epistemic matter that may track determination
and dependence relations (such as causation or grounding), but that the success and
virtue of an explanation is related to how it ameliorates the epistemic state of the
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inquiring agent. But there are complex and thorny issues here that require finesse and
fuller treatment.
He also objects to an explanatory strategy that is related to what he calls a
theory builder approach (van Inwagen 2016, 51). This is a more traditional approach
to metaphysics, and one that he ascribes (2004) to philosophers, such as David
Armstrong, but which is equally applicable to Lowe. It is, to all intents and purposes,
a form of inference to the best explanation, though I will note a distinction in Chapter
Five. The idea is that one starts with phenomena, some data to be explained, and then
proceeds to develop a theory to account for this data - usually invoking a variety of
primitives and theoretical virtues. Ontologists, according to van Inwagen, have no
tools at their disposal to offer any kind of explanation for any set of data. With respect
to the debate on the problem of character, which I discuss in Chapter Three, he claims:
If, therefore, one argues that immanent realism 110 is to be preferred to
transcendent realism because immanent realism better explains certain data
(e.g., that objects that are numerically diverse can nevertheless be identical in
a certain respect), that is in my view no argument at all – for there is and could
be no such thing as an explanation of those data. Or, more precisely, there is
no such thing as an explanation of those data that is of the sort the immanent
realist claims to provide or of the sort that transcendent realists who have rival
explanations of them claim to provide: explanations at whose core lies an
ontological analysis of being wise, of being white, of being bipedal, of being...
(and so on). And this is because there is and could be no such thing as an
ontological analysis of being wise or being white or being bipedal. (van
Inwagen 2016, 68; my emphasis)

Van Inwagen, we will see, claims that the only relevant explanation for the data that
features in the problem of character are provided for by the sciences or, perhaps,
contextual and pragmatic matters relevant to the matter at hand (e.g., the fence is white
because Tom painted it white).

110

Immanent realism and transcendent realism are contrasting positions on the problem of character,
the former often associated with Aristotle and the latter, with Plato. The nature of these positions will
become clear in Chapter Three.
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As mentioned above, van Inwagen links his ontological method with his
conviction that there are no ontological explanations. That is, one looks to sentences
that are affirmed true, puts them through the requisite neo-Quinean machinery of COC
and commits to the values of the variables of the regimented sentence. There is no
explaining here; just logical procedures the end result of which is a description. We
will see an illustration of this in Chapter Three with respect to the problem of
character. Enough has been done here to establish his claim and its link with his
proposed metaontology.

1.3.2 Thesis 7: No Levels of Being (Flatology)
Metaphysical explanation typically rests on the idea that the world has
ontological structure, or that there are levels of being. Van Inwagen objects to this
idea, but again, on the grounds that he doesn’t understand:

My principal reason for repudiating the idea of ontological structure is a reason
I have for repudiating this idea, but it is not one that I can expect anyone else
to share. This reason is a very straightforward one: I do not understand the idea
of ontological structure or, indeed, any of the ideas with which one ﬁnds it
entwined in the various constituent ontologies. I do not understand the words
and phrases that are the typical items of the core vocabulary of any given
constituent ontology. ‘Immanent universal’, ‘trope’, ‘exist wholly in’, ‘wholly
present wherever it is instantiated’, ‘constituent of’ (said of a universal and a
particular in that order): these are all mysteries to me. (van Inwagen 2014, 208)

I articulated earlier the dialectical futility of declarations of personal inabilities to
comprehend. However, just as with his claim not to understand substitutional
quantification discussed above, if he doesn’t understand it, he doesn’t think anybody
can. He has two principal papers addressing these related issues entitled “Against
Ontological Structure” and “Dispensing with Ontological Levels: An Illustration”. In
neither paper does he offer any sustained attack or any substantive argument against
the idea of levels of being or ontological structure. He provides an account of his
favoured ontology which he claims does not require an appeal to levels. Other than
that, there seems to be a mix of incomprehension and parsimony guiding his thought.
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Whatever about parsimony, his incomprehension is of little use to the philosophical
community except, perhaps, as a cautionary note.111 We are left only with insistence:

Substances are not grounded in abstract objects, nor are abstract objects
grounded in substances. Nor are some substances grounded in other substances
or some abstract objects grounded in other abstract objects—not, at any rate,
in any sense of “grounded in” that at all resembles the sense in which, e.g., the
set that contains Socrates and nothing else, a standard example of an entity that
is said to be grounded in an entity of another sort, is said to by those who use
this example to be grounded in Socrates. Substances and abstract objects,
moreover, do not occupy different ontological levels. They belong to radically
different ontological categories, yes, but there is nothing that could be meant
by saying that one of these categories was higher than the other. (van Inwagen
2014a, 42-43)
His idea is based on the conviction, not argument, that there are ‘no ontological
parasites’ (Ibid., 33); part of his proposal to dispense with any claims that there are is
to construct a theory that doesn’t require them. I italicize “construct” because it’s
surprising to read given his opposition to “theory-builders”, but I gather his way of
constructing is an indirect process through his method outlined above. He claims that
his ontology of composite objects outlined in his famous work Material Beings,
mentioned above, doesn’t appeal to levels as many have claimed. He says ‘I take just
a moment to insist—vehemently—that that metaphysic does not in any way involve
the idea of a plurality of ontological levels and goes on to say that for there to be a
level occupied by medium sized artefactual objects, such as chairs, there would have
to be chairs, but ‘there are no chairs.’ And further:

Nor does that metaphysic imply that electrons and mice inhabit different
ontological levels: electrons have no proper parts (so they say), and mice have
proper parts (whatever Aristotle may have supposed), but an electron and a
Craig thinks van Inwagen’s professions of incomprehension have a more severe effect: ‘We take it
for granted that if a notion is meaningful, then an intelligent and informed philosopher will be able to
make sense of it. So when a gifted philosopher informs us that after due reflection, he “doesn’t
understand” a certain notion, that is taken as a pretty damning criticism, a polite way of saying that
notion is unintelligible’ (Craig 2014, 553).
111
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mouse are both equally “there,” and the two phrases ‘has no proper parts’ and
‘has proper parts’ are not—at least so far as I can see—phrases that even seem
to be, that so much as represent themselves as, names of ontological levels.
(Ibid., 30)

I return to this matter in Chapter Five, claiming there that he has not done enough to
discredit the idea of ontological structure or levels of being. That does not
automatically bestow credibility on alternative views, but as we shall see, there are
compelling arguments from the neo-Aristotelian quarter that deserve attention. To
emphasise again, the relevance of his rejection of levels of being, and of ontological
structure of any kind, has to do with the connection between metaphysical explanation,
on the one hand, and explanation and metaontology on the other.

1.3.3 Thesis 8: Argument and Ontology (Argument)
If ontology doesn’t explain, what does it do? What kind of answers does it
provide? All the metaphysician, or ontologist, can do, according to van Inwagen, is to
provide arguments for a given position and, when regimented in first order predicate
logic, look to the logical entailment of the arguments provided.
There is an extensive literature on both the nature of argumentation and the
nature of explanation. Without navigating too finely the precise nature and role of
argument in ontology, it will be instructive to reflect on some of van Inwagen’s views
which impact on his ontological methodology. In this regard, there are five points
worth mentioning.
The first interesting point van Inwagen makes is that philosophical arguments
ought not be treated as proofs; philosophical theories, he claims, have fallen farcically
short of the demonstrative ideal. He opines that a successful mathematical proof, for
example, is an argument which should convince anybody who understand it that the
conclusion is true (van Inwagen 2003, 97). Philosophical arguments are not like this,
in his view. He says that ‘The idea that there are proofs in philosophy as there are
proofs in mathematics is ridiculous, or not far short of it; nevertheless, it is an all but
irresistible idea’ (van Inwagen 2003, 37). 112 More precisely, he claims that ‘in
He says elsewhere, against William Lane Craig’s critique of his position: ‘I find it puzzling,
incidentally, that some critics of current analytical ontology should think that they are making some sort
112
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philosophy there are no proofs of any positive, substantive philosophical thesis’ (van
Inwagen 2015, 299). In fact, he claims: ‘I doubt whether any philosophical argument
for any important philosophical position whatever has been found convincing by more
than 30 percent of the philosophers who have encountered it’ (van Inwagen 2015, 299300). While empirical work would be required to substantiate such a claim, and what
constitutes a “positive substantive philosophical thesis” requires precisification, the
figure highlights the difficulty, in van Inwagen’s view, of propounding theories
commanding assent. In fact, he has a rather low estimation of the amount of
metaphysical theories that even manage to make sense: ‘As I’ve said many times,
meaninglessness is what we risk in doing metaphysics; what one risks in metaphysics
isn’t being wrong—except in the sense in which someone who believes that a cube
root can be extracted with a forceps is “wrong.” What we risk is not even being
wrong.)’ (van Inwagen 2017, 351).113
If arguments are not proofs, what is it that constitutes a good philosophical
argument? And how are we to distinguish between two seemingly equally good
arguments? This brings us to the second point: arguments are best judged, he thinks,
not by one philosopher debating another philosopher; rarely does one convince the
other. Arguments are best judged, rather, by how well each philosopher in a debate
can convince a neutral ideal observer, something he calls the forensic model (van
Inwagen 2003, 44). This is an interesting barometer, but highly idealized and not
practicable given the inability to conjure up an observer in a truly neutral way.
The third point is that arguments have probative force, according to van
Inwagen; that is, they are forms of evidence (van Inwagen 2003, 18). To present an
argument for a conclusion just is to present evidence for that conclusion. He thinks
that evidence and argument could potentially be conflated in philosophy given their

of case against ontology by pointing to the undoubted fact that ontological disputes seem to be
unresolvable. All philosophical disputes—at least those of any consequence—are unresolvable, or at
any rate give every evidence of being so. The ubiquity of disagreement among ontologists is precisely
on a par with the ubiquity of disagreement among philosophers of mind, philosophers of language,
epistemologists, moral philosophers, political philosophers.…’ (van Inwagen 2020, 10-11).
113
And similarly: ‘Meaninglessness is what we risk in metaphysics. It’s a rare metaphysical sentence
that does manage to express a proposition and expresses a false one—and on those rare occasions on
which a metaphysical sentence does do that (“The physical world has always existed” might be an
example), that is generally because a metaphysician has encroached on someone else’s territory. If my
metaphysical writings contain meaningless sentences, and no doubt they contain a good many of them,
that is simply because I’m doing my job—trying to work out a metaphysical position. If I weren’t willing
to risk saying and writing things that were, in Wolfgang Pauli’s immortal phrase, not even wrong, I’d
take up the history of philosophy’ (van Inwagen 2014, 212).
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tight connection (van Inwagen 2003, 18).114 He goes to great lengths avoiding the use
of the term “explanation”.
Even if they are a form of evidence, what is to be said about those who have
the same evidence, but disagree? This brings us to the fourth point which is that it is
perfectly rational, he believes, for two philosophers to be privy to the same evidence
and to disagree with the conclusion, yet be rationally justified in doing so:

I will say first that I think that no philosophical argument whose conclusion is
a positive, substantive proposition… need convince those who perfectly
understand it that its conclusion is true… But I am convinced that someone of
high intelligence and unexceptionable intellectual honesty could understand
these arguments perfectly and nevertheless reject their conclusions – and not
thereby convict himself or herself of irrationality. (van Inwagen 2019, 29)115

He arrives at this conclusion after he rejects various unappealing positions that would
hold that either philosopher in the debate were in some way cognitively defective.
Citing a famous debate between himself and David Lewis where there was
disagreement on the problem of free will and its compatibility with determinism, he
thinks it is inappropriate to consider either of them to lack philosophical acuity, or to
presume one has superior cognitive architecture allowing ready insight into the truth
of the matter.
If neither metaphysics nor ontology explains, and there are no successful
positive substantive metaphysical theses, how does one choose between competing
“unsuccessful” arguments? The fifth and final point highlights a concern about
philosophical methodology more broadly:

He claims elsewhere: ‘Whatever evidence may be, what one’s evidence for a certain belief is
certainly has a great deal to do with how one would answer the question, ‘Why do you think that?’.
More exactly, it has a great deal to do with how one would answer that question when the question is
understood in what one might call its epistemic sense. ‘Why do you think that?’ (where ‘that’ is a
philosophical thesis) by presenting one or more arguments for the thesis in question. It is, in fact, not
easy to see what other kind of answer to this question there could be. It seems plausible to say that in
philosophy evidence is argument – or at least that to present evidence is present one or more arguments’
(van Inwagen 2009, 22). Again, he avoids the claim that what is offered is an explanation.
115
See Uwe Meixner for a contrasting view who claims that ‘All controversies I will consider are, in
my view, intellectually unsatisfactory’ (2019, 83).
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If two metaphysical theories are in competition, no experiment will decide
between them. They will not differ about how the World will look to an
observer, no matter how sophisticated the observer’s instruments may be. It is
likely, therefore, that a metaphysician’s position is going to be, to a significant
degree, a reflection of certain biases, however much it may also owe to
evidence and argument. It is likely that there will be certain theses the
metaphysician would have accepted no matter what evidence or what
arguments had come to his or her attention. (van Inwagen 2009b, 18; italics
added)

This is not a matter confined to metaphysics and ontology, however. Why does one
prefer a political position over another, or some ethical stance rather than another? But
it is no less important a question because it is so widespread. In pursuing the question
there is a danger of foregoing philosophical efforts to resolve the problem and instead
wander into other territory, such as psychology or sociology, to find an answer.
Nonetheless, it is a pressing point: if one’s metaontological commitments and the
method employed to discern what there is rests as much on bias as it does on argument,
then the whole ontological enterprise is in danger of being somewhat arbitrary.

1.4 Conclusion
In this rather lengthy chapter, I provided an exposition and critique of van
Inwagen’s neo-Quinean metaontology. His five metaontological “theses” were shown
in various ways to be problematic. He does not do enough, I contend, to justify
distinctive aspects of his proposed methodology and does little to commend his
approach to the wider ontological community. I then very briefly discussed three
further theses that inform his ontological practice. The most central of these was his
claim that ontological theories do no explanatory work. While the nature of
explanation in ontology is the subject matter of Chapter Five, in Chapter Three, I
provide an illustration of van Inwagen’s ontological approach in connection with the
problem of character. In the next chapter, I turn to Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian
metaontology which is in stark contrast to the views outlined in this chapter.
One final point is worth mentioning before closing this chapter. Van Inwagen
has recently (2014) provided a second definition of ontology which appears, at least
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initially, to contrast with the account discussed in this chapter. In a surprising shift in
metaontological emphasis he claims: ‘Ontology, as I see ontology, rests on the
following assumption: there are ontological categories. We may, in fact, define
ontology as the discipline whose business is to specify the ontological categories’ (van
Inwagen 2014, 2). This distinctively Aristotelian definition is surprising, especially
given the standard Quinean rejection of Aristotelian inspired metaphysics and
ontology. But it will be more instructive to discuss this in the following chapter in
connection with Lowe’s metaontology which is centrally concerned with identifying
the categorial structure of realty.
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CHAPTER 2. NEO-ARISTOTELIAN METAONTOLOGY:
EDWARD JONATHAN LOWE
It just isn’t good enough to say,
with W. V. Quine, that the
fundamental
question
of
ontology is “What is there?”,
and that its most concise
answer
is
“Everything”.
Ontology is concerned above
all with the categorial structure
of reality – the division of
reality into fundamental types
of entity and their ontological
relations with one another.
(Lowe 2013, 51)
We have still to explain… how
metaphysics… is possible and
what its method of inquiry
should be…. Indeed, it is
probably one of the hardest
questions in metaphysics, and
it would be crazy to begin any
area of investigation with the
most difficult questions that
that area throws up. (Lowe
2009, 104)
… metaphysics always buries
those who try to write its
obituary. (Lowe 2011, 100)

2.0 Introduction
This chapter concerns the neo-Aristotelian metaontology of E.J. Lowe. As
mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, I do not claim that neo-Aristotelianism is
a uniform position with Lowe as the single best representative. Neo-Aristotelian
metaontology can be characterised as a cluster of related positions defined almost as
much by its debt to Aristotle as by its reaction to neo-Quinean metaontology. The debt
to Aristotle is often tenuous and amounts to being inspired in a loose way by the
method and doctrines of Aristotle’s work; the objection to neo-Quinean metaontology
is often dramatic and hostile. Lowe is particularly vocal in his objections to neo-
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Quineanism, and he is representative of the kind of metaontology neo-Quineans, such
as van Inwagen, claim to be problematic, and even meaningless.
It was demonstrated in the last chapter that interpretations of the existential
quantifier play a central role in much of the metaontological literature. I quoted Ted
Sider who claimed that it was, in fact, the central question (Sider 2009, 397). Such
matters do not consume Lowe’s attention and are in certain ways far removed from his
metaontological concerns. Existential quantification features in his work largely as
part of his critique of neo-Quinean metaontology, which he takes to be an
impoverished form of what ontology should be. Lowe does endorse a first-order logic,
one he calls “sortal logic”, which is a form of free logic. It is free in that there is an
unloaded or non-objectual sense of existential quantification, but it does not play a key
role in his writings.116 Lowe’s metaontology, therefore, may appear unconventional to
those steeped in the Quinean tradition, but that is precisely the reason for choosing
such a figure as a contrast.
In what follows, I extract from Lowe’s copious works what I deem to be central
features of his metaontology and consolidate them in nine theses which I introduce in
the following section. I begin in section 2.1 with some preliminaries highlighting
certain complications in presenting Lowe’s metaontology in a simple and direct
manner. Subsequently, as just mentioned, I introduce his metaontological theses which
I discuss in turn in the succeeding nine sections, identifying various challenges that
Lowe’s approach faces at each stage. However, the primary aim of the chapter is
expository, though certain challenges to his approach will naturally emerge throughout
each section.
By the end of this chapter, a clear contrast between van Inwagen’s neo-Quinean
metaontology and Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian metaontology will be evident. I will then
be in a position to illustrate their respective metaontologies in Chapter Three and Four
with respect to the first-order problem of character. I conclude this chapter with the
claim that Lowe’s approach to ontology, despite its many challenges, is more
promising than van Inwagen’s neo-Quinean metaontology.

116

This is discussed briefly below. See his Forms of Thought (2013) for an elaboration of this sortal
logic.
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2.1 Lowe’s Neo-Aristotelian Metaontology: Some Preliminaries
In this section, I discuss some obstacles in presenting Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian
metaontology in a succinct and systematic way.
Lowe is an adventurous and ambitious philosopher. His metaphysical 117
system endeavours not only to provide an intellectual foundation for the sciences,118
but for any rational activity seeking to gain knowledge of the world. Though his
metaontology is clearly neo-Aristotelian, and ontological method is a subject that is
frequently and directly discussed in his works, it is still difficult to articulate his
position in precise terms. This is so for several reasons.
To articulate the first of these reasons, it is helpful to distinguish between the
target, tasks and method of ontological inquiry. Superficially at least, the target of neoQuinean ontology is what there is: it’s task is to provide an inventory of what there is,
or what a theory says there is, and the method to do so is in accordance with Quine’s
criterion of ontological commitment discussed at length in Chapter One. It is not so
easy to delineate Lowe’s target, task, and method, for he often conflates this
trichotomy in various ways under what might be labelled more broadly a “conception”,
or what he calls a ‘characterization’ of ontology (Lowe 2008, 277). This conception,
this metaontology, is bound up with his first-order practice of ontology, much of which
is both complex and controversial. To discuss his metaontology is to be embroiled in
an unfortunate number of intricate ontological debates. In contrast, very little of van
Inwagen’s first-order ontological commitments needed to be discussed when
articulating his metaontology.
A second difficulty is that, as well as conflating the above trichotomy, he
provides several distinct, though related, characterizations of ontology. He refrains
from providing a “definition” of ontology or metaphysics for he’s aware that any such
definition could not be metaphysically neutral.119 Ontology, then, or metaphysics, is
equally described as the science120 of essence, the science of being, and the science of
In this chapter, more than others, the terms “metaphysics” and “ontology” are used interchangeably.
For Lowe, metaphysics is at the core of all philosophy, and ontology is at the core of metaphysics; there
is no way clear way to extricate them.
118
The subtitle of his most famous work, The Four Category Ontology, for example, is A Metaphysical
Foundation for Natural Science (Lowe 2006).
119
He says, in relation to a different matter, for example: ‘…I won’t say definitions, since I rather dislike
definitions, finding them, for the most part, either tendentious, vacuous, or useless…’ (Lowe 2008, 277).
120
His notion of “science” is perhaps more akin to the German “wissenschaft” which has a related but
somewhat broader meaning. He says: ‘However, before proceeding, let me emphasize that by “science”
117
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possibility. He emphasizes that he regards the ‘three characterizations as being entirely
complementary and, indeed, as implying each other’ (Lowe 2008, 278). These
characterisations are synthesized in the ‘study of the most fundamental structure of
reality as a whole’ (Ibid., 277). Insofar as these represent the target and tasks of
ontology, the task is accomplished by ‘identifying the ontological categories to which
entities belong’ (Lowe 2011, 100). There is frequently a conflation of “metaphysics”
and “ontology” in his writings, which in itself is no bad thing given that such
separations are largely artificial, but again, it makes it more difficult to precisify an
ontological method to compare with the relative simplicity of van Inwagen’s structure.
A third difficulty concerns the relationship between ontology and science.
Lowe sees ontology to be in some sense prior to empirical research. What he might
mean by this is discussed in detail below. The general idea is that while ontology is
concerned with what there is, with how things exist and with what is fundamental, it
is essentially a modal enterprise primarily concerned, in a fallibilistic way, with what
is possible and compossible. In practice, however, science and ontology are supposed
to work together, each informing the other in a symbiotic way, in a kind of
‘bootstrapping’ relationship (Tahko 2012, 56). This makes it difficult to treat the
“pure” part of his ontology, the a priori part, in isolation from the empirical, or a
posteriori part, while also remaining respectful to the bootstrapping relationship. The
difficulty is somewhat loosely summed up by L.A. Paul who declares:

There is a complication: each metaphysical theory is drawn partly from
experience, but it also organizes experience, and thus its success cannot be
understood independently from its interpretation. Since the world is, in a sense,
seen through the lens of the metaphysical theory, any metaphysical theory is
confirmable only indirectly, and as part of a whole package. (Paul 2012, 7)

There is a tension, then, between ontology as an autonomous discipline with its own
sui generis methods and subject matter,121 and its intertwinement and dependency on

in this context I emphatically do not mean empirical science…. In this respect, in this context, I just
mean a systematic and rationally constrained study of some subject-matter, issuing in objective
knowledge about it’ (Lowe 2008, 278-279).
121
Though Paul (2012), in contrast to Lowe, claims that ontology has the same method as the sciences,
just a distinct subject matter.
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the sciences, at least with respect to what is fundamental.122 Whatever the difficulties,
the task in front of me is to articulate central features of his metaontology, to which I
now turn.
To help mitigate these challenges, I consolidate Lowe’s metaontology in the
form of nine metaontological theses,123 some with their own sub-theses. Only certain
of these are methodological, but the others, in one way or another, guide and inform
his ontological practice. The divisions I make among the theses are not entirely neat,
given that they are interrelated in various ways. Breaking things up in this manner is
useful for making his metaontology more tractable. The theses are as follows:

1) The Indispensability Thesis
2) The Primacy of Ontology
3) The Directness of Ontology
4) The A Prioricity Thesis
5) The Essentialist Thesis
6) The Possibility Thesis
7 The Categorial Thesis
8) The Centrality of Ontology
9) Truthmaker Theory

I begin in the next section to elucidate these nine theses, each of which is given a
dedicated section. Before concluding, in the penultimate section, I contrast core
aspects of Lowe’s metaontology with van Inwagen’s from the previous chapter.

2.2 Lowe’s Neo-Aristotelian Metaontological Theses
In the following nine sections, then, I provide an exposition and critique of
Lowe’s metaontology. While this involves a close analysis of some first-order
problems, as mentioned in the introduction, I’m centrally concerned with the

122

Ontology is relevant to forms of inquiry outside of the sciences, questions regarding the existence of
fictional objects, for example, but Lowe’s metaontology is largely discussed in connection with his
attempt to provide a metaphysical framework for the sciences.
123
I use the word “theses” to align with van Inwagen’s terminology, which I noted in the previous
chapter is not the best choice of words.
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epistemological and methodological aspects of his approach which I try to extract and
elucidate.

2.2.1 The Indispensability Thesis
The first thesis, the Indispensability Thesis, amounts to the claim that
metaphysics is a ‘rationally indispensable intellectual discipline’ that is a prerequisite
for all intellectual inquiry, including the sciences (Lowe 2011, 99). There are several
aspects to this supposed indispensability. A first concerns the idea that every
intellectual discipline presupposes a metaphysics. Put crudely, if physics is concerned
with fundamental features of the universe, then it must have some conception of
“fundamentality”, which is arguably a metaphysical notion. If biology is concerned
with living organisms, it must have some conception, implicitly or explicitly, of what
constitutes the existence, identity and persistence conditions of the organisms it
studies. Such conditions are arguably metaphysical notions. If the various sciences
make use of laws of nature, then some conception of these laws is required which,
again, is arguably a metaphysical matter. Metaphysics, for Lowe, is indispensable in
this sense insofar as it provides an intellectual ground for the practice of these other
disciplines.
A second aspect of the Indispensability Thesis is related to Lowe’s claim,
discussed in the next section, that metaphysics is first philosophy. One feature of first
philosophy is the claim that metaphysics is the only discipline appropriately positioned
to unite all the intellectual disciplines due to the generality of its subject matter.
Metaphysics, for Lowe, is concerned with being qua being, 124 whereas all other
disciplines are concerned with only portions of being: physics with matter and energy,
biology with living organisms, psychology with the mind and so forth. The relatively
parochial concerns of these other disciplines, Lowe claims, elevates metaphysics to
this privileged position.

There are a variety of ways “being qua being” might be understood. Friedo Ricken highlights several
possibilities of what Aristotle might have meant: ‘Book I (Α) determines “the science we are searching
for” (983a21) as “wisdom”, i.e. a science of the first principles and causes (982a2). Book IV (Γ) begins
as follows: “There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this
in virtue of its own” (1003a21f.). Book VI (Ε) declares as its task: “We are seeking the principles and
the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them qua being” (1025b3f.). According to Book XII
(Λ), it is about the ousia, the essence or substance. “The subject of our inquiry is the ousia, for the
principles and the causes we are seeking are those of the ousia” (1069a18f.)’ (Ricken 2012, 105).
124
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This aspect of the indispensability thesis is predicated on what Lowe calls
alethic monism (Lowe 2006, 177). Alethic monists typically endorse a principle of
invariance, which can be defined as follows: ‘The nature of truth is uniform or
invariant across discipline or sector of discourse’ (Wright et al. 2010, 2). Lowe claims,
for example, that ‘Metaphysics, as traditionally conceived, is very arguably
ineliminable and conceptually necessary as the intellectual backdrop for every other
discipline. Why? Ultimately, this is because truth is single and indivisible or, to put it
another way, because the world or reality as a whole is unitary and necessarily selfconsistent’ (Lowe 2013a, 128). This indivisibility of truth is not quite argued for, but
is, rather, a default position which Lowe appeals to due to the apparent incoherence of
its competitors. However, he goes on to say that:
…the argument from the indivisibility of truth is not absolutely essential to the
defence of metaphysics, in the sense that metaphysics would be left completely
without justiﬁcation in its absence – which, once again, should not surprise us,
because everything, including even the question of whether truth is indivisible,
is potentially open to metaphysical inquiry. (Lowe 2013a, 130)

The indivisibility of truth is indeed questionable. I look below to some contrary
positions and to Lowe’s opposition to them. It is enough here to point out the
connection between alethic monism and indispensability with respect to Lowe’s
conception of metaphysics.
In defending alethic monism, Lowe employs a particular argumentative
strategy, which features prominently in his work. It takes the form of what I call the
argument from metaphysics. This appellation is made through analogy with the
controversial argument from reason, which is found in the apologetic works of G.K.
Chesterton (1905, 1908) and C.S. Lewis (1947), as well as philosophers such as Arthur
Balfour (1894) and J.P. Moreland (1989). The argument has recently been extended
and promulgated by Alvin Plantinga in the form of his evolutionary argument against
naturalism (1993). Plantinga argues that if reason is the product of blind evolution
through random selection, then there is little justification to trust that our reason tracks
truth and consequently, no reason to believe that the theory of evolution, or any theory
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for that matter, is true in any significant sense.125 The argument, in the hands of the
theist, is intended to lead one to the indispensable idea of a Creator who designed the
world, and thus, gives ground to reason. Lowe similarly claims that any attempt to
dispense with metaphysical reasoning, or even reduce it to a lesser form, such as
conceptualism or Kantianism, 126 leads to vacuity or incoherence. He employs a
similar, informal argument against the naturalistic reduction of metaphysics in
“Metaphysical Knowledge” (Lowe 2013, Chapter 9). The kind of naturalism to which
Lowe objects will become clear as we proceed. Effectively, then, Lowe follows
Francis Herbert Bradley’s reasoning who states in the introduction to Appearance and
Reality, that ‘The man who is ready to prove that metaphysical knowledge is wholly
impossible… is a brother metaphysician with a rival theory of first principles’ (Bradley
1893, 1). We will see this argumentative strategy recur throughout this chapter.
A third aspect of the Indispensability Thesis concerns the claim that both
metaphysics and ontology are primarily concerned with possibility. This is a
controversial position that is central to Lowe’s conception and, again, is discussed
further below in section 2.2.6. The general idea is that while the sciences are concerned
with what is actual, actuality presupposes possibility, and possibility is the proper
domain of ontology, thus making ontology indispensable to the practice of science.

2.2.2 The Primacy of Metaphysics
The second metaontological thesis, that metaphysics is first philosophy, is
sometimes called the primacy of metaphysics (Simons 2018). It is not entirely clear
what this meant for Aristotle, for he never employed the term as such, nor
circumscribed some singular discipline that was first philosophy. He seems variously
to have meant the subject that dealt with fundamental things, or things in themselves –
being qua being, or perhaps first causes or principles. He may even have meant
something that might more accurately be called theology.127 What does seem to be
Darwin evidently had similar concerns. In a letter to William Graham he wrote: ‘But then with me
the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from
the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the
convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?’ (Darwin 1881).
126
I discuss each of these below as representative of antirealist position to which Lowe is fervently
opposed.
127
Cohen remarks, for example: ‘Whereas natural science studies objects that are material and subject
to change, and mathematics studies objects that although not subject to change are nevertheless not
separate from (i.e., independent of) matter, there is still room for a science that studies things (if indeed
125
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clear, as Cohen illuminates, is that for Aristotle, this ‘study does not concern some
recondite subject matter known as “being qua being”. Rather it is a study of being, or
better, of beings—of things that can be said to be—that studies them in a particular
way: as beings, in so far as they are beings’ (Cohen 2016).
For Lowe, the main idea of first philosophy is articulated in opposition to
various conceptions of naturalism which seek either to dispense with metaphysics, or
to make metaphysics subservient to the sciences, though the term “naturalism” is
notoriously difficult to refine as discussed briefly in Chapter One. While Lowe is in
many respects a naturalist, on one construal of the term, he maintains that metaphysics
is in certain ways prior to the sciences, and sees his main work as providing a
metaphysical framework for the sciences. He claims that ‘Metaphysics and empirical
science are not “continuous” with each other in any sense which implies that they have
the same goals and methods, or that metaphysics is just the extension of empirical
science to questions of greater generality than any that are addressed by the so-called
“special sciences”’ (Lowe 2009a, 101-2). However, many neo-Quineans, including
van Inwagen, which was demonstrated in Chapter One, have dispensed with Quine’s
naturalistic reductionism, and many neo-Aristotelians, Tuomas Tahko for instance,
claim that it is misplaced to demand the naturalization of neo-Aristotelian metaphysics
for it already is naturalized. Tahko claims, ‘the call for naturalization is deeply
mistaken: not only is Aristotelian metaphysics already naturalised, it is also a
necessary precursor of all scientific activities’ (2012, 27). By already naturalised,
Tahko seems to mean that Aristotelian metaphysics is inextricably bound up with the
sciences to form a complete picture of the world.128 In many ways, as Edward Feser
remarks, ‘Modern philosophy began with a rebellion against the Aristotelianism of the
Scholastics and has, to a large extent, always been defined by it’ (Feser 2013, 1). It is
to be expected, then, that contemporary neo-Aristotelianism meets with some strong
opposition. Ladyman et al., for example, who derogatively call contemporary analytic
metaphysics ‘scholastic metaphysics’, claim that it ‘contributes nothing to human
knowledge and, where it has any impact at all, systematically misrepresents the relative
there are any) that are eternal, not subject to change, and independent of matter. Such a science,
[Aristotle] says, is theology, and this is the “first” and “highest” science. Aristotle’s identification of
theology, so conceived, with the study of being qua being has proved challenging to his interpreters’
(Cohen 2020).
128
One could be a neo-Aristotelian in the scholastic tradition and not be naturalistic when it comes to
religious or theological matters, but Lowe doesn’t appear to fit in this camp and there’s little need to
pursue that avenue here.
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significance of what we do know on the basis of science’ (2007, vii). 129 We shall
explore in more detail further opposition below.
As Lowe claims: ‘metaphysics goes deeper than any merely empirical science,
even physics, because it provides the very framework within which such sciences are
conceived and related to one another’ (Lowe 2002, vi). It is this aspect of Lowe’s
metaontology that is most traditional and that I find most compelling. The idea that
metaphysics can provide a framework within which the sciences can find a rational
basis is perhaps the defining feature distinguishing the neo-Aristotelians and neoQuineans. As we saw in Chapter One, Quine claimed that ‘It is within science itself,
and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described’ (Quine
1981, 21). And further, that naturalism ‘sees natural science as an inquiry into reality,
fallible and corrigible but not answerable to any supra-scientific tribunal, and not in
need of any justification beyond observation and the hypothetico-deductive method’
(Ibid., 72). Van Inwagen, while rejecting Quine’s naturalism, maintains the Quinean
position that metaphysics can offer little that is valuable to the sciences (van Inwagen
2014, 19).
Lowe divides the labour of ontology in two: ontology proper, or ‘pure
ontology’, inquires into ontological possibility and then ontology, with the aid of
empirical research, inquires subsequently into what from this possibility space is
actual.130 He says:

So, if pure metaphysics is aptly described as an inquiry into the space of
possibilities, then applied metaphysics—or “cosmology”, in the original sense
of that term—may aptly be described as the attempt, conducted with the aid of
the various natural sciences, to establish the fundamental structure of reality as

Incidentally, Tahko provides a nice rejoinder: ‘the manner in which Ladyman and Ross characterize
“neo-scholastic metaphysics” is almost as misinformed about the nature of Aristotelian metaphysics as
Aristotle perhaps was about natural science’ (Tahko 2012, 34).
130
He puts it rather succinctly here: ‘Pure metaphysics, then, is that form of inquiry whose object it is
to explore and delimit the space of possibility—to determine which worlds are genuinely possible—
and this is a form of inquiry which precedes and is presupposed by any form of empirical inquiry, such
as the natural sciences. But pure metaphysics cannot establish which of all the possible worlds is
actual—which such world is this world. For that, appeal must be made to empirical evidence, the best
of which is provided by the mature natural sciences. Determining what is actually the case, then, requires
a combination of metaphysics and natural science, which consequently complement each other rather
than being in competition’ (Lowe 2014, 259).
129
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a whole. In this respect, metaphysics has an a posteriori as well as an a priori
dimension. (Lowe 2014, 259)131

I do not find this conception of ontology particularly compelling for several
reasons, two of which I’ll mention here. The first is because there are aspects of
ontology, such as the problem of character discussed in Chapter Three and Four, that
don’t seem to fit this picture. Many of the distinctly ontological posits (universals,
properties, modes, tropes, relations of instantiation, etc.), while possible, don’t appear
to be the kinds of entities that can be substantiated by empirical testing, at least not
directly. All the empirical evidence is in, so to speak, and it is unclear by what criteria
we can non-arbitrarily choose between competing theories. 132 But I discuss this at
some length in Chapter Four and Five. Second, it’s not clear that a strict division can
be drawn between a priori and a posteriori reasoning such that there can be a precise
distinction between pure metaphysics and cosmology.133 Lowe, to some extent concurs
and, as mentioned above, thinks that metaphysics and the sciences work in a
bootstrapping relationship. He claims, for example:

The growth of objective knowledge consists, then, in a constant interplay
between an a priori element — knowledge of essence134 — and an a posteriori
element, the empirical testing of existential hypotheses whose possibility has
already been anticipated a priori. This process does not have a foundational
“starting point” and it is constantly subject to critical reappraisal, both with
regard to its a priori ingredients and with regard to its empirical contributions.
(Lowe 2013, 156)135
As Oderberg mentions in agreement: ‘Metaphysics may be the science of being qua being, to use
Aristotle’s celebrated phrase, but although we begin with being we do not end with it: we want to know
about the specific objects, the objects with specific natures, in the world around us’ (Oderberg 2007,
12).
132
Earl Conee somewhat shares my concern: ‘This new view may allow metaphysics to have exclusive
claim to its topics. The view has its own liabilities, however. It seems to leave out much that goes on in
the name of metaphysics. For instance, there is the question of whether or not we actually have free
will. Answering this question seems as much part of metaphysics as answering the questions of what
free will must be and what it might have been. Similarly, the question of why there actually is something
rather than nothing seems to be about a contingent fact. Yet this question is as metaphysical as anything
is’ (Conee 2005, 236).
133
Tahko seems to concur and claims ‘it is exceedingly difficult to pick out an example of a posteriori
or a priori knowledge that would be pure’ (Tahko 2011, 155).
134
Lowe’s conception of essence, which is central to his metaontology, is discussed below.
135
And again: ‘Here I should say that I see the proper relationship between scientific and metaphysical
thinking as being one of complementarity and cooperation, rather than one of opposition and rivalry.
131
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There is a tension, it seems, then, between Lowe’s claim that ontology is a sui generis
discipline with a distinct subject matter and methodology, and its seemingly
inextricable involvement with the empirical sciences. I will have more to say about
purported interplay of ontology and science below, as well as concerns about the
epistemology of a priori reasoning.

2.2.3 Metaphysics Done Directly
Given that metaphysics is indispensable, according to Lowe, and that it is
accorded the status of first philosophy, how is it to be done? Simply put: directly. In
fact, Lowe claims that ‘The slogan for my preferred conception of metaphysical
method might well be this: metaphysics must be done directly’ (Lowe 2013a. 126).
Yet, though this is a central methodological claim, he does not advance many positive
arguments in its favour. Rather, he appeals to this pre-modern136 conception and looks
to its rich lineage, from Aristotle through to, but not including, Descartes - the reasons
for which will become clear shortly. It is not quite evident, then, what he means by
done directly. But it is clear what he does not mean: ‘What I am opposing is the view
– so widespread that it often goes unspoken – that metaphysics, to the extent that it can
be done at all, has to be done through the medium of some other branch of philosophy,
such as epistemology, logic, philosophical semantics, or the philosophy of mind’
(Lowe 2013a, 126). For example, Lowe is particularly hostile (e.g. Lowe 2007, 238)
to the neo-Quineans who he claims attempt to do metaphysics primarily through logic
and language. In some respects, this can seem like a caricature of the neo-Quinean
position but in fact, as we saw in Chapter One, it is not far from the truth. The emphasis
on language, we saw, is clear: it was shown that the neo-Quinean at best seems to be
in a position to claim, not what exists, but only to what a given set of sentences is
ontologically committed. With respect to logic, the neo-Quineans endorse a very
particular construal of predicate logic which constrains the kind of entities that can

Both have as their ultimate aim a closer coincidence between the way we think of the world and the
way the world is: in short, both are concerned with the pursuit of objective truth’ (Lowe 2009, 7).
136
Regarding this pre-modern conception, he says: ‘This is to promote a certain conception of the
methodology of metaphysics which is regrettably still very much in abeyance, largely on account of the
dominance of, ﬁrst, epistemology, and then the philosophy of language, in the Western philosophical
tradition of the last 300 years’ (Lowe 2002, 126).
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occupy the domain of the quantifier. I’ll return to a discussion of Lowe’s criticism of
neo-Quineanism below.
Lowe attributes the contemporary indirectness of metaphysical method to the
‘pernicious’ (Lowe 2013a, 126) effect of the moderns, beginning with Descartes and
reinforced by Locke, Hume and Kant, each of whom contributed to the displacement
of metaphysics as central to efforts to comprehend objective reality. 137 Peter Simons
provides a nice overview of this historical development:

The critical turn in philosophy, starting with Descartes and Locke, and leading
to the metaphysical deflationism of Hume, pushed metaphysics away from its
regal position in philosophy. Kant strove to rescue metaphysics from Hume’s
criticisms by confining it to the sphere of our cognition, leaving mindindependent reality outside the pale. History repeated itself over a century later
when Quine, Strawson, and Dummett strove to rehabilitate metaphysics after
the positivist onslaught by making it an adjunct to semantics. The result was in
each case the same: to relativize what exists to our linguistic or conceptual
scheme, and so to approach that most evil of philosophical positions: idealism.
(Simons 2018, 39)

Not only has the effect been pernicious, according to Lowe, the very attempt, he
claims, is without substance, a claim related to the Indispensability and first philosophy
theses: ‘What is particularly absurd about this view is that each of these branches of
philosophy has, inevitably, certain distinctively metaphysical commitments which
cannot possibly be warranted by doing metaphysics in the way that the view
recommends’ (Lowe 2013a, 126). We see here an example of the argument from
metaphysics: any attempt to relegate metaphysics from its position as first philosophy,
according to Lowe, requires an appeal to metaphysics in which to do so.
We can perhaps get closer to what he means by done directly by addressing
some related theses. Contained within this view are three sub-theses: a) metaphysical
realism, b) epistemic realism and c) receptivism. Each claim is highly contentious and
He goes on to claim that ‘All that sustains the view in the face of this absurdity, as far as I can see,
is the unspoken conviction of so many philosophers that metaphysics cannot be done, as I put it,
“directly”. I think we owe this pernicious conviction in large measure to the “modernist” legacy of
Descartes, Hume, and Kant – great philosophers all of them, but all philosophers whose work
contributed to the demotion of metaphysics from its central role in philosophy’ (Lowe 2013a, 126-7).
137
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are such big philosophical concerns that I can here only provide a cursory discussion
of them. Such views underscore his claim that a priori rational reflection is a legitimate
kind of reasoning which provides access to how the world (possibly) is.
Regarding a) metaphysical realism, though there are many varieties of this
view, and the matter is discussed further in Chapter Five, a central feature of the idea,
according to Lowe, is that there is an ‘ultimate nature of mind-independent reality’
(Lowe 2009a, 99).138 Metaphysical realism, he claims, is also committed to a form of
essentialism (Lowe 2008, 9) discussed in section 2.2.5. Again, his defence of this
position amounts to an argument from metaphysics and he targets two opposing views:
Kantianism and Conceptualism.
Central to Kantian metaphysics, what Kant calls transcendental idealism (Kant
1781), is the proposal that there is an unbridgeable gap between the world of
phenomena, of that which we experience, and the noumena, which is how the world is
in itself. Lowe, however, finds this division of a world of appearance and a world
somehow inaccessible to us, confused:

Moreover, I cannot make any sense of the view that reality can be cleanly
divided into two domains, the domain of appearance and everything else, such
that only the domain of appearance contains multiplicity and differentiation of
any kind—the view, roughly speaking, that there is on the one side
differentiated appearance and on the other side “the world”, with the latter
being completely undifferentiated “stuff”, or “the noumenon”. Apart from
anything else, I cannot see how reality as a whole can be coherently divided
into “appearance” and “the world”, nor in any other way analogous to this, such
as into “mind” and “world”, or into “representation” and “reality”… (Lowe
2007, 240)

In agreement with Lowe, I do not think the world is easily divided into appearance and
reality, so when I advocate in Chapter Five for explanatory antirealism as the most
defensible form of metaontology, it is with the nuance that a strict division between
Lowe defines it thusly: ‘Metaphysical realism is the view that most of the objects that populate the
world exist independently of our thought and have their natures independently of how, if at all, we
conceive of them’ (Lowe 2008, 9). And Simons defines it as the idea that ‘the world of things comes
self-differentiated into different fundamental kinds, and these things combine and interact in their own
ways, mostly without input from ourselves’ (Simons 2018, 38).
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our conceptual scheme and the world as it is in itself, is not a fruitful way to conceive
matters.139
Regarding forms of conceptualism, which he regards as an outgrowth of
Kantianism, he says:

As I have already indicated, I myself regard a concept as being a way of
thinking of some thing or things, and I take it that conceptualists can agree with
me about this. However, as a metaphysical realist, I also want to say that not
all of our ways of thinking of things — not all of our conceptions of things —
are equally good. Because I am a metaphysical realist, I believe that our
conceptions of things may be more or less adequate, in the sense that they may
more or less accurately reflect or represent the natures — that is, the essences
— of the things of which we are thinking, or at least attempting to think. Thus
it is open to me to stipulate further that, in my usage, a “concept” is precisely
an adequate conception of some thing or things, which accurately reflects the
nature or essence of the things in question. (Lowe 2008, 18)140

For Lowe, then, ontology is dealing with being, not merely our concepts about being.
A concern emerges, however, regarding how it is we can decide what ontological
concepts are correct. While he is clearly opposed to extreme forms of antirealism, I
suspect he would also object to contemporary neo-Carnapian 141 accounts whose
proponents claim that, at least with certain ontological debates, concepts are relative
to the framework in which they are employed. An ontological concept may be good or
adequate within one particular framework, but inadequate within a different, possibly
incommensurable, framework, allowing for the possibility that both frameworks are
equally good. Nonetheless, I agree with Lowe’s contention that ‘to attempt to recast

139

In light of the difficulties Lowe faces in defending the claim that his categories are of being, he seems
to make some concessions towards Kantian metaphysics when he says, ‘What is needed for progress in
metaphysics, I believe, is a judicious mixture of the insights of Kant and Aristotle’ (Lowe 2009, 7). I
return to this matter in Chapter Four and Five.
140
He also targets a related view that might be called semanticism which is the idea that we can discern
what there is by looking to language, as he claims the neo-Quineans do. Against this idea, he says: ‘But
this presupposition seems to get things exactly back-to-front. We can’t find out what there is in the
world by studying semantics, since semantics already presupposes some account of what there is in the
world in order to propose various word-to-world relations, which is its central task’ (Lowe 2011, 103).
141
The relevant part of Carnap’s work was discussed briefly in Chapter one. See Hirsch (2009),
Thomasson (2015), Chalmers (2009) and Price (2009) for variations of this view.
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all ontological questions as questions about our thoughts about what exists is to
engender a regress which is clearly vicious’ for what are thoughts if not some part of
reality? (Lowe 2013, 109)142 The division between thought and reality is a precarious
one, recognising that there are candidates for entities that are more clearly identifiable
as social constructions rather than mind-independent - institutions or money, for
example.
The claim that there is a mind-independent reality brings us to a sub-thesis,
what might be called epistemic realism, which is the idea that ‘our cognitive powers
are capable of reaching reality itself and not just representations of it…’ (Novotný and
Novák 2014, 5). The claim here is not merely the case that there is a mind-independent
world, but that we can also know it. The idea that we have unadulterated access to a
mind-independent reality might be characterised as naïve or direct realism. While
Lowe’s position seems to approximate this view at times, his position is much more
nuanced. He is an epistemic fallibilist regarding a priori metaphysical reasoning, just
as he is an epistemic fallibilist regarding scientific theories:

A rational being must no doubt possess some suitable mental capacity enabling
it to attain knowledge of such truths, if indeed it does so—call it “rational
insight”, if you will…[t]his kind of judgement, properly exercised, must be
thought of as having an inherent and autonomous—albeit by no means
infallible—power to reveal mind-independent truths of essence. Furthermore,
in my view, this kind of judgement is no less indispensable in theoretical
science than it is in metaphysics… (Lowe 2014, 256)143

His conception of essences, as well as our epistemic access to them, is discussed
below. The important point is that Lowe claims that neither ontology nor science could
begin to function without some rational capacity to identify what is real and
independent of conceptual schemes about reality. But an epistemology of this rational
insight requires a more substantial defence than he generally provides.
He says further: ‘The conceptualist, to be consistent, must say that the essence of concepts is
constituted by our concept of a concept. But what could this mean? And what could it mean, according
to conceptualism, to say that the concept of a concept “has application” — that there are concepts? I
don t believe that conceptualism has any intelligible answer to such questions’ (Lowe 2013, 109).
143
And further: ‘I shall defend a radically different and uncompromisingly realist methodology of
metaphysics: one which implies that any rational being, simply in virtue of being rational, is necessarily
capable of grasping the essences of at least some mind-independent entities’ (Lowe 2014, 256).
142
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A further related point is another sub-thesis called receptivism. This is the idea
that ‘our cognitive powers adapt to reality and not vice-versa’ (Novotný and Novák
2014, 5). While Novotný and Novák claim that such a view is central to neoAristotelian metaontology, and while it seems clear that Lowe subscribes to it, for it
accords with his opposition to antirealism, Lowe does not speak on the matter directly.
Oderberg, an important figure in the neo-Aristotelian literature, declares:

Knowledge of the truth just is the conformity of the mind to the way things
are… The knowledge is frequently only partial and incomplete, but it is no part
of the [neo-Aristotelian] worldview that humans can always achieve complete,
adequate knowledge of the essences of things. This not a counsel of despair but
an encouragement to the increase and improvement of knowledge (Oderberg
2009, 19).

These sub-theses are presented in the context of a simple dichotomy: the external
world and an internal mind that has epistemic access to that world, with theories or
concepts playing a mediating role. As I mentioned above, the real matter is surely
much more complex. Leaving these complexities aside, the upshot of these three theses
is that, given the problematic alternatives, we can and must do ontology directly,
according to Lowe.

2.2.4 A Prioricity
We have seen that Lowe claims that ontology is primarily an a priori discipline
that is directly concerned first, with what is possible, and only subsequently, with what
is actual. This is central to Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian metaontology, and safeguards
aspects of his traditional approach to ontology. The a priori, however, is variously
understood as a kind of justification, knowledge, mode of reasoning, truth or
judgement that is in some way independent of experience, though it’s difficult to
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precisify to what “independent of experience”144 amounts.145 It is contrasted with a
posteriori knowledge, which is empirical knowledge justified by appeal to experience.
While there is much debate over the nature of the a priori, there is remarkable
division over the importance of the concept generally. Some proponents claim that it
is central to the task of doing philosophy. Peacocke, for example, claims that ‘A
philosopher’s attitude to the a priori is a touchstone for his whole approach to the
subject.’ He goes on to say that ‘even when no explicit use is made of the notion of the
a priori in the questions addressed, a philosopher’s methodology, the range of
considerations to which the philosopher is open, his conception of the goals of the
subject, his idea of what is involved in justification – all of these cannot fail to involve
commitments about the nature and existence of the a priori’ (Peacocke 2005, 741).
Laurence Bonjour, in defending a rationalist account of the a priori in terms of
justification, considers its rejection to be akin to ‘intellectual suicide’ (Bonjour 1998,
99). He argues not only that it is central to the rationalist position, but that ‘it is
arguably difficult or impossible to make good sense of most if not all claims of
empirical knowledge, and indeed of reasoning generally, while eschewing any a priori
appeal’ (Bonjour 1998, xi). We see him employing here a kind of argument from
metaphysics too.
There are, however, no shortage of critics, and given the presumed
incompatibility of the a priori with empiricist positions, some are happy to eschew the
a priori altogether. Michael Devitt, for example, argues that there simply is no place
for the a priori, that empirical justification is sufficient to account for all knowledge
claims and that ‘[h]ankering after a priori knowledge is hankering after the
unattainable’ (Devitt 2014, 29). Recognising the difficulty of circumscribing the a
priori, Philip Kitcher, while not proposing an eliminativist approach like Devitt, is
Bonjour provides a relatively uncontroversial stipulative definition: ‘a proposition will count as
being justified a priori as long as no appeal to experience is needed for the proposition to be justified
once it is understood, where it is allowed that experience may have been needed to achieve such an
understanding’ (Bonjour 1998, 10)
145
A variety of candidate examples permeate the literature: the axioms of logic and mathematics,
probability and confirmation theory, principles of rational decision theory and modality. Some also
appeal to economic propositions and others to principles of morality. Stock examples used in debates,
however, tend to be minimal in nature appealing to basic claims such as “no object can be both red and
green all over at the same time” or “if one thing is above another and the second is above a third, the
first is above the third” Such claims appear to be about the world, but knowable or justifiable
independently of experience - knowable, that is, by reason alone. It is this feature that is most
objectionable to critics of the a priori; many are happy to allow the a priori in their epistemological
inventory of claims – once they are not regarded as factive – that is, about the world in any significant
or substantial way.
144
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deflationary about the possibility of any fruitful explication of the concept.146 While
some, such as Hawthorne (Hawthorne 2007, 201) and Williamson (Williamson 2007,
169) find the distinction between the a priori and a posteriori unhelpful, Papineau
actively encourages naturalists to embrace the a priori, but with a deflationary
qualification: ‘Even naturalists should agree that a priori knowledge is possible. But a
priori knowledge isn’t important for philosophy. Philosophy doesn’t consist of
conceptual analysis, but of abstract scientific theorizing’ (Papineau 2011, 82).
The most contentious issue appears to be the nature of the rational faculty that
is required to possess a priori knowledge, or to legitimate a priori reasoning. Casullo
concisely points out: ‘Much of the controversy over the a priori focuses on the
cognitive states alleged to justify the a priori. Radical empiricists claim that they find
these states puzzling or even mysterious. Proponents respond that they are familiar and
offer

phenomenological

descriptions’

(Casullo

2012,

146).

But

these

phenomenological descriptions are often at odds with each other and this lends support
to those already sceptical. For example, both Plantinga and Bonjour provide analogies
with perception in their phenomenological description of the a priori. Plantinga claims
that one simply sees that an a priori proposition is true. It consists first in ‘finding
yourself utterly convinced that the proposition in question is true. It consists second,
however, in finding yourself utterly convinced that this proposition is not only true,
but could not have been false’ (Plantinga 1993, 105). Bonjour similarly states ‘when I
carefully and reflectively consider the proposition (or inference) in question, I am able
simply to see or grasp or apprehend that the proposition is necessary, that it must be
true in any possible world or situation (or alternatively that the conclusion of the
inference must be true if the premises are true)’ (Bonjour 1998, 106). While similar to
Plantinga, Bonjour considers such insight to be primitive, but this raises issues on how
to choose between competing primitive accounts of phenomenological experiences.
While Bealer (2000) agrees with Bonjour that the justifying states are irreducible, he
disagrees with both him and Plantinga about the phenomenological experience. Rather
than an appeal to seeing, Bealer appeals to intuition.
In a similar vein to Bonjour, and as was shown in the previous section, Lowe
appeals to a faculty of rational insight which he considers indispensable for both
He claims, for example: ‘It seems to me that discussions of the past decades have made clear how
intricate and complex the classical notion of the a priori is, and neither the Strong conception nor the
Weak conception (nor anything else) can provide a coherent explication’ (Kitcher 2000, 85).
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ontology and science. He is critical of those who appeal to intuitions, which, he argues,
are of little evidential value:
One currently popular methodology of metaphysics has it that “intuitions” play
an evidential role with respect to metaphysical claims somewhat analogous to
that supposedly played by experimental observations with respect to the
hypotheses of theoretical science. I believe that such a view is fundamentally
misguided and leads inexorably to an anti-realist conception of metaphysical
claims… Intuitions as such are just psychological states of rational subjects,
but no such state can of itself constitute reliable evidence for the correctness of
a rational subject’s judgement concerning the nature or essence of some mindindependent entity. (Lowe 2014, 256)

In the following section it will be shown that, according to Lowe, this rational faculty
permits us access to the actual and possible essences of entities which, he claims, we
grasp with this faculty of insight – a further epistemological notion that requires
specification.
Critics of the a priori, usually empirically minded with scientistic 147
sympathies, argue that this cognitive faculty as it is usually presented appears
mysterious or occult, or at very least, ill-defined. Devitt, for example, claims:

What sort of link could there be between the mind/brain and the external world,
other than via experience, that would make states of the mind/brain likely to be
true about the world? What nonexperiential link to reality could support
insights into its necessary character? There is a high correlation between the
logical facts of the world and our beliefs about those facts which can only be
explained by supposing that there are connections between those beliefs and
facts. If those connections are not via experience, they do indeed seem occult.
(Devitt 2011, 29)148
The term “scientistic”, until recently, was largely a pejorative term denoting an inflated conception
of the scope and powers of the sciences to gain unrivalled knowledge of the world. Ladyman et al.
(2007) aimed to reclaim the word in favour of a conception of metaphysics that was tied more closely
to current best science.
148
David Papineau, in a tellingly titled paper “The philosophical insignificance of the a priori” responds
to Devitt’s claim: ‘I don’t accept this characterization of naturalism. I take myself to be a fully paid-up
naturalist. But I see no reason to deny that a priori knowledge is possible’ (2011. 61).
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This claim of “occultism”, or less dramatically, the claim that the cognitive faculty is
not adequately defined or supported, poses a serious challenge to the apriorist, partly
due to the differences in phenomenological descriptions mentioned above. If all that is
adduced in support of a priori justification is a quality of an epistemic episode (seeing,
apprehending, grasping), and there is little agreement concerning the precise nature of
this quality, then the sceptic is entitled to be concerned. 149 It may be asking too much
for a precise account of any mental faculty or cognitive process, especially one so
fundamental to the process of reasoning itself, but the challenge remains.
Both critics and defenders of the a priori mentioned above often associate a
priori knowledge with knowledge of that which is indefeasible and necessary. 150
According to Lowe, however, we primarily have a priori access to what is possible, a
matter discussed further in connection with his doctrine of essentialism in the
following section. This avoids at least one epistemological concern that is directed at
those who profess to possess a priori knowledge of necessity.
However, Lowe still faces epistemological challenges which often arise from
those endorsing extreme forms of scientism. Ladyman et al. (2007), for example,
whose hostility to contemporary analytic ontology was mentioned above, challenge
the idea that we can have ready insight into how the world is, or even could be, resting
solely on our rational capacity from the armchair, so to speak.151 The sciences have
shown that the world at the atomic and subatomic level, for example, is dramatically
different than what our rational faculties could hope to discern with the unaided use of
the senses. With respect to the problem of material constitution they claim that
‘Physicists do not believe there are such things as good a priori grounds for holding
beliefs about the constitution of the physical world, and we suggest that only a
Casullo clearly identifies the problem: ‘Proponents of the a priori are faced with a dilemma. Either
we have direct introspective access to the cognitive states that provide non-inferential a priori
justification or we do not. If we do, sympathetic proponents of the position should be able to agree on
the correct description of those states. If we do not, then some alternative rationale must be offered to
support the claim that there are such states. The lack of consensus among proponents lends support to
the claim of radical empiricists that more needs to be said here’ (Casullo 2005, 134).
150
Kripke (1972), helpfully distinguishes three notions that have in various ways been conflated. The
first is an epistemological distinction that concerns the a priori and a posteriori. The second is a
metaphysical distinction concerning necessity and contingency and the third, a linguistic distinction
between the analytic and synthetic. Keeping these distinctions separated, even if at times they happen
to be coextensive, provides philosophers such as Lowe, pace Kripke, ground to claim a priori access to
knowledge of possibility.
151
They make the rather dramatic claim that ‘science respects no domain restrictions and will admit no
epistemological rivals (such as natural theology or purely speculative metaphysics). With respect to
anything that is a putative fact about the world, scientific institutional processes are absolutely and
exclusively authoritative’ (Ladyman et al. 2007, 28).
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foolhardy philosopher should be willing to quarrel with them on the basis of his or her
hunches’ (Ladyman et al. 2007, 34). They censure too van Inwagen’s organicist theory
for employing notions of fundamental particles that they claim betray a superficial
high school understanding of the complexities of contemporary physics (Ibid., 37). All
metaphysics, they claim, should be motivated by our current best science, or be in the
service of unifying aspects of the various sciences, with physics having a fundamental
status.
However, Lowe clearly does not think that we have a priori access to empirical
matters the way these authors suggest. He thinks it would be hubristic and misplaced
for an ontologist to dictate to the scientist what exists in their respective domain of
inquiry (Lowe 2003). With respect to the categorial structure of the world, for example,
he says that ‘metaphysics should not be in the business of dictating to empirical
scientists precisely how they should categorize the theoretical entities whose existence
they postulate.’ He goes on to say, however, that while metaphysics provides the
categorial structure, ‘how best to apply them in the construction of specific scientific
theories is a matter best left to the theorists themselves, provided that they respect the
constraints which the categorial framework imposes’ (Lowe 2006, 19). This position
will be made more evident in the following sections. But even with respect to what is
possible, the domain Lowe tries to carve out as distinctly ontological, Ladyman et al.
claim that ontology has no jurisdiction. They cite examples from history to bolster
their case:

Philosophers have often regarded as impossible states of affairs that science
has come to entertain. For example, metaphysicians confidently pronounced
that non-Euclidean geometry is impossible as a model of physical space, that
it is impossible that there not be deterministic causation, that non-absolute time
is impossible, and so on. Physicists learned to be comfortable with each of
these ideas, along with others that confound the expectations of common sense
more profoundly. (Ladyman et al. 2007, 30)152
In much of Lowe’s work, he uses everyday examples or basic scientific examples. He’s clear,
however, that his approach, while being informed by the sciences, can also delimit them. He says, for
example: ‘It may perhaps be doubted whether the four-category ontology provides an adequate
metaphysical foundation for the more esoteric reaches of modern physics, such as the general theory of
relativity and quantum physics. But I believe that even here it will serve well enough. The examples of
“objects”, “kinds”, “attributes” and “modes” that I have so far utilized have been for the most part fairly
familiar and mundane ones. But nothing hinders us from saying, if need be, that relativistic space-time
152
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Of course, scientists too have proffered an array of theories that have equally turned
out to be false, a point discussed at some length in Chapter Five. The sciences are not
immune from error any less than ontology is on this front.
As mentioned in the preliminary section above, it is difficult to separate Lowe’s
account of the a priori part of ontology and the empirical a posteriori part. In practice,
he does not think that they are entirely distinct. He attempts to make clearer his stance
in the following:

When I say that pure metaphysics engages in a priori inquiry, I do not mean to
suggest that such inquiry is open to any thinker to engage in quite
independently of the possession by that thinker of any empirical knowledge
whatsoever. It would be a gross caricature of a priori knowledge to describe it
as knowledge attainable, even if only in principle, by a thinker devoid of all
empirical access to the actual world. Rather, a priori inquiry is distinctive in
that it proceeds in advance of some a posteriori knowledge, while still, in
general, relying on other such knowledge. (Lowe 2014, 267)

Lowe envisages a much closer connection between ontology and the sciences than
Ladyman et al. give him credit for. In fact, Ladyman et al. seem to misconstrue various
aspects of Lowe’s metaontology. They consider his ontological project to be mere
conceptual analysis (Ladyman et al. 2007, 30), which I showed above was a
characterization to which Lowe objects. And further, they claim that Lowe appeals
either to intuition or some special faculty of insight (Ibid.), both of which we saw Lowe
fervently denounces as viable for the purposes of ontological inquiry.
The epistemological challenge with respect to a priori access to knowledge of
possibility remains, but Lowe refuses to relinquish the ontological and epistemological
priority of ontology. His case is somewhat blurred by his attempts to defend pure
metaphysics, but it is more defensible, I claim, when viewed in the context of the
bootstrapping relationship suggested by Tahko. Against his scientistic critics, he

has the status of an individual substance or object, with the consequence, perhaps, that the entities that
we are ordinarily apt to regard as objects—such as material bodies—are “really” just spatiotemporally
continuous successions of space-time modes’ (Lowe 2006, 19). His ontological schema, he claims, then,
is applicable to fundamental scientific domains. This is what Ladyman et al., contest. While I appreciate
their concern, I’m not yet in a position to judge either way. What is clear, it seems, is that some ontology
is required.
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claims: ‘Metaphysicians cannot afford to ignore developments in scientiﬁc theory, but
they only promise to render themselves foolish in the eyes of posterity by slavishly
accepting current scientiﬁc orthodoxy’ (Lowe 2009, 8).153

2.2.5 The Essential Thesis
Lowe’s doctrine of essentialism, alluded to several times now, is perhaps the
most central and controversial thesis in his metaontological account. While it is
properly a first-order ontological matter, it is so central to what he views as the target
of ontology, or his characterization of ontology, that it seems pertinent to discuss it
here.
Theories of essence are part of a long historical tradition going back to the
Ancient Greeks and emerges out of the intuition that certain features of an entity are
more central than others to the entity being what it is. The essence of an entity is thus
often contrasted with that which is accidental: Socrates’ humanness, or his being
human, is arguably more fundamental or central to him than his being snub-nosed. If
Socrates’ humanness was taken from him, it would seem that he would cease to be; if
his snub-nosedness was somehow altered or taken from him, he would arguably still
essentially be Socrates. It’s natural, then, to think that that which is necessary to his
being is what is essential to him and that is the contemporary standard view, what is
called “modal essentialism” or “modalism”.
Essences in the contemporary neo-Aristotelian tradition, as with a priori access
to them discussed above, are censured for being occult entities, mysterious and
unscientific, an unfortunate hangover from scholastic metaphysics where the term
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Oderberg highlights, and disagrees with, the standard reluctance of contemporary metaphysicians in
this respect. He claims: ‘It is one thing to set out a metaphysical system and quite another to use it to
encroach upon the hallowed domain of natural science. Even the most autonomous minded of
contemporary metaphysicians hesitate long and hard before venturing to suggest that metaphysics can
correct the supposed deliverances of science. Such hesitation, more often downright refusal, is doubly
misguided. First, it ignores the metaphysical presuppositions that litter scientific thinking. Second, it is
itself born of the contemporary scientistic view of the world, according to which philosophy can only
ever have a “bookkeeping” role in respect of science. The philosopher must keep the house of science
neat and tidy – no contradictions, no fallacies, and maybe even a few suggestions as to how to make
sense of the phenomena – but the philosopher may not raise the possibility of structural or design flaws.
There can be no intrusion upon the phenomena themselves. The metaphysician is free to say, “If this
happened, then you can interpret it like that”; but it is almost unthinkable that he should say, “According
to sound metaphysical principles, it could not have happened like that – even if I cannot tell you how it
did happen”’ (Oderberg 2007, xii).
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“scholastic”, I mentioned, is meant unkindly. Tahko, while finding a place for essences
in his ontology, echoes this point and claims that essences are:
…notoriously mysterious: philosophers seem to use it in a number of different
senses, and even if they do use the notion in the same sense, it is often not quite
clear what that sense is. At the same time, essences, when they are invoked,
are generally supposed to do a lot of explanatory work: natural kinds can be
identified in terms of their essences, metaphysical modality may be reduced to
essence, the causal powers of various entities can be explained with the help of
essences, and so on. (Tahko 2018, 93)

Lowe recognises this charge of occultism, but just as with his defence of the a priori,
he finds the notion of essence not only uncontroversial, but indispensable.154 He says,
‘Essences are apt to seem very elusive and mysterious, especially if talked about in a
highly generalized fashion… Really, I suggest, they are quite familiar to us’ (Lowe
2013, 146). What, then, are essences according to Lowe? Lowe finds this question
misleading for the essence of an entity he claims, is not some further entity for, on pain
of regress, each further entity would require its own essence and so on ad infinitum.
The essence of an entity, therefore, is not a constituent of the entity that possesses it,
according to Lowe; it is not something that makes up the entity. This was John Locke’s
mistake, Lowe claims, and one that was repeated by the now standard conception
propagated by Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975). On this latter conception, what Lowe
calls ‘ersatz essentialism’ (Lowe 2013, 144), we understand the essence of an entity
by empirical investigation. We find out the essence of water, for example, by analysing
the molecules that make it up, H2O,155 or that the essence of organisms is made up of

David Oderberg also considers it to be central to traditional, neo-Aristotelian metaphysics: ‘At the
heart of traditional metaphysics is the thesis that everything has a real essence – an objective
metaphysical principle determining its definition and classification. Such principles are not mere
creatures of language or convention; rather, they belong to the very constitution of reality’ (Oderberg
2009, x).
155
This is a standard, but simplified, example which leaves out other important matters concerning the
composition of water. Ladyman et al., cite this as an example of metaphysicians not paying enough
attention to current best science: ‘The case of composition in the physical sciences is similar. Water, for
example, is composed by oxygen and hydrogen in various polymeric forms, such as (H 2O)2, (H2O)3,
and so on, that are constantly forming, dissipating, and reforming over short time periods in such a way
as to give rise to the familiar properties of the macroscopic kind water. The usual philosophical identity
claim ‘water is H2O’ ignores a fascinating and complex scientific account that is still not complete’
(Ladyman et al. 2007, 40).
154
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DNA, to take two standard, but not unproblematic, examples. The composition of such
items, it is argued, could not be known purely a priori; procuring such knowledge
requires scientific investigation and is unavailable to the armchair analyst. Lowe does
not quite object to this; to the idea that we could discern from the armchair the precise
molecules that contribute to the composition of water. He is only opposed to the idea
that the constituents that make up water and living organisms constitute its essence –
or at least its complete essence. For Lowe, such molecules are only part of the essence
of these things.
The essence of an entity, on this Kirpke-Putnam view, then, is that which the
entity possesses necessarily. This might be considered the basic modal criterion, that
a given x has a given essence if and only if it has that essence necessarily. In the modal
semantics developed by Kripke, we would say that the essence of water is H2O for
water is H2O in every possible world. But Lowe objects to understanding essentialism
in this way, for he claims that this modal account gets matters back to front:

It is vital for my purposes in this paper that the doctrine of essentialism be
suitably understood. I say this because many contemporary possible-worlds
theorists readily describe themselves as essentialists and propose and defend
what they call essentialist claims, formulated in terms of the language of
possible worlds. They will say, for instance, that an essential property of an
object is one that the object possesses in every possible world in which it exists.
And they will typically claim that some, but not all, of an object’s actual
properties are essential to it in this sense. But a doctrine of this sort is not
serious essentialism in my sense, because it attempts to characterize essence in
terms of antecedently assumed notions of possibility and necessity and thus —
in my view — puts the cart before the horse. (Lowe 2008, 10).
That is, Lowe’s central objection to possible world theory is that it fails to explain what
modal truths are. It fails, he thinks, partly because the idea of a possible world is more
obscure than that which it is invoked to explain – necessity and possibility – but worse,
the very notion of a “possible world” rests on a prior conception of necessity and
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possibility.156 In fact, he claims to have ‘no sympathy at all for the metaphysics of
possible worlds quite generally’ (Lowe 2009, 11), a point, he acknowledges, ‘many
analytic metaphysicians will consider to be at best highly provocative and at worst
extremely repugnant’ (Lowe 2013a, 139).157 He remarks further that ‘talk of possible
worlds can contribute nothing whatever of substance to our understanding of the nature
and ground of metaphysical modality – that is, metaphysical necessity and possibility.
If I am right, then a great many philosophers and logicians have been wasting a good
deal of their time in elaborating accounts of the putative nature of possible worlds and
their supposed relationships to one another’ (Lowe 2013a, 139).158
Lowe aligns himself with Kit Fine’s critique of modalism who argues that
though an entity possesses its essential properties necessarily, it is not a sufficient
condition for an essential property that it is had necessarily. The example frequently
cited concerns Socrates and the singleton set {Socrates}. Though Socrates is a member
of {Socrates}, it does not appear that he is so essentially, for Socrates could potentially
exist while sets do not. And according to modalism, it is necessary and essential that
Socrates is a member of the singleton set for that is what it is for the singleton set to
exist. This generates an asymmetry concerning Socrates and the set he belongs to, yet
symmetry concerning necessity. This artificial example is meant to show that the
modal criterion is not adequate to the task of distinguishing in sufficient detail the
essential properties of different entities leading to the further claim that essential truths
are prior to, or more fundamental than, modal truths (See Fine 1994). A deep
discussion of the complexities of modality lies outside the purview of this chapter,
however, and my aim isn’t to resolve disputes between theorists, only to present and
evaluate Lowe’s approach.159

Oderberg explicates this point nicely: ‘any realist theory of possible worlds will be circular in its
attempt to illuminate modality, for there has to be some criterion of what counts as a possible world;
there are by definition no impossible worlds. But then we have to have a prior conception of modality
before we can use possible worlds to explain modality’ (Oderberg 2009, 2).
157
See Oderberg (2009, 7-12) for a short critique of Fine’s position. Joan Kung claims this is Aristotle’s
position too: ‘Aristotle, unlike many recent authors, refuses to equate necessary and essential properties
(Top. A.5.102a18-30, An. Post. A.4.73a34-b2 with 16-24, Met. A.30.1025a30-32). All essential
properties are necessary, but the converse does not hold’ (Kung 1976, 363).
158
Kit Fine concurs: ‘the contemporary assimilation of essence to modality is fundamentally misguided
and that, as a consequence, the corresponding conception of metaphysics should be given up ... the
notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood
in modal terms or even to be regarded as extensionally equivalent to a modal notion’ (Fine 1994, 3).
159
See Oderberg (2009) and Tahko (2015) for extended criticism of possible world theory from a neoAristotelian perspective.
156
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But what, then, if we can be permitted to ask, is an essence, over and above,
say, the constituents of an object, according to Lowe? Or, if we’re not to ask, “What is
an essence?”, perhaps we can ask “how are we to understand essence-talk, or the nature
of essence?” To these questions, Lowe provides an answer: essences are best
understood as something akin to what Locke proposed: ‘the “proper original
signification” of the word, is “the very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is.”’
(Lowe 2013, 97).160 Slightly more formally, the essence of an entity, ‘X, is what X is,
or what it is to be X’ (Lowe 2018, 16).161 The “very being of a thing”, it’s quiddity in
an older idiom, is an ontological matter, but essences are known by us as definitions,
according to Lowe. But such definitions, he claims, are not merely verbal; drawing on
Aristotle and the Scholastics, he employs the notion of a real definition.162 ‘A real
definition of an entity, E’, he elaborates, ‘is to be understood as a proposition which
tells us, in the most perspicuous fashion, what E is—or, more broadly, since we do not
want to restrict ourselves solely to the essences of actually existing things, what E is
or would be’ (Lowe 2012a, 104-105).163
A real definition, then, a definition of an entity a res, is a proposition that tells
us what the entity is, or what it would be if we don’t yet know of the entities’
existence.164 And though it is a real definition of an entity, the essence of an entity, as
mentioned numerous times now, is itself not some further entity, according to Lowe.165
He claims:
To know something’s essence is not to be acquainted with some further thing
of a special kind, but simply to understand what exactly that thing is. This,
indeed, is why knowledge of essence is possible, for it is a product simply of
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See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975), iii, iii, 15.
161
It is also a notion found in Aristotle, as Lowe elaborates: ‘This is perfectly in line with the original
Aristotelian understanding of the notion of essence, for the Latin-based word “essence” is just the
standard translation of a phrase of Aristotle’s which is more literally translated into English as “the what
it is to be” or “the what it would be to be”’ (Lowe 2012, 105). In the translated words of Aristotle: ‘The
essence of each thing is what it is said to be in virtue of itself’ (Meta. 1029b14).
162
In the Scholastic tradition, this would be ‘opposed to a nominal definition, which merely gives the
sense of a word we use to talk about things’ (Feser 2014, 256).
163
Fine defines it thusly: ‘Just as we may define a word, or say what it means, so we may define an
object, or say what it is’ (Fine 1994, 2).
164
Oderberg quotes Cato the Elder’s poetic rendering of the position: ‘Rem tene, verba sequentur’ or
‘Grasp the thing and the words will follow’ (Oderberg 2009, xiv).
165
Lowe distinguishes between general and individual essences: ‘The general essence of a K is “what
it is” to be a K– and is therefore shared by all particular Ks – whereas the individual essence of a
particular K is “what it is” to be this particular K, as opposed to some other particular K’ (Lowe 2013,
98). But this is a controversial distinction that need not concern us here.
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understanding, not of some mysterious kind of quasi-perceptual acquaintance
with esoteric entities of any sort. And, on pain of incoherence, we cannot deny
that we understand what at least some things are, and thereby know their
essences. (Lowe 2013, 147)166

This whatness, or quiddity, then, is understood by us given our rational nature. This
raises serious epistemological concerns that run through several central notions in
Lowe’s ontology. If essences aren’t some further entity, how are we to know about
them? Because they aren’t entities, for Lowe, we certainly can’t acquire knowledge of
them by empirical acquaintance. It is through our rational intellect that we ‘grasp’167
essences (Lowe 2012, 110). He provides an example of what it is to know the essence
of a circle, an example taken from Spinoza:168 ‘a circle is the locus of a point moving
in a plane at a fixed distance from a given point. Provided that I understand what a
point and a plane are, and what motion and distance are, I can understand what a circle
is, by grasping this real definition’ (Lowe 2012, 110). The same is true, he argues, for
physical objects, though in practice, it is much harder to provide clear examples. One
may only grasp aspects of what is involved in a real definition; understanding, he
claims, may be imperfect.169 Importantly, as we saw above, he does not want to appeal
to a special faculty of insight or intuition, something of which the neo-Aristotelians
are frequently accused.170 Such an appeal, he claims, would rightly be open to the
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See (Oderberg 2009) for a contrasting view.
Though the notion of grasping is metaphorical and somewhat opaque, it is not a difficulty that besets
only the ontologist and metaphysician. Recent work in epistemology and the philosophy of science has
had to tackle this issue. See, for example, (Grimm 2006; Kvanvig 2006; Zagzebski 2001). I return to
the notion of grasping in Chapter Five in connection with explanation and understanding.
168
Lowe provides the following reference: ‘Benedict de Spinoza, On the Improvement of the
Understanding, Ethics, Correspondence, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (New York: Dover, 1955), 35’ (Lowe
2012, 105).
169
He claims, for example: ‘Of course, I make no claim that we human beings are in a position to grasp
and hence know the complete class of real definitions, only the much more modest claim that we do
grasp and know at least some of them. Some of them we may grasp only imperfectly or partially,
moreover, as when a child grasps only that a triangle is a three-sided figure, without grasping more fully
that it is a rectilinear three-sided planar figure’ (Lowe 2014, 265-266)
170
Hofweber, for example, complains about the mysterious exclusivity of neo-Aristotelian metaphysics.
Speaking of Kit Fine’s metaphysics, he says: ‘As far as I understand Fine’s view, it is a sophisticated
version of esoteric metaphysics: metaphysics is supposed to find out what is GROUNDED in
REALITY, in a special metaphysical sense of these terms. To know what this sense is gives you entrance
into the discipline, but it takes a metaphysician to know this sense. Esoteric metaphysics never sounded
so exclusive’ (Hofweber 2009, 270). And further, that ‘Esoteric metaphysics appeals to those, I
conjecture, who deep down hold that philosophy is the queen of the sciences after all, since it
investigates what the world is REALLY like. The sciences only find out what the world is like, but what
philosophy finds out is more revealing of reality and what it is REALLY like’ (Hofweber 2009, 273).
167
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charge of ‘anti-naturalistic obscurantism’ (Lowe 2012, 110). Oderberg too finds the
contemporary aversion to real definitions misplaced:

The prejudice against real definition is a deeply held one, going back to the
roots of empiricism. Yet it is hard to see why the concept is unacceptable.
Indeed, since defining a word is best seen as giving the essence of a kind of
object (the meaning), the opponent of real definition who at least concedes that
we can define words has already conceded the principle that one can define
objects of a certain kind; if that kind, why not others? …. To define something
just means, literally, to set forth its limits in such a way that one can distinguish
it from all other things of a different kind. (Oderberg 2009, 19)

The difficulty, however, the seemingly mysterious quality that provokes concern, is
partly due to how this real definition is known and in what way it “latches” on to the
world in a joint carving way.171 For example, Lowe claimed above that we can know
the essence of a circle, but it is likely that no such circle exists or could exist, given
the imperfect nature of matter, a point clearly made by Plato. If a perfect circle cannot
be instantiated, it remains a merely possible entity. Essence, then, precedes existence
in this respect, a matter I return to in the next section.
He wishes, then, only to appeal to a familiar faculty of understanding, which
on pain of incoherence, we must already possess to understand or know anything about
anything. That is, on pain of incoherence, the notion of essence is an intellectual
necessity for if we are to talk about anything in a comprehending way, Lowe thinks
we must have some idea of the essence of the thing talked about, however approximate,
however incomplete, and however fallible. Fleshing this out in an example, he asks
how could we comprehendingly talk about a particular cat called Tom if we have no
idea what cats are and which particular cat Tom is? Enough must be known about both

The words with uppercase letters are meant to highlight how ordinary words are problematically given
rarefied and technically sophisticated philosophical meanings.
171
José Benardete reinforces this kind of objection: ‘Finally, and this can too easily be left unsaid, a real
definition is rightly required, again in the best case, to tell us something deep and important about the
thing being defined. It is this last, positive feature of a real definition that is almost certain to alienate
partisans of the less speculative, more empirical strain of philosophy, which was expressed once by
Locke when he modestly characterized himself as a mere “under-laborer” serving such masterbuilders
as Newton and Sydenham, and again, in our own time, by Quine when he said, “Philosophy of science
is philosophy enough”’ (Benardete 1993, 267).
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Tom and cats to distinguish them from other things – kinds from kinds and Tom, as a
particular cat, from other cats (see Lowe 2013, 145).
In this section, we see again an argument from metaphysics at play. Not
subscribing to the existence of essence, Lowe claims, creates an epistemological
problem whereby we can never know anything about anything - a situation which
seems absurd. But denying essences also generates an ontological problem. Each entity
must have a certain identity, a certain something that makes it what it is irrespective
of our knowledge about it. ‘Anti-essentialism’, he says, ‘commits us to anti-realism,
and indeed to an anti-realism so global that it is surely incoherent’ (Lowe 2013, 146).
Whatever his objection to antirealism, further work on the epistemology of essence is
required.172

2.2.6 The Possibility Thesis173
The sixth thesis, The Possibility Thesis, is Lowe’s claim that metaphysics is
primarily a modal discipline. This has already been discussed in various sections
above. Here, I aim to emphasise the point.
Lowe claims that ‘All metaphysics is implicitly modal, because it is primarily
concerned with what kinds of things are possible and compossible, and only
subsequently with what kinds of things are actual’ (Lowe 2009a, 106). And again, he
avers: ‘But I do not claim that metaphysics on its own can, in general, tell us what
there is. Rather—to a ﬁrst approximation—I hold that metaphysics by itself only tells
us what there could be’ (Lowe 1998, 9). This much has been made clear. He
distinguishes between various kinds of possibility, and identifies a distinctive kind of
metaphysical possibility that is his concern:
… the task of pure metaphysics is to determine what is possible, independently
of what might actually be the case, and that this requires a method of
knowledge-acquisition which is a priori. Here it is important to emphasize that
the kind of possibility now in question is so-called metaphysical possibility,
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See Tahko (2018) for efforts in this direction.
Lowe, as shown below, somewhat controversially distinguishes different types of possibility: ‘A key
ingredient in my defence of metaphysics is the articulation of a distinctive and, in my view,
indispensable notion of metaphysical possibility—conceived of as a kind of possibility which is not to
be identiﬁed with physical, logical, or epistemic possibility’ (Lowe 2001, v).
173
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which I take to be objective and mind-independent in character, as well as
being discoverable a priori. Metaphysical possibility, then, is not to be
confused with physical or natural possibility, as determined by physical laws
of nature (pace Shoemaker 1998). Nor, however, is it to be confused with mere
logical possibility, or freedom from contradiction (see further Lowe 1998, pp.
1–27). Finally, it is not even to be confused with conceptual possibility, since
this is not suitably mind-independent. (Lowe 2014, 263)
He goes on to say that ‘Of course, there are those who will say that, having thus
stipulated what metaphysical possibility is not, we have left nothing for it to be. And
there are others who will say that, even if we have left something for it to be, we have
left something that is not humanly knowable’ (Ibid.). However, his defence of
metaphysical possibility, as we have seen, rests on an argument from metaphysics and
he puts the challenge to those who object to his thesis that ‘metaphysical possibility is
an inescapable determinant of actuality’ (Lowe 1998, 9), to substantiate their claim
without appealing to metaphysical possibility (Lowe 2014, 264).
He provides an example of the idea that essence preceding existence, both
ontologically and epistemologically, concerning the discovery of transuranic elements.
A transuranic element is a “superheavy” element, one with an atomic number greater
than 92; uranium is one such element. It is typically unstable and difficult to
synthesize. In Lowe’s own words: ‘Prior to the actual synthesis of various transuranic
elements—prior, indeed, to the actual existence, anywhere in the universe, of certain
of these elements—chemists knew what they would be. That is to say, they grasped
the real definitions of certain as yet non-existent transuranic elements’ (Lowe 2014,
267).174 This example is meant to show that (a) we can know the existence conditions
of an entity, possible and actual, by knowing it’s essence (or part of it, however
imperfectly), (b) that essence precedes existence ontologically and epistemologically
and (c), that the sciences require metaphysics for the sciences are concerned with what
is actual while ontology is concerned (primarily) with possibility.

Tahko informs us that ‘As early as 1922, Niels Bohr described the possibility of transuranic elements
and predicted the configuration of the hypothetical element Z = 118, ununoctium. He went further and
suggested that this element would be a noble gas with chemical properties similar to radon. This
superheavy element, now called oganesson, is the heaviest that has been synthesised. We do not yet
know whether Bohr’s predictions regarding the chemical properties of oganesson are fully correct, but
he was right about its electron structure and it is classified as a noble gas’ (Tahko Manuscript, 2020).
174
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The example of the transuranic element is unusual with respect to this last
point; that ontology is concerned primarily with possibility. It is unusual insofar as
ontology has a sui generis subject matter and methodology according to Lowe. For
example, it is not the ontologist who predicts the existence of entities based on current
scientific knowledge; it is the scientist. Did Mendeleev become an ontologist as he was
filling in parts of the periodic table? It seems an odd way of conceiving of both the
ontologists and the scientist’s practice. Further, if a pattern or structure is identified
and developed in sufficient detail, such as with the periodic table, then to
systematically fill in the detail of the pattern by extrapolating information from other
parts of the system is a project distinct to, in this instance, chemistry. If the scientist
employs laws, which he surely does, he is not a metaphysician in virtue of employing
such laws. He becomes one, perhaps, as he reflects on their nature, which qua scientist,
he may never find himself wont to do. And if she contemplates the nature of possibility,
or the existence of possibilia, she again is a functioning metaphysician. But as she
engages in her daily practice of predicting and experimenting, developing hypotheses
etc., it seems misplaced or gratuitous to consider that practice somehow metaphysical,
recognising that the practice is shot through with metaphysical assumptions.
As an example of the general capacity to know the essence of an entity prior to
its actuality, the example appears acceptable. However, if ontology is primarily
concerned with possibility and only subsequently, with actuality, what can be said
about distinctly ontological primitive posits such as the existence of attributes or
modes? I’ll return to this matter in Chapter Five, but it seems evident that such
primitives aren’t the kind of thing that can be substantiated by empirical means, at least
not directly. Indeed, they are a prerequisite, according to Lowe, for the very act of
empirical investigation. What, then licences Lowe to postulate them? And how are we
to choose between competing accounts of what they are like, if indeed they exist?
Lowe, we will see appeals to theoretical virtues, such as explanatory power and
parsimony, to help decide the matter. However, in Chapter Five, I claim that this is a
problematic strategy, at least where realism is concerned. Whatever the case, the
ontological status of these distinctly ontological posits do not appear to fit the example
of the discovery of transuranic elements where ontology is considered a primarily
modal matter, unless, perhaps, such primitives remain in the realm of the possible.
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2.2.7 The Categorial Thesis
Categories play an important role in Lowe’s account of character and are
discussed extensively in Chapter 4 in connection with the problem of character. Here,
I just introduce the metaontological claim that the task of ontology, according to Lowe,
is to provide an account of the fundamental175 categories of being, and the relations
between them. He claims that ‘Any system of ontology must embody an account of
the ontological categories – that is, an account of what an ontological category is, what
ontological categories there are, and which ontological categories are fundamental, as
well as an account of which ontological categories are actually occupied and which
are not’ (Lowe 2006, 34). Whether or not this is agreed, I argue in Chapter Four that
he does not achieve the central task he sets the ontologist: to provide an adequate
account of what an ontological category is. He can perhaps be forgiven for this to some
extent for when dealing with the most general aspects of being, it is not clear what else
can be appealed to in a description of what categories are. That is to say, in any account
a bedrock will be reached. But positing a primitive, however necessary, is not an
account of what that primitive is, though it is arguable that we come to know some
features of an entity by its function in a theory. He does provide an account of what
ontological categories are fundamental, though there is perhaps some ambiguity in
this. Lowe’s categories are ontic; they are categories of being, not of thought and it is
this claim that is perhaps most controversial. It is controversial because while the
categories are of being, there literally are none of them – only he argues for four
fundamental ones and indefinitely many sub-categories. His defence of this claim is
tied up with his rejection of neo-Quinan metaontology, discussed at points in the
previous chapter and further below. Briefly, it involves a rejection of the existential
quantifier as ontologically committing such that items, like the categories, are
quantified over – a requirement Lowe finds absurd.

He articulates what he means by “fundamental” in the following way: ‘I do, however, believe that
we need to ﬁnd room in our ontology for entities belonging to each of these categories and that in no
case are the entities belonging to one of them wholly explicable in terms of, reducible to, or eliminable
in favour of entities belonging to one or more of the others. This is what it means, in my usage, to say
that these categories are fundamental. Moreover, I am not denying—any more than Aristotle did—that
there are other ontological categories besides these four (for instance, it may be contended that there is
a distinct ontological category of events): I am only committed to the view that any such further
categories are not fundamental in my sense’ (Lowe 2006, 58).
175
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Lowe calls his favoured categorial theory a four-category ontology, which is
inspired by the second chapter of what would become Aristotle’s Categories. The four
categories emerge out of a distinction Aristotle makes between entities that can be
“said of a subject” and those that are “in a subject”. Thus, an entity might be 1) said of
and not in a subject, 2) said of and in a subject, 3) not said of and not in a subject, or
4) not said of and in a subject. The corresponding categories, according to Aristotle,
are Substantial Universals (Kinds), Non-Substantial Universals (Attributes),
Individual Substances (Objects) and Attribute Instances (Modes). It is represented in
the Aristotelian Ontological Square below, Fig 1:

Fig.1 Aristotelian Ontological Square

Fig.2 Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian

(Lowe 2009, 9)

Ontological Square (Lowe 2009, 10)

Lowe modernizes the Aristotelian ontological square, which incorporates some
new nomenclature and a variety of ontological relations between categories not
considered in the original Aristotelian version. Lowe’s version is represented in Fig. 2
above.
Quickly articulating the core components of this neo-Aristotelian ontological
square, there are four distinct fundamental categories: objects, kinds, attributes and
modes. There is a further distinction between particulars and universals, one he cashes
out in terms of instantiation relations. Both particulars and universals are transcategorical; that is, neither comprise a separate ontological category. Indeed, both are
pre-requisites for the existence of the other categories. Universals are abstract and
particulars are concrete. Universals divide into two types: Kinds and Attributes. Kinds
are universals that have objects as their instances; attributes (properties and relations)
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are universals that have modes (tropes) as their instances; objects are characterised by
modes – or modes inhere in objects and kinds are characterised by attributes - or,
again, attributes inhere in kinds. He has a specific use of exemplified, which relates
attributes and objects in two ways and comes in two species: occurrent and
dispositional.
To take some examples of each, a familiar concrete particular, such as a
particular table or particular human, would be an example of an object in Lowe’s
schema. Such particulars, he claims have a corresponding kind of which the objects
are instances, so there is the kind table and the kind human. The category of attributes
comprises characterising universals such as redness or hardness, which are
exemplified by objects and the redness or hardness that is particular to the object is an
example of the category of modes.
Lowe’s ontological square will prove to be particularly important in Chapter
Four, where it is fleshed out in greater detail when his theory of character is discussed.
As mentioned in the last chapter, van Inwagen is fundamentally opposed to Lowe’s
categorial schema, as well as the hierarchical conception of being upon which it rests.
This matter, in turn, is explored further in Chapter Five in connection with the problem
of grounding as a form of metaphysical explanation.

2.2.8 The Centrality of Ontology
By the centrality of ontology, I refer to Lowe’s construction of a first-order
logic (what he calls sortal logic) so as to reflect his neo-Aristotelian ontology. The
thesis is put in opposition to choosing an ontology that reflects the constraints of a
logic, however powerful, such as Frege’s and Russell’s – a complaint Lowe
consistently makes against the neo-Quineans. However, I claimed in Chapter One that
Lowe’s criticism needs to be more nuanced. And, indeed, as we shall see below, there
are instances where such nuance is visible. It is true that certain ontologies may be the
result of the constraints imposed by an interpretation and application of predicate logic.
But it is also true that predicate logic developed as a result of a particular ontological
conception of the world. I emphasised, for example, that there is nothing intrinsic to
the nature of the existential quantifier such that it must be understood as ontologically
loaded. Understood as such, it is a logic that favours a certain ontology of particulars.
Thus, it is not neutral and is the very reason why philosophers, such as Armstrong
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(2004), choose a different criterion of ontological commitment, i.e. truthmaker theory,
discussed below, which is a theory more favourable to the existence of universals that
both he and Lowe want to endorse in their ontology.
Lowe, then, for reasons that go beyond how the existential quantifier is to
interpreted, does not find the constraints of standard predicate logic with identity
suitable for the kind of ontology he wants to do. He highlights some of its limitations
in a paragraph worth quoting at length:

Most philosophers today who have been brought up in the analytical tradition
have been exposed, at a formative period of their thinking, to the formalism of
ﬁrst-order predicate logic with identity. This has equipped them with a certain
conception of reference and predication which is, from the point of view of
serious ontology,176 extremely thin and superﬁcial. It is a view which embodies
– to invoke Barry Smith’s apt term – all the myths of “Fantology”:177 the idea
that the most basic form of atomic proposition is one that may be symbolized
as “Fa”, where “F” is the predicate and “a” is a singular term, or “individual
constant” (the logical counterpart of a proper name). The only further
elaboration of this that is countenanced is to admit relational predicates with
any ﬁnite number, n, of “places”, giving us as the most general form of an
atomic proposition “Rn a1a2 ... an"”. And the only “relation” that is given any
special formal recognition is the dyadic relation of identity, with its own
dedicated symbol, “=”, as in “a1 = a2”. Sometimes, a formal recognition is also
accorded to the monadic existence predicate, as in “E!a”, but this is generally
analysed in terms of the particular (or, more tendentiously, ‘existential’)
quantiﬁer, “∃”, together with identity, as being equivalent to “∃x(x = a)”. And
that, basically, is the sum total of the formal machinery of standard ﬁrst-order
predicate logic that serves to represent anything remotely “ontological” in
character: it is “ontology lite”. (Lowe 2013, 50-51)

“Serious ontology” is the name he gives to his ontology, or any ontology that is done “directly”.
In Smith’s own words: ‘Here ‘F’ stands for what is general in reality and ‘a’ for what is individual.
Hence “f(a)ntology”. Because predicate logic has exactly two syntactically different kinds of referring
expressions—‘F’, ‘G’, ‘R’, etc., and ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, etc.—so reality must consist of exactly two
correspondingly different kinds of entity: the general (properties, concepts) and the particular (things,
objects)’ (Smith 2005, 1).
176
177
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Barry Smith calls fantology, the idea that one can do ontology by addressing syntactic
features of predicate logic, a ‘dark force’ which has haunted the metaphysics of the
past hundred years or so (Smith 2005, 1). He considers it a ‘twentieth-century variant
of linguistic Kantianism’ for proponents endeavour to read off the structure of
language the structure of reality’ Ibid., 2).178 The question emerges, however, if logic
is not ontologically neutral, by what means does one choose an ontology and a
perspicuous logic in which to express it? There is no easy answer to this question, and
we will see why when the matter is discussed further in Chapter Five.
In the previous section, I briefly surveyed Lowe’s categorial schema.
According to Lowe, the task of ontology is to articulate the fundamental types of
entities there are, and the relations between them, such that we end up with a
fundamental categorial structure of being. This structure, he claims, demands more
from a logic than what standard predicate logic permits. Essentially, Lowe finds this
logic limiting as it does not admit quantification over properties or relations, at least,
not without appealing to a second-order logic, 179 nor does it permit for divisions
amongst the types of objects he wishes to countenance.180 He avers:

We need to sort out our ontology properly first, and only then shape our formal
logic to fit it, not vice versa. And the first step towards sanity here is to abandon
the idea that there is something special and sacrosanct about the ‘atomic’
logical form ‘Fa’– Fantology. Fantology, which originates from the systems of
formal logic newly developed by Frege and Russell around the beginning of
the twentieth century, does implicitly rest on certain ontological assumptions,
but on rather weak and ill-thought-out ones – assumptions which seemed to
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He claims that early fantologists, such as the Logical Positivists, were more explicit about the
purported mirroring between logic and reality than contemporary philosophers who are more tacit in
this regard (Smith 2005, 2). To take an explicit version, we could look to Bertrand Russell for example:
‘logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general
features’ (Russell [1919] 2008, 109).
179
In response to the complications that emerge with second-order logic that was developed to account
for properties, he bemoans: ‘Now, at this point I want to cry out that all of this is completely insane
from an ontological point of view that aspires to any seriousness, being driven entirely by the constraints
of a particular style of logical formalism and the ramshackle ontology that typically accompanies it’
(Lowe 2013, 55).
180
In chapter three it is shown that van Inwagen claims that everything is a thing; that is, that everything
is an object. Lowe disagrees and requires a distinction between objects and non-objects (modes, for
example) and is discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
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matter little when they were overshadowed by the sheer logical power of those
formal systems’ (Lowe 2013, 55).
It’s unnecessary here to give a comprehensive critique of standard first-order predicate
logic, though some brief comments might be appropriate. One issue already
mentioned, and the motive for the term “fantology” is that the “Fa” of fantology
permits of a worldly distinction of only two kinds, only one of which is quantified
over. While Barry Smith identifies several problems that impede ontological analysis
when done through the lens of predicate logic, the most important, he contends, is the
so-called “vanishing copula”. By this he means the conflation of the “is” of predication
and the “is” of essential identity, or to put it differently, a conflation of universal kinds
and universal attributes, one we’ll find plays just as significant a role for Lowe as it
did for Aristotle.
Even though Lowe develops a sophisticated sortal logic to reflect his ontology,
elaborated in detail in his Forms of Thought, it is not employed much in his ontological
work. There’s little reason, therefore, to articulate its intricacies here. The relevance
for the purposes of this chapter is to emphasise the fact that for Lowe, logic is
secondary to ontology. It seems in some respect just a technical exercise highlighting
his conviction to metaphysics as first philosophy; that ontology comes first and logic
second. To provide some sense of his account, his categorial schema requires four
“material” expressions to account for the four categories of being: Object, Kind,
Attribute and Mode; “F” and “a” is not enough. He proposes to endorse the following
notation: Let a, b, c, ...denote primary substances, α, β, γ, ...denote secondary
substances, F, G, H, ...denote attributes and f, g, h, ...denote modes. Following the
post-positioning structure of predicate logic, then, we can symbolise “Socrates is
Human” as “βa” where “a” is Socrates and “β” is the kind “human”, and “Socrates is
snub-nosed” as “Fa” where “a” is Socrates and “F” is snub-nosed. Pre-positioning can
be used to express the relation of inherence or characterisation such as the relation of
modes and the objects that possess them. In this regard the particular paleness that is
Socrates can be represented as “fa” where “f” is the mode paleness and “a” is Socrates.
In this way, a whole variety of atomic propositions can be made that represent all the
various categories and relations of ontological dependence that his neo-Aristotelian
four-category ontology houses (Lowe 2013, 35-37). While I don’t elaborate this logic
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further, it’s expression will become clearer as his general metaphysical schema is
articulated in greater detail in Chapter Four.

2.2.9 Truthmaker Theory
Thus far, many central features of Lowe’s metaontology have been elucidated
and a clear picture of his neo-Aristotelian metaontology is beginning to emerge. It
should be equally clear that each of the theses are intricately related, and that separating
them for the purpose of exposition and critique was a helpful strategy, given the depth
and complexity of his view.
In this penultimate section, I briefly discuss truthmaker theory. Lowe endorses
a version of truthmaker theory which he claims provides a certain kind of metaphysical
explanation, as well as a possible criterion of ontological commitment to rival Quine’s
COC discussed in Chapter One. However, space will not permit a full analysis of
truthmaker theory here. It is also hard to get an appreciation of Lowe’s position on
truthmaker theory prior to a fuller treatment of his four-category ontology.
Nonetheless, it will be instructive to gloss some aspects of the theory in connection
with Lowe’s metaontological commitment that ontology is an explanatory enterprise.
Truthmaker theory came to prominence in analytic philosophy due to a 1994
paper, “Truth-Makers” by Peter Simons, Barry Smith and Kevin Mulligan. However,
it is arguably traceable to Aristotle (Categories 14b, 14-22), with early contemporary
accounts found in the work of Wittgenstein (1927) and Russell (1948). Though there
are various traditions within truthmaker theory, perhaps the most notable and staunch
defender generally is David Armstrong (2004).181
The central idea of truthmaking is rather simple: for every truth, there is some
thing that makes that truth true. This simplistic formulation might be called the
truthmaker principle and some version of it is endorsed by all truthmaker theorists.182
But this formulation hides many complexities, among which are questions concerning
what a truth maker is, what a truth bearer is, and what the nature of the relation
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Armstrong (2004) credits C.B Martin for bringing the topic to his attention.
It is actually a loose formulation of truthmaker maximalism which can be more precisely formulated
as: ‘(TM) For every x: x is true iff there is a y such that y is a truthmaker for x’ (Rami 2009, 3). This
version is popularized by Armstrong (2004) but the scope of the claim, that every truth requires a
truthmaker is often restricted.
182
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between them is. Attempts to address these concerns, and to precisify truthmaker
theory generally, has proved difficult with little consensus being reached.
Truthmaker theory, then, attempts to preserve the realist183 intuition that truth
depends on being, rather than the other way around and is often seen as the heir of the
correspondence theory of truth. 184 , 185 For example, the proposition “Socrates is
Human”, it is claimed, is true because of how the world is; the proposition is true in
virtue of some feature of the world – in this case, Socrates himself. It is largely agreed,
however, that truthmakers, Socrates in this instance, can be a truthmaker for many
truths; truths need not have only one truthmaker. Socrates is a truthmaker, for example,
of truths such as “Socrates exists” or even more broadly, “Humans exist”.
A truth maker, then, is anything that makes a truth true where this making is
not regarded as causal in nature. It is thought of, rather, in a distinctive metaphysical
sense (not meaning to suggest causation is not a metaphysical notion).186 It is what is
often called the in virtue of relation, which is, according to Lowe, a distinctive
metaphysical kind of explanation (Lowe 2009), though the term metaphysical
explanation is most frequently associated with grounding in contemporary
literature.187 A truth maker, then, as shown in the above example concerning Socrates,
is that in virtue of which something is made true.
With respect to truthbearers, Richard Kirkham identifies the following
candidates that have been proffered: ‘beliefs, propositions, judgments, assertions,
statements, theories, remarks, ideas, acts of thought, utterances, sentence tokens,
sentence types, sentences (unspecified), and speech acts’ (Kirkham 1992, 54).188 Lowe
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For the claim that it fails to safeguard realist intuitions, see Chris Daly (2005) and for the claim that
it actually supports idealism, see (Morris 2005). Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005) in fact, claims that
truthmaker theory can accommodate idealism as well as realism for truthmaker theory depends on the
world, not whether the world is mind-independent.
184
Jamin Asay (2020) in a recent article, however, claims that the correspondence theory and truthmaker
theory are distinct, while being motivated by the same concern with truth being worldly.
185
This is contrasted with certain deflationary accounts of truth dominant from the 1930’s. Such
accounts, like Tarski’s (1936) semantic theory of truth and Ramsey’s (1927) redundancy theory of truth
were part of the so-called linguist-turn in philosophy. Adolf Rami elaborates that ‘at the end of the
1970s and the beginning of the 1980s metaphysical and ontological philosophical enquiries flourished
again under the main influence of authors such as D. M. Armstrong, D. Lewis, M. J. Loux and P. van
Inwagen. In the middle of the 1980s this metaphysical renaissance also reached the theory of truth’
(Rami 2009, vii).
186
I emphasise this issue in connection with grounding theory in Chapter Five.
187
Chris Daly claims that truthmaker theorists are almost unanimous in their view that ‘the truthmaker
principle does explanatory work’ (Daly 2005, 86). Asay (2017), however, argues that explanation and
truthmaking should come apart and would be to the advantage of the truthmaker theorist.
188
Quoted in Armstrong (2009, 121).
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(2009), as with the majority of truthmaker theorists,189 favours propositions to play the
role of truthbearer.

190

Propositions, then, are the things that are made true.

Propositions, though peculiar entities, somehow expressing the ‘content of belief’
(Armstrong 2009, 122), are a natural enough choice given that they admit of truth and
falsity and philosophers are inclined to want to know what it is that makes the
difference; that is, what makes a true proposition true and a false proposition false.
There are various ways to specify the truthmaker relation. What is perhaps the
orthodox view is the claim that a truthmaker is one that necessitates the truth of the
truthbearer.191 This is Armstrong’s view (2004), and it can be defined as:

For every object x and proposition y: x is a truth-maker for y iff it is necessary
that if x exists, then y is true. (Rami 2009, 5)192

This necessitation criterion leads to problems, one of which concerns necessity as a
sufficient condition. There is a danger in making the criterion trivial since any object
appears to necessitate the truth of any necessary or analytic truth. That is to say, any
contingent object trivially seems to imply the existence of a necessary statement such
as “7 + 5 = 12”, yet this statement is not true in any relevant sense that concerns some
arbitrary contingent object; an object such as a stone, a chair, or Plato. It does not
appear that analytic truths need to be made true by anything in the world in any
interesting way. There are various proposals that try to deal with this problem. Lowe
appeals to the idea of essential dependence to circumvent the issue. Regarding the
mathematical sum above, he says:

Consider, for example, the mathematically necessary truth that 7 plus 5 equals
12. In this case, it seems that the proper thing to say is that it is part of the
essence of this proposition that it is true if the natural numbers exist—or, at
least, if the numbers 5, 7 and 12 exist. These numbers are truthmakers of the
proposition in question. For it is upon these numbers that the truth of that
189

See, for example Rodriguez-Pereyra (2009), Armstrong (1997), Merricks (2006).
He at times hedges, however, saying, for example ‘To avoid undue complexity, I shall assume that
propositions are the primary truth-bearers in what follows, but I do not think that this assumption is
crucial to the general thrust of the arguments that I shall be advancing’ (Lowe 2009, 201).
191
See, for example Restall (2009), Horwich (2009), Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006).
192
Armstrong defines it as: ‘p (a proposition) is true if and only if there exists a T (some entity in the
world) such that T necessitates that p and p is true in virtue of T’ (Armstrong 2004, 17).
190
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proposition essentially depends, because it is part of the essence of these
numbers that they stand in the relevant arithmetical relation. (Lowe 2009, 250).
Granting the existence of essences, Lowe’s account helps somewhat to deal with the
issues facing necessary propositions, but more work is required when dealing with the
truth of contingent propositions, discussed presently.
Truthmaker theory is sometimes employed as a criterion of ontological
commitment to oppose COC.193,194 It is claimed that we ought not be concerned with
quantification, but with the entities that are required in our ontology (Cameron 2010,
252). As Armstrong declares:
Why should we desert Quine’s procedure for some other method? The great
advantage, as I see it, of the search for truth-makers is that it focuses us not
merely on the metaphysical implications of the subject terms of propositions
but also on their predicates. Quine has told us that the predicate gives us
‘ideology’ rather than ontology (1966: 232). This saying is rather dark, but it
is clear that, to some degree, he has stacked the ontological deck against
predicates as opposed to subject terms. But when we look to truth-makers for
truths, subject and predicate start as equals, and we can consider the ontological
implications of both in an unbiased way. (Armstrong 2009, 23)
I’ve mentioned numerous times that COC was ontologically biased against the
existence of universals and that, rather than serving as a neutral criterion of ontological
commitment, it merely preserved a nominalistic predilection. Armstrong tries to
balance affairs employing truthmaker theory as a criterion of what exists, though it
might easily be claimed that truthmaker theory is merely biased in favour of the
existence of a variety of exotic referents of a predicate.
Let us take an example of how truthmaker theory works as a criterion of
ontological commitment. If we take the proposition “the dog is brown”, when
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Rami (2009, 5) claims that this has not been successful as does Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002), Beebee
& Dodd (2005) and MacBride (2005).
194
In this regard, Sider claims that ‘truthmaker theorists think that they have a powerful methodological
device at their disposal. It is the method of “catching the cheaters”: they seek to expose and reject any
view which takes certain propositions to be true but without saying how reality could be such as to make
those propositions true’ (Sider 2005, 37).
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paraphrased in the technical machinery of COC, it can be informally read as “for some
x, x is a dog and x is brown”. According to COC, the sentence is committed only to
one object, the dog, for the dog is the value of the variable x. According to truthmaker
theory, however, even if the dog satisfies the above regimented sentence, it does not
entail the truth of the proposition “the dog is brown” for the dog is a contingent object
and need not have been brown. But even brownness in conjunction with the dog does
not satisfy the proposition “the dog is brown” for neither do they jointly entail its truth.
Armstrong (1997) postulates the existence of states of affairs, which amounts in this
instance to the peculiar entity, the dog being brown, as the truthmaker that does entail
the truth of the proposition, but such postulated entities are controversial. Lowe, in
contrast appeals to the category of modes as particularised properties to serve as the
requisite entity to account for the truth of such contingent propositions. “The dog is
brown” is true because the attribute, brownness, is instantiated by a mode that is the
dog’s particular colour brown, where the mode is essentially dependent for its
existence on the dog. But this account is all too brief and, as mentioned above, won’t
be appreciated until a fuller discussion of his four-category ontology is discussed in
Chapter Four.
Truthmaker theory is problematic and it is not clear that it is any less
problematic than COC. It faces many of the same issues that COC had to contend with,
such as the existence of negative existentials, fictional entities and introduces the
problem of “falsemakers”. Armstrong, in fact, claims not to possess substantial
arguments in favour of truthmaker theory. He claims ‘I do not have any direct
argument. My hope is that philosophers of realist inclinations will be immediately
attracted to the idea that a truth, any truth, should depend for its truth for something
“outside” it, in virtue of which it is true’ (Armstrong 2004, 7). There is little consensus
on why the truthmaker principle should be accepted, and this lack of argument is an
evident weakness.

2.3 Lowe, van Inwagen, and Metaontology
Enough has been said, I think, about general features of Lowe’s metaontology.
Given its remove from van Inwagen’s metaontological account, in this penultimate
section I want to tie some of the themes of Lowe’s metaontology to the analysis of
Chapter One.
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We have seen, at various junctures of the thesis so far, that Lowe is markedly
critical of Quine’s ontology and metaontology. I mentioned in the Introduction, for
example, that Lowe claims that ‘Quine ultimately has nothing intelligible to say about
ontology – as I conceive of it – and would happily accept that charge, on the grounds
that ontology, thus conceived, is an impossible enterprise’ (Lowe 2009, 204). Further,
he believes ‘that Quinean “ontology” is a travesty of the real thing and more of a threat
to genuine ontology than anything issuing from the pens of self-professed antirealists
and relativists’ (Lowe 2008, 276).195 These are dramatic and damning claims. It’s not
entirely clear that Lowe’s many objections to Quine are equally applicable to van
Inwagen, though some, as we’ve seen, evidently are.
Lowe endorses the idea that there are levels of being, or that being is
hierarchical, incorporating several kinds of formal ontological relations between the
various categories and sub-categories. Van Inwagen, we saw, finds this idea
incomprehensible. It seems to follow naturally that Lowe would endorse different
modes of being. By modes, here, I don’t refer to the category mode, but the idea that
being comes in modes, or perhaps ways or degrees. This was part of van Inwagen’s
Non-Activity thesis which he associated variously with Heidegger and Sartre, but in
related ways is also applicable to scholastic philosophers such as Aquinas and some
Ancient Greeks such as Plato. Yet, at least extrapolating from Lowe’s endorsement of
Univocity, it doesn’t appear that modes in this sense fit with his metaontology. I
mentioned in the previous chapter that, in one of his major works More Kinds of Being,
he claims that ‘I most emphatically do not wish the title of this study to convey the
impression that I postulate different kinds of existence, as opposed merely to different
kinds of thing that exist. “Exist” is univocal’ (Lowe 2009a, 4). His endorsement of
Univocity coincides with his belief in alethic monism discussed earlier. He claims, we
remember, that ‘truth is single and indivisible or, to put it another way, because the
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Lowe has some interesting critiques of Quine claiming he is an antirealist partly due to the emphasis
on variables for what (a theory says) exists, partly because of his doctrine of ontological relativity, and
partly because of Quine’s construal of existence as a second-order predicate. There isn’t space to discuss
the merits of this view, or whether it is applicable to van Inwagen. Quine clearly professes realist
convictions in “limning the true and ultimate structure of reality” (Quine 1960, 221). And van Inwagen,
claims that ‘truth is radically non-epistemic’ (van Inwagen 1988, 95). This amounts to his commitment
to metaphysical realism, with a qualification. He says ‘I have no very reliable sense of the boundaries
of what is at issue in the realism/antirealism debate. Perhaps there is more to “realism” than the thesis
that truth is radically non-epistemic’ (Ibid., 97). However precise his understanding of metaphysical
realism is, he says that his conviction that metaphysical realism is non-epistemic ‘would not be accepted
by any of those philosophers who describe themselves as antirealists’ (Ibid.).
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world or reality as a whole is unitary and necessarily self-consistent’ (Lowe 2013,
128). In this respect, he appears to join van Inwagen against neo-Meinongians who
claim that there are things that don’t exist. But Lowe’s analysis of this situation differs
from van Inwagen. Lowe does not endorse Bexistence, the idea that being and
existence are the same, nor does he seem to identify either as invariably ontologically
loaded. To substantiate his point, he adduces an example from Through the Looking
Glass where the red Queen says she thinks of ‘six impossible things before breakfast.’
Plainly, Lowe says, ‘these are not six existent things. “At least one x”, like “exactly
six xs”, express quantity, but not existence’ (Lowe 2011, 122-123). In this vein, we
saw that he also objects to Quantification where the existential quantifier was thought
to capture the single sense of existence. Lowe, I mentioned, claims that the existential
quantifier of predicate logical should not be given an objectual interpretation and
should, rather, be called the particular quantifier to contrast with the universal
quantifier, which is typically not considered commissive.
In rejecting three of van Inwagen’s first four theses, there is little to support for
Quine’s ‘notorious criterion of ontological commitment’ (Lowe 2008, 11; my italics).
Lowe objects, not only to the objectual construal of the existential quantifier, but also
to the constraint of having just one variable representing just one kind of entity. In fact,
as we saw above in connection with fantology, he objects to his ontology being held
hostage to logic; ontology, he claims, is first philosophy and logic should be in its
service. Lowe also objected, we saw in Chapter One, to any paraphrastic strategy that
was not symmetrical; that is, where the paraphrase could avoid the ontological
commitments of the paraphrased sentence. Summing up his thoughts on COC, he
claims, ‘I see no reason to place any confidence in Quine’s famous criterion’ (Lowe
2008, 11).
Lowe also objects to van Inwagen’s claim that ontological theories cannot
explain, and to the related idea that ontologists ought not to engage in theory-building.
While this is a task that is proper to Chapter Five, Lowe clearly endorses various forms
of explanation. In a most basic sense, he claims that his four-category ontology
‘provides a powerful explanatory framework for a unified account of causation,
dispositions, natural laws, natural necessity, and other related matters, such as the
semantics of counterfactual conditionals’ (Lowe 2006, v). He seeks to explain
fundamental features of the world, both possible and actual, and includes various
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ontological primitives in his ontology precisely because of their purported explanatory
power. He says, for example:

That we should include in our ontology properties and relations—both as
particulars and as universals—I am now taking as given: but which properties
and relations we should include is another question, to be settled by further
discussion and argument, in which considerations of ontological economy and
explanatory power will have an important and perhaps decisive role to play.
(Lowe 2006, 59)

Lowe, here, is appealing to the strategy of inference to the best explanation that, on a
realist construal, is predicated on the truth-conduciveness of the theoretical virtues.
This is a questionable strategy. In Chapter Five I argue that there is little reason to
think that the theoretical virtues can be relied upon as a guide to truth, and that
pragmatism in this regard is a preferable position.
Lowe also endorses distinctively metaphysical kinds of explanation, of which
grounding is an example. Such explanations are based on the idea that being is
ontologically structured, and that various dependency or determination relations
provide, what I called above, an in virtue of kind of explanation. This is clearly
opposed to van Inwagen’s position which flatly denies there is any such structure or
any such explanation.
There are bound to be similarities between van Inwagen’s neo-Quinean
metaontology and Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian metaontology. They are, after all, both
concerned in some respect with being; they are both doing ontology. I mentioned in
the previous chapter that van Inwagen, in a rather surprising paper, provides an
updated definition of ontology, which, he claims, is a compliment to the standard
Quinean definition as concerned with what there is; though further work is required to
assess the compatibility of his two conceptions.196 He claims that ‘We may, in fact,
define ontology as the discipline whose business is to specify the ontological
categories’ (van Inwagen 2014, 157). It is one of the assumptions of ontology, he
claims, that there are categories. In fact, he claims that without this assumption,
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See Koskinen (2012) for a convincing case why neo-Quinean ontology is not suited to the business
of charting the categories of being.
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ontology would be like astrology; ‘a science that rests on a false assumption’ (Ibid.,
191). He views categories as natural classes and says: ‘what I intend by the statement
“Natural classes are real” to convey is that there are natural – nonconventional – lines
of division among things’ (Ibid., 186). Thus far, this appears to approximate Lowe’s
position on the tasks of ontology.197 However, van Inwagen’s categories, as is how he
arrives at them which we will see in the following chapter, are quite unlike Lowe’s.
According to van Inwagen’s favoured ontology there are two primary categories, the
category of substance and the category of relation. The category of substance (concrete
object) comprises only particulars and the category of relation, which he also calls
abstract thing and even universal, is construed as a special kind of proposition which
he calls unsaturated assertibles. A proposition, for van Inwagen, is a (0-adic relation)
and a universal, a monadic relation.198
Whatever the possible similarities between Lowe and van Inwagen’s
conception of ontology under van Inwagen’s latest definition, we have seen that their
general approach to ontology are almost diametrically opposed.

2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I provided an exposition of Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian
metaontology. Though I divided his metaontology into nine theses, it is clear that they
are meant to form a systematic whole to furnish Lowe with the tools to provide a
metaphysical framework for the sciences. Lowe’s metaontology faces serious
challenges, many of which are epistemological in nature. We will see further
challenges in Chapter Four and Five. Despite its shortcomings, in my view, it is a more
promising approach to ontological inquiry than van Inwagen’s neo-Quinean
With respect to the neo-Aristotelian conception of ontology, he claims: ‘Let me say something to
connect the definition of ontology I have given with an ancient and important definition of ontology.
The definition I am thinking of derives from one of Aristotle’s definitions of “first philosophy” in
Metaphysics: Ontology is the science of being as such or being qua being. In my view, this Aristotelian
definition of ontology is, if not entirely satisfactory, not wholly wrong either... If I reject the Aristotelian
definition of ontology, it is not because I deny that the question “What is being?” is one of the questions
that ontology must answer. I reject it because I deny that it is the primary ontological question, the
question that defines the business of ontology’ (van Inwagen 2014, 199-200).
198
Lowe has some interesting arguments to the effect that Quineans are committed to a zero-category
ontology, which is an incoherent ontology, according to Lowe, because of the incapacity to differentiate
between entities. Quine’s response to the ontological question “what is there?”, is “Everything”, but
such a term does not admit of speciation and therefore is not even a one-category ontology. Work is
required to see if this accurately fits Quine’s position, and further work, to see if it is applicable to van
Inwagen. See, for example, (Lowe 2008, 281).
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metaontology. I argue for this more forcefully in Chapter Five; here, I just briefly
outline why I think so.
What I find promising are the more general features of his approach: his effort
to do ontology directly, his theory-builder approach and the idea of ontology and
metaphysics as first philosophy, however bound up it is with the practice of the
sciences and other domains of inquiry. It is possible to remain agnostic on certain more
controversial aspects of his view - such as his sortal logic or his endorsement of four
categories (rather than, say, L.A Paul’s (2012) one-category ontology or David
Armstrong’s (1978, 1992) two-category ontology) - while still recommending core
aspects of his approach. While the aforementioned examples are important ingredients
of Lowe’s metaontology, it is his broader approach that I wish to defend. In this sense,
my aim is more modest than a wholesale defence of Lowe’s metaontology. Central to
his approach is the effort to develop explanatory theories. How successfully Lowe’s
theories explain depend on how explanation in ontology is understood and this is the
focus of Chapter Five. To put the point bluntly: van Inwagen and Lowe, as mentioned
in the Introduction, don’t engage in each other’s work because they endorse such
contrasting metaontologies. I want to defend aspects of Lowe’s metaontology that
permit him to engage with those philosophers seeking to provide explanatory theories
of phenomena in the world.
In the next two chapters I turn to the problem of character and to van Inwagen
and Lowe’s respective ways of dealing with this first-order ontological issue. This
issue will serve as an illustration of their respective metaontological theories which
serves to magnify the differences in their methodologies. I begin in the following
chapter with van Inwagen and in the subsequent chapter, with Lowe.

120

CHAPTER 3. VAN INWAGEN ON THE PROBLEM OF
CHARACTER: AN ILLUSTRATION OF NEO-QUINEAN
METAONTOLOGY
[A]t the end of the day, the
best way to do metametaphysics is to do firstlevel
metaphysics.
(Benovsky 2017, 31)
It is, I believe, the task of
ontology to draw out the
ontological implications of
our everyday and scientific
beliefs and assertions. And
the way to draw out these
implications (I contend)
essentially involves the
method
Quine
has
recommended.
(van
Inwagen 2016, 52-53)
[N]o set of statements
among all possible sets of
statements counts as an
explanation of what it is for
a particular to have a
property or for two distinct
particulars to have the same
property. (van Inwagen
2011, 398)
How could we have arrived
at these two radically
opposed positions? I believe
that a large part of the
explanation—perhaps the
whole
of
it—is
methodological.
(van
Inwagen 2017, 350)

3.0 Introduction
In Chapter One, I provided an exposition and critique of van Inwagen’s neoQuinean metaontology. There, I demonstrated several weaknesses in his neo-Quinean
account. In Chapter Two, I provided a detailed analysis of Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian
metaontology. While Lowe’s account faces many challenges, I claimed that it is the
more promising of the two approaches with respect to how ontological inquiry might
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be conducted. In this chapter, and the next, I provide an illustration of how first-order
ontological issues are conducted in the light of these respective metaontologies. The
first-order topic that is the focus of these chapters is the problem of universals, or what
I prefer to call the problem of character.199 Briefly, the idea is that there are familiar
concrete objects (trees, houses, people) that not only are charactered, or have features
(colour, shape, texture), but also share character with other familiar concrete objects.
Character, and shared character have given rise to countless perplexing metaphysical
problems for millennia. Both Lowe and van Inwagen provide theories that are related
to this problem and it is therefore a convenient topic to discuss to magnify the
contrasting nature of their respective methods. I provide an analysis of van Inwagen’s
approach to the problem in this chapter and turn to Lowe’s account in the next. At first
glance it would appear that van Inwagen and Lowe are providing competing theories
of character, but they are in fact engaged in very different projects as I will show. The
difference in projects, I argue, is a direct result of their respective metaontological
positions, particularly, their position on the nature and role of explanation in ontology.
I begin in the following section with an overview of the problem of character.
This will help to contextualise van Inwagen’s position on the problem in this chapter,
and Lowe’s theory in the next. I then introduce van Inwagen’s position on character
which he calls ‘ostrich-Platonism’ (van Inwagen 2014, 215). This rather peculiar
appellation, we will see, is a result of his predilection for nominalism married with his
conviction that nominalism is untenable; the putative untenability of nominalism
inclines him to proffer a theory of properties. This theory of properties, somewhat
counterintuitively, is not a response to the problem of character, a point that will
become clear below. I divide an analysis of his theory into two parts, which will be
treated separately: the existence of properties and the nature of properties. Van
Inwagen claims that properties must exist because our everyday and scientific
discourse seems to require some object to play the property role. That is, we cannot
seem to dispense with property talk (or talk of nominalistically acceptable entities),
according to van Inwagen, therefore we should commit to their existence in accordance
with the principles of COC. His theory of properties, then, is a direct result of his
metaontological theses discussed in the Chapter One. To appreciate his account of the

I will have something to say in the next section about the terms “universal”, “property” and
“character”.
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existence of properties, I first discuss his account of abstract objects, which forms part
of his platonistic position.200 As with Plato’s theory of Forms, van Inwagen’s theory
of character is a relational ontology. I contrast this with its main rival, constituent
ontology. Van Inwagen’s rejection of constituent ontologies in all its forms is related
to the rejection of ontological structure and metaphysical explanation, as well as his
position on theory-building, each of which were discussed in Chapter One. I then
further critique his criterion of ontological commitment and show that, rather than
being a neutral criterion, it does in fact merely reinforce an already existing ontological
prejudice. Subsequently, prior to articulating what he considers to be the nature of
properties, I discuss what he claims properties are not. Finally, the surprising
consequences of his theory are discussed. I conclude with the claim that his account is
in varying ways lacking and while it is, as he claims, non-explanatory, offers little to
an understanding of character or the nature of universals in any substantial sense.
Insofar as this theory is a consequence of his metaontology, it is further reason to
question its viability for the purposes of ontological inquiry.

3.1 The Problem of Character
In this section, I briefly discuss the longstanding and vexed problem of
character. This is a thorny issue and the fact that it is still being debated millennia after
its inception is, to many, a sign of the futility of the problem and an indictment of
analytic ontology insofar as the problem features as a concern. As Swoyer remarks:
‘Even people who like philosophy often don’t like metaphysics. Ontology in
particular, with its arcane discussions of universals and particulars, is frequently cited
as a paradigm of desiccated Scholasticism’ (Swoyer 1999, 100).
There are several distinct, though related, problems with what has traditionally
been called the Problem of Universals. The issues involved in this slightly misleading
piece of nomenclature have a long history, many going back to Plato and Aristotle
whose names still frame aspects of the contemporary debate. The appellation is slightly
misleading as there is no single problem of universals; rather, there is an assortment
of complex matters each in some way having to do with the ontological status and
“platonism” is often defined as the view that there are abstract objects and “realism”, the view that
there are universals. The lowercase “p” in “platonism” is used to distance the position from Plato’s
wider metaphysical theory.
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nature of properties. This point is well recognised, yet the confusing title remains.
Rodriguez-Pereyra, for instance, proposes that a more apposite name would be “The
Problem of Properties”, though he refrains from employing the title in his work in
deference to tradition (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2000, 256). 201 We see already, then, the
beginning of a terminological mess amounting to difficulties that threaten to obfuscate
an already difficult subject matter. There are further issues that make it bothersome to
provide an uncontroversial account of what the problems involved actually are. For
example, not only are there different names for properties throughout this longstanding tradition, but also, the same name at times takes on a different meaning
depending on the theoretical framework housing the term. Lewis gets close to
surmising these issues:
It’s not as if we have fixed once and for all, in some perfectly definite and
unequivocal way, on the things we call “the properties” ... Rather, we have the
word “property”, introduced by way of a varied repertory of ordinary and
philosophical uses. The word has thereby become associated with a role in our
commonsensical thought and in a variety of philosophical theories ... But it is
wrong to speak of the role associated with the word “property”, as if it were
fully and uncontroversially settled. The conception is in considerable disarray.
It comes in many versions, differing in a number of ways (Lewis 1986c, 55 56).
Various terms have been used for this notion that Lewis declares to be in “considerable
disarray”, terms such as “attribute”, “feature”, “quality”, “characteristic” and more
besides. Unfortunately, the term “property” has also been used synonymously with
“universal”, which simply confuses matters. It is my contention that it is best to reserve
the term “property” for a very particular meaning: a property is any theoretical entity
that is posited to provide an account of what might be called character. There is a
slight complication with this terminology as van Inwagen employs the term
“property”, yet not in the service of providing an account of character. But there is no
perfect terminology, and I will do my best to avoid ambiguity. One convention I
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For this well recognised point, see, for example: Campbell (1981, 483), Oliver (1996, 47) and (van
Inwagen 2014, 51).
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employ that should mitigate some confusion is that when I use the term “property” in
the context of van Inwagen’s theory I will employ the subscript “PvI” as in “property
PvI”.

In fact, van Inwagen’s propertiesPvI are so radically unlike traditional properties

he says ‘Once more I find myself in a generous mood: I’m happy to make a present of
the words “property” and “universal” to anyone who has strong feelings about their
proper use and who thinks that I am using them improperly’ (van Inwagen 2017, 346)
Character, then, in a basic sense, concerns the features of familiar concrete
particulars,202 what we would naturally call “things”, like tables, chairs and people.
Such familiar concrete particulars appear in certain ways; they have shape, texture,
weight, colour and a whole range of other qualities; they have a particular character.
As we experience the world, it would seem, at first glance at any rate, that these
features exist; that the “things” of the world have objective features with which we are
familiar. In fact, J.P. Moreland, in his book on universals, claims that ‘one of the most
obvious facts about the world is that it consists of individual things that have
properties…’ (Moreland 2014, 1). Further, this character that appears so evident seems
to be borne by more than one familiar concrete particular; that is, it seems to be the
case, not just that a given familiar concrete particular has a character, but that more
than one familiar concrete object can have the same character, thus the familiar
particulars, or the properties they bear, appear to be in a relation of what is typically
called attribute-agreement or resemblance - what I will call character-agreement.
There are two issues here, then: the first concerns individual concrete familiar
particulars and their character; the second, multiple individuals and their shared
character. Other issues relevant to the problem of character are of a linguistic or
semantic nature and concern matters of predication and abstract reference. The former
concerns the truth of subject-predicate discourse represented by the schema “a is F”.
It is amongst the most basic forms of discourse where a, the subject of the sentence, is
thought to denote an object, and F, the predicate, is said of the subject. The copula is,
concerns some relation between a and F. But does F refer to an entity the same way a
does, and does the copula refer to a relation that is distinct from the relata it relates?
The realist claims that the truth of “a is F”, “Socrates is wise”, for example, depends
both on the structure of the sentence and the non-linguistic structure of the world; that
It may concern fundamental features of the world too, as in the posits of fundamental physics – the
spin of electrons, for example, but for the purposes of illustration, it will be sufficient to speak of regular
medium-sized dry goods.
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F is not merely playing some grammatical role, but has ontological import. The issue
of abstract reference is most easily identifiable in the appearance of abstract singular
terms, terms which can play the subject role in a sentence. Examples include terms
like “circularity”, “mankind”, and “wisdom”. We might say “Socrates is wise”, where
“wise” is a predicate, but we can also say that “Wisdom is a virtue”, where “wisdom”
is a subject. The question emerges whether the postulation of some entity, a property,
is required to make sense of these various issues concerning character.
Realists 203 answer in the affirmative and construe properties as universals
whose defining characteristic is, perhaps, its ability to be exemplified by more than one
object. That is, universals are thought to be repeatable entities that are multiply
instantiable. Thus, according to realism, just as Socrates is wise, so too, is Plato where
the predicate wise is a universal; wisdom as a universal is shared. Broadly, as
universals they may be immanent in, or transcendent to, the familiar particular that has
them, though even here, there are varieties of each position.204 Traditionally, Platonists
construe universals as transcendent entities and Aristotelians construe them as
immanent. Both positions need to account for the relation between the universal and
the entity exemplifying it.205
Austere or extreme nominalism is the anti-realist view that the world is
composed only of particulars, thus rejecting the existence of universals in any of its
forms. There is a tendency among nominalists to reject the demand for an explanation
of the issues raised above surrounding the problem of character. The issue of character
and character-agreement, for example, are thought to be primitive, irreducible features
of the world. As Loux articulates this position: ‘There are no prior facts that serve to
explain these facts; they constitute the primitive materials out of which we construct
our story of the world’ (Loux 2002, 53). What makes it true that “a is F” is simply that
a is F. What makes it true that “Plato is wise” is that Plato is, in fact, wise. The subject
has a referent and the predicate is satisfied by this referent, and this naming and
203

Each position I mention comes with the qualification that there are vastly different perspectives and
interpretations on what the position amounts to. For the sake of brevity, I gloss over these many
complicating factors even if some precision is lost.
204
For example, Armstrong (1989) endorses immanent universals as constituents of the familiar
concrete particular that are wholly present and not abstract, whereas Lowe, we saw in Chapter Two,
endorses immanent universals that are abstract entities, though he also endorses particular properties
called modes that are not abstract (Lowe 2006). There are complications with the term abstract here
which are discussed below and in Chapter Four.
205
This fact is one of the issues why the terms “relation” and “constituent” are not quite apposite, as the
division seems to suggest that the latter can avoid providing an account of relations.
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satisfaction is thought to be enough; there is no explanatory difference, the austere
nominalist insists, between the claim that “Plato is wise” and “Plato exemplifies
wisdom”. Nothing more needs to be added; no abstract objects appealed to.
Trope theory, what is sometimes called luxuriant nominalism (van Inwagen
2014, 48) is rather counterintuitively a version of nominalism. It is perhaps counter
intuitive because of the tendency to conflate the term “property” with “universal”,
where the rejection of universals seems to amount to the rejection of properties. Trope
theory endorses properties, but properties only as particulars. As Daly succinctly
explains: ‘If a, b, and c are each red, there are three properties here. There is a’s
property of being red, or a’s red trope, there is b’s red trope, and there is c’s. Each of
these red tropes is a distinct property’ (Daly 1994, 253). This distinct property is not
transmittable; it belongs only to the entity that has it, if the tropes are paired with a
substratum. On a different line of thought, tropes are all there is, thus there is no entity
that has tropes; rather the entity is a bundle of compresent tropes. There is debate
amongst trope theorists as to whether to treat tropes as abstract entities or concrete
entities.
There are a seemingly endless array of positions dealing with the problem of
character, each involving various subtleties and complexities that can’t be navigated
appropriately in this all too brief introduction. Some of the issue mentioned here will
become clearer in this chapter, and the next, as I discuss how van Inwagen and Lowe
develop their respective theories. With the broad ideas rehearsed and nomenclature
somewhat fixed, we have covered sufficient ground to be able to elaborate upon van
Inwagen’s position which he variously calls ostrich platonism and lightweight
platonism.

3.2 Van Inwagen’s Theory of Properties: Ostrich Platonism
Van Inwagen proposes a theory of propertiesPvI that he considers ‘very nearly
vacuous’ (van Inwagen 2014, 175). Because of its near vacuity, it is in some ways
simple to grasp. But because of its near vacuity, it’s not clear in what way it is related
to character as traditionally understood. His theory is not developed in response to the
problem character, for as mentioned, he does not think there is a problem of character.
Van Inwagen names his position ostrich platonism and in the next two sections, I
analyse both aspects of the unusual appellation.
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3.2.1 The Plight of Flightless Birds
Van Inwagen is, then, a self-professed “ostrich platonist”. He claims: ‘I am,
you see, what Armstrong would call an ostrich nominalist – or would be but for the
fact that I am not a nominalist. Perhaps I am an ostrich platonist’ (van Inwagen 2017,
61). As noted in Chapter One, he extends his ostrich platonist predilection to all
purported metaphysical explanations: ‘And I would say more or less the same thing
about any metaphysical theory that presents itself as an explanation of some
phenomenon: assuming that that phenomenon exists at all, it will not be a thing that it
makes any sense to speak of explaining’ (van Inwagen 2017, 61).
By “ostrich” in the purposefully oxymoronic appellation, he means that, with
respect to character, there is nothing in virtue of which an object is charactered. As
with Quine (1948), he claims that the fact of character is primitive. Quine,
representing a nominalistic position, famously stated: ‘That the houses and roses and
sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible, and it may be held
[that the realist is] no better off, in point of real explanatory power, for all the occult
entities which he posits under such names as “redness” (Quine 1948, 81).
Armstrong (1978, 16) used the epithet “ostrich nominalism” in a pejorative
sense. As ostriches allegedly put their head in the sand,206 hoping any imminent threat
passes, so too the ostrich nominalist is accused of simply ignoring a troublesome but
legitimate problem. Armstrong deems this the weakest form of nominalism and
provides various arguments against it, one of which we met in the last chapter in the
form of truthmaker theory. Another is the so-called “Harlot” argument. This argument
claims that the ostrich nominalist ascribes to the predicate ‘what has been said to be
the privilege of the harlot: power without responsibility. The predicate is informative,
it makes a vital contribution to telling us what is the case... yet ontologically it is
supposed not to commit us. Nice work: if you can get it’ (Armstrong 1978, 16). The
ostrich, he considers, differs from traditional nominalists207 who, while rejecting the
existence of universals, provide theories attempting to account for character in a
nominalistically acceptable way. Armstrong ascribes this position to Quine who, he
206

It seems that ostriches actually put their head merely on the ground in the face of danger, if they
can’t outrun the threat that is, and put their head in the sand only to check on the buried eggs that is their
offspring.
207
Armstrong (1978) reviews and critiques several kinds of nominalism which he views as legitimate
strategies in dealing with the problem of character, which include predicate, concept, resemblance,
mereological and class nominalism.
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claims, refuses ‘to take predicates with any ontological seriousness’ (Armstrong 1978,
16). Devitt (1980), however, argues that Quine is not an ostrich nominalist as
Armstrong suggests. Quine, he claims, does engage in dealing with issues concerning
the existence of universals (1960), just not Armstrong’s version of the problem, which
Devitt claims isn’t a real problem and thus, there is no problem to ignore. Devitt claims
that Armstrong is a mirage realist (Devitt 1980, 433), seeing things in the ontological
desert that aren’t there.
According to van Inwagen, then, the fact that a familiar concrete particular,
such as a golf ball for instance, is white, admits of only two kinds of explanation: one
physical and the other philosophical. The philosophical answer, however, is not
ontological in nature in his view – it is relevant only to the philosophy of perception
which would incorporate information from the appropriate sciences. A scientific
answer would involve an analysis of the object’s surface, measuring the hue,
brightness and saturation of the reflected light, an account of the frequencies of
electromagnetic radiation and so forth. The philosophical answer would provide an
account of how the white object was causally related to the visual experience of the
human observer. An ontological account, he claims, that appeals to instantiation
relations, or universals, or any other theoretical posit is no explanation at all. In his
own words:

There simply are no such questions as the supposed metaphysical questions
“What is it for an object to be white?” and “What is it for an object to have a
surface (etc.)?” And, in my view, the declarative sentences that are supposed
to be their answers (sentences like “For an object to be white is for it to bear
the relation “having” to a certain object in Plato’s heaven, to wit, property of
being white” and “For an object to be white is for it to have the universal
whiteness as an ontological constituent”) are meaningless. (van Inwagen 2016,
64)208
To take another example to emphasise the charge of meaningless, he claims: ‘In my
view, the idea of a metaphysical explanation of the fact that (say) this copy of A Theory
If not meaningless, it may be false a priori. He says ‘(…Compare that postwar-Oxford chestnut
‘Quadruplicity drinks procrastination’. Is that sentence meaningless or false a priori? A case could be
made for either answer.)’ (van Inwagen 2016, 64).
208
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of Justice is green is meaningless—that is to say, there is no such idea, there are only
the words “metaphysical explanation of the fact that this copy of A Theory of Justice
is green”, words that darken metaphysical counsel’ (van Inwagen 2017, 347).
His charge of “meaninglessness” we met in the last chapter and sounds
histrionic, but he mitigates the drama by saying that ‘Meaninglessness is what we risk
in metaphysics’; it’s a rarity, he thinks, that metaphysicians say something that is
meaningful, never mind correct, and even on those occasions, it’s often because
metaphysicians have ‘encroached on someone else’s territory’ (van Inwagen 2015,
58). The accusation of meaninglessness, especially in metaphysics, ‘should be no more
offensive than the charge “What you are saying is wrong”’ (van Inwagen 2015, 58).
As I noted, however, he often, rather unfortunately, equates meaninglessness with
what he doesn’t understand. And there are many things he doesn’t understand – so
much so that his lack of comprehension has led to humorous play with the phrase
“Petering out”. 209 I say “unfortunately” because it’s far from a robust criterion of
meaning, and therefore is of use only rhetorically. John Keller, however, in defending
van Inwagen, appropriately identifies that ‘If there is semantic nonsense, there are
things that no one understands, and if there are things no one understands, surely some
metaphysical terms of art are among them’ (Keller 2017, 2).210 If there are no such
things as tropes or immanent universals, then, it's not clear that one can be said to have
understood them, or what it was they were posited to explain. I will return to this matter
in Chapter Five in connection with theories of explanation, understanding and
factivity.

3.2.2 Van Inwagen’s “Lightweight” platonism
To be clear, van Inwagen does believe that there is character; just that there is
no problem of character. He claims, for example:

209

The phrase means to dwindle or gradually disappear. In relation to van Inwagen, it highlights how
he can’t continue to engage with that which he professes not to understand.
210
Keller discusses this point in detail in the Introduction to Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from
the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen. He says: ‘Famously, or perhaps infamously, Peter van Inwagen
doesn’t understand some things. Of course, there are things that few or none of us understand. But van
Inwagen doesn’t understand some things that the rest of us seem to. For that reason, many people find
van Inwagen’s incomprehension—or at least his professed incomprehension—to be off-putting,
offensive, or insincere.’ And makes the following adulatory, but not unwarranted, remark: ‘But if none
of us understand these expressions, why shouldn’t van Inwagen— someone with, shall we say, rather
stringent expectations when it comes to clarity—be among the first to notice? (Keller 2017, 2).
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I do believe that there is an object I call “the color green”. And, of course, I
think that the color green or the property greenness is exactly what all green
individuals have in common, and I of course think that they share this thing
that they have in common with no non-green individual. But I should never
want to say that the fact that greenness was a property of both the apple and
the book explained the fact that they were both green or the fact that they were
both of the same color. In my view that would be as absurd as saying that the
fact that the proposition that the book and the apple are both green is true
explained the fact that the book and the apple were both green. (van Inwagen
2017, 61)211

Van Inwagen, then, rejects the problem of character as a pseudo-problem.
However, he does provide a theory of propertiesPvI construed as universals, and this
brings us to his platonism. He says: ‘I put the phrase “the problem of universals” in
scare-quotes and suggest an alternative phrase because, although I believe that there
are many philosophical problems about or raised by universals, I do not think that there
is any one philosophical problem that deserves to be called the problem of universals’
(van Inwagen 2016, 51). On first reading, one may take his meaning to be that there is
no single problem of universals, as is in fact the case. On closer inspection, however,
as we have seen, he does not think that there is any problem in the usual sense and his
theory of universals is not an answer to this “problem” or set of problems.
Van Inwagen refines his ostrich nominalist stance and declares himself to be a
‘lightweight platonist’, 212 which is a form of transcendent realism (van Inwagen 2016,
55). He considers himself a platonist for the following reasons:
…because the theory contends that universals are invisible, intangible,
achronic and nonspatial things that exist at all times and in all places and in all
possible worlds, and whose existence is serenely indifferent to whether they
have instances: if a universal has instances/has no instances at one time and has
no instances/has instances at a later time, that is a “mere Cambridge” change
He elaborates with the following example: ‘“Daddy, why is the sky blue?” “Well, sweetheart, that’s
because the proposition that the sky is blue is true.” “Oh, Daddy, how wise you are!”’ (van Inwagen
2017, 61).
212
The appellation, van Inwagen tells us, was coined in the doctoral thesis of Kenny Boyce (van
Inwagen 2016, 55).
211
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in that universal; there is no sense whatever in which a universal is a
“component” or “constituent” of its instances. (van Inwagen 2016, 55)
So, he’s a platonist insofar as he endorses the existence of universals. These universals,
he thinks, can’t be identified by the senses, they are intangible, timeless and nonspatial, though they are necessary and “exist” at all times and places. Such universals
need not be instantiated, and if instantiated, are not an ontological ingredient of the
object that possesses them; he is not, I will make clear below, a constituent ontologist.
These properties of propertiesPvI are analysed in more detail in the penultimate section
of this chapter after further aspects of his position are made clear.
Such is the nature of his platonism. He is lightweight for the following reasons:
‘“Lightweight” because, as I view matters, universals are “anetiological”; they have
no causal powers and they are not such as to respond to the causal powers of those
things that do have causal powers. (Plato’s Forms or Ideas certainly had causal
powers.)’ (van Inwagen 2016, 55).
This lack of causal efficacy provokes the question: how are we to know about such
entities if we cannot causally interact with them? And further, what are we to make of
the claim that universals are acausal, but exist in all times and in all places? The best
van Inwagen can do is the following:

Well, let us say that if God were to provide us at some time and place with a
list of all universals, he would have provided the same list at any other time or
place. Perhaps, rather than saying that universals exist at all times and in all
places, it would be better to say that statements about the existence of
universals – unlike statements about their having or not having instances –
cannot be temporally or spatially qualified. (van Inwagen 2016, 56)

But there is a subtle shift here from speaking of a theory of properties to providing an
account of what we say about properties – the property role. Though van Inwagen in
practice conflates them, they are, I claim, different kinds of theories accounting for
different kinds of things.
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Russell famously declared at one point in his career that universals were
‘nowhere and nowhen’ (Russell [1912] 2001, 56). It was in the context of discussing
geographical relations. He says:
… relation “north of” does not seem to exist in the same sense in which
Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask “Where and when does this relation
exist?” the answer must be “Nowhere and nowhen”. There is no place or time
where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any
more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor
can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be
apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time.
Hence the relation “north of” is radically different from such things. It is neither
in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something. (Ibid.)
Van Inwagen seems to concur with the central point ‘To ask when or where a universal
exists is to ask a question that betrays a misunderstanding of the nature of universals’
(van Inwagen 2016, 55). We will see below that van Inwagen thinks properties PvI are
just something said about – well, something else – the concrete object that has the
property.
Though van Inwagen is an ostrich, his position is not nominalism, though it is
as close to it as one might get while still endorsing the existence of properties. 213 As
mentioned above, I treat his account of the existence of propertiesPvI separately to his
account of the nature of propertiesPvI, though in practice, it is hard to distinguish them.
Before discussing each of these, however, I contextualise his account of propertiesPvI
by analysing his account of the existence of abstract objects of which propertiesPvI are
but one type.

I recognise this is an unusual way of characterising a position. While nominalism isn’t something
that admits of degrees, as such, this almost nominalism best represents van Inwagen’s position. In fact,
he identifies with this characterization in a recent paper: ‘It is, indeed, a defensible position that (my
sort of) platonism is more like austere nominalism than it is like Aristotelianism in that each gives the
same account of concrete particulars: particulars are what David Armstrong has called “blobs”; the only
kinds of “structure” a concrete particular has are spatial and mereological structure—and the only proper
parts a concrete particular has are other, smaller concrete particulars’ (van Inwagen 2017, 349).
213
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3.3 Van Inwagen on Abstract Objects
Traditional nominalism, then, involves the rejection of the existence of abstract
objects. Van Inwagen wishes to be a nominalist, only, he doesn’t find the position
rationally tenable. He proclaims, in fact, that he ‘hates having to affirm the existence
of abstracta’ and though he desires to be a nominalist he says ‘I don’t want to be one
badly enough to purchase a button that reads “I’m a nominalist and I’m proud” at the
price of contradicting myself’ (van Inwagen, 2019 274).214
He commits, then, reluctantly, to the existence of abstract objects. He thinks,
however, that ‘it would be better not to believe in abstract objects if one could get
away with it. Or…, if it is not the same: it would be philosophically desirable to accept
only philosophical positions that do not require their adherents to afﬁrm the existence
of abstract objects’ (van Inwagen 2016, 153). It would be desirable, he thinks, largely
for reasons of parsimony.215
There are different senses of the term “abstract”,216 but in one significant sense,
it is contrasted with “concrete”. Other than insisting on this division, van Inwagen has
little more to say on the matter that is informative. Rather than attempt to provide a
sophisticated theory to account for the division, he merely makes strong exhortations
about the world being divided into two categories, and humbly declares that he
unfortunately has nothing particularly useful to say about what the term “abstract”
means (see van Inwagen 2004, 108). 217 Or rather, he claims that the predicates
employed in everyday and scientific language are divisible into two exhaustive and
exclusive categories: abstract and concrete. If certain predicates are put in one category
- predicates such as “table”, “the Eiffel Tower”, “elf”, “god” or “the copy of The
Critique of Pure Reason” - and other predicates such as “property”, “proposition” “the

He says elsewhere: ‘‘I should very much like to be a nominalist, but I can’t see my way clear to
being a nominalist. I can’t see my way clear to being a nominalist because I don’t like contradicting
myself, and I find that I can’t get along in the world without saying things that imply the existence of
abstract objects—or at least they seem to me to have that implication, and I can find no very convincing
reason to suppose that that seeming is mere seeming’ (van Inwagen 2014a, 37).
215
Precisely, he says, his reason for preferring not to be a Platonist is the following: ‘The reason is not
profound. I suppose one could classify it as an “Occam’s razor” sort of reason, though I will not make
any use of this term’ (van Inwagen 2014, 156).
216
As I discuss in the following chapter, Lowe distinguishes several varieties. In a related, but distinct
sense, “abstract” is sometimes used to identify objects that can exist independently from the objects that
bear them.
217
Elsewhere, he admits: ‘The world, I say, divides into abstract and concrete objects: everything is
either abstract or concrete and nothing is both. I must concede at the outset that I don’t know how to
define either of these terms’ (van Inwagen 2014, 239).
214
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horse” (as in “the horse is a quadruped”), “number”, “the French language” in another
category, then philosophers, he claims, will by and large agree which predicates will
go into which category. Depending on one’s ontological position, there will be
differences when it comes to cases, but the realist about abstract entities, according to
van Inwagen, is simply someone who thinks that predicates which fall within the
exhaustive and exclusive category of abstract entity have non-empty extensions. Of
course, many have denied the existence of abstracta, and as we saw above, van
Inwagen would wish to, but should such a division of entities exist, he says ‘The
difference between any abstract object and any concrete object would seem to be the
maximum difference any two objects could display (van Inwagen 2004, 110). I return
to this matter below in connection with the nature of properties. His approach amounts
to, then, the construction of inventories (of predicates) that seem to be contrasting in
nature, but he professes, there is not much more to be done. He does say that he
considers the term “abstract object” to be simply a ‘general term that applies to the
objects denoted by the terms in the second class218 – provided, of course, that those
terms have denotations’ (van Inwagen 2004, 110). But this, he recognizes, is nothing
more than stipulation.
In the following chapter we will see that Lowe remonstrates positions that treat
“object” and “thing” as synonymous. Lowe wants to allow for the existence of things
that are not objects, in that they do not have determinate existence and identity
conditions (what we called modes in the previous chapter). Van Inwagen allows no
such distinction. ‘The word “object”’, he says, ‘is synonymous with “thing” and “item”
and, no doubt, with “entity”. That is to say, everything is an object. That is to say, “For
every x, if x is an object, then x is F” is equivalent to “For every x, x is F” and “For
some x, x is an object and x is F” is equivalent to “For some x, x is F”’ (van Inwagen
2014, 156). It follows, then, according to van Inwagen, that if we use certain predicates
in discourse that fit into the “abstract” column by stipulation, and accept the sentences
that use these predicates as true, then by neo-Quinean decree, we are committed to the
existence of abstract objects, and those objects exists just as any thing exists.
He does, however, distinguish between the existence of an object and an
object’s nature:219
The “first class” is the class of concrete objects.
One of the criticisms, we remember, of those who would distinguish different kinds of being or
existence is due, van Inwagen thinks, to mistaking a thing’s nature for a thing’s being.
218
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If x falls into one of these categories and y into the other, then no two things
could be more different than x and y. According to orthodox Christian theology,
no two concrete things could differ more than God and an inanimate object.
But (assuming for the sake of the illustration that all three things exist) the
differences between God and this pen pale into insignificance when they are
compared with the differences between this pen and the number 4; indeed, the
number seems no more like the pen than like God. (van Inwagen 2014, 156)
I’m unsure whether this is in line with Christian theology, however, and it is an unusual
and striking claim, but as the nature of his understanding of abstract objects is made
clearer, given the choice, it might be preferable for a theist to acquiesce.
Though van Inwagen finds the division between abstract and concrete
ontologically undesirable, and as pleasing as it would be for him to be able to have just
one category, he does not think we can dispense with either. We could not get rid of
concrete objects, he maintains, on pain of incoherence for ‘that is the category into
which we fall’ (van Inwagen 2016, 157) and it seems that we know the nature of
concrete objects much better than abstract objects:

We do not understand even the simplest, the paradigmatic, abstract objects very
well at all. You say there is such a thing as the number 4? All right, tell me
what properties it has. Well, it has logical properties like self-identity and
having, for no property, both that property and its complement. And it has
arithmetical properties like being even and being the successor of 3 and
numbering the Stuart kings of England. But what others? It is, no doubt,
nonspatial, and perhaps nontemporal. It is perhaps necessarily existent. At
about this point we trail off into uncertainty. (Ibid.)

However, we can speak almost endlessly about the properties of a given concrete
object, such as a pen – its colour, texture, function, spatiotemporal location etc. Van
Inwagen is, then, reluctantly a Platonist insofar as he divides the world into two (Ibid.,
158).
Before I discuss in more detail the methodology van Inwagen employs that
leads him to claim propertiesPvI exist, I first wish to draw attention to an issue at the
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core of neo-Quinean methodology. This issue, alluded to in Chapter One, concerns to
what extent the neo-Quinean methodology preserves prior ontological commitments,
and to what extent ontological commitments are the result of neo-Quinean
methodology. This is most notable with respect to issues of paraphrase and I will
address this matter again below, but it is evident here even in van Inwagen’s division
of the world into abstract and concrete. As noted, while there will be large agreement
which predicates will go in which list, there will be differences, he says, when it comes
to cases. Precisely, he says: ‘Some of the terms in our list of paradigms may be
ambiguous and might be understood by different philosophers in different ways.220
And some philosophers may have idiosyncratic theories about the items in the
extensions of some of these terms’ (van Inwagen 2014, 155). But it is precisely for
these special cases that some methodology is required. Of what value is the neoQuinean method if it can’t help us decide difficult cases? Anna Sofia Maurin agrees
with my concern. With respect to the stipulative division van Inwagen makes between
the abstract and concrete, she says:
What makes the difference between placing e.g., sets or “War and Peace” in
the abstract or in the concrete box, it seems, is our understanding of the nature
of those items coming in. But, then, just as whether we come to the table with
an understanding of sets as classes or not makes a difference to in which ‘box’
we think they belong, whether we understand properties as Platonic Forms or
as tropes or immanent universals also matters to our categorizing them as either
abstract or concrete. Rather than functioning as a comparatively speaking
neutral starting-point for our categorizations, then, the putting into boxes
imagined by van Inwagen seems to depend on preconceived ideas we have
about the nature of the things we thus categorize. (Maurin 2019, 117)
He provides the following examples: ‘(Most philosophers would put ‘{Catherine the Great, {the
Eiffel Tower}}’ in with ‘property’ and ‘the lion’; but the author of Parts of Classes might be inclined to
think that this term was more at home with ‘Catherine the Great’ and ‘the Eiffel Tower’.) And some
terms may just yield inconsistent responses: Amie Thomasson would say that our whole scheme of
classification was in at least one respect objectionable, since ‘War and Peace’ isn’t a clear candidate for
membership in either class – for it denotes an object that is nonspatial and has instances (like many of
the items in the second list), and is, nevertheless, a contingently existing artifact (like some of the items
in the first). Nicholas Wolterstorff would say that our classification scheme was unobjectionable, and
that ‘War and Peace’ clearly belonged right where we had put it, since it denoted something that was
much more like a proposition than it was like a volume on a library shelf. He would add that the idea of
a contingently existing, nonspatial object that had instances was incoherent’ (van Inwagen 2014, 155).
220
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I raise this point because van Inwagen thinks it evident that properties naturally fall
into the abstract category. According to how he views properties, that may be so, but
it is not, I claim, a product of a neutral methodology. Rather, it is the reinforcement of
an ontological prejudice by the application of a method convenient to that prejudice.
The issue can be raised against Quine also: does his criterion of ontological
commitment invariably lead to a desert landscape, or does it simply preserve his
preference for arid terrain? This, in my view, mitigates the challenge to parse one’s
ontological claims in the machinery of the neo-Quinean method.
With this recognition in mind, the next section looks more closely at this
method and its connection with the existence of propertiesPvI.

3.4 The Existence of PropertiesPvI: The Property Role
In this section, I look more closely at van Inwagen’s theory of propertiesPvI in
connection with his neo-Quinean method.
Rather than developing a theory of properties that accounts for character, van
Inwagen merely provides a theory that accounts for the property role in language. He
says:

My method for approaching the question of the existence of properties is to
attempt to show that our language and our thought (the affirmations and beliefs
we bring to philosophy) define a role that can plausibly be described as the
“property role,” and to defend the thesis that there are objects that play that
role. My theory of properties is an attempt to describe the nature the objects
must have if they are to play that role. (van Inwagen 2016, 55; my italics)

His approach, then, is clear. Let us look to a now famous argument he provides
concerning the anatomy of spiders and insects to illustrate his approach:
Any two mature unmaimed conspecific female spiders have the same
anatomical characteristics
Any spider and any insect share certain anatomical characteristics
Therefore
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For any insect and any two mature unmaimed conspecific female spiders, there
are anatomical characteristics that belong to that insect and to both spiders (van
Inwagen 2016, 53).221
An “anatomical characteristic”, then, is a characteristic, and a characteristic is a
propertyPvI. PropertiesPvI, then, exist. That is not yet to say what a property is, only to
notice that everyday and scientific discourse employs terms that seem to suggest their
existence.
Van Inwagen claims that ‘It is a straightforward logical consequence of this
proposition that there are anatomical features: if there are anatomical features that
insects have and spiders also have, then there are anatomical features that insects have;
if there are anatomical features that insects have, then there are anatomical features –
full stop’ (van Inwagen 2016 160). But invoking a punctuation mark does nothing to
reinforce his argument: it is not at all clear that it is a straightforward consequence of
the argument that anatomical features exist. It may be, perhaps, if one subscribes to
the idea that “there are” is synonymous with “exists”, and that such words are
ontologically loaded – the thesis we called Bexistence in Chapter One. But one can
reject that claim, as was discussed at length.
The challenge put forth by the neo-Quinean is this: if you do not believe in the
existence of entities that you find ontologically repugnant, then do not employ terms
that seem to refer to them. The challenge, then, is to find a paraphrase that dispenses
with seeming referential terms over unwanted objects. Nominalism, van Inwagen
contends, is false not because it fails to provide an adequate explanation of the problem
of character (for there is no explanation of the existence of character or shared
character according to van Inwagen), but because it fails to provide an adequate
paraphrase of arguments with the schema above: that spiders and insects share
characteristics for example. I won’t rehearse the various efforts made to produce such
paraphrases and while some may dispense with properties, they cannot, van Inwagen
221

He shows that the validity of this argument holds:
‘∀x∀y (x is a mature unmaimed female spider & y is a mature unmaimed female spider &x
and y are conspecific → ∀z (z is an anatomical characteristic →. x has z ↔ y has z)).
∀x∀y (x is spider & y is an insect. → ∃z (z is an anatomical characteristic & x has z & w has

z))
Therefore
∀x∀y∀z (x is an insect & y is a mature unmaimed female spider & z is a mature unmaimed
female spider & y and z are conspecific. → ∃w (w is an anatomical characteristic & x has w
& y has w & z has w))’ (van Inwagen 2016, 53).
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maintains, dispense with reference to objects that are nominalistically acceptable. That
is, he claims, they cannot dispense with reference to some abstract objects and of all
the possible abstract objects that could play the property role, properties are the most
congenial to his nominalistic proclivity.
Van Inwagen makes a curious point, however: even if one could
nominalistically paraphrase away reference to properties, such that the paraphrase
abides by the various proposed constraints, ‘that achievement, by itself, would have
no ontological implications’ (van Inwagen 2016, 168). He goes on to say:

After all, Quine has shown how to eliminate quantification over everything but
pure sets222 (at least, it can be argued that he’s shown how to do this), and
Church has shown how to eliminate quantification over women. The devices
of Quine and Church223 would be of ontological interest if “containing only
pure sets” or “not containing women” were desirable features for an ontology
to have. But they’re not. If what I said in the first section of this chapter is right,
however, “containing no abstract objects” is an advantage in an ontology. (van
Inwagen 2016, 168)

But this is problematic. Let us look at the consequences of this passage. The only
reason to countenance the existence of properties, according to van Inwagen, is
because our everyday and scientific discourse carries ontological commitments to
them (or at least to abstract objects of some description). Keep in mind that we are not
speaking even of our best theory, but any beliefs we happen to accept as true. A
property role is identified because of terms employed in patterns of meaningful
speech. Surely, if we can find a way to paraphrase away this pattern of speech in our
discourse, then so too we dispense with the very reason to posit the existence of
properties in the first place under the neo-Quinean proposal? What extra requirements
222

See Quine 1976.
Van Inwagen remarks on the rather humorous endeavour as follows: ‘In 1958 Alonzo Church
delivered a lecture at Harvard, the final seven paragraphs of which have lately been making the e-mail
rounds under the title (not Church’s) “Ontological Misogyny.” In these paragraphs, Church wickedly
compares Goodman’s attitude toward abstract objects to a misogynist’s attitude toward women. (“Now
a misogynist is a man who finds women difficult to understand, and who in fact considers them
objectionable incongruities in an otherwise matter-of-fact and hard-headed world. Suppose then that in
analogy with nominalism the misogynist is led by his dislike and distrust of women to omit them from
his ontology.”) Church then shows the misogynist how to eliminate women from his ontology’ (van
Inwagen 2014, 168).
223
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are there to legitimately denounce the existence of properties? Van Inwagen seems to
be saying that there is no extra requirement (other than, perhaps, consistency with
other beliefs); rather, you first decide what are desirable features of the ontology you
want. But this attenuates the force of the neo-Quinean challenge and the value of the
criterion of ontological commitment. Remember, Quine proposed the criterion of
ontological commitment, according to van Inwagen, as a method to ‘settle
philosophical disputes about what there is – disputes about the existence of universals,
for example…’ (van Inwagen 2014, 79). And again, according to van Inwagen: ‘How
can the dispute between those who affirm and those who deny the existence of
properties (platonists and nominalists) be resolved? The ontological method invented,
or at least first made explicit, by Quine and Goodman… suggests a way to approach
this question’ (van Inwagen 2006, 113). 224 Given the problems with this method
discussed in Chapter One, it’s not clear that it can play this role. And given van
Inwagen’s remarks above, it’s not clear that it is even required to do so.
Let us rehearse the neo-Quinean criterion of ontological commitment. It is
meant to proceed as follows:

(PvI COC):
1. Identify the beliefs of everyday or scientific discourse accepted as true
(importantly, those beliefs that were had prior to entering the “ontology
room”).
2. Choose a canonical language in which to express most perspicuously the
claims inherent in such beliefs (First-order predicate logic with an objectual
existential quantifier and only one kind of variable).
3. Translate, or regiment, these claims into this canonical language, paraphrasing
where necessary.

And yet again: ‘Nominalists and platonists have different beliefs about what there is. Let us therefore
ask this: How should one decide what to believe about what there is? According to Quine, the problem
of deciding what to believe about what there is is a very straightforward special case of the problem of
deciding what to believe. (The problem of deciding what to believe is, to be sure, no trivial problem,
but it is a problem everyone is going to have somehow to come to terms with.) If we want to decide
whether to believe that there are properties—Quine tells us—we should examine the beliefs we already
have, the theses we have already, for whatever reason, decided to believe, and see whether they “commit
us” (as Quine says) to the existence of properties’ (van Inwagen 2006, 114).
224
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4. Identify the values of the variables that render the claims true (Identify the
entities that can be substituted for the variables to make the affirmations of the
claims true).
5. The theory is committed to the existence of the values of the variables: so,
therefore, should you be so committed.

The concern I am highlighting is not entirely different from what William Alston
(1958) and Lowe (2008), and many others, have pointed to regarding paraphrastic
strategy. That is, should the paraphrase be the most perspicuous and faithful
articulation of the original sentence? Or should the paraphrase be a revisionary
sentence somehow related to the original sentences, but without the ontological
baggage? If the latter, it’s not entirely clear why the initial sentence is even required.
Why spend such efforts paraphrasing a sentence if the paraphrased sentence is different
in meaning? Just go straight to an articulation of your preferred ontological
commitments. Quine happily endorsed the revisionary sort of paraphrastic strategy,
and so too does van Inwagen. But the scope of my concern is broader; it concerns the
very purpose of the criterion of ontological commitment in play.
Given van Inwagen’s comments above, his criterion of ontological
commitment in practice proceeds quite differently. According to this modified version,
one need not look to logic and language to discern what exists, or what a theory says
exists; one chooses first one’s ontology, then expresses that ontology in unnecessary
technical language. That’s it. Full stop, as van Inwagen likes to say. It would run
something like the following:

(PvI COC*)
1. Identify the ontological beliefs you have and the entities you desire in an
inventory of what there is.
2. Choose sentences that best express your favoured ontology, if you can find
them.
3. Put these sentences through superfluous and technically elaborate processes of
regimentation in predicate logic. Paraphrase away unwanted ontological
baggage in the sentences if they do not accord with your favoured ontology.
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4. Identify the values of the variables that render the claims true (but already
rendered true by your initial commitment).
5. Commit to the existence of what you already decided to commit to.
a. If you’re a nominalist, there is no evidence of a paraphrase that
dispenses with reference to abstract objects. But even if you find one,
it will at most make your language use ontologically consistent, while
saying nothing about the existence or non-existence of abstract objects.

This is a criticism that can be put to Quine also. As mentioned above, he wants to
dispense with entities that are repugnant to his desert-landscape sensibilities – that is
a different project to looking to logic and language to identify what there is; that’s just
clothing one’s ontological preferences in a language convenient to one’s pre-existing
ontological commitments. Quine, we saw, tried to bolster his position with an extreme
form of naturalism; van Inwagen has no such security.
Whether this critique of the neo-Quinean method holds, it is the method van
Inwagen employs and the method which he credits in leading him to proffer a theory
of the property role. The property role amounts to an account of predicate use in
everyday and scientific discourse. A propertyPvI, in van Inwagen’s account, is simply
something that is capable of filling the role played by the kinds of predicates employed
in everyday and scientific discourse that can’t be paraphrased away. But before
addressing van Inwagen’s account of what propertiesPvI are in more detail, let us look
at what propertiesPvI are not. It will be helpful to contextualise this matter in terms of
relational and constituent ontologies, which in turn, are best understood in terms of
ontological structure.

3.5 Constituent vs Relational Ontologies: What Properties Are Not
Realist positions concerning properties tend to fall into two distinct camps:
relational and constituent.225 Both camps, in endorsing properties of some kind, claim
that the character of a familiar concrete particular is dependent on some other thing
(e.g., universals, modes, tropes). While character is thought to be derivative, these

225

This is the general tendency, but Lowe, for example, claims that his ontology is neither constituent
nor relational, but rather what he calls a “substance ontology” (see Lowe 2012).
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properties can be construed as existing non-derivatively (in their own right) in the
familiar particular as parts or components (or, more usually, constituents), or else as
existing derivatively in some non-mereological relation to a non-derivative entity.
However these properties are construed, they are the privileged source of character.226
It is convenient to construe the constituent and relational strategies as mapping onto
the Aristotelian and Platonic ontological divide, bearing in mind that this is not an
entirely accurate correlation.227
As mentioned above, the difference between constituent and relational
ontologies is best understood in terms of ontological or metaphysical structure. A
constituent ontologist typically embraces two kinds of structure: a commonsense
mereological structure and a metaphysical structure. Mereology is concerned with
part-whole relations and commonsense mereological structure concerns the various
parts, or proper parts, of objects and how such parts are related to the whole and to
each other: e.g., how the proper parts, four legs and a flat surface, are related the whole,
the table. While some hold that such proper parts, however many and however small
(e.g., subatomic particles) exhausts the mereological structure in some restricted sense
of mereology, others claim that there is a further structure; a metaphysical structure.
This amounts to the idea that the whole is made up of things other than commonsense
parts; the usual candidates for these parts, or constituents, are either tropes or
immanent universals.
We saw in Chapter One that van Inwagen objects to ontological structure, and
as a consequence, objects to constituent ontologies. He does not argue against
constituent ontologies as such, but again, professes an inability to comprehend what is
being proposed.228 We remember he said ‘I do not understand the idea of ontological

The terms representing these strategies in the contemporary literature, “constituent” and “relational”,
are attributed to Nicholas Wolterstorff (Wolterstorff 1970, 1991).
227
Further, the terminology is by no means perfect: both the constituent ontologist, no less than the
relational ontologist, appeals to some kind of relationship between the non-derived source of character
and the entity exemplifying it.
228
He recognises that what he is providing does not amount to an argument, but he doesn’t write in
academic journals simply to confess his ignorance on central philosophical matters; he looks to convince
or persuade readers if by nothing else than the authority of his (often) respected opinion in the
philosophical community. Nonetheless, he says: ‘I must make it clear that when I say these things, I do
not pretend to be presenting an argument. What I am presenting is rather a confession. Just as a
confession of faith – someone’s recitation of the Nicene Creed, for example – is not a presentation of
an argument for the thesis that anyone other than the speaker should accept the propositions the
confession comprises, a confession of bewilderment is not a presentation of an argument for the thesis
that anyone else should be bewildered by whatever it is that the speaker finds bewildering’ (van Inwagen
2015, 57).
226
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structure or, indeed, any of the ideas with which one finds it entwined in the various
constituent ontologies. I do not understand the words and phrases that are the typical
items of the core vocabulary of any given constituent ontology’ (van Inwagen, 2014
208). However, while one cannot share his particular experience of incomprehension,
and a declaration that he doesn’t understand has no argumentative force, it does have
rhetorical force and he does expect others to agree that constituent ontologies are ‘not
even wrong’ (van Inwagen 2014, 212);229 that is, they are not false, but meaningless.
Let us look more closely at why he thinks this is so:

Consider two tennis balls that are perfect duplicates of each other. Among their
other features, each is 6.7 centimeters in diameter, and the color of each is a
certain rather distressing greenish yellow called “optical yellow.” Apparently,
some people understand what it means to say that each of the balls has its own
color – albeit the color of one is a perfect duplicate of the color of the other. I
wonder whether anyone would understand me if I said that each ball had its
own diameter – albeit the diameter of one was a perfect duplicate of the
diameter of the other. I doubt it. But one statement makes about as much sense
to me as the other – for just as the diameter of one of the balls is the diameter
of the other (6.7 centimeters), the color of one of the balls is the color of the
other (optical yellow). (van Inwagen 2015, 57)

Van Inwagen may be correct to say that colour and diameter are each properties
(however construed) of the tennis ball; both he and the constituent ontologist can agree
on that, though they mean different things by the term “property”. He evidently picks
the case of a diameter because it does not seem perceptible in the sense that an instance
of the colour green is.230 But why the diameter of one ball ought to be more mysterious
than colour, or somehow show that the particular colour of each ball (if each has its
own distinctive colour), is not clear. One can see the thought at which van Inwagen is
gesturing, but one could respond that if there’s uncertainty about the width of one of
the balls, it is that particular ball that is then measured and the length of that particular
diameter that is discovered, one it then may share with (or hold a resemblance to if the
He credits this ‘immortal phrase’ to Wolfgang Pauli (van Inwagen 2014, 212).
I’ll discuss the perceptibility of properties below. Here, I just mean to say that we can identify
charactered green objects as green, not that we see the property green.
229
230

145

property is not transferrable) some other ball’s diameter. But this is discussed in more
detail below when addressing the properties of his proposed account of propertiesPvI.231
Those who endorse immanent universals, and those who endorse entities such
as tropes, are, van Inwagen thinks, trading on the respectability of the sciences in so
far as they seem to be aping the methodology of the sciences. He says that such items
‘seem to me to be an impossible amalgam of features of individuals and the features
of attributes’ (van Inwagen 2015, 56), and that ‘Such talk bewilders me to a degree I
find it hard to convey’ (van Inwagen 2015, 55). ‘The bewilderment I experience arises’
he says, ‘when I try to form some conception of what immanent universals could be’
(van Inwagen 2015, 57). Enough about his professions of incomprehension; it does not
further the discussion.
A relational ontologist, on the other hand, endorses only one kind of structure.
On this view, the privilege sources of character are abstract entities, but the claim here
is that such entities are not the kinds of things that can compose a concrete particular.
They can, however, enter into special ontological relations. While the constituent
ontologist requires an account of the connection between the constituent property and
the object, there is perhaps a more pressing challenge the relational ontologist faces as
the universal is thought to exist apart from the entity in a topos Ouranos. The usual
strategy is to posit some relation, such as instantiation or exemplification, but any such
relation faces difficulties.232 Bradley’s regress, is one such difficulty, and refers to a
class of arguments concerning relations. The general schema is as follows: in an effort
to explain the relationship between a and F in the sentence “a is F”, where a is an
object, F is a universal and the copula is represents the instantiation relation which
we’ll call R, then some further relation will be required to relate a, F and R which we’ll
call R1. But then a, F, R, and R1 will require a relation, R2 and so the regress continues
ad infinitum.

It’s worth noting that he claims: ‘The idea that a garment might have a color that was essentially
peculiar to it – because it, the color, was in some recondite sense a constituent of the garment – is opaque
to me. No one would say – or would they? I hope not, but I’ve been caught out in matters like this more
than once – that Jill’s scarf had a width or a length or a texture that was all its own, and could not
possibly be the width or length or texture of some other object’ (van Inwagen 2014, 241). While Lowe’s
modes are not constituents of the objects that possess them, Lowe does seem to be saying that the scarf
has its own width, length, texture and so on.
232
Some of these difficulties will be discussed in relation to Lowe’s theory of character in the following
chapter.
231
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A standard strategy for those endorsing constituent ontologies is to appeal to
such relations as being internal.233 While that may resolve some issues, it is unclear
whether being internal is any kind of relation at all. But for van Inwagen, the relation
between propertiesPvI and the objects that have them is external. It’s not clear, however,
if there is an abstract object and a relation that is equally abstract, how that helps in
explaining (or accounting for given that van Inwagen doesn’t endeavour to explain)
how the abstract object latches on to the concrete object. If the world is divided into
objects that are concrete and objects that are abstract, as van Inwagen holds, and that
these categories are exhaustive and exclusive and as radically different as any two
things could be, how does positing a further abstract object (an external relation) help
mitigate the distance between these two worlds?
Let us look a little more closely at this external relation. Van Inwagen is a
transcendent realist, but of a very particular kind. Armstrong defines transcendent
realism as follows: ‘a has the property, F, if and only if a has a suitable relation to the
transcendent universal or Form of F’ (Armstrong 1978, 64). Van Inwagen doesn’t call
the relation he endorses “instantiation” or any such thing, but simply, the ordinary
non-technical term “has”. Thus, he is willing to say that ‘a has the property F if and
only if a has the property F’ (van Inwagen 2016, 57). There is nothing controversial,
or substantial, in acquiescing to such a claim. But “has”, he recognises, is variously
understood. He says: ‘Obviously, when we say that a thing has a certain property, we
are not using “has” in any of the senses of the word illustrated by the following
examples: “Alice has a cold/has a grievance/has a Lexus/has a husband”’ (van Inwagen
2016, 57). But then it’s unclear in what sense “has” is being employed. Part of van
Inwagen’s metaontological injunctions is to tie all ontological terms of art to ordinary
language; but if “has” means something else other than how it is used in the above
examples, it is not evident what it is.
Again, however, he shifts the attention to language. He claims that the
following sentences all express (very nearly) the same proposition:

233

The idea here is that the relation is a consequence of the objects it relates. If John is taller than Mary,
the relation of height is dependent only on John and Mary. Nothing else, it is thought, is needed. The
relation is no addition to being. This is contrasted with “John loves Mary”, which requires an account
of the “loving” relation.
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1. Solomon had the property wisdom.
2. Wisdom was one of Solomon’s properties.
3. The property wisdom belonged to Solomon.
4. Wisdom can be truly predicated of (or “ascribed to”) Solomon.234

Moreover, he claims that there is no more fundamental analysis of an object having a
property than that expressed in each of the above propositions; it is a primitive and
rephrasing it in terms of instantiation or exemplification adds nothing to the account.
He avers: ‘This relation, I contend, the relation these sentences assert to hold between
Solomon and wisdom, is as familiar and well-understood as it is hard to explain or
give an account of. I would say that it was hard to explain because it was hard –
impossible, in fact – to find simpler or better-understood ideas in terms of which to
explain it’ (van Inwagen 2016, 58). 235 Whatever the difficulties of providing an
account of this relation, this doesn’t further our understanding.
But once again, he makes a peculiar claim:
The only object that in any way “figures in” the proposition that Solomon was
wise is Solomon. That proposition says of that object, Solomon, that it, or he,
is wise, but in saying that of him, it does not affirm that there is some other
object, some object that exists independently of him… to which he bears some
relation – “having” or any other relation. (van Inwagen 2016, 60)

It is standard Quinean practice to quantify over just the object in the sentence so that
“Solomon is wise” is expressed as “for some x, x is wise and x is Solomon”, or ∃xWx,
where W is wise and the variable, x, ranges over Solomon. This is Quine’s way of
dispensing with a commitment to the existence of properties.236 But van Inwagen does
endorse the existence of propertiesPvI and does so because our discourse commits us to

234

I added the numbering, but it is otherwise a direct quotation (van Inwagen 2016, 58).
I will discuss the nature and scope of the term “explanation” in chapter five. Van Inwagen, I will
show, allows for explanation in the sense of explicating a concept as he does here. There is nothing
controversial about that.
236
Van Inwagen objects to quantifying into predicate position, again, on declarations of nonsense. He
says: ‘Why do I not use a quantifier that binds variables in predicative positions; why do I not use an
expression along the lines of ‘∀x∀y(Fx ↔ x has the property of being F)’? The short answer is that I
believe that the idea of variables that occupy non-nominal positions (e.g., predicative positions and
sentential positions) makes no sense’ (van Inwagen 2016, 58).
235
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properties: anatomical characteristics is something shared by spiders and insects;
wisdom by Solomon and Socrates. Perhaps he is objecting to Armstrong’s famous
argument from “gross facts” (see Armstrong 1978, 11) where he claims that concealed
in the proposition “a is F” is the claim that “a instantiates the property F” and van
Inwagen doesn’t want to commit to the existence of properties that may suggest a
relation he’s not willing to countenance. We will see, however, that on his account,
the attribution of propertiesPvI has more to do with what we say, with our attributions,
than with the objects to which the properties are attributed. His idiosyncratic view on
the nature of properties, reinforced by his nominalistic predilection, is evident in the
following remark:
In my view, to say that Solomon’s having the property wisdom is what it was
for Solomon to be wise is as absurd as saying that what it was for Solomon to
be wise is for the proposition that Solomon was wise to be true – or as saying
that what it was for Solomon to be bipedal is for the number 2 to have been the
number of his legs.

Whatever is to be made of this, van Inwagen is not willing to discuss his contribution
to the nature of properties using “wisdom” 237 as a test case. He prefers, for the most
part, to use colour predicates, or “perceptual” properties, examples that may work to
his advantage. I turn now to a discussion of the nature of van Inwagen’s propertiesPvI.

3.6 The Nature of PropertiesPvI: Unsaturated Assertibles
Van Inwagen, then, thinks propertiesPvI exist. But what can be said about their
nature? What are the properties of propertiesPvI? Not much can be said, according to
van Inwagen; little more than that which can be said about abstract objects generally.
He claims:

He says: ‘In fact, in my view, the only sense the question ‘What is it for someone to be wise?’ can
have is the sense that this question had when it was discussed by Socrates and his companions in
dialectic. Since I do not know the answer to that ancient and profound question, I will not use ‘wise’
and wisdom in the examples in the paragraphs that follow. The examples in the sequel will pertain to
the predicate ‘white’ and whiteness or the property of being white –, a property of physical objects, the
common property of a sheet of white paper, a whitewashed fence, and the Taj Mahal’ (2015, 63).
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The theory I shall present could be looked on as a way of specifying the
property role, a way independent of and a little more informative than
specifying this role via the apparent quantiﬁcations over properties that are to
be found in our discourse. This theory identiﬁes the property role with the role
“thing that can be said of something.” This role is a special case of the role
“thing that can be said”. (van Inwagen 2014, 175)

However, there are surprising consequences if his theory is correct. Consequences that
are discussed in more detail below. Before looking to those, let us look more closely
at his non-explanatory and almost vacuous account.
He calls “things that can be said”, what are usually called propositions,
assertibles and “things that can be said of something” unsaturated assertibles.
Properties, then, are nothing other than the things we say of things. That is, they are a
kind of proposition, not simply stated, but stated about238 some object. He draws the
distinction between assertibles and unsaturated assertibles in the following way:

Some things that can be said are things that can be said period, things that can
be said full stop. For example: that Chicago has a population of over two
million is something that can be said; another thing that can be said is that no
orchid has ever filed an income tax return. But these things – “propositions” is
the usual name for them – are not things that can be said of anything, not even
of Chicago and orchids. One can, however, say of Chicago that it has a
population of over two million, and one can also say this very same thing of
New York. And, of course, one can say it of Sydney and of South Bend. (It can
be said only falsely of South Bend, of course, but lies and honest mistakes are
possible.) I will assume that anything that can be said of anything can be said
of anything else. (van Inwagen 2014, 175)
I don’t find this to be the clearest exposition of his position, but the general point, I
think, is evident. He is not, then, providing a theory of properties in a way that such
theories are usually presented. Firstly, as stated many times now, he does not think

He considers “about” and “of” to amount to the same thing in this context (see van Inwagen 2014,
176).
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there are phenomena amenable to ontological explanation and secondly, his
propertiesPvI, the things that exist, exist only so far as they are things that can be said
of objects – at least in principle.239
So, his account of character is as follows: an object has character if we say
something of it, or if something of it can be said in principle: if we say of the Taj Mahal
that “the Taj Mahal is white”, then the Taj Mahal has the propertyPvI of being white,
simply because it is that which can be said of it. His account of character agreement
is as follows: ‘It seems to me that there is an x such that x can be said of y and can also
be said of z, where z is not identical with y. One of the things you can say about the
Taj Mahal is that it is white, and you can say that about the Lincoln Memorial, too’
(van Inwagen 2014, 176).
Here we see the vacuity of his proposal: something is required to play the
property role and things we say can play that role. He asks: ‘what is the property
whiteness but something we, in speaking of things, occasionally predicate of some of
them? And what is predicating something of something but saying the former of the
latter?’ (van Inwagen 2014, 178). Well, throughout the philosophical tradition there
have been countless suggestions: Platonic Forms, immanent universals, tropes and so
on – all of which elude his comprehension.
Van Inwagen claims that ‘The fact that this theory is inconsistent with various
interesting and important theses about properties shows that, although it may be very
close to being vacuous, it does not manage to be entirely vacuous’ (van Inwagen 2014,
182). That is to say, insofar as this amounts to a theory of propertiesPvI, we can identify
some surprising consequences of what their nature must be, and more importantly
perhaps, what their nature can’t be. The reason for this, he avers, has to do with the
fact that ‘if properties are [unsaturated] assertibles, then a wide range of things
philosophers have said using the word “property” make no sense’ (van Inwagen 2006,

Given that unsaturated assertibles are simply things we say, he puts in the following caveat: ‘It
follows that the phrase I used to specify the role I wish to consider – “things that can be said of things”
– cannot be taken too literally. For if there are any unsaturated assertibles, and if there are arbitrary
conjunctions and disjunctions and negations of such unsaturated assertibles as there are, it will be
impossible for a finite being to say most of them of anything. “Things that can be said of things” must
therefore be understood in the sense “things that can in principle be said of things,” or perhaps “things
of a type such that some of the simpler things of that type can be said of things” or “things that can be
said of things by a being without limitations.” All these ways of qualifying ‘said of’ could do with some
clarification, but I cannot discuss the problems they raise here’ (van Inwagen 2014, 176).
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134). In the following section, I look more closely at the nature of propertiesPvI and the
consequence for other theories should van Inwagen’s account be correct.

3.7 The Properties of PropertiesPvI as Unsaturated Assertibles
In this section, several of the most relevant features of van Inwagen’s
propertiesPvI are discussed, some of which have already featured in this chapter. A
more detailed examination of the properties of propertiesPvI will magnify the vacuity
of his proposed account and the contrast with other theories of properties will be more
evident.

1. Abstract Objects
Van Inwagen, we saw, construes propertiesPvI as abstract objects. Given that
he considers them to be unsaturated assertibles, it is hard to conceive of them
otherwise. If propertiesPvI are a special kind of propositions, then being abstract seems
an ineluctable consequence. It does not seem to be the case that a proposition is tied to
the language in which it is expressed, though the language itself is contingent and
arguably abstract.

The sentences “snow is white” and “Tá sneachta bán” (the

underused Gaelic equivalent) express the same proposition and this proposition is in
some way separate from the sentences uttered. Though the respective sentences are
contingent, in that they are inextricably bound to the languages within which they are
couched, the propositions need not be. Van Inwagen claims when the proposition is
said of an object, the proposition is similarly abstract. The consequence, if his vacuous
claim is correct, is that there are no concrete properties.

2. Universals
One of the defining characteristics of a universal is that it is applicable to many
things, often by way of instantiation or some other ontological relation. If propertiesPvI
are unsaturated assertibles, it seems that they can be said of many things and in this
sense they would seem to qualify as universal. However, we have seen that they are
not universals in any robust manner that is comparable to other theories, whatever the
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failings of such theories may be.240 Nonetheless, if his theory is correct, then there are
no particular properties. It was shown that he does not present arguments against
properties as particulars, but just professions of a failure to understand what they could
be. Emphasizing the connection between metaontology and his approach to first-order
problems, he does say: ‘I can do no more than record my conviction that if you follow
the method I recommend, you will end up with neither a monocategorial ontology (like
austere nominalism) nor a constituent ontology. I think you will end up with a
relational ontology (if you end up with anything at all; perhaps you will confess
failure)’ (van Inwagen 2014, 217).241 As I have argued above, however, it seems that
his neo-Quinean method is not a neutral criterion of ontological commitment; it is a
theoretically loaded method which constrains the account of those who employ it in
favour of a certain outcome.

3. Transcendent
Unsaturated assertibles (should they exist) 242 are clearly transcendent. Van
Inwagen, we saw, rejects immanent universals for he will not countenance ontological
structure of any kind. The only kind of structure he endorses is a commonsensical
mereological kind. But again, his universals are transcendent, it seems, only in name;
they are just the objects required to play the property role; something played out in
language. Though as already mentioned in the previous chapter, and discussed in detail
in the following chapter, Lowe endorses a view of immanent universals while
considering his account to be neither constituent nor relational. The point being, one
could perhaps object, with van Inwagen, to immanent universals construed as
constituents while not endorsing transcendent universals.
As transcendent entities, van Inwagen accords immanent universals the usual
privilege of necessity: being non-spatial and non-temporal entities, they are not subject

Maurin (2017), however, argues that there is nothing in van Inwagen’s method that invariably leads
to thinking of properties as universals.
241
He goes on to say: ‘But I should not regard it as a tragedy if someone were to demonstrate that this
conviction was wrong. If some philosopher showed me how to eliminate quantification over abstract
objects from our discourse – an achievement that would in my view make the world safe for austere
nominalism – I’d be delighted, for I’d really like to be an austere nominalist. And if a philosopher
adopted my proposed method and ended up with a constituent ontology – well, if I didn’t find that
outcome delightful, I’m sure I should find it instructive: I should almost certainly learn something
valuable by retracing the intellectual steps that had led that philosopher to a constituent ontology. In any
case, whatever you end up with, it won’t be an explanatory theory’ (van Inwagen 2014, 217).
242
I’ll assume this caveat in what follows rather than repeating it each time.
240
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to the kinds factors that would make them contingent. But they have the less usual
quality of “anetiology”, or acausality. This was mentioned already above, and the
implications of this point are discussed below regarding perceptibility. Briefly, the
concern emerges, if they have no causal power, how can we gain epistemic access to
them?

4. Relational
Unsaturated assertibles are not ontological ingredients of the objects that have
them, leaving aside for a moment the issues of possession (it is odd that things have
only the ontological properties that we ascribe to them). It is clear why unsaturated
assertibles could not be constituents of objects:

If this pen exists, there are no doubt lots of things that are in some sense its
parts or constituents: atoms, small manufactured items . . . perhaps, indeed,
every subregion of the region of the space exactly occupied by the pen at t is
at t exactly occupied by a part of the pen. But “that it is a writing instrument,”
although it can be said truly of the pen – and is thus, in my view, one of the
properties of the pen – is not one of the parts of the pen. (van Inwagen 2014,
178)
It seems evident that something we say isn’t a constituent of the pen, but it’s less clear
in what way that which we say is something the pen has, appreciating that the
unsaturated assertible is simply something that is meant to play the property role.
Properties are not abstracted from objects under van Inwagen’s proposal; we provide
the contribution, not the object. Unsaturated assertibles seem to be intensional items
of sorts. What is unclear is the link between what we say of and the object we say it of.
Whatever the link, it should be more obvious now why van Inwagen considers
this link, or relation external to the object. He says:
Consider, for example, my dachshund Jack and the property xenophobia – that
is, aggressive hostility toward any living thing that one has not been properly
introduced to. Xenophobia is certainly one of Jack’s properties (and it is
certainly a universal, since he shares it with his little life-partner, my other
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dachshund, Sonia), but it is in no possible sense one of his constituents. For the
proponent of the Favored Ontology, the dyadic relation ‘having’ that Jack and
Sonia each bear to the property xenophobia is as abstract and ‘external’ as the
variably polyadic relation ‘being numbered by’ that they enter into with the
number 2. (van Inwagen 2015, 52)

It is perhaps easier to conceptualise dispositions or character traits of animals, such as
xenophobia, as being externally related; perhaps. But it is very hard to see in what
sense van Inwagen’s dachshund’s eye colour, hair texture, muscle density and such are
properties of the dog given that propertiesPvI are merely a special case of things we say.
Unsaturated assertibles seem to do nothing to bridge the gap between the abstract and
the concrete.
He provides an example of how misguided it is to construe propertiesPvI as
being too intimately related to the objects that possess them:
Well, here’s an example that may serve as a model for what I am trying to
express by using this phrase. Johnny’s algebra teacher asks him to ‘extract’ a
cube root; he requests a forceps to use in this operation. His request, you will
probably concede, is ill informed: the extraction of a cube root is an operation
to which the concept of a physical extracting tool has no application. It ought
to be as evident that there is no sense of ‘constituent’ in which unsaturated
assertibles are constituents of individuals as it is that there is no sense of
‘extraction’ in which a physical tool can be of use in the extraction of a cube
root.). (van Inwagen 2015, 53)

If properties are unsaturated assertibles, then his analogy, I think, holds. But properties
construed otherwise, as immanent universals or tropes, may be thought of as being
extracted from the objects possessing them, for how else might we come to know
them? That is, in fact, one of the appeals of constituent ontologies against relational
ones. Nonetheless, if his almost vacuous theory is correct, properties aren’t
constituents of objects.
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5. Not Ontologically More Basic
In Chapter One, we saw that van Inwagen commits to a flat world rather than
an ordered (structured) world. That is, there is no ontological priority, or ontological
fundamentality, that any object possesses over any other object in any meaningful
sense; there is only what exists, and all things exist equally fundamentally (or nonfundamentally) so to speak. Some objects may be smaller than other objects and there
may be some kind of supervenient relation: tables may be composed of atoms, but the
atoms are not ontologically more basic or fundamental, though they may be the
building blocks of the table. Of course, ontologically speaking, van Inwagen doesn’t
think tables exist; only particles arranged tablewise (see van Inwagen 1990). If
properties are unsaturated assertibles, then the objects that possess them, or the objects
to which they are ascribed, are no more fundamental than the unsaturated assertibles
themselves.

6. Necessarily Uninstantiable Properties
One of the more peculiar consequences of endorsing unsaturated assertibles is
the commitment to necessarily uninstantiable properties. He says: ‘If there are
uninstantiated properties, are there necessarily uninstantiated properties? Yes indeed.
It would seem, moreover, that one of the things you can say of something, one of the
things that is “there” to be said about a thing, is that it is both round and square’ (van
Inwagen 2014, 181). At this point, it is hard to find value van Inwagen’s contribution.
One can try to remain sober and recognise with van Inwagen that if properties are that
which can be said of something, then anything can be said of that something, even if
untrue, even if impossible, even if contradictory. Again, the link between an object
having a property and an unsaturated assertible seems to break down. If all he is doing
is deflating all approaches that hypostasize properties as constituents of objects, or as
existent in some Platonic heaven, then his point is well made before drawing out such
consequences. Nothing, I should think, can exemplify the property of being a square
circle (nothing can be both circular and non-circular at t) or any set of contradictory
properties, at least with respect to familiar concrete particulars.243 It clearly can be said,
and can be said (falsely) of an object. But van Inwagen, if I understand him correctly,
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Things are perhaps different at the quantum level, but I am not in a position to make a judgement on
that.
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does not equate unsaturated assertibles with sentences, with strings of words, but with
a special kind of proposition, though most often expressed in sentential form. I’m
unclear what proposition is being expressed by ascribing contradictory properties to
an object. It could be argued that the terms employed in the sentence are meaningful,
such that a truth value could be assigned; it is not (arguably) meaningless in the way a
babbling sentence such as “gioih aeoihf sflkdnlk”; but it is not clear that it’s
meaningful either. Just because the words are regular and proper syntax is followed, it
doesn’t automatically follow that a proposition is being expressed.

7. Imperceptible
He claims that propertiesPvI are not perceptible objects.244 In one sense, in a
more familiar Platonic sense, it seems clear that the reason we say the pot is black is,
not because we see the universal property blackness, but rather its instantiation or
exemplification of blackness in a particular object. But one does see black; that the pot
is black, else why posit the existence of blackness in the first place? Some mechanism,
such as instantiation, it would seem, is required such that we have reason to ascribe a
property at all to a given object. But on van Inwagen’s account, even perceptible
propertiesPvI, such as colour, are not perceptible:

If colors are properties and properties are [unsaturated] assertibles, then the
color white is the thing that one says of something when one says of it that it
is white. And this assertible is not something that can be seen – just as
extracting a cube root is not something you can do with a forceps. We never
see properties, although we see that certain things have certain properties.
(van Inwagen 2014, 179)

He claims that it doesn’t make sense to say one sees properties under any construal: ‘I mean ...I mean
how could you see a property—on anybody’s understanding of ‘property’? You can only see things if
they absorb electromagnetic radiation and re-emit it. You can see a book or an apple because they, or
parts of their surfaces, do just that. They can do that because they are made of atoms and molecules that
have electronic structures: a photon kicks an electron momentarily into a more energetic atomic or
molecular orbital, and another photon is emitted when the electron falls back into a lower-energy orbital;
some of these emitted photons interact with the visual apparatus of the observer. Properties (on
anybody’s account of properties) aren’t composed of atoms and molecules, are they?’ (van Inwagen
2017, 349-350).
244
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If propertiesPvI are things that we say of objects, and we don’t perceive propertiesPvI
(though we perceive the sentence that is uttered through hearing, it seems we don’t
hear the unsaturated assertible), then what the link between what we say of something
and the actual object that we say it of is, again, unclear. As shown above, he considers
having to be basic; there is nothing more basic to which we can appeal to illuminate
the having relation, though this having appears to be a sui generis basic relation,
different to an object having a molecular structure. I think I can just about comprehend
what van Inwagen is saying when he says we don’t see propertiesPvI. After all, many
philosophers, including, we will see, Lowe, claim that universals are anetiological,
though he posits the existence of modes to accommodate our indirect perceptual
knowledge of universals.
Van Inwagen claims that ‘since the property “being sky-blue” is just one of
those things that can be said of a bird or a flower or a 1958 Cadillac (or, for that matter,
of human blood or the Riemann curvature tensor), we obviously don’t see it’ (van
Inwagen 2004, 136). What is it, then, that is seen when a blue object is perceived? Is
there a colourless blue object? A bare particular? I shouldn’t think van Inwagen would
affirm this. There is just the blue object in its totality it seems; the usual division
between a concrete object and the properties it possesses doesn’t apply.
Paraphrasing William Vallicella, 245 according to van Inwagen colours are
properties, properties are abstract objects, abstract objects are colourless, then colours
are colourless; it could arguably follow that van Inwagen is claiming that blue is not
blue. Indeed, perhaps the colour blue, if it is a universal, is not blue (if that makes
sense), but then what is it? On van Inwagen’s account, it is just something that is said
of. But if that is so, are all propertiesPvI without properties? Or rather, how are we to
distinguish the nature of one property (the property of being blue) from some other
property (the property of being circular)? That is, what are the identity conditions of
propertiesPvI? If they are not perceptible, and there is no transmission from the object
to us regarding their nature, I’m not quite sure what this could be. The two
propertiesPvI, or unsaturated assertibles, are of course, different: at least different words
are used, for example. But unsaturated assertibles aren’t the sentences; they are, so to
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Vallicella has several blog entries, some of which I contributed to, critiquing van Inwagen. See:
https://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/
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speak, the propositions of. We are in rarefied territory, but his positive account of
propertiesPvI is beginning to look as mysterious as that which he is critiquing.

8. Abundant rather than Sparse
Contemporary debate on the problem of character is frequently discussed in
terms of abundant and sparse properties. Van Inwagen’s account populates the
universe with an untold and seemingly infinite number of properties, although given
their nature, that’s not surprising. Given the vacuity of his account, this again says
more about what properties can’t be if his theory is correct.

3.8 Conclusion: Lightweight-Ostrich-platonic Nominalism
This heading should strike one as odd, perhaps absurd, and certainly ugly; yet
it is a combination of van Inwagen’s views directly, or indirectly, related to character
discussed throughout this chapter. He is lightweight insofar as the properties he
countenances are acausal; he is platonic insofar as his properties are universals (of
sorts), non-spatial and non-temporal and thus not locatable; he’s an ostrich insofar as
he doesn’t think there are phenomena to be ontologically explained and he’s
nominalistic in that really, his propertiesPvI aren’t properties in any significant sense –
they are just that which play the property role. The phrase “property role” is perhaps
apt, for though there is a role to be played, and that role is played by a propertyPvI, that
role, appears to be only a pretence.
In this chapter, van Inwagen’s neo-Quinean metaontology was seen at work
with respect to the problem of character. It is clear what method he employs: a
modified version of all that is involved in Quine’s criterion of ontological
commitment. The shortcomings of this method were discussed in Chapter One and
reinforced here. Van Inwagen’s account of propertiesPvI is a direct result of employing
this method: they are deduced, he contends, from the sentences we accept outside of
the ontology room. However, I argued that the process of deduction rests on one’s
prior preferences and the criterion is by no means neutral. His argument for the
existence of propertiesPvI is not epistemological in the sense that there is no intention
to offer evidence in favour of their existence, other than his claim that arguments are
a form of evidence, perhaps the only evidence, for philosophical positions. Whatever
the case, he claims that there is no explanation in the vicinity. Though work is still
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required to refine the nature and scope of his claim that ontological theories cannot be
explanatory, the connection between his metaontology and how he engages in firstorder ontological inquiry should be now clear.
There is a constant danger when analysing van Inwagen’s account to treat his
propertiesPvI as if they were regular properties, which at the beginning of the chapter I
defined as primitive posits postulated to account for the problem of character. In fact,
Michael Loux, an estimable and incisive metaphysician, appears to misconstrue van
Inwagen’s project. Not only does he mistakenly attribute to van Inwagen the claim that
character is grounded in properties (Loux 2017, 15), a view anathema to van Inwagen,
he also misrepresents him in a map which charts various positions on the matter. In
that map, he subsumes van Inwagen’s relational strategy under the heading: ‘A
substantial Explanatory Account Required’ (Ibid., 29) and puts Quine and Lewis on
the opposing side. Such is the difficulty of tackling van Inwagen’s ‘nearly vacuous’
account.
But van Inwagen, I showed, is involved in a different project, with its own
distinct tasks, from traditional approaches to the problem of character. The starting
point for him is not some phenomenon in the world demanding of ontological analysis;
it is the sentences we accept as true. It seems far removed from an analysis of being
qua being and is diametrically opposed to Lowe’s direct approach to which I now turn.
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CHAPTER 4. LOWE ON THE PROBLEM OF CHARACTER:
AN ILLUSTRATION OF NEO-ARISTOTELIAN
METAONTOLOGY
It just isn’t good enough to say,
with W. V. Quine, that the
fundamental
question
of
ontology is ‘What is there?’,
and that its most concise
answer
is
‘Everything’.
Ontology is concerned above
all with the categorial structure
of reality – the division of
reality into fundamental types
of entity and their ontological
relations with one another.
(Lowe 2013, 51)
[T]he four-category ontology
… seems to accommodate
many features of our everyday
and scientific talk of objects
and their properties. None the
less, in the eyes of
philosophers with a penchant
for desert landscapes, it will
seem to be an extravagant
ontology.
Can
it
be
satisfactorily defended against
such critics? I believe so.
(Lowe 2006, 96)

4.0 Introduction
In a recent volume dedicated to Lowe’s contribution to philosophy, John Heil
remarks on the momentous challenge of providing a summary of Lowe’s views. He
was, he declares, ‘paralyzed’ by the very thought of it and he ‘procrastinated for more
than a year’ (Heil 2018, 2). Heil’s proposed solution to this paralysis was to present
three aspects of Lowe’s work. Though the focus of this chapter is on just one aspect
of Lowe’s corpus, the problem of character, the difficulty is only marginally mitigated,
for Lowe is a systematic thinker. As Heil further remarked: ‘Lowe combined an
instinct for the big picture with an analytical temperament that equipped him to master
the details: a foxy hedgehog’ (Heil 2018, 1). This combination of the mythological fox
that knows many things, and the hedgehog that knows just one important thing, is what
makes Lowe’s work sophisticated and alluring, but it is also what frustrates attempts
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to present his theory of character in isolation from his wider metaphysical
commitments. A further problem, one Lowe recognises, is that any attempt to hold him
accountable for a given position must contend with his changing views throughout a
long career. He sympathises, saying ‘Unsurprisingly… my views have not remained
perfectly constant… but have undergone continual elaboration and revision, so that it
must be difficult even for the most careful commentator to be quite sure about my
current position on the matters in question’ (Lowe 2006, 114). What has remained
somewhat consistent is his commitment to a four-category ontology, as has the various
metaontological commitments discussed in Chapter Two. Perhaps the most strikingly
consistent feature of his work is his effort to ‘restore metaphysics to a central position
in philosophy as the most fundamental form of rational inquiry, with its own distinctive
methods and criteria of validation’ (Lowe 1998, iii).
The aim of this chapter is to see his proposed neo-Aristotelian metaontology
at work, so to speak, applying his philosophical method discussed in Chapter Two to
the problem of character, introduced in the previous chapter. In Chapter Two, I
articulated nine of Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian metaontological commitments. Only some
of these were shown to be methodological, but the others, in one way or another, guide
and inform the practice of ontology. There will be some unavoidable overlap in this
chapter for, as was noted, his metaontological commitments are bound up with his
first-order ontological practice. That will only strengthen our understanding of his
position.
I begin with an introduction to his metaphysics and a brief reminder of the
issues involved in the problem of character. In section 4.2, his four-category ontology
is discussed in detail. Subsequently, section 4.3 deals with three metaphysical
distinctions crucial to understanding Lowe’s account of character. An account of three
formal ontological relations required to understand how categories systematically
hang together is discussed in section 4.4. Much of his theory of character will have
been made clear at this point, and section 4.5 brings this theory into focus. Finally, his
neo-Aristotelian metaontology is discussed in connection with his theory of character.
In Chapter Three, I demonstrated the shortcomings of van Inwagen’s account
of propertiesPvI. This chapter, however, is primarily expository, given the intricate
details that need to be covered just to articulate Lowe’s account of character. We will
see the troubling extent to which Lowe employs primitive ontological posits in his
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theory and in the following chapter, I will explore whether such primitives can bear
the explanatory burden placed upon them. I begin in the next section with a brief
introduction to Lowe’s ontological schema.

4.1 Lowe’s Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics
Lowe’s theory of character is inextricably bound up with his diverse
ontological commitments and metaphysical views. We saw in Chapter Two that he
considers metaphysics to be at the heart of philosophy, and ontology to be at the heart
of metaphysics. While he articulates the nature of ontology in various ways, it is
primarily concerned with delineating the categories of being; what he calls categorial
ontology or formal ontology. What is it to do categorial ontology? He says: ‘When we
say of something that it “is an object”, or “is an event”, or “is a property” – just to cite
a few examples – we are engaging in what I propose to call categorial predication: we
are assigning something to a certain ontological category’ (Lowe 2013, 64). It is, then,
a kind of classificatory practice, but is distinct from the taxonomic practices of the
empirical sciences in various ways, not least in that it is essentially an a priori matter
(Lowe 2013, 50). In fact, the classificatory practices of the sciences implicitly assume
the general features of being that categorial ontology is concerned with, according to
Lowe. By “formal” he does not mean logical form, but rather the form of being rather
than its content, so to speak. The categories, along with other posits in Lowe’s
ontology which are discussed below, have a questionable ontological status.
This practice of seeking to delineate the categories of being, while once
dominant in philosophy, has fallen out of favour since the dawn of analytic
philosophy.246 Peter Simons, in agreement with Lowe, claims that this is due to an
over-reliance on logic and language: ‘The principal task of ontology’, he says, ‘is the
provision of a Kategorienlehre. As long as analytic philosophy was beholden to the
forms of predicate logic and its semantic partner set theory, the notion of category and
the theory of categories languished’ (Simons 2018, 39). The relatively recent neoAristotelian revival has witnessed a resurgence of interest in category theory in the
work, not only of Lowe, but Roderick Chisholm (1996), Ingvar Johansson (1989) and
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There is considerable debate regarding when, and with whom, to identify this dawn. See What is
Analytic Philosophy (Glock 2008) and The Story of Analytic Philosophy: Plot and Heroes (Biletzki and
Matar 2002) for some interesting discussions on this.
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Reinhardt Grossman (1983), among others. In a surprising revelation, we saw that van
Inwagen too subscribes to categorial theory in a sense. It is within Lowe’s fourcategory ontology, reinforced by some sophisticated theoretical machinery which will
require unpacking, that his approach to the problem of character is found.
The problem of character, we remember from the last chapter, is concerned
with the properties of familiar particulars, where the term “property” is a neutral term,
representing variously a universal or a trope or some such entity.247 The term character
was introduced to allow those of a nominalist persuasion to speak of the character of
familiar particulars without countenancing the existence of properties, however
construed.
Lowe claims that ‘If we are to answer the questions… “—What are
properties?” and “Do any exist?”—we need at the very least to provide acceptable
accounts of both the existence-conditions and the identity-conditions of properties’
(Lowe 2007a, 137). What this amounts to is discussed in detail below, but in order to
provide existence and identity conditions, the broad category, whether universal or
particular, the putative entity belongs to must be known. Simply, he says:

[W]e need to be able to explain satisfactorily what it is, quite generally, for
there to be such a property as the property of being F, or Fness. And we need
to be able to explain satisfactorily what it is, quite generally, for the property
of being F, or Fness, to be identical with the property of being G, or Gness—
on the assumption that these properties do indeed exist. But it is far from easy
to meet either demand. (Lowe 2006, 137; My emphasis).

In contrast to certain kinds of nominalists, as well as the lightweight platonism of van
Inwagen, Lowe presumes that the character (the property of being F), as well as
character agreement (the property of being F being identical with the property of being
G) is in need of explanation, thus he builds a theory to try to explain this phenomena.
While the next chapter is concerned directly with explanation in ontology, in what
follows, I pay particular attention to whether any explanatory work is really being done

For the most part, when Lowe uses the term “property”, he means “attribute” which is a secondary
substance which characterizes kinds and is instantiated by modes. This will become clearer below.
247
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by Lowe’s account of character, as he professes it does. But there is a lot of unpacking
required first, a task to which I now turn.

4.2 The Four-Category Ontology248
Lowe’s theory of character is housed in his four-category ontology which
involves some sophisticated metaphysical theory. The four-category ontology is
traceable to the second chapter of what would become known as Aristotle’s
Categories, possibly ‘the most important single text in the history of ontology’
according to Lowe (Lowe 2006, 58).
The four categories emerge out of a distinction Aristotle makes between
entities that can be “said of a subject” and those that are “in a subject”. Thus, an entity
might be 1) said of and not in a subject, 2) said of and in a subject, 3) not said of and
not in a subject, or 4) not said of and in a subject. Respectively, the corresponding
categories, according to Aristotle, are Substantial Universals (Kinds), Non-Substantial
Universals (Attributes), Individual Substances (Objects) and 4) Attribute Instances
(Mode). It is represented well in the Aristotelian Ontological Square below:

Fig.1 Aristotelian Ontological Square

Fig.2 Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian

(Lowe 2009, 9)

Ontological Square (Lowe 2009, 10)

Lowe dislikes the rather archaic sounding language of said of and in a subject.
He dislikes said of because of the linguistic association that harbours the suggestion
that the categories are merely conceptual, or language based. To be said of is clearly
indicative of predication, an important matter for the problem of character, but Lowe
248

In his very early work (1989), Lowe proposed a three-category ontology and at times left open the
possibility of a fifth fundamental category of persons (2008).
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wants to emphasise that the categories are of being, not merely of language or
thought.249 He also doesn’t like the implication that in a subject suggests; some kind
of spatial relation, what later scholastics would call inherence, though he seems happy
enough to employ this latter term. For such reasons, Lowe provides an updated neoAristotelian version of the ontological square which incorporates some new
nomenclature and a variety of ontological relations between categories not considered
in the original Aristotelian version. Lowe’s version is represented in Fig. 2 above.
Briefly, according to this neo-Aristotelian ontological square, there are four
distinct fundamental categories: objects, kinds, attributes and modes. There is a further
general distinction between particulars and universals, one we will see, he defines,
not in spatiotemporal terms, but in terms of instantiation relations. Both particulars
and universals are trans-categorial; that is, neither comprise a separate ontological
category.250 Indeed, both are pre-requisites for the existence of the other categories.
Universals are abstract and particulars are concrete. Universals divide into two types:
Kinds and Attributes. 251 Kinds are universals that have objects as their instances;
attributes (properties and relations) are universals that have modes (tropes)252 as their
instances; objects are characterised by modes – or modes inhere in objects and kinds
are characterised by attributes - or, again, attributes inhere in kinds. He has a specific
use of exemplified which relates attributes and objects in two ways and comes in two
species: occurrent and dispositional. To take some examples of each:

A particular table, rock, or dog would, then, be an example of something
belonging to the category of object, as I conceive of it. Such items are more
traditionally known as individual substances. Corresponding examples of the
category of kinds, as I conceive of it, would be the kinds table, rock, and dog
249

They will most likely have some level of correspondence with language and thought, but language,
he doesn’t tire of mentioning, is a poor guide to ontology (see Lowe 2006, 84; 2008a, 282).
250
Other transcategorial items are “thing” and “entity”. They are such that they don’t provide any
essential knowledge about entities.
251
To be more precise, universals divide into two types: Kinds on the one hand, and attributes and
relations on the other. These relations differ from the formal ontological relations which, we will see
below, are not elements of being. Relational properties are characterising properties in that they tell us
how the entities related are. For example, if adoration is a relational property and “Paul adores
Penelope”, the relational property adore says something about the way Paul and Mary are. But as with
most discussion on the problem of character, I will not spend time on relational properties and will
focus instead on attributes.
252
There are distinctions between Lowe’s conception of modes and the nominalist conception of tropes;
I put the term “trope” here to highlight some broad connection between tropes and modes, the former
of which is currently a more popular term.
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of which the foregoing objects are, respectively, particular instances. Examples
of the category of attribute would be the properties, conceived as universals,
of brownness, hardness, and furriness that are exemplified, respectively, by
those objects. And, finally, examples of the category of mode would be the
particular instances of those universals possessed by those objects: the table’s
particular brownness, the rock’s particular hardness, and the dog’s particular
furriness. (Lowe 2009b, 33)

Even with these examples, this is all rather congested. In order to get to his
theory of character, and to make fuller sense of this ontological square, several matters
require elucidation. In what follows, I begin by elaborating his reasons for endorsing
distinctions between object and entity, particular and universal and between abstract
and concrete. Subsequently, the formal ontological relations, instantiation,
characterization and exemplification are clarified. I will then revisit the ontological
square by examining each corner individually which will bring us closer to his notion
of character. Before doing so, I briefly look to what an ontological category is
according to Lowe.

4.2.1 What is an Ontological Category?
Despite the role categories play in Lowe’s ontology, ‘There are’, he says, ‘quite
literally, no such things as ontological categories’ (Lowe 2006, 43).253 I quote him at
length:

[O]ntological categories, while they are categories of actual and possible
entities, are not themselves entities. That is to say, they should not themselves
be included in a complete inventory of “what there is”. You may protest: but
how can you even talk about “them” if “they” don’t exist? Well, if you say this,
then you are probably under the spell of Quine and his doctrine that “to be is
to be the value of a variable”. I have said that I favour an ontological system
according to which there are four basic ontological categories. Translate this
claim into Quinese and we get an existentially quantiﬁed statement beginning
He argues in various places what the categories cannot be. He provides reasons why they can’t be
universals or particulars, for example. See, for instance, (Lowe 2006, 40-44).
253
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“(∃w)(∃x)(∃y)(∃z)(w is an ontological category & x is an ontological category
& …”. Now applying Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment, it seems
that we can immediately conclude that I am ontologically committed to the
existence of ontological categories—at least four of them. But this is ludicrous.
If I thought that ontological categories were entities at all, I would probably
have to hold that they are fundamental entities belonging to a basic category of
their own— the category of ontological category. That would make my system
a ﬁve-category ontology. But it isn’t! Anyway, I’m going to go on talking about
ontological categories without presuming that “they”—as opposed to the
entities belonging to them—exist, in deﬁance of Quine’s criterion. (Lowe
2008a, 281-282)
His objection to “Quinese” was discussed at various junctures in the previous chapters.
I argued in Chapter One, in agreement here with Lowe, that it is defensible to object
to a construal of the existential quantifier as ontologically loaded. However, Quine’s
criterion of ontological commitment seems precisely valuable when philosophers posit
x’s that don’t exist. Lowe, I contend, is in a precarious position concerning the
ontological status of categories. However, we saw also in Chapter Two that van
Inwagen speaks of categories as classes, but does not consider classes to exist, but
simply to denote a real division among things. He says ‘To specify the ontological
categories is therefore to make an existential statement – even if one regards the
categories themselves as virtual classes or as ontological fictions of some other sort
and thus as not really “there”’ (van Inwagen 2014, 200). It is an assumption of van
Inwagen’s that there are categories for ontology to be practicable. Perhaps Lowe’s preemptive defence is unnecessary, and he need not be held hostage by the dominance of
neo-Quinean thought. If van Inwagen, as a consummate neo-Quinean, can get away
with speaking of things that don’t exist, such as classes, perhaps Lowe should be
permitted the same luxury.
As mentioned above, part of Lowe’s difficulty is that he wants to consider
categories to be categories of being; if they were thought of as mere schemas or useful
taxonomies, the same issue would not emerge. There is a sense in which he wishes
them to be connected to the world in a non-arbitrary, non-linguistic-relative way and
it is this that seems to generate ambiguity. While he recognises an invariable
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connection between our grammatical distinctions and categorial distinctions, he does
not think the latter is predicated on the former: ‘On closer examination’, he says,
‘grammar is not, in fact, a very good guide to ontology—nor should we expect it to be,
since our Palaeolithic ancestors probably had little time for the luxury of metaphysical
speculation when the human language-faculty was in the process of evolving’ (Lowe
2008a, 282). And given that philosophers within the same language propose different
categorial systems, it seems unlikely that they reflect some sameness in some intrinsic
universal grammar. Even with this close connection, however, Lowe wishes to claim
that ontology is not conceptual analysis, nor is it merely descriptive metaphysics, as
demonstrated in Chapter Two. 254 But if categories are of being¸ and there are
competing categorial systems with seemingly no objective criteria to substantiate one
system above another, how are we to make a principled and rational choice? It is
standard to appeal to theoretical virtues, such as explanatory power or parsimony, but
I argue in the following chapter that such virtues are merely pragmatic and choice of
one’s preferred categorial system is based on extra-theoretical considerations.
It was emphasised in Chapter Two also that Lowe is markedly critical of
various kinds of relativism and antirealism when it comes to certain core issues in
metaphysics. However, in More Kinds of Being, a rather late work in his career, he
seems to soften towards the Kantian view of metaphysics in recognition, it seems, of
the difficulty that emerges from his account of the categories. He says: ‘I align myself
in some respects with a Kantian view of the aim and scope of metaphysical thinking,
although many of the metaphysical theses advanced in the following chapters are much
more Aristotelian than Kantian in character and spirit’ (Lowe 2009, 7). He goes on to
remark in a footnote that ‘…I disagree fundamentally with the transcendental idealism
of Kant and wholeheartedly endorse Aristotle’s metaphysical realism. What is needed
for progress in metaphysics, I believe, is a judicious mixture of the insights of Kant
and Aristotle’ (Lowe 2009, 7). Given his admonitions of various philosophical
outgrowths he finds problematic, outgrowths he often traces to Kant, this is a rather
surprising concession – but in the light of the difficulties facing his account, it is
understandable. But what such an amalgamated view would look like, I don’t know. I
return to this matter in the following chapter in connection with my proposed position
I call lightweight explanatory antirealism.
254

‘Genuine metaphysics’, he says, ‘is nothing if not revisionary in spirit’ (Lowe 2008a, 282).

169

To dispense with any confusion in nomenclature, and to sum up the fourcategory ontology in a table, I present the following:

Particular

Lowe

AKA

Ontological Status Aristotle

Objects

Individual

Independent255

Substance/
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Fig 3. Fixing Nomenclature
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As we will see, objects have a special place among the fundamental categories because they are
ontologically independent entities whereas each of the others are in some way dependent on the entities
possessing them.
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4.3 Three Metaphysical Distinctions
4.3.1 Objects256 and Entities
In this section, I’ll have to move rather quickly through some complex and
highly contentious matters concerning the nature of objects, non-objects, entities,
criteria of identity and sortal persistence conditions, each of which play an important
role in Lowe’s metaphysical account.
When Lowe uses the term “object”, as is shown in the neo-Aristotelian
ontological square, he refers to individual objects, or individual substances. But there
is a broader sense in which the term is used, one which incorporates kinds, or
substantial universals. In this broader sense, Lowe insists on drawing a division
between objects and entities: ‘Everything whatever’, he says, ‘that does or could exist
may be categorized as an “entity”’ (Lowe 2006, 7). Entities are equivalent to, what in
the most general way might be called, “things”. Lowe builds on the distinction between
objects and entities by looking to Quine’s metaontology. Quine considers the
fundamental ontological question to be “What is there?”; the answer, he said, is
“everything”, an ‘only semi-facetious remark’ according to Lowe (Lowe 2008a, 275).
Lowe believes it is a substantial metaphysical claim if “thing”, here, is thought to be
synonymous with “object”. That is, “every thing is a thing” is a trivial statement, just
as “every chair is a chair” is trivial. The statement “everything is a thing”, however, is
not; it is metaphysically substantive and controversial. Its denial “not everything is a
thing”, a position Lowe endorses, highlights a contrast with neo-Quinean
metaontology as it leaves open the possibility that there are things that exist but that
are not objects.257 Why is this important? Because Lowe wants to allow for entities
that are, but that are not objects and thus cannot be quantified over – at least they can’t
be quantified over when the quantifier is construed as ontologically loaded. The result
is that Lowe considers there to be more to the task of ontology than just answering the
question “what is there?”; one must also address how things are, or ways things are.

“Objects” here, when not italicised, isn’t synonymous with individual substances or substantial
particulars, but, as we will see, to any entity possessing identity conditions.
257
Lowe says elsewhere: ‘…on that view, it is just trivially true that everything is a thing, since what
the quantifier "everything" ranges over is precisely things - which it does because “things” themselves,
by this account, are precisely to be understood as what the quantifier ranges over’ (Lowe 1998, 38). It
was shown in Chapter Three that Lowe claims that Quine, and those who follow him, are committed to
a ‘no-category ontology’ as the term “everything” admits of no divisions.
256
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But it is clearly suspicious to appeal to things that are but are not objects: what, then,
are they? His idea is that waves and smiles are not objects for they have no determinate
identity conditions. It does not make sense, he argues, to claim that the smile on Mary’s
face is the same smile she had last year. At least, according to Lowe, it does not make
any ontological sense to speak of a smile as an object in the same sense as the face that
expresses or wears the smile; the smile is a way the face or person is. This way is a
thing, but a thing whose existence is ontologically dependent on the object that
possesses it. This idea will become clearer when discussing formal ontological
relations below.
If entities are the most general category of being, and are distinguished from
objects, what is it that constitutes the nature of objects? According to Lowe, it is partly
the idea that objects are property bearers, but are not borne by other entities, but also,
as just mentioned, it is the determinate identity conditions the objects possess conditions entities that are not objects lack. It is a criterion of identity that governs
these conditions. Lowe says that ‘A criterion of identity tells us what conditions need
to be satisfied by objects to which a general term applies if those objects are to be
identical with one another’ (Lowe 2013, 13).
The very notion of a criterion of identity is a contested matter. It is not always
clear that such a criterion ever finds real-world utilization, thus, whether it is a notion
that is needed. Nor is it clear, should it be required, how it should be precisified.
Nonetheless, Lowe informally defines it as: ‘a principle expressing a non-trivial
logically necessary and suﬃcient condition for the identity of objects of a given sort
or kind, φ’ (Lowe 2013, 14). Formally, he defines it: ‘(CI ϕ) ∀x∀y ((ϕx & ϕy) → (x =
y  Rϕxy))’ (Lowe 2013, 14).’ (Ibid.)258 Here I only want to note that Lowe employs
the idea to distinguish objects and entities, thus allowing for the existence of modes
and attributes discussed presently.
A criterion of identity is to be distinguished from a principle of individuation,
a distinguishing feature being the unity of an object. He says:

Which means: ‘for any objects x and y, if x and y are φs, then x is identical with y if and only if x
stands to y in the relation Rφ. To avoid triviality, we must insist that Rφ – which may be called the
criterial relation for φs – is not simply the relation of identity itself. Rφ must, of course, be an
equivalence relation deﬁned on objects of the sort or kind φ – that is to say, it must be reﬂexive,
symmetrical, and transitive, and either hold or fail to hold between any pair of objects of the sort or kind
φ’ (Lowe 2013, 14).
258
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A principle of individuation, we may say, combines a criterion of identity with
a principle of unity: countable259 items are singled out from others of their kind
in a distinctive way that is determined by the sortal260 concept under which
they fall, whereas portions of stuff can only be singled out in ad hoc ways, of
which there are indefinitely many - as when a portion of gold is singled out as
the gold composing a certain ring. (Lowe 1998, 616)

A criterion of identity is also to be distinguished from sortal persistence
conditions. Sortals are distinguished from categories in that the latter are the most
general classification of being, while the former are general terms that provide the
determinate identity conditions of objects of a given kind. The term “sortal” was coined
by John Locke 261 and refers to ‘nouns or noun phrases denoting putative sorts or
kinds’, otherwise called substantival general terms 262 (Lowe 2013, 12). Sortalism,
according to Lowe, is the doctrine that ‘an object can be singled out in thought only
when conceived as falling under some specific sortal concept, such as the concept of
a cat, a table or a mountain.’ He defines sortal persistence conditions as ‘the conditions
that an object of a given sort must comply with in order to continue to exist as an object
of that sort’ (Lowe 2013, 18). Such conditions are an empirical matter, but he claims
that the possible discovery of such conditions presuppose at least some grasp of the
criterion of identity governing the object:

For example, it is only because we already know or assume that sameness of
life is the criterial relation for animal identity that we can then go on to
determine whether, when a caterpillar is transformed into a butterﬂy, this is to
be classiﬁed as an individual’s surviving a change of sort or merely as its
surviving a change of phase within the same sort. (Lowe 2013, 1)

Countabiltiy plays an important role for Lowe in determining objects. He says: ‘It is a familiar but
none the less important philosophical point that an instruction simply to count how many things there
are in a given room at a certain time is one that cannot be carried out: not because there will always be
too many things to count, but because the instruction does not even make determinate sense in the
absence of a specification of the sorts or kinds of things that are to be counted…’ (Lowe 1998, 31).
260
A “sortal” is equivalent to a kind or substantial universals in Lowe’s metaphysical account.
261
See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975), iii, iii, 15.
262
Sortal terms are contrasted with adjectival general terms such as “red” and “circular” which don’t
have determinate identity conditions according to Lowe.
259
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All of this leads to complexities that won’t concern us here. What is of relevance, with
respect to the problem of character, is his attempt to distinguish objects from entities
which will allow, he claims, for discussion of attributes and modes which play a key
role in the character of an object for Lowe.

4.3.2 Particulars and Universals
Another distinction relevant to the problem of character is between particular
and universal. This distinction is both exhaustive and exclusive, according to Lowe.
That is, everything is either a universal or a particular - but not both; a debatable point,
but one he finds uncontroversial. The distinction is often drawn in spatiotemporal
terms, but Lowe does not find this perspicuous. Rather, he wishes to elucidate the
division in terms of the formal relation of instantiation. This distinction was discussed
to some extent in the previous chapter and I discuss this relation in further detail below.
Briefly, the idea is that particulars are things that are instances of universals (perhaps
many universals) but are not instantiated by any other entity, whereas it is definitive
of a universal, should it exist, that it is instantiated by something; that is, that it has an
instance, or instances. At least, the universal must be instantiated according to neoAristotelian immanent realism; it need not be the case for Platonists who embrace
transcendental realism.
However, Lowe does not align himself here with the likes of Armstrong who
considers universals to be wholly present in the locations of the entities possessing
them – a view Lowe considers incoherent (Lowe 1998, 155-156). Lowe calls the
Armstrongian account of universals ‘strong immanence’ and his own account, ‘weak
immanence’ (Lowe 2006, 99). The latter just requires a commitment to the Principle
of Instantiation, which amounts to the claim that there are no uninstantiated universals.
Every universal must be instantiated, have been instantiated or will possibly be
instantiated. His issue with strong immanence takes the following form:

I do not believe that the distinction between universals and particulars can be
satisfactorily accounted for in spatiotemporal terms. I do not believe, for
instance, that a particular may be defined as something that cannot be “wholly
present” in two different places at the same time or, correlatively, that a
universal may be defined as something that can be “wholly present” in two
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different places at the same time. It is not just that I have doubts as to what
exactly could be meant by such talk of something’s being, or not being,
“wholly present” in two different places at the same time—though I do have
such doubts. Rather, it seems to me that the proposal is flawed inasmuch as it
rules out by definition the possibility of there being universals or particulars
which do not exist ‘in’ space and time at all— in short, it rules out by definition
the possibility of there being abstract entities belonging to these categories, in
one fairly familiar sense of the expression “abstract”. (Lowe 2006, 88-89)263

A brief discussion of the distinction between concrete and abstract follows in the next
section. What is important to note here, regarding the problem of character, is that
Lowe endorses the existence of abstract objects. In fact, there are only two kinds of
abstract objects he does endorse: sets and universals. Indeed, he says that ‘This is not
to say that such paradigmatically abstract objects as numbers and propositions are
impossible, only that if they are possible, then they are either sets or universals’ (Lowe
2002, 66).264 While an attribute such as redness is an example of an abstract universal,
numbers, 265 and possibly propositions, serve as putative examples of abstract
particulars.

4.3.3 Abstract and Concrete
Lowe, then, distinguishes between abstract and concrete entities. Recognising
it is an assumption, he claims, just as with universals and particulars, that the
distinction is exhaustive and exclusive (see Lowe 2002, 62). There are, however,
different senses of “abstract”266 found in contemporary literature, as I highlighted in
the previous chapter. In one sense, abstract is contrasted with concrete where the
division is made in spatiotemporal terms. Under this conception, concrete entities are
263

See also (Lowe 1995; 1998 chapter 10).
He does say elsewhere, however, that he has ‘some doubts concerning the degree to which we should
regard sets with full ontological seriousness’ (Lowe 2006, 35). See also (Lowe 2002, 377).
265
Lowe shares my scepticism about the significance of whether numbers are thought to exist: ‘Even
so, one cannot help doubting whether concerns like this really have much metaphysical importance, in
the way that other ontological concerns do. Does it, in the end, really matter whether the numbers
actually exist in anything like the way in which it matters whether space and time or persons actually
exist? I find it hard to suppose so. Perhaps it is enough, for mathematical purposes, that numbers could
exist, if indeed that is a possibility distinct from that of their actually existing’ (Lowe 1995, 523).
266
Lowe distinguishes three types (Lowe 2002). The third type is a Fregean notion which Lowe rejects,
and I won’t discuss here.
264
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thought to exist in space and time whereas abstract entities are thought to exist outside
or non-spatiotemporally. Numbers and sets are typically thought of in this way. 267
Lowe, we saw, has no problem endorsing items existing non-spatiotemporally, though
he would take issue with the sense of things existing outside, as if in some mysterious
plane. Because Lowe subscribes to the univocity of existence, a matter discussed in
some detail in Chapter One, there is nothing special, he contends, about existing nonspatiotemporally. While the preposition outside functions as an unfortunate spatial
metaphor in this context, to exist as such is simply for an entity to lack certain
properties – spatiotemporal ones. Numbers, in this abstract sense, don’t have the
spatiotemporal properties of shape or colour, for example, nor do they undergo change.
In his more eloquent words:
… abstract entities are not denizens of some “Platonic” realm which is
“separated” from the world of things existing in space and time. According to
this view, to say that abstract entities do not exist “in” space and time is not to
say that they somehow exist “elsewhere”, a notion which is doubtfully coherent
in any case. It is merely to say that when we speak of abstract entities we must
“abstract away” from all spatio-temporal determinations and distinctions.
(Lowe 2002, 66)

A second sense of abstract Lowe identifies is one where entities are understood
as ‘logically incapable of “enjoying” a separate existence’ (Lowe 1995, 514). That is,
the abstract entities are dependent on the entities possessing them, though they may be
abstracted and thought about separately.268 Modes, it would seem, are abstract in this
sense, but not in the former sense. That is, the particular colour of a given object is
abstract in the sense of being an entity dependent on the object possessing it, but
concrete in the sense of being spatiotemporal. But this second sense of abstract might

Though Lowe conceives of numbers as universals, he says: ‘Many philosophers think that numbers
are sets, though I myself hold that they are universals of a special sort – namely, kinds whose particular
instances are sets of appropriate cardinality (see Lowe 1993 and Lowe 1998: 223–27). Thus, on my
view, the number 2 is the kind whose particular instances are two-membered sets’ (Lowe 2002a, 66).
268
Lowe makes an important distinction between abstraction as a psychological process, and the
metaphysics of abstract objects: ‘Such separation “in thought” - a psychological process - seems to be
what philosophers like John Locke understood by “abstraction”; but in calling the entities thus separated
“abstract,” we are now invoking a metaphysical distinction, defined in terms of the impossibility of their
separate existence’ (Lowe 1995, 514).
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confuse matters here, as some consider modes, what they would term tropes, to be
abstract particulars (see Campbell 1990; Williams 1997). This sense of being
incapable of having a separate existence is best thought of in terms of dependence
relations, discussed below.

4.4 Formal Ontological Relations
There are three relations in Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian ontological square:
instantiation, characterization and exemplification, each of which are required for
making sense of his theory of character.269 Only the first two are fundamental, and the
last is divided into two parts: occurrent and dispositional. These relations are formal
and thus, according to Lowe, are not elements of being.270 What is an element of being?
Something in the world as claimed in the quotation below. These relations are not
objects with criteria of identity; they are not even entities - something that exists but
has no criterion of identity. As with identity and existence, such relations are
prerequisites for the existence of any kind of entity, according to Lowe, though merely
saying as such does not illuminate their nature. Again, we have reached a bedrock and
there is nothing left to appeal to. And again, as suspicious as this is, insofar as one is
looking for an intellectual foundation in metaphysics one invariably reaches a point
where nothing further can be appealed to. Comparing these relations to the relation of
identity, Lowe avers:

Self-identity, and hence identity, is, we might say, a metaphysically necessary
condition of the existence of objects. That is no trivial matter. Without it, there
could be nothing in the world. It is too fundamental, indeed, to be something
in the world – an element of being – because it is that without which there could
be no beings and so no world. And the same applies, I would say, to the other
formal ontological relations. (Lowe 2006, 49)
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Lowe endorses other formal ontological relations such as: identity, constitution, composition and
dependence (he allows for rigid existential dependence, non-rigid existential dependence and identity
dependence). Identity and the various dependence relations will concern us only in passing below.
270
This sense of formal is contrasted with content, a point familiar in logic between, say, the ‘logical
form of a proposition and its non-logical content’ (Lowe 2006, 48). The given entity provides the
ontological content so to speak, and its place in the categories, provides the form, according to Lowe.
But I don’t find this illuminating for the idea of “ontological content”, while intuitive in some respects,
seems to lack precision in meaning.
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So, it would seem that nothing more can be said about them; even the architecture of
the world still seems too full of content; metaphors fail at the bedrock. They are
primitives. He recognises that ‘it may seem to be blatantly self-contradictory to say
that formal ontological relations are not relations…’ (Lowe 2006, 41). However, such
is the price one pays when inquiring into the fundamental nature of reality. I will pay
some attention below to all of the peculiar items that Lowe houses in his four-category
ontology, especially those that, in Armstrong’s famous phrase, are ‘no addition to
being’ (Armstrong 2010, 8). But to get a sense of Lowe’s standard defence, he says:
Instantiation and characterization clearly have something to do with being –
they are, after all, ontological relations – and yet… it seems that we cannot
regard them as beings, or entities. The lesson, no doubt, is that there is more to
the business of ontology than just saying what there is, or even what there could
be. There is also the matter of saying how beings are, both in themselves and
with respect to one another. One might have thought that this was just a matter
of saying what the properties of beings are and what relations beings stand in
to one another. But now we know that that can’t be right, because this leaves
out of account such matters as the having of properties – that is, what we have
been calling “characterization” (and, in another sense, “exemplification”). We
have established, for example, that the having of properties is not itself an
element of being – a relational entity in which two other beings may stand to
one another, the being that has a property and the property that is had by it.
(Lowe 2006, 47)

We saw that van Inwagen considers this having of properties to be too
fundamental to be analysed, and thus disregards such accounts of formal ontological
relations as uninformative and non-explanatory.
Considering such relations to be internal is one way to license their
existence.271 An internal relation only requires the existence of the respective relata,
that is, the entities that are related (or their properties).272 To take an example, the

Using “existence” here is problematic. Recognizing they don’t exist as elements of being, for Lowe,
I’m unsure what other word to employ. I could rephrase the sentence, but this would seem like shirking
away from what is evidently a concern.
272
See further Lowe’s defence (Lowe 2006, 167).
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relation “taller than” is a good candidate for being internal for all that is required for
Paul to be taller than Penelope is for Paul and Penelope to exist (with their respective
properties, notably their respective heights). Of course, this leaves open the question
of what such a relation is. It is something of being, for Lowe, not a mere facon de
parler. The relation of distance, being x metres away, is a good candidate for being an
external relation as it is dependent, it would seem, on factors other than simply the two
objects that are related. A significant advantage of such relations being formal is that
they don’t appear to suffer the threat of Bradley’s regress argument, discussed briefly
in Chapter Three. The best way to stop a regress is to do so before it begins, and Lowe’s
internal relations, if they can be tolerated, at least seem to achieve this.
The instantiation relation exists between kinds and objects as well as between
attributes and modes according to Lowe’s ontological square. To be instantiated just
is to have instances; there are no uninstantiated kinds or attributes according to neoAristotelian immanent realism. A kind, such as a human, is instantiated in the object,
Socrates, for example. Attributes, such as redness, are instantiated in the mode redness.
Square-circles and such putative “impossible” entities don’t fit into his ontology (see
Lowe 2013, 98-99).
The characterisation relation exists between attributes and kinds as well as
modes and objects. Kinds are characterised by attributes; attributes inhere in kinds,
though attributes are instantiated by modes. Objects are characterised by modes;
modes inhere in objects, though objects are instances of kinds. We have seen examples
of such relations above.
A further complicating feature of the Neo-Aristotelian ontological square is the
exemplification relation. Exemplification is a relation that exists between universals
and particulars, but there are two types of universals, and two types of particulars.
These differences, as we saw, bring with them two different relations –
characterization and instantiation. There are two ways, then, that objects are related
to attributes: either indirectly by the instantiation relation where kinds are
characterized by attributes or indirectly by the instantiation relation where modes are
characterized by attributes. This is more easily thought of by considering fig.2: we
can get to objects from attributes by going left or right, and while different categories
and relations are concerned in both directions, there is only one exemplification
relation – albeit one which comes in two species: occurrent and disposition, as already
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mentioned. 273 To state this complicating feature in Lowe’s words: ‘an object O
exemplifies an attribute A dispositionally when O instantiates some kind, K, that is
characterized by A; and an object O exemplifies an attribute A occurrently when O is
characterized by some mode, M, that instantiates A’ (Lowe 2009, 10-11). Because of
this division, exemplification is not considered a primitive, or fundamental, relation,
nor in fact, an internal relation. The occurrent/disposition distinction is directly
relevant to the state of objects and the kind of character that is expressed. For example,
“salt dissolves in water” is a dispositional state, yet “this salt is dissolving in water” is
an occurrent state. Lowe insists that in distinguishing these states, he is not proposing
two types of properties; the same property is being expressed, just through different
formal ontological relations. It is a selling point, he thinks, of his complex categorial
system that it is able to account for this ‘bedevilled distinction’ (Lowe 2006, 30), with
the dispositional relation serving to underscore the nature of laws. While an analysis
of his conception of laws is outside the scope of this chapter, the sense in which the
character of an object requires an understanding of each of the formal ontological
relations should be now clear.

4.5 The Four Corners of the Neo-Aristotelian Ontological Square and
Lowe’s Theory of Character
With all this theoretical machinery in play, let us return to the four corners of
the neo-Aristotelian ontological square. Much of the details regarding these categories,
and the relations between them, have already been elucidated. After shining a light on
some specifics, his theory of character is then brought into focus.

4.5.1 Objects
It should be clear by now that objects, in Lowe’s ontology, are bearers of
properties, but they do not bear universals in the sense of attributes. Rather, though
they are instances of the universal kind, they bear only modes. It is the modes, as

Lowe uses the term “occurrent”, though “categorical” is more customary in the literature – though
liable to confuse given the central role category theory plays in his ontology. He regards the distinction
as ‘a modern counterpart of the Aristotelian distinction between the actual and the potential, differing
from the latter perhaps only verbally’ (Lowe 2009, 11).
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particularized properties, that bear the universal attribute. Objects cannot be borne by
anything else.
Lowe’s ontology is neither constituent nor relational, but is, rather, a substance
ontology.274 It is not relational in the sense that there is a substratum that is related (in
some non-formal way) to properties making up the object, nor do the various properties
(universal or particular) bundle together in some kind of compresence relation to
constitute the object. Rather, the substance, in the sense of object, is primary and Lowe
calls his four-category ontology a “neo-Aristotelian Substance Ontology”. He says:

According to my conception of objects, an object is not a complex which is
somehow constituted by a collection of particular properties together with
some further entity which is itself neither a particular property nor a propertied
object. The mistake is to suppose that an object is even partially constituted by
its particular properties, as this inverts the true direction of ontological
dependency between object and property. Particular properties are no more
(and no less) than features or aspects of particular objects, which may indeed
be selectively attended to through a mental process of abstraction when we
perceive or think of particular objects, but which have no being independently
of those objects and which consequently cannot in any sense be regarded as
‘constituents’ of objects. In this respect, the particular properties of an object
differ radically from its parts, if it has any, for these are just further objects
with particular properties of their own. (Lowe 2006, 97)

Again, however, we are left with an epistemological question regarding the particular
properties of an object, notably, through what faculty of the mind, and by what process
of that faculty, can we “abstract” from objects its character, but I’ll discuss this below
in connection with modes and attributes.
Though Lowe says that all the four categories are equally fundamental, he
again aligns himself with Aristotle and considers objects to ‘have ultimate ontological
priority over entities in any of the other three categories’ (Lowe, 2012; 103). In another
work he declares that: ‘Objects, we may say in Aristotelian vein, are ontologically
prior to properties, or occupy a more fundamental place in the scheme of being’ (Lowe
274

See (Lowe 2012).
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2006, 75). Elsewhere, however, Lowe argues that objects and kinds are two sides of
the one coin, each being irreducible to the other: kinds and objects are not ‘in any
sense more fundamental than the other – a corollary of which I take to be that
individuals275 and kinds are ontologically on an equal footing, at least in the sense that
neither may be reduced to the other, even though their manners of existing may
obviously differ’ (Lowe 2003, 3). And further: ‘I also hold… that the notions of an
“individual” and of a “sort” or “kind” are opposite sides of a single conceptual coin:
each is understandable only in terms of the other. Individuals are necessarily
individuals of a kind, and kinds are necessarily kinds of individuals’ (Lowe 2009, 4).
There is, then, ambiguity here, though, being charitable, possibly not
contradiction. In later works he replaces “fundamental” with “unique” and “special”,
as in objects occupy a unique place among the fundamental categories. This
uniqueness is due to the fact that objects, as seen in fig. 3, are ontologically
independent - their most defining characteristic. It is also the case, given his
commitment to “weak” immanent realism, which involves endorsing the principle of
instantiation, that kinds, for Lowe, are abstracted from objects, thus making objects
epistemically prior.
As with each of the categories, there is an explanatory bedrock. The best he
can do to defend the category of objects is to show how it is involved in the explanatory
power of the four-category ontology as a whole and to show why it doesn’t succumb
to the same pitfalls as its rivals, notably various substratum views which seem to
require a “bare particular” or bundle theories, which have a mysterious compresence
relation. He says: ‘Explanation—even metaphysical explanation—must reach bedrock
somewhere, and this, according to the four-category ontology, is one place where
bedrock is reached. The idea that some more fundamental explanation is somehow
available, if only we can probe reality more deeply, is, I think, just an illusion…’
(Lowe 2006, 28). I address this explanatory bedrock issue in Chapter Five.
While objects have a certain priority, and while we know what objects are
through their identity and existence conditions, Lowe makes a surprising concession
in the direction of van Inwagen. While emphasising the realist nature of his fourcategory ontology, he says:
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Here he means “objects”.
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Realism with regard to sorts need not, however, be unqualified. Perhaps only
natural kinds need to be accorded a wholly mind-independent ontological
status – although this, of course, raises the thorny problem of precisely how we
are to draw an objective distinction between natural and non-natural kinds…
Observe, however, that even granting the general connection between
individual and sortal realism, to deny the reality of non-natural kinds (such as
artefactual kinds) does not entail denying the reality of individuals instantiating
those kinds, so long as the individuals in question can be regarded as also
instantiating one or other real, natural kind. Thus, even if tables do not
constitute a real kind, an individual table might still be acknowledged to be a
real particular if it could be identified as, say, a tabular-shaped collection of
pieces of wood. My own view is that such an identification would be incorrect,
however. If this means that my kitchen table does not really exist, then so be
it! Perhaps indeed it is a sort of fiction. But whether artefactual kinds are in
fact unreal is, I should stress, an issue on which I remain agnostic in this study,
although I shall commonly talk as if they are real. (Lowe 2009, 5)

This passage is worth mentioning here in the context of objects to keep in mind
potential points of contact between such diverse ontologies as Lowe’s and van
Inwagen. Lowe is a fervent metaphysical realist in many respects; it is interesting to
see some nuances with respect to his agnosticism with respect to familiar concrete
artefactual objects as kinds of “fiction”.

4.5.2 Kinds
Kinds, then, are substantial universals in that they are objects that are
instantiable, and, according to Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian immanent realism, must be
instantiated. They are abstract in that they do not exist in space or time. They are
objects because they have, or may have if they are only possible kinds, fully
determinate identity conditions. This is obvious for Lowe as ‘the kind “horse” is surely
determinately distinct from the kind “whale.” Certainly, the kind “gold” is
determinately distinct from the kind “carbon.” (Other kinds, such as the color kinds
“yellow” and “orange,” are obviously more problematic, in view of the vagueness of
their boundaries’ (Lowe 1995, 217).
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Kinds, such as the kind “horse”, though instantiated by a particular horse, are
not in the horse in any sense of being a metaphysical ingredient. As stressed above,
Lowe argues that his four-category ontology is not a constituent one. It is important
not to confuse kinds with a species, in the biological sense. The difference, Lowe
mentions, is that ‘Species have members, whereas kinds have instances: species are
collectives, whereas kinds are universals’ (Lowe 1997, 44). A given object, Fido¸ may
instantiate many kinds. For example, ‘Fido is, perhaps, a poodle and, certainly, Fido is
a dog and so also a mammal. Fido, then, instantiates the kinds poodle, dog, mammal’
(Lowe 2006, 77).
Kinds, then, as shown in fig 3, are dependent entities. To be more precise, they
depend non-rigidly on objects according to Lowe. He defines non-rigid existential
dependence as: ‘x depends non-rigidly on the ys =df for some F, the ys are the Fs and,
necessarily, x exists only if there is something z such that z is an F’ (Lowe 2004a, 299).
The idea here is that, though kinds are dependent on objects from an immanent realist
perspective, they are not dependent on any specific entity. That is, though Fido exists,
and therefore the kind doghood exists, there is a sense in which doghood doesn’t
depend simply on Fido; it could be instantiated by Rover or some other dog. This kind
of non-rigid dependence is found, as we will see, between attributes and modes also.
Given that kinds are ontologically dependent on objects, Lowe claims that they
must exist if objects exist:
[R]ealism with regard to individuals, or particular objects – the belief, in my
opinion correct, that they may exist independently of the human or indeed any
other mind – implies realism with regard to sorts or kinds. I cannot, then, accept
John Locke’s famous contention that “All Things, that exist, [are] Particulars”
and that “General and Universal, belong not to the real existence of Things; but
are the Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding.”’ (Lowe 2009, 05)

That kinds exist is controversial, however, and it is unclear what objective criteria
could decide the matter between Locke’s view and Lowe’s. Lowe claims, however,
that we are not free to carve up reality any way we wish; that reality delimits what
kinds are permissible. A minimum requirement, or condition of adequacy, is that a
given kind K, is at least metaphysically possible. This rules out ‘round square cupolas’
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(Lowe 2013, 98) for example. He claims that ‘An adequate conception of Ks must be
a coherent way of thinking of Ks – but there is no coherent way of thinking of
something whose existence is metaphysically impossible’ (Ibid.). Kinds, then, are
known by their essences, a matter discussed at length in Chapter Two. ‘The general
essence of a K’, he says, ‘is “what it is” to be a K – and is therefore shared by all
particular Ks – whereas the individual essence of a particular K is “what it is” to be
this particular K, as opposed to some other particular K’ (Ibid., 99). He employs his
standard defence, an argument from metaphysics, which claims that we must at least
know, in a fallible and imperfect way, the essences of some kinds to comprehendingly
talk about anything. However, that supposed fact does not help distinguish the realist
commitments of Lowe, from the antirealist commitments of Locke.

4.5.3 Attributes
Attributes, in Lowe’s metaphysical account, are what might be called propertyuniversals. He defines them as such: ‘it is a necessary condition of a [universal U’s]
existing in a world w that some object should exemplify [U] in w – and if that object
is a concrete one, [U] will be exemplified by it at some time and in some place’ (Lowe
2002, 66).
Given that the focus of this chapter is on Lowe’s response to the problem of
character, it would be natural to assume that analysing the nature of these attributes
would be sufficient to capture Lowe’s theory. But, unlike most theories that endorse
such universals, they are not instantiated by objects, though they are possessed by
objects, nor is there a substratum that somehow binds with the attribute. An attribute,
such as whiteness or circularity, does not find its instance directly in the object, but
only indirectly through being instantiated by a mode – a particularised property,
whereby it is then exemplified by the object. But further, attributes play a role in
characterizing kinds, which then find instances in their corresponding object. So even
the kind doghood is characterized by attributes: non-substantial universals inhering in
substantial universals. Attributes are simply a way Kinds are.
Such attributes, then, are ‘adjectival rather than objectual in nature’ (Lowe
1998, 157). The difference between the universal kind and the universal attribute,
according to Lowe, is found in the instances of each: ‘The basis of this distinction…
lies in the ontological status of the particular instances of these two sub-categories of
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universals. What is at issue here is the categorial distinction amongst particulars
between “objects” and “non-objects”, and it should be clear that by “non-objects”
Lowe means modes (Lowe 1998, 180).

4.5.4 Modes
Modes are best characterized as particularised properties. If there is an object,
such as a cat named Tom, and Tom is white, the whiteness of the kind cat may be
shared by other white objects, including other white cats. But the specific whiteness of
Tom, Tom’s white mode, is a property that can’t be shared; it is non-transferrable –
when Tom is no more, the whiteness that is particular to him is no more, while the
universal attribute whiteness, as long as it has other instances, continues to exist.
Examples276 of such modes are “The smile on Tom’s face”, “The roundness of this
particular ball”, “The redness of this particular tomato”. In Lowe’s words:

Notice that while the apple is an instance of the kind-universal apple, it is not
itself an instance of the property-universal redness. The latter universal does
indeed have a particular instance here, namely, a colour mode of the apple - the
apple’s particularised property of redness (of a quite specific, determinate hue).
The apple “possesses” the universal property of redness precisely in virtue of
possessing a particular mode of that property, red modes being particular
instances of the universal property of redness. (Lowe 1998, 182)
Modes, we recall, are not objects, on Lowe’s account, for they lack determinate
identities. He says that ‘They are not themselves “objects”, somehow related to the
objects which “possess” them. Rather, they have an “adjectival” status: they are, quite
simply, ways those objects are’ (Lowe 1998, 82). In fact, he rather cumbersomely, as
mentioned above, calls them ‘non-objects’ (Lowe 1998, 78).
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I follow Lowe in using everyday examples rather than scientific ones for ease of discussion, for
which nothing of significance, Lowe claims, is lost. But Lowe does not object to the idea that
fundamentally, the only things that may feature as real expressions of his categories are fundamental
scientific entities: ‘We should be prepared to allow that the four categories are best illustrated, in fact,
only by entities postulated in advanced scientific theories, rather than by those assumed in our
“common-sense” ontology’ (Lowe 2009b, 174).
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The discussion of modes leads to many peculiarities which, at least on first
appearance, are fundamentally at odds with neo-Quinean ontology. Modes, though
they are only ways things are, these ways, which Lowe does not want to hypostasize
or reify, still exist and are required to bear attributes and characterize objects. Again,
it seems to amount to claiming that there are things that don’t exist. This, I argued in
Chapter One is fine when one does not want to be held hostage to the demands of a
particular construal of logic. However, while ways are arguably not things, they play
such a pivotal role in Lowe’s theory of character, and four-category ontology
generally, that a more solid understanding of their nature would be welcome.
Lowe, then, introduces modes in order to account for the instantiation of
abstract properties, attributes, in objects. This, he claims, is required to explain how
an abstract entity finds instances in concrete objects:

And one reason why we need to acknowledge the existence of modes is
precisely in order to explain how it is that an individual concrete object, such
as an apple, can “possess” a universal property, such as redness, despite the
fact that such a universal is an abstract entity and hence non- spatiotemporal
in nature. It seems clear that there must be something about how, concretely,
the apple is in itself which warrants the ascription to it of precisely this abstract
universal, redness, rather than another. The solution is to say that the apple
“has” redness, the universal, in virtue of being coloured in a red way - that is,
in virtue of having a red mode, where this is itself a concrete particular, the
particular way in which the apple is coloured. (Lowe 1998, 182)
But it’s not clear that this “accounting for” really explains anything. It’s not clear that
understanding is enhanced by endorsing a non-hypostasized concrete particular nonobject (Lowe 1998a 203) called a mode, an abstract universal non-object called an
attribute and an existing (insofar as there are such things) and non-existing (insofar as
they are formal and shouldn’t be included in an inventory of what there is) relation
between them called instantiation, never mind the further characterizing relation
between modes and objects and kinds and attributes. This is a lot of theoretical
machinery, employing many primitives which, by their nature, can’t be elaborated

187

further. This is a significant drawback of the theory-builder approach advanced by
Lowe.

4.5.5 Lowe’s Theory of Character
We recall from the previous chapter that the problem of character, more
usually known as the problem of universals, is in fact a cluster of related problems.
Familiar concrete particulars, what Lowe calls objects, appear in certain ways: they
have shape, texture, weight, colour and a whole range of other features; they have a
particular character.277 Further, this character that appears so evident seems often to
be borne by more than one object; that is, it seems to be the case, not just that a given
object has a character, but that more than one object can have the same character, thus
the objects, or the properties they bear, appear to be in a relation of what is typically
called attribute-agreement or resemblance - what I call character-agreement. There
are two issues here, then: the first concerns individual objects and their character; the
second, multiple individuals and their shared character.
Simply put, this is Lowe’s account of character and shared character:

The thought, then, is that properties are ways things are. That being so,
however, it is natural to try to distinguish between a “way” two or more
different things may be and a “way” just one thing is – a “way” that is
necessarily unique to just one thing. And this would correspond, it seems, to
the distinction between properties conceived as universals and properties
conceived as particulars. (Lowe 2006, 90)

With respect to the first issue, the character of an object, the essential ingredient
in Lowe’s four-category ontology is a mode. These modes are not shareable, so he
says:

In respect of those ways, we can meaningfully speak only of qualitative, not of
numerical, sameness and difference. We can say, thus, that the particular way

It is standard to speak of character with respect to familiar concrete particulars for simplicity’s sake.
However, as was demonstrated in Chapter Two, Lowe claims his four-category ontology is applicable
across the sciences, even to fundamental physics.
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in which S is shaped is exactly similar to the particular way in which S* is
shaped namely, spherically, with such-and-such a radius of curvature - but we
should not admit as intelligible the question of whether or not those particular
ways are numerically identical (Lowe 1997, 39).

With respect to the shared character of an object, the essential ingredients are
attributes, but it’s clear, on Lowe’s account, that when describing a way a number of
objects are, the attribute is characterizing the kind while the object only exemplifies
the attribute, thus, as we saw through this chapter, one must include a lot of theoretical
machinery, on Lowe’s account, to understand how he accounts for the problem of
character. A final question remains, however: is his account explanatory? I address
this question briefly in the next section and provide a fuller examination of the matter
in the following chapter.

4.6 Conclusion: The Problem of Character and neo-Aristotelian
Metaontology
Lowe’s theory of character has been discussed in detail in this chapter, albeit
often indirectly, through an analysis of his four-category ontology. It is housed in a
theoretical framework that is complex and often obscure. The purpose of this chapter
was not to resolve issues that emerge in Lowe’s account, nor to try to solve the problem
of character. Rather, the endeavour was to see an illustration of a his neo-Aristotelian
metaontology. With that in mind, let us bring to the fore some of his metaontological
theses from Chapter Two and review his position on character.
With respect to the character, then, Lowe is first and foremost a metaphysical
realist. That is, he not only believes in the existence of a mind-independent world; he
believes also in the existence of properties, both universal and particular. He is also an
epistemic realist, believing we can gain access to this mind-independent world in both
a posteriori and a priori ways. His defence that this can be done is primarily based on
what I’ve called the argument from reason. That amounts to the defence that any
position rejecting these claims is either vacuous or incoherent. It is not that he argues
by this reasoning that his ontological account must be correct; there may be, and in
fact are, many conflicting categorial ontologies: most are polycategorial, such as
Armstrong’s (1989) two category ontologies, some are monocategorial, such as L.A.
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Paul’s one-category (2017). Indeed, part of what Lowe sees as buffering his own fourcategory ontology is what he sees as the inherent problems in these other accounts.
While they may be more parsimonious, they are less explanatory according to Lowe.
The point is, however, that some ontological account is required to deal with both
character and character agreement. Metaphysics, he contends, is indispensable in this
respect.
If one is going to try to provide a metaphysical account of character, then there
is reason, or so it is argued, to employ universals (attributes), and reason to employ
particular properties (modes) in such an account. It is highly irregular to employ both,
which I demonstrated Lowe does. Not doing so seems to require an appeal to a
mysterious substratum, “bare” particulars, or strange “ties” of compresence amongst
tropes. But in employing both categories, Lowe generates not only an inflated ontology
of fundamental categories, but also, an appeal to many formal ontological relations
between them which are highly suspicious given how he wants them construed – as of
being rather than as taxonomies of thought: Aristotelian rather than Kantian, not
forgetting the concession made to the latter later in his career.
Let us remind ourselves of the various theoretical posits Lowe postulates that
are of questionable ontological status which throw caution on his neo-Aristotelian
account. The categories, first and foremost, the four fundamental ones, do not exist.
But there are four of them and they are categories of being. Even in dispensing with
the ontologically loaded existential quantifier, and those who prefer desert landscapes,
this at first glance, sounds odd. However, what would the categories be other than of
being? It is too easy to rest on the idea that there is a distinction between our minds
and the world; an inseparable gap that hinders access to the world as it is in itself. It’s
arguable that such a notion will lead to antirealist consequences that are no less
appealing than the realist commitments of Lowe. Even if the categories are projections
of thought, are not our thoughts part of reality; especially those we reflect rationally
upon which purport to do explanatory philosophical work? A challenge here comes
from scientistic quarters: given that the sciences, which have proved highly successful,
has shown the world to be vastly different to how we perceive it to be, why think that
our perceptions or rational reflections have a priori access to anything resembling the
structure of the world? Lowe’s answer, again, is that metaphysics is first philosophy;
there is no science without metaphysics. For the sciences to function, there must first
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be a recognition, even tacitly, of categories. Science doesn’t function in a metaphysical
vacuum.
Universals, in the sense of attributes, are another example of a metaphysically
curious entity. Again, it is not unusual for a philosopher to endorse universals, and it
is perhaps less mysterious when couched in an immanent realist framework. But it is
more unusual to distinguishes between two types of universals: kinds and attributes. It
is the attributes that do most of the legwork: they not only characterize kinds, and thus
objects indirectly through exemplification, but are also instantiated by modes. Yet,
though they clearly play a pivotal role in Lowe’s account of character, as well as other
philosophical matters not fully discussed here, they are not to be hypostasized or
reified. They are dependent beings, adjectival in nature and inhering in the objects
possessing them. But these ways exist, unlike categories and it’s hard to get a sense of
the nature of their existence precisely. Though, perhaps we shouldn’t try; it’s precisely
because they don’t have precise identity conditions that they are not objects; they are
asymmetrically dependent non-objects. Though they are abstract, we know of them
through concrete particulars. We know of attributes, which we can’t perceive, through
modes, which we can. We know of kinds, which we can’t perceive, through objects
which we can. When stated as such, it may help assuage certain empiricist scruples,
and bypass epistemological problems of cognitive access to such entities.
The formal ontological relations are more features that are cause for concern.
They are of being, but no addition to it. They are primitives, again, too fundamental to
be exposited in much detail. The work they do is evident; but can they bear the load
that is put upon them? Positing primitives is standard practice in the more traditional
metaphysics of Lowe and contrasts dramatically with van Inwagen’s neo-Quinean
approach. Lowe argues that, as a whole system of thought, his account can provide an
intellectual framework for all intellectual inquiry. That’s no small feat if successful.
Direct ontology, he contends, done through a priori reflection, in conjunction with
cosmology, can tell us what exists, or at least what may possibly exist. Let the sciences
inform us, let our conjectures be fallible, let us rest on language when necessary – but
don’t marginalise ontology, or make it subservient to other disciplines that must
assume some metaphysics to even get going.
It was made clear in Chapter One and Three that van Inwagen’s theory of
propertiesPvI was merely a descriptive account of the property role. The dramatic
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contrast between van Inwagen’s neo-Quinean metaontology and Lowe’s neoAristotelian metaontology has been magnified by an illustration of their respective
positions with respect to the first-order problem of character. Is, then, Lowe’s account
of character and shared character explanatory? This is a complex question which I
postpone an analysis until the following chapter where we lay some ground as to what
an explanation in ontology might amount to. I’m not entirely sure my understanding
of character is enhanced by endorsing kinds, tropes, attributes, a certain conception
of objects and various formal ontological relations. I see how Lowe wishes it all to
hang together, and while one can perhaps trade theoretical virtues against other
accounts, I don’t regard such virtues as being truth conducive, so even if Lowe’s theory
of character is explanatory, how we are to choose between his account and other
competing accounts, remains to be seen.
The next and final chapter, then, is concerned with the nature of explanation in
ontology. It will bring together the themes of the last four chapters. I will defend the
claim that Lowe’s theory-building approach is a more promising way to do ontology
than van Inwagen’s neo-Quinean approach. However, given the explanatory burden
the primitives of his theory are required to bear, and the lack of an objective criterion
to choose between the primitives of competing theories, I advocate for a position I call
lightweight explanatory antirealism.
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CHAPTER 5. EXPLANATION, METAONTOLGOY, AND
THEORY CHOICE
The
word
“explanation”
occurs so continually and
holds so important a place in
philosophy, that a little time
spent in fixing the meaning of
it will be profitably employed.
(Mill 1891, Ch. 12§1, 305)278
Explanations and explanatory
inferences
abound
in
metaphysics; sometimes it is
hard to see how metaphysics
could even be done if not by
comparing
potential
explanations. (Saatsi 2017, xx)
The term “explanation” should
not be an empty honorific; the
title should be earned. A
philosophical
theory
of
explanation should say when
the title is earned. (Craver
2014, 28)
Remember that we sometimes
demand explanations for the
sake not of their content, but of
their form. Our requirement is
an architectural one; the
explanation a kind of sham
corbel that supports nothing.
(Wittgenstein [1953] 2009,
91).

5.0 Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to explore how best to do ontology, and how to
choose between competing metaontologies. We have already looked at van Inwagen’s
neo-Quinean metaontology and Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian metaontology, as well as
their respective approaches to the problem of character. I claimed at the outset of the
thesis that explanatory considerations were a distinguishing metaontological feature
and a viable candidate to aid in metaontological theory choice. That is, one’s choice
of method in ontology is connected to one’s position on the role explanation plays in
278

Quoted in (Ruben 1992, 103).
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ontological inquiry. Van Inwagen claims that ontology cannot explain; that if one
subscribes to his metaontological principles and employs his neo-Quinean method for
discerning what a theory says there is, then the ensuing theory will be non-explanatory.
We saw this at play in his theory of propertiesPvI in Chapter Three. I was critical of his
metaontology in Chapter One and further, of his approach to the first-order problems
in Chapter Three. But nowhere does he refine the scope of the claim that ontological
theories are non-explanatory, and nowhere does he provide a detailed account of the
kind of explanation to which he objects. E.J. Lowe claims that his neo-Aristotelian
method yields explanatory theories and that such theories explain, at least possible,
features of the world. Again, however, he provides no robust analysis of what
constitutes an explanation in ontology. In this chapter, I explore the nature of
explanation and attempt to refine the nature and scope of their respective views.
Explanation in metaphysics is often conflated with metaphysical explanation279
creating somewhat of a terminological muddle. Metaphysical explanation, such as
grounding, is thought to be a form of explanation distinctive of metaphysics. However,
explanation is standardly regarded as an epistemological matter. My concern in this
chapter, then, is with whether metaphysical or ontological theories explain under any
suitable sense of “explanation”. That is, do ontological theories have the
epistemological credentials to do any explanatory work? In what follows, then, the
topics I discuss from the vast and complex literature on explanation is largely guided
by this concern.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. I begin with some preliminary work,
first establishing that there is broad agreement, at least among many ontologists, that
explanation is a feature of ontological inquiry. Van Inwagen’s contrary view is noted,
and this sets the ground for a discussion on the nature of explanation. The subsequent
few sections disambiguate terms with which “explanation” is often conflated,
dispenses with less philosophically significant aspects of its usage, and draws a
distinction between explanation construed as a product and a process. Theories of
explanation have largely been the province of the sciences and it is natural to look
there for insight into the nature of explanation. From the extensive and complex
literature, Carl Hempel’s deductive-nomological model is briefly discussed, not
because it is directly relevant to the role explanation plays in ontology, but because it
279
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is a seminal work against which subsequent accounts of explanation are both measured
and understood. His efforts to link argument and explanation provide a segue to return
to van Inwagen’s claim from Chapter One that ontology can provide only arguments,
not explanations. It is natural to make a connection between explanation and
understanding, and this relationship is then explored. After introducing explanatory
realism and antirealism, grounding theory is then discussed as representative of a
distinctly metaphysical explanation. I argue that grounding and explanation should
come apart and where there are distinctive ontological explanations, such explanations
need not be factive.
Inference to the best explanation is arguably a central feature of ontological
inquiry; a method Lowe employs, and van Inwagen claims leads only to bad
metaphysics. I claim that there is value to this kind of reasoning in ontology but insist
that the theoretical virtues employed in determining theory choice are not truthconducive, but pragmatic. Relying on work from Chapter Four, I demonstrate that
primitives play a significant role in (traditional) ontological theories. While primitives
alone can’t do any explanatory work, I claim that they are expected to carry too much
of the explanatory burden of the theories in which they feature. Because I can discern
no objective way to choose between primitive posits, once minimum criteria are met,
and because they cannot be substantiated directly by empirical means, I advocate for
lightweight explanatory antirealism.
I conclude with the claim that van Inwagen provides little evidence to support
the claim that ontological theories cannot explain. Insofar as this claim is linked to his
metaontology, that serves as reason against it. I argue that Lowe is correct in
identifying a place for explanation in ontology, but that the best he can hope for with
his approach is a form explanatory antirealism.

5.1 Explanation: Some Preliminary Work
This section first establishes that there is a broad consensus in the field of
ontology that ontological theories explain. It is made abundantly clear that Lowe
endorses this view and van Inwagen opposes it. Further, I’ll remind the reader of how
van Inwagen links his method with the generation of only non-explanatory theories.
5.1.1 Explanation in Ontology: Some Standard Perspectives
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Purported explanations feature predominantly in ontological discourse. At first
glance, it’s not entirely clear what an ontological account is meant to be if not
explanatory. Various theoretical entities are posited precisely because of their reputed
explanatory value. Most introductory metaphysical textbooks introduce the topic of
ontology as an explanatory enterprise. Sophie Allen writes: ‘This chapter introduces
… the ontology of properties and the explanatory work which properties can do’ (Allen
2016, 1). In The Atlas of Reality it’s stated that ‘The primary datum a theory of
properties must explain is the simple, undeniable fact that many things are similar to
one another in certain respects’ (Koons and Pickavance 2017, 126). Michael Loux
avers: ‘Realists want to claim that an ontology of universals provides us with the
resources for explaining more than predication. They think their metaphysical theory
enables us to give an intuitively satisfying account of the phenomenon of abstract
reference’ (Loux 2002, 26). And where not stated for instructional purposes,
philosophers will insouciantly use the term “explanation” or “explanatory” and their
cognates when articulating their favoured ontology. Lowe, for example, claims that
his four-category ontology ‘provides a powerful explanatory framework for a uniﬁed
account of causation, dispositions, natural laws, natural necessity, and other related
matters, such as the semantics of counterfactual conditionals’ (Lowe 2006, v).
Regarding properties and relations, he says:

That we should include in our ontology properties and relations—both as
particulars and as universals—I am now taking as given: but which properties
and relations we should include is another question, to be settled by further
discussion and argument, in which considerations of ontological economy and
explanatory power will have an important and perhaps decisive role to play.
(Ibid, 59)

David Armstrong, while not subscribing to their existence, claims that
‘Transcendent [Universals]… are theoretical entities, standing apart from the ordinary
world, postulated in the same general sort of way that atoms or genes were postulated,
to explain certain phenomena’ (Armstrong 1978, 66). Roy Cook declares: ‘In fact, the
list of purported “examples” of abstract objects given above also provides a useful
guide to the topics within which abstract objects might play a signiﬁcant explanatory
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role’ (Cook 2014, 71). And Jiri Benovsky remarks that ‘Explanatory power is one of
the main criteria we use to evaluate our metaphysical theories. After all, the very point
of building a metaphysical theory in the first place is to provide an explanation for
some phenomena that we want to better understand…’ (Benovsky 2016, 69).
By and large, then, ontology is thought to be engaged in providing
explanations. There are, however, detractors. Though it’s an example of only one
controversial issue in ontology, regarding the problem of character Alex Oliver quotes
Devitt and Sterelny (1987, 228) as saying that ‘the one-over-many is a pseudo
problem; the explanations prompted by it are pseudo explanations’ (Oliver 1996, 48).
More generally, Wittgenstein argued that ‘philosophy really is purely descriptive’
(Wittgenstein 1964, 18), and further, that ‘we must do away with all explanation, and
description alone must take its place’ (Wittgenstein1953, §109).280 But Wittgenstein
argued that there are no philosophical problems that require solving; there are only
pseudo-problems that require dissolving.
Perhaps the most famous quotation denouncing the value of explanation with
respect to the problem of character comes from Quine, some of which was quoted in
Chapter Three. He says:

One may admit that there are red houses, roses, and sunsets, but deny, except
as a popular and misleading manner of speaking, that they have anything in
common. The words “houses”, “roses”, and “sunsets” are true of sundry
individual entities which are houses and roses and sunsets, and the word “red”
or “red object” is true of each of sundry individual entities which are red
houses, red roses, red sunsets; but there is not, in addition, any entity whatever,
individual or otherwise, which is named by the word “redness”, nor, for that
matter, by the word “househood”, “rosehood”, “sunsethood”. That the houses
and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and
irreducible, and it may be held [that the realist is] no better off, in point of real
explanatory power, for all the occult entities which he posits under such names
as “redness” (Quine 1948, 81; my italics).
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We saw that van Inwagen claims that ontological theories can at best describe, and that
its only arsenal in ontological inquiry was argument regimented in first-order predicate
logic.
The term “explanation”, however, is used in a variety of ways across a variety
of disciplines. While van Inwagen’s claim appears extravagant, given its undefined
scope, it does provoke the following questions: for the majority who proffer
ontological theories purporting to be explanatory, what counts as a legitimate
explanation in ontology? If it is a feature of the sciences to proffer explanations, are
ontological explanations similar? And if explanations in the sciences are the hallmark
of good or complete explanations, and ontological explanations differ, what is the
ground of such explanations and how are they to be evaluated? Such questions recur
in various ways throughout the chapter. I begin in the next section by disambiguating
“explanation” to help refine the kind of explanation relevant to such a discussion.

5.1.2 Dispensing with Seemingly Cognate Terms
The term “explanation” in everyday discourse admits of several readings. Let
us now dispense with some initial notions with which the term is conflated, though for
the most part, this is just a stipulative exercise to help refine how explanation is used
in the philosophical sense.281
Words may be defined and concepts may be “explained”, but a more apposite
term for this latter process would be “explication”.282 While one may try to define the
word “explanation”, one might explicate the nature of explanation rather than explain
its nature. Van Inwagen uses the term “explain” in this way frequently. For example:

We have, or so I claim, introduced the canonical notation using only the
resources of ordinary English. And to do this, I would suggest is to explain that
notation. (van Inwagen 2014, 76)
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Some of the following distinctions are noted in Jenkins (2008).
The term “explication” has found various technical usages in some prominent philosophical
positions, notably in the work of Rudolf Carnap (1950). More recently Audi (2015) makes use of the
term for his theoretical needs. I use it here in its regular, non-technical sense.
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It is evident that Thesis 4 - “The single sense of being or existence is adequately
captured by the existential quantifier of formal logic” - is true if our explanation
of the meaning of the existential quantifier is correct. (van Inwagen 2001, 21)

Here, he is explicating the meaning of terms and concepts and he evidently does not
wish to rule out such practices from ontology; there would be little left if he did. Lowe,
similarly, employs “explanation” in this manner, but he has no objection to explanation
in ontology, so there is little value in quoting him.
One may “explain” a confusion within a theory, but a better term for this might
be “clarification”; I may thus clarify the more complex and subtle parts of a theory of
explanation. One may also provide an “explanation” of one’s theory to a friend in the
sense of providing an exposition, where perhaps just the outline of the theory is being
delineated – something approximating a description, rather than an explanation, of that
theory. Approximating an explanation in the sense of “exposition” or “clarification”,
van Inwagen says:
…the words “having a metaphysical locus” do not denote a property, since,
being meaningless, they don’t denote anything. But if they are meaningless, I
would suggest, the best way to establish their lack of meaning would be to
challenge the philosopher who uses them to explain their meaning and to
subject such attempts at explanation as may ensue to critical scrutiny and
dialectical pressure. (van Inwagen 2014, 151)

Again, Lowe naturally employs the term in this manner also. But these
accounts do not quite capture any real sense of the significance of explanation; they
are more basic and less in need of analysis. It is clear, also, that van Inwagen is happy
to employ the term “explanation” in these ways, so there is little need to address these
matters further.
5.1.3 Disambiguating “Explanation”
The term “explanation” admits of different meanings. However, the term is not
homonymous. That is, it is not like the ambiguities besetting the word “bank” or “bark”
where several distinctly different meanings can be found. For example, as a noun, the
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word “bank” can refer to a financial institution or the land alongside a body of water;
as a verb, a manoeuvre a pilot may make or the process of heaping soil, or something
similar, to form a mound. It is not so with the term “explanation” which suffers issues
of polysemy. All the various accounts employing the term “explanation”, though they
may differ, presumably have something in common. Yet, providing a unified account
of explanation, even just within the narrow domain of the philosophy of science, has
proven unsuccessful. In fact, Newton-Smith, at the beginning of this century, opined
that the state of philosophical understanding of scientific explanation was ‘an
embarrassment for the philosophy of science’ (Newton-Smith 2000, 132). It was so,
he claimed, precisely because of the lack of consensus:

While we have insightful studies of explanation, we are a very long way from
having this single unifying theory of explanation… [W]e would like to be able
to explain what it is that leads us to count different explanations as explanatory.
This task is made all the more pressing as most philosophers of science hold
that a main task, if not the main task, of science is to provide explanation,
whatever that may be. (Ibid.)
But not all philosophers consider explanation to be the aim of science, 283
whatever features explanations are deemed to have.284 Is Newton-Smith’s dismay at
the lack of consensus legitimate? Whatever about consensus, it is overreaching, I think,
to aspire to a univocal account of explanation, or even “scientific” explanation,
whatever “scientific” contributes here. While a universal scientific conception was the
preoccupation of philosophers in the middle of the last century, as Díez et al. argue,

Not all philosophers think it is even purposeful to speak of an “aim of science”. See Resnik (1974)
and Rowbottom (2014) for positions of this sort.
284
Pierre Duhem is a prime example of one who claimed that the sciences are not in the business of
explanation. The sciences, he claimed, are in the business of classifying and summarising experience;
it is essentially a representative enterprise – a position influenced, perhaps, by the mechanistic theories
in ascendency in the late 20th Century. The proper domain of explanation, he argues, belongs to
metaphysics; it is metaphysics that goes beyond mere appearance to uncover reality: ‘To explain’, he
says, ‘is to strip reality of the appearances covering it like a veil, in order to see the bare reality itself’
(Duhem [1906] 1991, 7). This stripping away of reality, he argues, requires the tools of philosophy, or
even theology; science is bereft in this respect resting, as it does, on observation, broadly construed.
Aspects of this thought is echoed in some neo-instrumentalist philosophers, such as Kyle Stanford
(2006) and Darrell Rowbottom (2019) who, leaving aside metaphysical and theological access to reality,
wish to constrain realist commitments and reinforce the idea that science is an instrument for furthering
practical ends.
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‘there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domain-invariant constraints
on explanatory information exist.’ They reinforce this point by claiming that:
The current focus on domain-speciﬁc models of explanation in philosophy of
science suggests that there can be no general, domain-invariant theory of
explanation, i.e. no theory that covers explanation in the different sciences and
in mathematics and in ethics, etc. The tacit and default assumption appears to
be that such generality would walk a tenuous line between falsehood and
triviality. (Díez et al. 2013, 280)

However, even if there is a distinctive, sui generis, kind of explanation in ontology to
which van Inwagen objects, and that the treatment of explanation requires discipline
specific analyses, some broad sense is still required for, as noted above, the issue is
one of polysemy, not homonymy. Arianna Betti concurs and opines:
… no matter how pluralistic one wants to be about explanation, a general
account of explanation tout court seems to be called for. By this I do not mean
that we should strive towards a single model or theory of explanation, be it
causal or not; I mean that we should strive towards a uniﬁed, maximally broad
discussion of what we (are prepared to correctly) call by one and the same
name: “explanation” (Betti 2010, 285).

Thus, even if explanations in ontology turn out to be sui generis, it should bear some
similarity to other forms of explanation, else why call it “explanation”?

5.1.4 Process/Product Ambiguity
The term “explanation” also suffers an ambiguity between process and product,
an ambiguity that afflicts many words with the suffix “ion”, such as “prediction”,
“proposition” and “deduction”. For instance, one may see the destruction of a
building, the tumbling blocks and plumes of smoke, or one may see the destruction by
identifying the remnants of the building sometime after its collapse. The process part
is an activity, and with respect to explanation, it is communicative in nature with a
tripartite structure involving the one who explains, an audience to whom the
201

explanation is directed, and an idea or theory, in speech or in text, which is being
transmitted in the act of explaining. The one who explains, the lecturer for example,
intends to impart information about some phenomenon. The aim of this explanatory
act, broadly speaking, is to produce understanding in the recipient concerning the
phenomenon discussed. Such an explanation could fall short in a variety of ways. An
incorrect account could be provided that seems to produce understanding in the
audience; a correct account may be provided, but in such a way as not to produce
understanding where the lecturer is at fault; or the audience might be at fault, through
distraction or boredom say, in not understanding the account. But whatever the case,
as Sylvain Bromberger elucidates, as a process, ‘an explanation may be something
about which it makes sense to ask: How long did it take? Was it interrupted at any
point? Who gave it? When? Where? What were the exact words used? For whose
benefit was it given?’ (Bromberger 1965, 104). There is sometimes caution in treating
explanation as a process for the introduction of agents threatens to make explanation
subjective, relative and context variant. Explanation, at least as it emerged as a topic
for Carl Hempel and his associates, discussed briefly below, was treated as a logical
matter, not a psychological one, and the epistemic state of the inquirer was secondary,
if not irrelevant.
Explanation, when understood as a product, is considered an entity of sorts, a
“thing”, not an action, insofar as that distinction holds up. It may be the product of an
explanatory act, but characterised independently of the actors. In fact, under this
conception, there may be no actors: it seems reasonable, on the surface at least, to say
“there is an explanans, y, for x, but we can never know y”. In this sense, explanation
is not the product of an act, but is a product in the sense of being an entity, even an
unknown entity. The kinds of questions Bromberger asks have no bearing on this
construal. I argue below that due to the lack of extra-theoretical resources available to
the ontologist to substantiate proposed explanations, even when treated as a product,
explanation will have agent-variant aspects, thus leading to my endorsement of
explanatory antirealism.

5.1.5 Interrogatives and Erotetic Explanation
Related to the agent-variant aspects of explanation is what is called erotetic
explanation. In everyday discourse, people seem to explain in a variety of ways, often
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in response to different kinds of questions. The term “erotetic” refers broadly to this
matter of asking questions. Questions seeking answers can be marked by several
interrogatives such as how, why, when, what, whom, which and so on. However, such
interrogatives alone don’t mark out a demand for explanation and each can be used in
seeking other kinds of non-explanatory accounts. Sometimes, a question asked with
one interrogative can be asked using another without loss of meaning. For example,
the question “why are you home so late?” seems practically equivalent to “how come
you’re home so late?” and “what reasons do you have for being home so late?”. It is
not always the case, however: the question “What time is it?” is not seeking an
explanation, nor can it be easily asked using the interrogative “why” or “how”. It is
the interrogative “why”, and to a lesser extent “how”, that has received most attention
in the philosophical literature for they seem most centrally connected with demands
for explanation that relates to a deep understanding of phenomena.
Interestingly, we saw that Quine stated that the central (meta)ontological
preoccupation is with what there is, and this interrogative (what is there?), in
concordance with van Inwagen’s position, doesn’t seem to be seeking an explanation.
Further, the problem of character is typically asked with the interrogative “how”.
Armstrong puts it this way: the problem of character is ‘how numerically different
particulars can nevertheless be identical in nature, all be of the same “type”’
(Armstrong 1978, 41). The effort to explain this agreement in character is the very
reason for which he postulates the existence of universals: ‘I would wish to start by
saying that many different particulars can all have what appears to be the same nature
and draw the conclusion that, as a result, there is a prima facie case for postulating
universals’ (Armstrong 1980, 440). Does the formulation of the problem of character
demand an explanation? If so, what kind of explanation? Jenkins claims that ‘Howexplanation can be assimilated to describing a means or method: explaining how X ϕed amounts to giving X’s method of ϕ-ing’ (Jenkins 2008, 62). So asking “how did the
convict escape the prison?” or “how did the magician perform the trick?” fits this
schema. This seems to fit Armstrong’s formulation of the problem of character: what
is the means by which character is shared? And Armstrong’s answer, because each
object that shares character possesses the same immanent universal, similarly seems
like an appropriate response fitting the schema of the question.
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Can the question of character be framed with a “why”? I think so, but it doesn’t
roll off the tongue: “Why are the lamppost and the radiator both white?” At least, in
this formulation, it doesn’t seem to capture the essence of the ontological question,
presuming the question has an essence and is meaningful. One would think to respond
with “they were both purchased in that colour” or “the manufacturers made them as
such” or “they both absorb and reflect the same light frequencies” as van Inwagen
does; “Each of the particulars participates in the form whiteness” is not what jumps to
mind for most people. But responses depend on the interests of the questioner and the
intended scope of the question, and this suggests that there are invariably pragmatic
aspects to explanation, a matter I will return to below.
It’s worth noting that even “why” questions suffer an ambiguity: a difference
between justificatory or epistemic reasons and explanation-seeking reasons. The
question “why did X happen” is an evidence-seeking question; the question “why
should one believe that X happened” is justificatory. One might ask “why does the
earth rotate around its own axis?”, to which the short and incomplete answer is
“because it was formed from a disk of gas and dust which was swirling around a newly
formed sun”. One might further ask “why should one believe that the earth rotates
around its own axis?” Here, one may appeal to observations, such as the daily cycle of
the sun rising and setting, or perhaps more complicated scientific literature, or even
appeal to the authority and consensus of the scientific community. Philosophers are
typically interested in the explanation-seeking questions when discussing explanation.
In the following section, I look to some such philosophers from the philosophy of
science to gain insight into what the nature of explanation might amount to in ontology.

5.2 Explanation and the Philosophy of Science: What can Ontology Learn?
As mentioned, the literature on explanation has focused mostly on explanation
in the sciences and it is natural to look there for some guidance as to its nature.
However, as David-Hillel Ruben notes: ‘the concept of explanation should not be
exclusively hijacked by the philosophy of the natural sciences… like knowledge,
explanation is an epistemic concept, and therefore has a philosophical location within
the theory of knowledge, widely conceived’ (Ruben 1992, ix).285 The scope of this
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chapter will not permit any extensive analysis of the literature. In fact, for the most
part, I just briefly discuss some of Carl Hempel’s work, widely thought of as the
‘fountainhead from which the vast bulk of subsequent philosophical work on scientific
explanation has flowed—directly or indirectly’ (Salmon 1989, 8). This is relevant for
three reasons. First, given its seminal position in the literature on explanation, it is a
helpful to understand subsequent theories and themes that were often developed as a
response. Second, Hempel considered good (scientific) explanations to be arguments.
Yet van Inwagen, we recall, claims that ontologist can only provide arguments, not
explanations. A discussion on the connection between argument and explanation will
help to make further sense of van Inwagen’s claim. The third reason concerns the
relationship between explanation and understanding. Hempel largely downplayed the
importance of understanding in his account of explanation but many subsequent
theories, notably Wesley Salmon’s causal-mechanistic (1998) account and Michael
Friedman (1974) and Philip Kitcher’s (1981) unificationist account, argued
persuasively that understanding should have a more significant place in theories of
explanation. Due to the lack of experimental feedback and testability of ontological
theories (typically), how ontological explanations are expected to improve the
epistemic state of the inquiring agent demands an answer. That is, how can such
explanations ameliorate our understanding? Further, in light of the explanatory burden
primitives are expected to play in ontological theories, and the tendency of ontologist
to claim that such posits are incomprehensible, the role of understanding in connection
with ontological explanation deserves attention.
5.2.1 Hempel’s Deductive-Nomological Model
It was with the work of Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim in 1948, with the
publication of “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”, that explanation found itself as a
central feature of debate in the philosophy of science. This paper was so influential
that Wesley Salmon claimed: ‘A large preponderance of the philosophical work on
scientific explanation in the succeeding four decades has occurred as a direct result or
indirect response to this article’ (Salmon 2006, 3).286 In this section, I first articulate
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Hempel worked among the logical positivists who typically downplayed the value of a logic of
explanation for science. Such an endeavour was seen as an invitation to do metaphysics, for explanation
seemed to demand going beyond experience to understand the nature of reality; to go beyond
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his conception of explanation, broadly known as the Covering-Law Model (C-L) which
comprises his Deductive-Nomological Model (D-N), Deductive Statistical Model (DS) and Inductive-Statistical Model (I-S). A brief analysis of the (D-N) model will be
sufficient to serve the purposes here, and I thus dispense with a discussion of the others
which would bring unnecessary technicalities.
Hempel was interested in the logical nature of scientific explanation. But we
must be cautious here with the term “scientific explanation”. It is generally agreed that
Hempel was not attempting to provide an analysis of how scientists actually provide
explanations in the course of their work, nor was he attempting to instruct scientists on
how they should provide explanations. 287 Rather, his analysis of explanation was
considered in an ideal form, one which scientific explanations could possibly be
reconstructed to fit; or at least, one against which explanations could be measured. His
ideal explanation is ideal in the sense of being complete or full – it seems that his
account would be no less impugned if no scientist ever provided such an account.
As an introduction to Hempel’s (D-N) Model, he says:

We divide an explanation into two major constituents, the explanandum and
the explanans. By the explanandum, we understand the sentence describing the
phenomenon to be explained (not that phenomenon itself); by the explanans,
the class of those sentences which are adduced to account for the phenomenon.
As was noted before, the explanans falls into two subclasses; one of these
contains certain sentences C1, C2,..., Ck which state specific antecedent
conditions; the other is a set of sentences L1, L2,..., Lr which represent general
laws. (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, 136-137)

For Hempel, then, explanations have the structure of arguments. Rather simply,
an adequate explanation, he claims, should be so constructed that statements about the
phenomenon to be explained are deducible from premises which must contain a lawlike statement and a description of the antecedent conditions. Hempel structures it in
the following way:

observational data to reality itself – something the logical positivists would have considered
meaningless. Hempel’s achievement in this context is all the more remarkable.
287
Though Hempel is not entirely consistent when he writes on this matter. See (Hempel 1965, 488–9).
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C1, C2, …, Ck

Statements of antecedent conditions

L1, L2, …, Lk

General Laws

Explanans

____________
∴E

Description of the empirical phenomenon

Explanandum

be explained288

Together, the explanans and the explanandum make up the explanation. To
help flesh out some of the subtleties of this model, let us look at what Hempel calls the
conditions of adequacy.
He divides such conditions into logical and empirical categories. The
important empirical condition is that the explanans needs to be true, both the general
law and the statements of the initial conditions. This is a stringent requirement and one
he refined subsequently. On the logical side, there are three important conditions. The
first, as just mentioned, is that the explanandum must be a logical consequence of the
explanans. The second has to do with constraints on the role of laws. Laws, or lawlike statements, are so central for Hempel because they confer what is called nomic
necessity on the explanandum; they provide the grounds for the necessity of the
conclusion of the explanation. Explanations for Hempel require the use of a law,
however; it is not enough that the explanation simply use a law or add arbitrary laws
for explanatory measure. Third, the explanans must also contain empirical content,
either in the description of the initial conditions or in the laws that are independently
and empirically testable.289
Arguments of this kind that constitute explanation for Hempel simultaneously
constitute prediction: the logical structure remains the same for both as do the

De Regt expands Hempel’s claim and highlights that ‘The classic model of explanation that Hempel
defended, the deductive-nomological (D-N) model, is but one way of articulating the idea that
explanations are arguments. It consists in a “narrow” interpretation of arguments as sets of statements
in which the conclusion follows deductively from the premises. But explanatory arguments may
alternatively fit the phenomenon to be explained into an accepted epistemic framework by representing
it in a model, for instance a mechanistic one, and such representations are not always linguistic’ (De
Regt 2017, 25).
289
To illustrate the significance of this last point, Hempel makes a comparison between Hans Driesch’s
theory of entelechy and theories of magnetism. In his neo-vitalist philosophy, Driesch postulated a “lifeforce” that directed the evolution of living things. He claimed that his postulation was similar in nature
to the invocation of magnetic forces which explained the behaviour of certain metals. Neither magnetic
forces nor “life-forces” are directly observable, but both, he claimed, “explain” the respective
phenomena. Hempel’s response to this was to appeal to the fact that independent empirical tests can be
made with respect to magnetism, but not with “life-forces” (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, 145-146).
288
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conditions of adequacy. The only difference between explanation and prediction, for
Hempel, is pragmatic in nature:

If E is given, i.e. if we know that the phenomenon described by E has occurred,
and a suitable set of statements C1, C2,..., Ck, L1, L2,..., Lr is provided
afterwards, we speak of an explanation of the phenomenon in question. If the
latter statements are given and E is derived prior to the occurrence of the
phenomenon it describes, we speak of a prediction. It may be said, therefore,
that an explanation of a particular event is not fully adequate unless its
explanans, if taken account of in time, could have served as a basis for
predicting the event in question. (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, 138)
Whether it’s an explanation or a prediction depends solely on the information
you begin with and the direction you take from there; they are structurally identical for
Hempel.
Hempel’s (D-N) model faced severe problems, some of which he recognised
even in his early writings. The problems are well documented, and a detailed
discussion is unnecessary for our purposes. Díez et al., somewhat humorously, list
some of the issues as follows: ‘The blemishes on Hempel’s record include ﬂagpoles
and shadows, syphilitic mayors, men taking birth control pills, and samples of hexed
salt’ (Díez et al. 2013, 380).290
Hempel’s (D-N) model was devised to serve as an account of the logic of
scientific explanation. There are aspects to it, such as the employment of laws of
nature, empirical testability and predictive power, that don’t seem to feature much in
ontological explanations, at least not with respect to the problem of character that has
been central to discussion in this thesis.291 As mentioned, what is most relevant about

To take one example, the “flagpole” issue just mentioned was first noted by Bromberger (1966) and
is an example of the problems of explanatory symmetry. If we look to explain the length of the shadow
a given flagpole casts, the (D-N) model maintains that when the antecedent conditions are described
(such as the length of the pole, the angle of the shadow given the position of the sun) and a pertinent
law is employed (such as the rectilinear propagation of light), then the length of the shadow can be
deduced. However, it seems that we can equally well deduce the height of the flagpole by rearranging
the information yet keeping the syllogistic structure; but in no meaningful sense does the length of the
shadow explain the height of the flagpole.
291
That being said, a recent project by Tobias Wilsch (2016) attempts to apply Hempel’s D-N model to
theories of grounding, where laws of nature are replaced with metaphysical laws. While this project is
in its infancy, (D-N) models aren’t usually appealed when speaking of explanation in metaphysics.
290
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Hempel here concerns the questions his account raises and the various theories that
developed in response to shortcomings in his account.

5.2.2 Explanation and Argument
Hempel was by no means the first to propose the idea that explanations were
arguments, and he was very much aware of this – though he was perhaps the first to
provide such a systematic account. He tells us that his account ‘is by no means novel;
it merely summarizes and states explicitly some fundamental points which have been
recognized by many scientists and methodologists’ (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948,
140). Aristotle and Mill are two notable forerunners. Ruben, in fact, claims that
‘…Mill is, as far as I know, the first empiricist philosopher to have explicitly addressed
himself to the question of the nature of explanation, and it is this fact that I find
surprising (Ruben [1992]2004, 112). The relevance of whether explanations are
arguments is only ancillary here, but important to address as van Inwagen claims that
all the metaphysician and ontologist can do is provide arguments for a given position;
that they have no means to explain anything. He claims, we remember, ‘In short, what
goes on in the Ontology Room is philosophical argument – the presentation of
arguments for and against the positions under dispute’ (van Inwagen 2018, 206). I
demonstrated in Chapter One that he does not try to precisify what arguments are,
though he articulates some broad points concerning the nature of philosophical
arguments. To recall some aspects of his claims, he considers all philosophical
arguments for positive substantive theses to fall dramatically short of the
demonstrative ideal and claims that ‘The idea that there are proofs in philosophy as
there are proofs in mathematics is ridiculous, or not far short of it; nevertheless, it is
an all but irresistible idea’ (van Inwagen 2003, 37). Unlike proofs, he thinks it perfectly
rational to understand fully a valid argument and reject its conclusion; thus, ‘It is likely
that there will be certain theses the metaphysician would have accepted no matter what
evidence or what arguments had come to his or her attention’ (van Inwagen 2009b,
18; my italics).
Whatever about the possibility of structuring explanations as arguments, in one
sense, nobody denies that arguments and explanations are different. The terms
“argument” and “explanation” are not synonyms, and for the most part, they are not
conflated nor are they regularly confused. In fact, as McKeon declares: ‘Even with the
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lack of consensus on the nature of an argument, the thesis that explanations and
arguments are distinct is near orthodoxy in well-known critical thinking texts and in
the more advanced argumentation literature (McKeon 2012, 283). However, there is
considerable difficulty attempting to precisify the nature of both argumentation and
explanation. Regarding the nature of argumentation Van Eemeren tells us that:

The study of argumentation has thus far not resulted in a universally accepted
theory. The current state of the art is characterized by the co-existence of a
variety of approaches, differing considerably in conceptualization, scope and
degree of theoretical refinement, albeit that all the modern approaches are
strongly influenced by classical and post-classical rhetoric and dialectic. (van
Eemeren 2003, 27)

Generally, then, explanations and arguments are thought to be separate, but with some
overlap, distinguished, or identified, sometimes by their respective structure, at others,
by their purpose. While attempts have been made to distinguish arguments and
explanations regarding structure (Govier 2004), it may be a better strategy to
distinguish them, if they are to be distinguished, by looking at each as a process. As
processes, arguments are thought of as attempts to justify conclusions and what is
central, for validity at least, is the appropriate logical relation between the statements,
and for soundness, the appropriate logical relation plus the truth of the premises.
Explanations are not typically thought of as justificatory in this sense. In a related
sense, arguments are required when a claim is in some dispute. As Michel Dufour
succinctly puts it: ‘The orthodox distinction between explanation and argument is
based on the status of their conclusion: is it accepted or not?’ (Dufour 2017, 23). To
take a basic and concrete example of the “orthodox” position, if it is agreed that the air
conditioning is broken, an explanation may be sought. If it is not agreed, for whatever
reason, an argument is required in order to proceed with an explanation.
There is a further lack of consensus on whether the categories of argument and
explanation are exhaustive and exclusive. There are four logical possibilities: either a
certain rationale is an explanation, an argument, is both an explanation and an
argument, or is neither. However, there seems to be a distinct sense of explanation that
van Inwagen rejects and that Lowe and other ontologists endorse, so a potential overlap
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should not concern us further. Moreover, whether or not explanations are most
perspicuously structured as arguments, I don’t think the emphasis on the structure or
pattern of the statements in an explanation captures its most interesting features. More
salient, perhaps, is how it improves the epistemic state of the agent; that is, how
understanding is supposed to be enhanced, a topic to which I now turn.
5.2.3 Explanation and Understanding
It is natural to make a connection between explanation and understanding, but
how precisely they are related is a vexing and complex question. As with analyses of
explanation, much of what follows concerns the literature on scientific understanding.
Even there, however, as John Yolton notes: ‘The more general, epistemic features of
explanation—the relation between explanation and understanding—are usually
assumed but infrequently explored’ (Yolton 1959, 194). Kim concurs and more
forcefully says:

[O]nce writers get past the obligatory paragraphs about the importance of
explanation and understanding, they quickly launch into highly technical
constructions heavily laden with an array of terms like “law”, “derivation”,
“causality”, “probability”, “simplicity”, and their forbidding technical kins,
and we never see a serious discussion of just what these concepts have to do
with understanding something or making something intelligible’ (Kim 1994,
52).292

Though they are distinct concepts, it is not entirely clear that explanation can be treated
adequately in isolation from a treatment of understanding, though the converse may
not suffer the same limitation.293 Perspectives on understanding are as diverse as those
292

Peter Lipton also agrees and attempts in his 2009 work to rectify the issue by showing how
understanding and explanation may come apart to be treated separately. Highlighting the importance of
understanding, and how it can’t be captured by epistemic models alone, he says: ‘Specifying the
structure of explanation would not, however, tell us everything we want to know. Why should things of
that shape be identiﬁed with understanding? To understand why a phenomenon occurs is a cognitive
achievement, and it is a greater cognitive achievement than simply knowing that the phenomenon
occurs—we all know that the sky is blue, but most of us do not understand why’ (Lipton 2009, 43).
293
There are conflicting views on this point. Peter Lipton, for example, claims that while there is an
intimate connection between explanation and understanding, understanding can be treated separately,
and he proceeds to argue that understanding can unfold in ways where explanation isn’t present (Lipton
2009). Michael Friedman (1974), on the contrary, does not think an analysis of one can be successful
without an analysis of the other. And Michael Strevens recently claimed that ‘There is no route to
scientific understanding… that does not go by way of scientific explanation’ (Strevens 2012, 510).
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on explanation and it is not my purpose to provide a full analysis of the relevant
theories.
Understanding,294 with respect to ontological theories, is especially important
given the explanatory burden primitive posits are expected to play. I discuss this
further below in connection with inference to the best explanation. Critics frequently
decry the comprehensibility of the primitive posits inhabiting a given ontological
theory. We have seen time and again throughout this thesis that van Inwagen doesn’t
understand any of the posits of the constituent ontologist and that talk of ontological
structure is meaningless. John Heil, who doesn’t appear to have the same knee-jerk
reaction of non-understanding that van Inwagen exhibits, doesn’t understand
universals. He knows what they are invoked to explain but does not know where the
explaining is going on when universals are appealed to, nor what kinds of entities they
are: ‘I don’t “get” universals. In saying this, I am not being coy. I am admitting failure.
I am admitting that, although I have learned to talk the talk, I really have no idea what
I am talking about when the talk concerns universals’ (Heil 2002, 108). And Lowe,
even with his array of primitive posits, claims not to understand, for example,
Armstrong’s immanent universals where the universals are considered wholly present;
he thinks the idea is incoherent (Lowe 2006). Lewis comments that ‘philosophers who
repudiate all that they cannot understand have very often gone astray’ (Lewis 1991,
ix). While there is something sobering about this, in practice, ontologists do repudiate
what they don’t understand, and ontological debates frequently end in an impasse; a
further reason inclining me to defend explanatory antirealism. Some time spent on the
connection between understanding and explanation will show why I think at least some
ontological theories are best thought of in antirealist terms.
Henk de Regt calls the view that understanding should be relegated from
discourse about explanation the ‘Objectivist’ view (De Regt 2009, 585). Again, we
can turn to Hempel as representative of such an account, though J.D. Trout (2007) is a
contemporary philosopher adopting a similar position on understanding. Hempel, I
mentioned, downplayed the relevance of understanding to explanation in his (D-N)
The term “understanding”, just like explanation, is variously used and, just as I dispensed with
epistemologically less significant uses of “explanation” above, Catherine Elgin does the same work for
us regarding understanding: ‘I can say “I understand” to hedge an assertion or to moderate its force. “I
understand that you are angry with me” may be a mild overture that gives you space to politely demur.
This is a moderating use. Or I might say “I understand that you are angry with me” when I am not
certain that you are angry, but have some reason to think so. Then “I understand” serves as a backing
away from a full-fledged claim to epistemic entitlement. This is hedging’ (Elgin 2009, 322).
294
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model. For the most part, he identified understanding with nomic expectability. He
claimed that ‘given the particular circumstances and the laws in question, the
occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected; and it is in this sense that the
explanation enables us to understand why the phenomenon occurred’ (Hempel 1965,
337).295 That something was to be expected, is in some sense an agential notion, but
tied with his (D-N) model, it is not to be agent-variant. He recognised another
dimension to understanding, but thought it psychological and subjective and not the
kind of thing capable of objective analysis: ‘such expressions as “realm of
understanding” and “comprehensible”’, he says, ‘do not belong to the vocabulary of
logic, for they refer to the psychological and pragmatic aspects of explanation’
(Hempel 1965, 413). He thought that such pragmatic aspects invariably involve the
subjective and leads only to relativism; his logical empiricist scruples wouldn’t permit
such a feature in an account of explanation. It is worth quoting him at length:

Very broadly speaking, to explain something to a person is to make it plain and
intelligible to him, to make him understand it. Thus construed, the word
“explanation” and its cognates are pragmatic terms: their use requires reference
to the persons involved in the process of explaining. In a pragmatic context we
might say, for example, that a given account A explains fact X to person P 1.
We will then have to bear in mind that the same account may well not constitute
an explanation of X for another person P2, who might not even regard X as
requiring an explanation, or who might find the account A unintelligible or
unilluminating, or irrelevant to what puzzles him about X. Explanation in this
pragmatic sense is thus a relative notion: something can be significantly said
to constitute an explanation in this sense only for this or that individual.
(Hempel 1965, 425–426)

While I agree that a theory of scientific understanding will invariably have
pragmatic aspects to it, pragmatic matters ought not be reduced wholesale to the
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This is his most longstanding position on the relationship between understanding and explanation.
However, in his 1965 work he remarks that understanding ‘lies rather in the insight that the
explanandum ﬁts into, or can be subsumed under, a system of uniformities represented by empirical
laws or theoretical principles’ and that ‘all scientiﬁc explanation . . . seeks to provide a systematic
understanding of empirical phenomena by showing that they ﬁt into a nomic nexus’ (Hempel 1965,
488).
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psychological, if “psychological” here is thought of in purely subjective terms. De
Regt (2017), we will see, provides an objective account of scientific understanding that
appeals to the values of the scientific community, rather than just the introspection of
the individual. However, with respect to ontology, it is precisely in the philosophical
community that there is dispute concerning what is intelligible, thus disciplinary norms
may not be applicable in this sense.
Thus far, I have spoken of understanding as if it were univocal, but there are
different ways “understanding” is understood, which De Regt (2017) and Strevens
(2013) help identify. They provide different accounts, and in what follows, I combine
some of their insights in order to gain a general appreciation of the spectrum of views
on the nature of understanding.
There is a sense of understanding that might be called the phenomenological
sense. It is this sense that Hempel and Trout, among others, consider to be
epistemically irrelevant. This kind of understanding is often associated with the Aha
or Eureka experience that sometimes accompanies understanding (an experience that
frequently seems to evade van Inwagen). This sense of understanding, Trout claims,
‘may be conveyed by a psychological impression that the explanatory mechanisms are
transparent and coherent, or that the explanation seems plausible, and so should be
confidently accepted’ (Trout 2002, 214).
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Trout rests his dismissal of

phenomenological understanding on certain psychological findings that highlight
various biases and deceptions, which can inform such experiences. I agree that such a
quality is epistemically problematic, and alone may be a poor guide to truth, but there
may be qualities associated with it, such as insight, however hard to precisify, that can
play a valuable epistemic role. However, Trout (2002) makes the stronger claim that
resting on this phenomenological experience is an impediment to science as it’s a false
barometer of explanatory success and disinclines the researcher to look further. 297 It
seems fair to say that the case is similar in ontology; I’m sure we all have aha!
moments in the first blush of developing theories that then turn out to be entirely
wrong, not discounting the possible insight with which the experience may be attached.
Zagzebski (2001), in contrast, endorsing epistemic internalism and the view that there’s a
transparency to understanding that knowledge can’t claim says that ‘Understanding… not only has
internally accessible criteria, but is a state that is constituted by a state of conscious transparency. It may
be possible to know without knowing one knows but it is impossible to understand without
understanding one understands (Zagzebski 2001, 246). However, the psychology of understanding is
outside the scope of this chapter.
297
See Lipton (2009) and Grimm (2009) for a contrasting view.
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Another sense of understanding, what Strevens (2013) calls understanding
with, concerns the ability to use a theory. While one may on some level know a theory,
being able to use the theory shows a measure of understanding that is qualitatively
different. In one respect, this is a poor measure in ontology for, as noted above, Heil
knows how to use theories of universals but professes not to understand their nature.
But De Regt links this aspect of understanding to intelligibility, which he defines as:
‘the value that scientists attribute to the cluster of qualities that facilitate the use of the
theory, and show that it is essential for achieving understanding’ (De Regt 2017, 12).
The cluster of values concerns the various theoretical or explanatory virtues. The
important point is that he thinks this measure is extrinsic to a theory rather than
intrinsic: ‘Theories are not intrinsically intelligible or unintelligible, but intelligible or
unintelligible to a particular scientist or group of scientists’ (De Regt 2017, 40). In this
sense, as Scriven notes, ‘understanding is not a subjectively appraised state anymore
than knowing is; both are objectively testable and are, in fact, tested in examinations’
(Scriven 1962, 176). It could be the case, as Lowe (Lowe 2012a 938) seems to think,
that there is a distinctive kind of metaphysical explanation and the ability to understand
such an explanation is relevant to the context of practicing metaphysicians. There is
surely something to this. A brief discussion on any philosophical matter with someone
who has not been exposed to the literature magnifies the community or societal aspect
of philosophy. However, it is precisely among the practicing metaphysicians that we
find professions of incredulity and incomprehension. Given the natural unwillingness
of ontologists to admit primitives they don’t understand, the ensuing theories in which
they feature appear ineluctably agent-variant.
Strevens claims there is another kind of understanding that is represented by
one’s ability to grasp a correct theory. He avers: ‘An individual has scientific
understanding of a phenomenon just in case they grasp a correct scientific explanation
of that phenomenon’ (Strevins 2013, 510). He goes on to precisify what a correct
theory amounts to but provides no extensive analysis. In some sense, the extra
condition that the theory be correct, or (approximately) true, is precisely what is at
issue and I discuss this in connection with factivity below. In this regard, Grimm (2012)
highlights that the Greek word episteme has traditionally been translated as knowledge,
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but etymologically, a more accurate translation would be understanding.298 He claims
that ‘On this view, only our notion of understanding captures the intellectual good the
Greeks were after: roughly, the good of being able to “grasp” or “see” how the various
parts of the world were systematically related’ (Grimm 2012, 103). While this is not a
bad description, however broad, of the kind of project Lowe is engaged in, I discussed
some of the issues with the notion of grasping in connection with the a priori in
Chapter Two. More important than the inability of different theorist’s incapacity to
agree on the precise nature of the phenomenological experience of grasping, is the
inability of different ontologists to grasp the primitives of competing ontological
theories.
Even van Inwagen, who rejects explanation in ontology, relies on grasping
with respect to arguments, where arguments, he claims, are a philosophical form of
evidence. He opines:
If that is what evidence is in philosophy, what is it to “have” the evidence for
the conclusion of a certain argument that is, or is contained in, or is constituted
by, that argument? The answer is pretty clearly this: It is to grasp or understand
the argument. Or, if grasping or understanding an argument is a matter of
degree: It is fully to grasp or understand the argument. (van Inwagen 2009, 19)

However, he has very little to say about what this grasping amounts to. Indeed, it is a
frequently employed notion, and while familiar, it remains opaque. Even so, Grimm
argues that while the ‘psychology of understanding is multi-layered’, ‘“grasping” or
“seeing” …seems to be… integral to understanding in all its forms’ (Grimm 2011,
88).299
Given the connection between explanation and understanding, and my claim
that (some) ontological theories are best construed in antirealist terms, I maintain that
neither explanation nor understanding need be factive. That is, explanations in
ontology may still be to some extent successful, and a level of understanding to some
extent achieved, without necessarily having correlates of the theory in the world.
298

He cites the following in support of this view: Moravscik (1979), Burnyeat (1981), Lear (1988), and
Benson (2000).
299
In agreement with Grimm, and against Hempel, Yolton avers: ‘Not deducibility, but intelligibility
constitutes the basic feature of the logic of explanation. Understanding and intelligibility are the basic
controls operative in every context’ (Yolton 1959, 207).
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Sorin (2017) distinguishes two standard arguments for those who claim nonfactivity with respect to understanding in the sciences. The first concerns the use of
idealizations, approximations or models which are purposefully designed to only
partially represent phenomena in the world. Rowbottom, in defending a type of
instrumentalism in the sciences, uses the example of a pendulum to illustrate the fact
that a simple model, though less “true” than a complete or more whole theory, may be
better in aiding understanding, and even prediction, given the complexities that are
avoided. Such complexities include ‘factors dealing with friction at the bearing and
the mass of the rod, refers to the sine of the angle, and so on’ which ‘obscures the result
that pendulum motion is sometimes approximately simple harmonic’ (Rowbottom
2019, 7). Such models, then, though simplified or idealized, are not considered factive;
to have precisely corresponding counterparts in the world.
The second argument Sorin identifies follows the intuition that we want to be
able to say that those who proffered theories in the past, which turned out to be false
in light of current evidence, still understood the theories they proposed and the
phenomena that was investigated. With respect to Newton’s theory of gravitation, and
its successor, Einstein’s theory of general relativity, De Regt asks:

But does this mean that Newton had no understanding of gravitational
phenomena? That seems an unacceptable claim. So we face the dilemma of
either giving up the idea that understanding requires truth or allowing for the
possibility that in many if not all practical cases we do not have scientific
understanding. I will argue that the first horn is preferable: the link between
understanding and truth can be severed. (De Regt 2015, 3782)

Both Sorin and de Regt discuss factivity with respect to natural phenomena, or the
objects of scientific inquiry. With respect to ontological theories, it seems preferable
to allow for understanding even if the connection between understanding and truth is
attenuated. With respect to competing ontological theories, all the empirical
information is in, so to speak, yet there is continual disagreement about metaphysical
and ontological matters. I return to this issue below in connection with the role
primitives play in explanation. In the next section, I focus more deliberately on the
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nature of explanation and understanding in ontology, elaborating on the claim that
explanation in ontology need not be factive.

5.3 Metaphysical Explanation and Explanation in Metaphysics and
Ontology
In the introduction, I drew a distinction between metaphysical explanation and
explanation as it occurs in metaphysics and ontology. Metaphysical explanation is a
term that covers a variety of determination or dependence relations that are typically
non-causal, some of which are discussed below. I think it is a poor choice of vernacular
for explanation in metaphysics, as in most disciplines, is standardly regarded as an
epistemic matter and, on at least one interpretation, the success of an explanation may
have less to do with the factivity of the determination or dependence relations it
supposedly tracks, than it does with ameliorating our epistemic state. That is, on such
a view, if an explanation does track worldly determination relations, then that is
ancillary to its epistemic success; it is not successful in virtue of having done so. To
make better sense of this difference, I introduce two sets of distinctions: the first
concerns explanatory realism and explanatory antirealism, and the second, ontic
conceptions of explanation and epistemic conceptions of explanation.

5.3.1 Explanatory Realism and Antirealism
Explanatory realism, though it comes in many varieties, is in a broad sense the
view that though explanation is an epistemological matter, the statements of
approximately true and full explanations represent non-explanatory events, entities,
determination or dependence relations in the world. Such items are non-explanatory in
the sense that they are things in the world, not representations and in this sense, things
don’t explain; statements arranged in a particular way do, if and only if such an
arrangement of statements represent these ontological matters correctly. 300, 301 Paul
Audi summarizes the position as follows:

300

I do not wish to claim that statements are not things in the world. In one sense, language is very much
part of the world. But still, there is a purposeful division to be drawn between a statement and that which
it represents.
301
There is a sense in which if I ask “how was the victim killed”, and the gun on the ground is pointed
to, that very gun, the object in the world, explains the cause of the victim’s death. However, this non-
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Broadly, [explanatory] realism is the view that explanations (a) can be correct
or incorrect, and (b) that their correctness or incorrectness is not solely a matter
of how well they tend to produce understanding or reduce mystery to some
audience. Rather, according to realism, (c) their correctness is a matter of how
well they track certain non-explanatory relations, relations that obtain whether
or not we know about them or conceive them in any particular way. (Audi
2015, 211)

Explanatory antirealism, though it comes in many varieties also, amounts to
the denial of at least some of these points. Explanatory antirealists claim that an
explanation can be instructive in a variety of ways without requiring this metaphysical
determination, or the existence of the posited entities that feature in such an
explanation. If the arrangement of statements is instrumental in helping us
comprehend, predict and perhaps manipulate our environment, then we need not
require the non-explanatory items to exist. While this is a central debate that touches
off many philosophical issues, the debate again has featured most prominently in the
philosophy of science. As Carrie Jenkins notes: ‘Although metaontological debates are
of relatively long standing, the terms “realism” and “anti-realism” have only recently
come to be regularly applied to metaontological positions. The new usage is not fully
stable’ (Jenkins 2010, 880).
It is, perhaps, easier to be an explanatory realist concerning causal explanations
given the resources that are often available (empirical feedback, prediction,
experiment) to help substantiate such accounts. It will be demonstrated below, in a
discussion of inference to the best explanation, that the resources available to the
ontologist consist largely in appeal to theoretical virtues, which, I claim, are best
construed as pragmatic rather than epistemic or evidential. In another sense, however,
given the abstruse nature of ontological matters, it can be hard to see the value of
antirealist positions for it threatens to make the enterprise somewhat arbitrary. As
Hofweber incisively points out: ‘to go anti-realist in metaphysics can seem like a way
of giving up on metaphysics as it was intended’ (Hofweber 2019, 238). If, as some
claim, what the various antirealist positions have in common is ‘furthering our

verbal form of pointing is arguably just shorthand for representing the claim in verbal form and the gun
features in the explanation only as node in my reasoning process.
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practical ends’ (Rowbottom 2019, i),302 what the practical ends of ontological theories
are is unclear. But perhaps this is too narrow a definition to fit ontology, and I’ll have
more to say on antirealism below. Perhaps the most interesting question concerning
ontological theories is whether the entities and relations invoked to explain or describe
the world actually exist. Despite the best efforts of Lowe and others, this may not ever
be answerable in a substantial manner. As such, some form of antirealism is the best
that ontological theories can amount to.
A different, but equally foundational, debate raised its head with the work of
Wesley Salmon (1984), which contrasts ontic and epistemic conceptions of
explanation.303 Explanations understood as epistemic fall into what is known as the
representation-subsumption view. The idea here is that phenomena are explained by
being subsumed ‘under a general representation, model, prototype, or schema’ (Craver
2014, 27). The difference here isn’t between realism and antirealism: the
representations, the statements in the explanation, may or may not have correlates in
the world; a realist will claim they do, or that we should behave epistemically as if
they do, and an antirealist will deny this. Oversimplifying, under the epistemic
construal of the formal structure of the representations, i.e. the logical relation between
statements, is what is most important. Carl Hempel’s Deductive-Nomological model,
discussed above, is often considered an epistemic rather than an ontic account.
Even contemporary philosophers who endorse the claim that explanation is
primarily an epistemological matter tend to highlight the need to consider
explanation’s metaphysical aspects; at least, this is the case within the realist camp. As
Kim declares: ‘I think it should be granted on all hands that explanation is epistemic
(what else could it be?); the proper question to raise is whether there is something
“ontic”, out there in the world, that grounds or underwrites (“corresponds to”, if you
prefer) the explanatory relation’ (Kim 1994, 58). And as Ruben writes: ‘explanation is

302

Rowbottom claims that such a characterisation covers instrumentalism, which is only one kind of
antirealist position. I am extending the quotation and using it more broadly.
303
Salmon also included a modal conception to complete his tripartite distinction; however, he dropped
this soon after its introduction. While many have continued to use the distinction between ontic and
epistemic, others are dissatisfied with Salmon’s ontic account for it seemed to collapse into the
epistemic: it seems to amount to an epistemic account which requires a strong metaphysical backing.
The fully objective facts, the ontic explanations, for Salmon, typically involve causal mechanisms and
he claims that the ‘underlying causal mechanisms hold the key to our understanding of the world’
(Salmon 1984, 260). It is causal processes, interactions and laws that ‘provide the mechanisms by which
the world works; to understand why certain things happen, we need to see how they are produced by
these mechanisms’ (Salmon 1984, 132).
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an epistemological concept, but one which requires a metaphysical “backing”’ (Ruben
2004, 2). More substantially, he claims:

Whether the explanation relation relates those real objects or events directly,
or only relates statements or facts about them, the basis for explanation is in
metaphysics. Objects or events in the world must really stand in some
appropriate “structural” relation before explanation is possible. Explanations
work, when they do, only in virtue of underlying determinative or dependency
structural relations in the world’ (Ibid., 210).304

The point Ruben makes could perhaps be put in terms of factivity, discussed above.
There, I suggested that factivity with respect to ontological theories need not be a
requirement. In Chapter Two and Four I claimed that certain of Lowe’s distinctly
ontological posits, essences, modes and instantiation relations, for example, aren’t the
kinds of things that can be substantiated by further empirical research. 305,306 Their
factivity, then, is questionable yet the theories in which they feature at least have the
appearance of being explanatory. It is a pressing question, and one I’m unsure how to
answer conclusively, in what way non-factive ontological theories can be explanatory?
And further, if the ontological posits in such theories are not real, as in worldly
correlates of the theories, how is our epistemic state improved and our understanding
ameliorated by accepting a theory in which they feature? Lowe suggests an answer
with respect to pure ontology.307 He claims, we remember, that pure ontology is a kind
of cartography of the space of possibilities. In this sense, it is not clear how such
possibilities could be factive. But it’s also unclear how such possibilities can be
Salmon also claims: ‘The linguistic entities that are called “explanations” are statements reporting
the actual explanation. Explanations, in this [ontic] view, are fully objective and, where explanations of
nonhuman facts are concerned, they exist whether or not anyone ever discovers or describes them.
Explanations are not epistemically relativized, nor (outside of the realm of human psychology) do they
have psychological components, nor do they have pragmatic dimensions (Salmon 1989, 133).
305
L.A. Paul concurs and claims: ‘Use of an electron microscope or other measurement devices will not
give us any more empirical information about the nature of composition than we can derive from
everyday experience… There is very little about the ontological that is observable, and what is
observable is observable (at least for the most part) at the level of ordinary experience… There isn’t the
faintest glimmer of an idea of what sort of instrument (much less an idea of how to build one) we could
use to detect the presence of numbers, of composition, or of necessity, or whether a property is an
instance of a universal or is a trope’ (Paul 2012, 21-22).
306
Though see Morganti and Tahko (2017) who claim that at least some ontological posits can be
indirectly tested through scientific practices.
307
L.A. Paul (2012) suggests a different answer and claims that ontological theories are best thought of
as models, akin to those employed in the sciences discussed briefly above.
304
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substantiated and further, what criteria can be employed to choose between competing
possibilities. I return to this point below in connection with inference to the best
explanation.
Some recent philosophers have pushed this emphasis on metaphysical
“backing” further, though Wesley Salmon (1984) was an important forerunner,
claiming that explanations are, in fact, first and foremost metaphysical entities. This is
the central claim of ontic theorists. Craver, for example, avers: ‘Representational
subsumption… is insufﬁcient as an account of scientiﬁc explanation. The fundamental
philosophical dispute is ontic: it concerns the kinds of ontic structure that ought to
populate our explanatory texts, whatever their representational format’ (Craver 2014,
28). He puts the point more forcefully:

Ontic explanations are not texts; they are full-bodied things. They are not true
or false. They are not more or less abstract. They are not more or less complete.
They consist in all and only the relevant features of the mechanism in question.
There is no question of ontic explanations being “right” or “wrong,” or “good”
or “bad.” They just are. (Craver 2014, 40)
Craver is referring here to “things” relevant to the causal structure of the world, but
this could be extended, potentially, to other non-causal determination relations. 308
Carrie Jenkins identifies this view, though endorses it as just one kind of explanation,
saying explanations are ‘not the sort of things that are true or false, but rather the sorts
of things that take place or obtain, such as facts or events’ (Jenkins 2008, 64).
It is, in certain respects an odd view that strikes one at times as possibly merely
terminological. Wright and Van Eck claim that: ‘The central divergence between
proponents of EC [epistemic conception] and OC [ontic conception] concerns whether
explanations are representations of entities in the world or the worldly entities so
represented’ (Wright and Van Eck 2018, 1001). This seems, if not simply a
terminological difference, at best a shift in emphasis. But proponents of ontic accounts
see a more dramatic divergence from the traditional epistemic account. Wright and
Craver provides examples: ‘Other forms of ontic structure might include attractors, ﬁnal causes,
laws, norms, reasons, statistical relevance relations, symmetries, and transmissions of marks, to name a
few’ and goes on to say that ‘The philosophical dispute about explanation, from this ontic perspective,
is about which kinds of ontic structure properly count as explanatory and which do not’ (Craver 2014,
29).
308
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Van Eck further claim that the distinction that is being put forward is exclusive; there
is no middle ground; if one were to endorse a weaker conception of ontic explanation,
it would collapse into being representational, thus not ontic. Salmon claims that the
distinction is so conceptually fundamental that ‘the shift from the epistemic to the ontic
conception involves nothing less than a radical gestalt switch’ (Salmon 1984, 277).309
I find this ontic account interesting for two reasons. In part it is because it
invites a discussion of one of the most basic and interesting philosophical concerns:
the relation between theory/language and the world. But it is also of interest because
of how abstract and arcane the objects of ontological theories tend to be; or rather, how
abstruse and esoteric the theoretical posits of ontology tend to be. The emphasis on the
ontic puts weight on the demand that ontological posits are something more than a
conceptual matter; theoretically pleasing, perhaps, but without significant import.
David Lewis seems to make this point with respect to necessitation: ‘N deserves the
name of “necessitation” only if, somehow, it really can enter into the requisite
necessary connections. It can’t enter into them just by bearing a name, any more than
one can have mighty biceps just by being called “Armstrong”’ (Lewis 1983, 366).
Ontic accounts face many difficulties.310 Whether or not the ontic/epistemic
distinction holds water, what is of central importance for the explanatory realist is the
metaphysical structure of the world. The structural relation that has been most
discussed is causation. But there are arguably other kinds of structural relations equally
fundamental that are required to make sense of the world. Kim puts the point as
follows:

309

Illari claims that adopting an ontic conception can better account for certain matters that perplex the
epistemic construal: ‘appeal to ontic explanations is essential for marking several crucial normative
dimensions by which scientiﬁc explanations are and ought to be evaluated: the distinction between howpossibly and how-actually explanations, the distinction between phenomenal descriptions and
explanations, the difference between predictive and explanatory models, and the requirement that
explanatory models should include all and only information that is explanatorily relevant to the
phenomenon one seeks to explain’ (Illari 2013, 243). Discussing whether this is so would take us too
far afield, but its mention is by way of highlighting that its proponents see it as far from a terminological
matter or a shift in emphasis.
310
One such difficulty is identifying the relevance of objects in the world to our understanding. That is,
how do entities traverse the barrier between ontology and epistemology, for it seems that understanding
is on the epistemic side of things. Another concern is with abstract and general explanations, which are
arguably more important to the sciences, but which ontic accounts don’t capture so easily. Ontic
accounts seem intuitive when the explanation concerns singular entities such as ‘the burst radiator, the
impinging photon causing the click, the failed blowout preventer causing the spill, or the frozen O-rings,
the severed brake cables causing the accident, or the whiskey or broken steering wheel, etc.’ (Wright
and van Eck 2018, 1019). Epistemic accounts seem to be more intuitively useful when dealing with
classes or events.
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Events in this world are interrelated in a variety of ways. Among them, the
ones we have called dependency or determination 311 relations are of great
importance. Broadly speaking, it is these relations, along with temporal and
spatial ones, that give a significant structure to the world of events…
[C]ausation, though important and in many ways fundamental, is not the only
such relation, and that there are other such determinative relations that deserve
recognition and careful scrutiny. (Kim 1994, 52)

There are several examples of putative determination relations that can be easily
produced. Mereological Dependence (or Mereological Supervenience), where the
properties of the whole depend on properties and relations of its parts. Or Cambridge
Dependence, which is exemplified by the widowing of Socrates’ wife, Xanthippe, as
he departs with the last drop of hemlock.
Perhaps the determination relation that has received most attention in the last
decade, causation aside, is grounding.312 It is arguable that there is nothing unique or
new in this idea; that grounding is just a regular kind of ontological dependence that
had been discussed by many philosophers without using the term.313 But proponents
of grounding have made a big fuss over its importance as a foundational metaphysical
explanatory ordering relation. While I noted Lowe seems to think of grounding as just
one species of ontological dependence, many of the features of grounding, as well as
the criticisms thereof, are relevant to ontological dependence relations generally.
Given its prominence in the literature as a distinctive metaphysical explanation, the
next section explores its nature.

5.3.2 Determination, Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation
In Chapter One, I showed that van Inwagen objects to the idea that there are
levels of being or ontological structure in the world and thus rejects grounding and any
purported explanation in which it features. More broadly, he rejects any kind of

Kim doesn’t distinguish between “determination” and “dependency”, whereas Ruben (2004), for
example, does. There may be value to the distinction, but such subtleties won’t concern us here and,
following Kim, I will use the terms interchangeably.
312
(See: Fine 2001, 2012; Schaffer 2009; de Rosset 2010; Audi 2012; Raven 2013).
313
See Tahko and Lowe (2020) for views on how grounding may differ from other dependence
relations. See also Tahko (2015, 162ff).
311
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abstract dependence relation (van Inwagen 2018). I also showed that his objections
aren’t particularly insightful, resting as they do on his incomprehension. Lowe, on the
other hand, endorses several kinds of ontological dependence, and while he doesn’t
seem to countenance modes of being314 given his commitment to Univocity discussed
in Chapter One and Two, he does endorse ontological structure, that the world is
ontologically layered.
Just as metaphysics has its own distinctive subject matter and methodology,
according to Lowe, it also, it seems, has its own distinctive kind of explanation. He
claims, for instance, with respect to essential dependence, that:

[T]he general notion of explanation is a broad and multifaceted one, with
explanations falling into a number of different species (for instance, logical,
mathematical, causal, teleological, and psychological). The general notion of
explanation is not, consequently, a notion that is fit to be appealed to in order
to frame a perspicuous account of essence. Rather, I think we should regard
essence-based explanation just as one more distinctive species of
explanation—and this requires us to provide an account of essence which does
not simply appeal to an already assumed notion of explanation. I believe that
the Aristotelian approach to essence in terms of real definition, if carefully and
judiciously pursued, achieves precisely this. (Lowe 2012a, 938)

But metaphysical explanation itself is an opaque notion. Anna-Sofia Maurin
shares this concern and tells us that ‘Exactly what a metaphysical explanation is, is
mostly left somewhat vague (Maurin 2019, 1574). And Thompson notes that ‘the
notion of metaphysical explanation is itself opaque, and has received little attention in
the literature’ (Thompson 2019, 395). If it is a distinct kind of explanation, what does
it have in common with other accounts? As mentioned above, rather than discuss the
merits of Lowe’s account of essence-based explanation as an example of a distinctively
metaphysical kind of explanation, I discuss metaphysical explanation in terms of
grounding which is more prominent in contemporary literature.315

“Modes”, again, is used here differently to his endorsement of particular ways objects are; that is, of
concrete particular non-objects.
315
I do so with caution, however. As Raven identifies: ‘The word “ground” has been used to express
notions as diverse as entailment, supervenience, truthmaking, existential dependence, essential
314

225

With respect to grounding, Naomi Thompson provides a nice simple definition
which will get us started: ‘Grounding is a relation of non-causal ontological
dependence, a metaphysical determination relation which obtains between entities of
various ontological categories including facts, properties, states of affairs, and actual
concrete objects’ (Thompson 2016, 395). One might add that it’s typically regarded as
a hierarchical dependence relation, though the idea that it is a relation is contested.316
While this definition seems basic enough, many have claimed not to understand it, and
as a consequence, as Thompson goes on to say, much ‘of the literature about grounding
is devoted to arriving at a proper characterization of the notion’ (Ibid.). In fact, towards
the end of Schaffer’s 2009 paper “On What Grounds What”, which is a seminal work
focused on explicating and defending the notion of grounding, he declares to his
sceptics: ‘Of course the notion of grounding may be unfamiliar to some
metaphysicians raised only on Quine and Carnap. The best advice I can give is work
with the notion, and see if you then come to grasp it’ (Schaffer 2009, 376). This reads
less like an invitation and more like a presumptive taunt; critics will not know how to
use what they find unintelligible.
The idea of grounding has an allure of something deep, of something that was
forgotten317 and of something that is fundamental to the architecture of the world. This
last part generates confusion, however – the idea that grounding is fundamental to the
architecture of the world – not, as many critics have suggested, because grounding is
an example par excellence of esoteric metaphysics (see Hofweber 2009), harping back
to the days of the defamed scholastic period (see Ladyman et al. 2007). While I am

dependence, metaphysical explanation, identity, reduction, and more. It is debatable how these diverse
relations interact and whether a common core unites them’ (Raven 2015, 322).
316
Maurin notes: ‘Whether grounding is a relation has been debated. Arguments on either side have
mostly been put in terms of what is the “best” way to linguistically represent grounding. Proponents of
the relational view have argued that grounding statements featuring the relational predicate “grounds”
most correctly depict the world they’re about (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005; Trogdon 2013). But grounding
can also be picked out using the sentential connective “because” or the sentence-forming operator “in
virtue of”. Whether those who argue that grounding is not best represented using a relational predicate
are in fact opposed to the idea that grounding is a relation is unclear. For, mostly, those people tend to
prefer alternative ways of representing grounding because of their supposed “ontological neutrality”
(Correia 2010; Fine 2012)’ (Maurin 2019, 1574).
317
This, at least, is how grounding is often presented. Jessica Wilson claims that the historical record
suggests otherwise: ‘Pace Schaffer, Quine’s view of metaphysics (understood as eliding concern with
dependence) is not the dominant view of what metaphysics is. Pace Rosen, it is not the case that the
idioms of metaphysical dependence have been widely dismissed as unintelligible or obscure, except as
suppressed in favor of modal notions. Pace Fine, it is not the case that philosophers have only recently
become receptive to the idea that there are forms of metaphysical explanation different from scientific
or causal explanation’ (Wilson 2014, 539). Such a view, I think, would be endorsed by Lowe.
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sympathetic to what is scorned by such philosophers, what generates confusion is a
certain ambiguity in speaking of grounding variously as a fundamental relation or
structure of the world and as a metaphysical explanation, when explanation is largely
considered an epistemic matter, as demonstrated above.
Yet, whatever the precise nature of metaphysical explanation is, Maurin
claims that the explanatory nature of grounding ‘is a feature that (probably) all
grounding theorists think characterizes grounding and one that most believe plays an
important role in distinguishing grounding from other types of metaphysical
dependence’ (Maurin 2019, 1574). But while all grounding theorists (probably)
subscribe to this connection, some identify metaphysical explanation with grounding,
a position called unionism, while others, the separatists, hold that grounding plays an
indispensable role in metaphysical explanation, but that grounding and explanation are
distinct notions. 318 The unionist view is a form of what we’ve been calling ontic
explanation while the separatist view leads to an epistemic account, where grounding
merely backs metaphysical explanation. As Maurin notes, ‘if grounding is a worldly
relation which obtaining or not is an entirely mind-independent affair, and if grounding
is (metaphysical) explanation, metaphysical explanation is a worldly and mindindependently obtaining relation as well’ (Maurin 2019, 1580). But just as was the
case with ontic accounts discussed above, if explanation is a thing in the world, then
the sense of explanation that is most familiar, an epistemic sense that is perhaps backed
by a worldly determination relation, is in danger of becoming vacuous. Maurin is
aware of this too and opines that ‘even if there is a point to categorizing metaphysical
explanation as “an explanation”, it is then an explanation so different from explanation
in the ordinary sense, that what properties it, and hence grounding, has becomes
somewhat of a mystery…’ (Ibid.).319
Grounding is usually posited as a primitive, a feature of explanations in
metaphysics I discuss below in more detail. Schaffer claims that it ‘passes every test
for being a metaphysical primitive worth positing. It is unanalyzable. It is useful. And
it is clear what we mean’ (Schaffer 2009, 376). However, it is not clear that it is useful,

318

These terms were originally introduced by Raven (2015) who argued that such divisions are more
often implicit than explicit in accounts of grounding.
319
Thompson concurs and claims that ‘the idea of objective explanation is in itself somewhat jarring.
The idea that reality comes furnished with an explanatory structure conflicts with our understanding of
explanation as an epistemic phenomenon. Explanations (unlike information that might figure in an
explanation) aren’t “out there” in the world for us to discover’ (Thompson 2019, 33).
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and far from obvious that it is even intelligible. There are two predominant ways one
can come to know about the nature of this primitive according to its defenders: it is
either defined using concepts that are thought to be more familiar, and supposedly
better understood, or understanding is meant to follow when familiarity with the
theoretical role it plays is gained. With regard to defining it in terms of more familiar
concepts, grounding, it is argued, is expressed in a variety of different ways concealed
in phrases such as “ontologically depends upon”, or “holds in virtue of”, or “obtains
because”. However, it’s not clear that these supposed cognate terms are any clearer
just because they are more familiar. Alex Oliver, for example, says that ‘we know we
are in the realm of murky metaphysics by the presence of the weasel words “in virtue
of”’ (Oliver 1996, 48). Chris Daly similarly claims that he is unsure of what “in virtue
of” actually means so attempting to illuminate grounding in terms of it is explanatorily
vacuous (Daly, 2012).
With regard to its role, one might say, for example, that the mind is ultimately
grounded in brain states, or mental facts obtain because of neurological facts. The
transparency of the glass is grounded in the nature of the molecules that make it up.
One might think that the molecules cause the transparency, but matters of causation,
it seems, require a temporal structure with the effect following the cause, whereas in
this instance, the transparency and the molecules temporally coincide. Similarly, the
aesthetic features of a work of art may be grounded in its physical properties, but it
does not seem correct to say that the physical properties cause the aesthetic ones. In
fact, Schaffer argues that many philosophical debates thought to be about existence
are more properly thought to concern grounding. For example, the debate ‘over the
mind’ he says, ‘is not a dispute over whether mind or matter exists, but rather over
whether mind is based in matter. The debate… over monism is not a dispute over
whether wholes or parts exist, but rather over which is prior’ (Schaffer 2009, 363). But
again, while this notion appears to be useful, it is perpetually suspect if the idea cannot
be further illuminated. It’s hard to see how objectors could be convinced when they
reject both these strategies for coming to know its nature. As Goodman put it, at best
‘the utility of a notion testifies not to its clarity but to the philosophical importance of
clarifying it’ (Goodman 1954, 32).320

320

Quoted in Daly (2012, 96).
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Despite its purported primitive status, certain features, its proponents say, can
be identified. Many of these features, the formal features, are inherited, at least on the
unionist view, from qualities associated with explanation proper. A few central
features are that it is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive and non-monotonic.321 It is
irreflexive in that no entity can ground itself;322 an explanation is to be informative and
the circularity of something explaining itself is uninformative. It is asymmetric in that
the ground has ontological priority over that which it grounds, and the ground is not
grounded in the derivative. It is transitive in that if one entity is the ground of a
derivative, and that derivative itself grounds a derivative, then the further derivative is
grounded in the first. That is, if A explains B, and B explains C, then A explains C. It
is non-monotonic in that what features in the explanans must be relevant to the
explanandum; explanation may not survive the addition of arbitrary premises. Maurin
neatly relates these formal explanatory features to understanding. That is, ‘Why do we
think that explanation is non-monotonic? Because any part of an explanation should
contribute to our understanding of that which it is an explanation of. Why do we think
that explanation is irreﬂexive? Because in order to increase our understanding, an
explanation must supply us with new information’ (Maurin 2019, 1581).
The very idea of a distinctive metaphysical explanation is suspect, and the
further the metaphysical or ontic aspect is pushed, i.e., unionism, the further suspicion
grows. The idea of a distinctive metaphysical explanation, as mentioned, appears to
rely on the idea of ontological structure, or the world being ontologically layered.
Maurin, for example, claims that ‘a commitment to metaphysical explanation is
inextricably bound up with a commitment to ontological structure is a commonly held
view. In fact, this is arguably the core-thesis of so-called “grounding theory”’ (Maurin
2019, 111). Even if this is the case, explanation, I argue, is centrally an epistemological
matter which may be backed by determination or dependence relations that illuminate
or capture aspects of this layered world. I claimed above, however, that ontological
explanations need not be factive, though it is a thorny issue exactly how understanding
is achieved with a non-factive explanation. Raven identifies a tension between
metaphysical explanation and explanation in metaphysics in the following way: ‘On
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More characteristics have been proposed, such as that it is Factive (if Fa ground Gb, then both
actually exist), Partial (if Fa grounds Gb, there may be some other fact, Hc, that also grounds Gb),
category neutral (grounding is not relevant to just one ontological category).
322
Though God, from a Christian perspective, may be an exception.
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the one hand, it is supposed that metaphysics concerns phenomena in the world itself
independently of the explanatory interests and goals of inquirers like us. On the other
hand, it is supposed that explanations are sensitive to the explanatory interests and
goals of inquirers like us’ (Raven 2015, 326). It seems to me that many ontological
explanations are constructed to ameliorate the epistemic state of the inquiring agent.
In this respect, as with many of Lowe’s postulated primitives, grounding appears to be
‘insensitive to empirical investigation’ (Thompson 2019, 31). Yet one can adopt a form
of antirealism, or irrealism (Thompson 2019), and claim that the postulation of a
grounding relation may explain why the glass is fragile (because of its molecular
structure) while remaining agnostic as to the existence of any ontological relation.
The nature of primitives, such as grounding, which appear to carry a significant
explanatory burden in ontological theories, deserves further scrutiny. In section 5.4, I
discuss an explanatory strategy that van Inwagen objects to and one in which
primitives tend to play a pivotal role. Before I do, however, a brief note on the
pragmatics of explanation will be of value to highlight the contextual and agent-variant
nature of explanation in ontology. If metaphysical explanation, at least in the form of
grounding, is dependent on the idea of ontological structure, what are we to say to
those who object to the very idea of ontological structure? It seems not much; just as
with Lowe and van Inwagen, conversation stops.

5.3.3 The Pragmatics of Explanation
The pragmatics of explanation concerns aspects of explanation that depend on
agential and contextual factors. It involves not only the intentional act of the explainer,
but the context in which it is given as well as the agent, should there be one, who is
the recipient of the explanation. It was shown above that the pragmatics of explanation
was side-lined from early theories of explanation, such as Hempel’s (C-L) models, but
just as understanding found a more central role in later theories, so did pragmatics. In
this section, I briefly highlight its relevance for ontology.
Bas van Fraassen is a notable proponent of the pragmatics of explanation in the
sciences, which he popularized, together with his constructive empiricist account, in
The Scientific Image (1980). The idea here is that science aims not at truth, but to
develop theories that are empirically adequate. Explanation, in this context, becomes
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a pragmatic virtue, just one among others. In reaction to objectivist accounts, of which
Hempel’s is a model, he remarks:

The discussion of explanation went wrong at the very beginning when
explanation was conceived of as a relation like description: a relation between
a theory and a fact. Really, it is a three-term relation between theory, fact, and
context. No wonder that no single relation between theory and fact ever
managed to fit more than a few examples! Being an explanation is essentially
relative for an explanation is an answer… it is evaluated vis-à-vis a question,
which is a request for information. But exactly… what is requested differs from
context to context. (van Fraassen 1980, 156)

Explanations, then, he claims, depend on context and by extension, contrast
classes. That is, while explanation is understood as an answer to a why-question323 –
or something translatable to a why-question – it is only context that provides meaning
to the question, and this meaning requires a contrast class. To take an example, a
seemingly simple question:

Why did Jane drive to Dublin last Saturday?

will require a different answer depending on context and the question which it
is put in contrast to. For example:

Why did Jane drive to Dublin last Saturday? (and not John or Paul)
Why did Jane drive to Dublin last Saturday? (instead of getting public
transport)
Why did Jane drive to Dublin last Saturday? (and not to Cork or Kerry)
Why did Jane drive to Dublin last Saturday? (and not Sunday or Monday)324

The answer to this seemingly simple question will depend on the interest and
concerns of the agent involved. There are many issues this account faces which I don’t
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Cross (1991) extended van Fraassen’s analysis to how questions.
A similar structure is found in van Fraassen (1980, 127).
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intend to address here. 325 What is relevant is the context and agential variation
involved in explanation. This is even more evident, I claim, in the context of
ontology.326 I mentioned in the Introduction that quite a bit of schooling is required
before one can even appreciate the nature or value of an ontological question. But even
after lengthy schooling, certain first-order ontological questions simply aren’t of
interest to van Inwagen; he finds them meaningless. I will address further agent-variant
aspects of explanation in the following section in relation to primitives, inference to
the best explanation and one’s preference of theoretical virtues.

5.4 Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE)
Inference to the best explanation (IBE) is of particular interest here because it
brings together van Inwagen’s opposition to explanation in ontology and to theorybuilding in ontology generally. Van Inwagen, we saw in Chapter One, objects to the
use of IBE in ontology and Lowe, as shown in Chapter Two, endorses it. Thus, an
analysis of its role in ontology helps further refine their respective approaches. While
van Inwagen dismisses its use in ontology, he provides little by way of an assessment
of its nature. He does, however, agree with many of van Fraassen’s animadversions
and, given van Fraassen’s prominence in the wider debate, he will feature in this
somewhat brief discussion. Van Fraassen is important also as both van Inwagen and
Lowe object to aspects of his assessment of IBE in ontology, but for very different
reasons. IBE in ontology is bound up with appeals to theoretical virtues and their
justificatory or epistemic status. I argue that they are best construed as pragmatic with
respect to their role in theory choice. Further, a central feature of IBE in ontology, we
will see, concerns the postulation of primitives, a matter that has emerged frequently
in the course of this thesis but has not yet received its own focused treatment.
Gilbert Harman (1965) introduced the term “Inference to the Best
Explanation”, though the general idea has had notable precursors.327 Though there are
325

See Kitcher and Salmon (1987) for early criticisms of this view.
Interestingly, Hochberg claims that ontological posits are similarly known only as contrastives:
‘Terms like “universal”, “particular”, “quality instance”, and “ontological tie” take on meaning by their
use, not only within one philosophical system, but, in various alternatives. Thus, to get one to see how
one uses the term “universal” or what the problem of universals is one points to alternatives that accept
and others that reject such “entities”’ (Hochberg 1970, 148).
327
Chief among them is C.S. Peirce’s theory of abduction. It is controversial, however, whether they
are in fact synonymous as Harman seems to have thought. He says: ‘“The inference to the best
explanation” corresponds approximately to what others have called “abduction,” “the method of
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various ways to construe IBE,328 the basic idea is rather simple: some phenomena or
set of data is identified. An explanatory hypothesis or theory is developed to account
for the phenomena. If that theory explains the phenomena better than its competitors,
then there is reason to infer that the proposed explanation is (approximately) true.
Further, if the best theory postulates unobservable or abstract entities, then there is
reason to suppose those entities exist. The salient point is that those endorsing IBE
claim that explanatory considerations play an evidential or epistemic role. As Saatsi
neatly puts it: ‘the explanatory goodness of theoretical hypotheses is an important
factor in the assessment and justification of those hypotheses’ (Saatsi 2018, 203). The
goodness of a theory, once minimal explanatory criteria have been met, typically
involves an appeal to theoretical virtues, discussed below, which themselves have a
controversial status.
Charles Darwin provides a simple example of the rationale of IBE:
…it can hardly be supposed that a false theory would explain, in so satisfactory
a manner as does the theory of natural selection, the several large classes of
facts above speciﬁed. It has recently been objected that this is an unsafe method
of arguing; but it is a method used in judging of the common events of life, and
has often been used by the greatest natural philosophers. (Darwin 1962, 476)329
But IBE is controversial. Some philosophers, similar to Darwin’s claim above,
consider it central to science, everyday discourse, and philosophy. Day and Kincaid,
for example, claim that ‘In epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, and
elsewhere, IBE has a basic role in both explicating philosophical theories and arguing
for them’ (Day and Kincaid 1994, 272). And Clark Glymour claims that this ‘pattern
of argument is not bounded by time or subject matter. One can ﬁnd such arguments in
hypothesis,” “hypothetic inference,” “the method of elimination,” “eliminative induction,” and
“theoretical induction’” (Harman 1965, 88-89). Douven (2011) argues that they can be treated
synonymously while Mcauliffe (2015), with a telling title “How did Abduction Get Confused with
Inference to the Best Explanation?” claims otherwise. The subtle distinctions need not concern us here.
328
The construal most relevant here, and what is the focus of most of the philosophical literature,
concerns the truth-conductivity or reliability of this kind of inference. Others (Bharathan and Josephson
2006) focus primarily on IBE and its relevance for belief revision.
329
Harman highlights its ubiquity: ‘When a detective puts the evidence together and decides that it must
have been the butler, he is reasoning that no other explanation which accounts for all the facts is
plausible enough or simple enough to be accepted. When a scientist infers the existence of atoms and
sub-atomic particles, he is inferring the truth of an explanation for various data which he wishes to
account for. These seem the obvious cases; but there are many others’ (Harman 1965, 89).
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sociology, in psychometrics, in chemistry and astronomy, in the time of Copernicus,
and in the most recent of our scientiﬁc journals’ (Glymour 1985, 99). Others, such as
van Fraassen (1989),330 provide arguments to the effect that we have little reason to
infer to the (approximate) truth of a theory simply because it is theoretically more
virtuous than its rivals; the pool of theories from which we may be choosing, for
example, may simply be the ‘best of a bad lot’ (van Fraassen 1989, 143), none of which
can claim (approximate) truth. There also may be unconceived alternatives (Stanford
2008; Rowbottom 2016) that explain matters much more effectively.
Any defence of IBE rests on a prior notion of what constitutes an explanation.
As we have seen, there is little consensus on this matter. But it also rests on the idea
of goodness; that is, what makes one explanation better than its rivals? But it seems
that there is even greater difficulty deciding this matter.331 In the sciences, when there
is underdetermination of theory by data (where there is more than one theory that can
adequately account for the empirical data), appeals are often made to various
theoretical virtues to aid in theory choice. Among the favoured theoretical virtues are
parsimony (qualitative and quantitative), explanatory power, and fruitfulness, but there
are many more.332 While it is generally agreed that such virtues aid in theory choice,
realists argue that these virtues are epistemic or evidential. That is, if a theory is more
parsimonious or fruitful than its rivals, for example, all other things being equal, that
is evidence in favour of the approximate truth of the theory. Antirealists of various
stripes, again van Fraassen is notable among them, consider such virtues to be merely
pragmatic; it is more convenient, for example, to use a parsimonious theory, but such
convenience is no guide to truth.
Regarding IBE and the practice of contemporary ontologists, Ted Sider claims:
Their methodology is rather quasi-scientiﬁc. They treat competing positions as
tentative hypotheses about the world, and assess them with a loose battery of
criteria for theory choice. Match with ordinary usage and belief sometimes
plays a role in this assessment, but typically not a dominant one. Theoretical
He claims that ‘as long as the pattern of IBE is left vague, it seems to ﬁt much rational activity. But
when we scrutinize its credentials, we ﬁnd it seriously wanting’ (van Fraassen 1989, 131).
331
Lipton concurs: ‘We do not yet have an account that provides the correct demarcation between what
explains a phenomenon and what does not; we are even further from an account of what makes one
explanation better than another’ (Lipton 1991, 2).
332
Kuhn (1977, 321–22) provides a list which includes, as well as those mentioned above, scope,
accuracy, and consistency.
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insight, considerations of simplicity, integration with other domains (for
instance science, logic, and philosophy of language), and so on, play important
roles. (Sider 2009, 385)333
The mention here of “quasi-scientific” is noteworthy on two counts. First, we
will see below that van Inwagen claims that this quasi-scientific approach leads to bad
metaphysics. Second, there is a trading of the supposed legitimacy of IBE in the
sciences to the claim that it is therefore legitimate in metaphysics. L.A. Paul (2012),
in fact, argues this very point. She claims: ‘if we accept inference to the best
explanation in ordinary reasoning and in scientiﬁc theorizing, we should accept it in
metaphysical theorizing’ (Paul 2012, 22). However, even if the legitimacy of IBE in
the sciences is granted, it does not automatically follow that it is therefore legitimate
in ontology.334 It is arguable that scientific methods have various features that are
typically not available to the kind of theorizing in which ontologists engage. Central
among them is experimental feedback. For example, many scientific posits, or
ontological posits within the sciences, have been rejected in the light of further
evidence, experiment, and advanced theory.
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Saatsi notes some historically

important examples in this regard: ‘gravitational force, caloric, phlogiston,
luminiferous ether, electromagnetic ether, circular inertia, miasma, vortices, vital
forces, and electron orbits, to name a few’ (Saatsi 2017, 173).
This fact has been turned against the scientific realist and amounts to what is
often called the “pessimistic induction argument” (Laudan 1981): because the sciences
were wrong in the past, there is no reason to expect that current science will not be
proven wrong at some future juncture. This is a significant challenge to scientific
realism, but realists typically respond that even a false theory can latch successfully
on to parts of the world; a false theory, as Newton’s theory of gravity is generally
considered to be, can still be empirically successful to a point. It is not clear, however,
that such an attitude is available to the explanatory realist in ontology. Lowe, we recall

This echoes Quine: ‘Our acceptance of an ontology is… similar in principle to our acceptance of a
scientific theory, say a system of physics: we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest
conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged.
Our ontology is determined once we have fixed upon the over-all conceptual scheme which is to
accommodate science in the broadest sense’ (Quine 1953, 16-17).
334
See Saatsi (2017) who claims it doesn’t hold, and Swoyer (1999) who claims it does.
335
I don’t mean to suggest matters are that straightforward in the sciences, but the general idea is
represented.
333
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from Chapter Two, argues that ontology is defeasible. I showed there, and in Chapter
Four regarding his theory of character, that some of the ontological posits he employs
do not appear defeasible in the way the scientific posits Saatsi mentioned above are.
That is to say, it’s not clear how modes or immanent universals are part of a defeasible
theory the way phlogiston and caloric are. 336 I mentioned this point in relation to
Lowe’s example of transuranic elements: we remember that he tries to bolster the
status of ontology by highlighting how knowledge of transuranic elements were known
prior to being synthesized.337 But the kinds of ontological posits Lowe makes in his
theory of character don’t, in principle, seem to be subject to further scientific
discovery; immanent universals do not seem to be discoverable in the same manner as
transuranic elements. Ontology does not have the same mechanism of experimental
feedback, of which prediction often plays an integral role. The kind of entities he
posits, and the formal ontological relations between them, while in principle
modifiable or dispensable, don’t appear to be empirically falsifiable. In some ways,
that is to be expected if ontology is epistemically and ontologically prior to the sciences
as he claims. This brings us back to the difficulties noted in Chapter Two in separating
Lowe’s ontology from science, and his metaontology from his ontology, for his four
categories, he claims, delineate the ontological conditions that make the very practice
of the sciences possible, while also seeking to identify with the sciences, what exists
as well as related ontological concerns.
I mentioned above that van Fraassen censures those ontologists that would
trade on the merits of the sciences by claiming some kind of continuity. Against the
use of IBE in ontology, he asks:

Where is the metaphysician who makes the case that the gain of explanatory
power outweighs the risk of ending up with a tissue of falsehoods? What is this
gain, what is the good, how is it weighed against truth? If simplicity, strength,
coherence, and all those other explanatory virtues338 are to be placed in the
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At the far reaches of the sciences, there may be theories that are in principle untestable; perhaps
multiverse theories are an example. There seems to be little scope to test string theory, but it seems in
principle to be falsifiable.
337
At least, this is on one interpretation of his example. It does serve as an adequate illustration of how
we might know the essence of possible objects.
338
“Theoretical virtues” are often called “explanatory virtues”. Van Inwagen rejects explanatory power
as a virtue of ontological theories, but he does endorse other virtues, such as parsimony. This is
addressed below.
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balance against truth, may we please be shown the balance, the gauge, the units,
the scale? As long as we have nothing like that, the defense of ontology as
scientific points only to the form its theory and theory choice take. But
nonsense can come in the same form as wisdom. Form is nowhere near enough.
(van Fraassen 2002, 16)339
As mentioned above, I’m sympathetic with the concern about how ontological
explanations are to be evaluated, but I think he overreaches in his criticism.
Interestingly, as I also mentioned, both Lowe and van Inwagen comment on his claim,
though naturally, from two different positions. I turn to their respective positions on
IBE in ontology in the next section.

5.4.1 Lowe, van Inwagen, and IBE
In this section, I bring together some of the work from Chapter One and
Chapter Two regarding van Inwagen’s and Lowe’s metaontology and the employment
of IBE.
With regard to van Fraassen’s quotation above, Rowbottom (2005), whilst
critiquing van Fraassen and defending Lowe, neatly points out that it is one thing to
proffer an explanation for some phenomena and another to choose between competing
explanations. Lowe claims that the target of ontology is first and foremost to survey
possible explanations, and only subsequently to identify actual explanations. It may
be work enough to provide a coherent explanatory account, whatever about choosing
the “best” theory. Whatever the case, Lowe evidently employs IBE frequently in his
work. It is, in certain respects, central to his direct approach discussed in Chapter Two.
He claims, for example:

Someone who denies the reality of universals and laws, other than as arising
from resemblances amongst particulars, must, it seems to me, be prepared to
Given that van Fraassen endorses constructive empiricism, Rowbottom responds: ‘“Where is the
empiricist who shows us how likely it is that inference to the best explanation with respect to
appearances will lead to true conclusions about future (or potential past) appearances?” (And if there is
no necessity in nature, then why should there be any in sensory experience, or with respect to the
interaction of the objects thereof?)’ (Rowbottom 2005. 207). There is a similarity here, as we will see,
with Lowe’s response; the similarity lies in the strategy of throwing back to the critic of metaphysics a
requirement to defend the metaphysical ground of his own position.
339
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accept the existence of enormous and mysterious cosmic coincidences as a
matter of brute, inexplicable fact. In short, then, my allegiance to an ontology
including both substantial and non-substantial universals, and the laws which
consist in certain of the latter characterizing certain of the former, is justified
by an inference to the best explanation of the order, intelligibility and
predictability of the physical universe. (Lowe 206, 136; my italics)
And where he doesn’t use the phrase directly, his work is littered with the general idea:

That we should include in our ontology properties and relations—both as
particulars and as universals—I am now taking as given: but which properties
and relations we should include is another question, to be settled by further
discussion and argument, in which considerations of ontological economy and
explanatory power will have an important and perhaps decisive role to play.
(Lowe 2006, 59; my italics)
In one sense, it is curious that Lowe rejects van Fraassen’s depiction of how
metaphysics is conducted, given how central IBE is to Lowe’s approach. But the real
issue Lowe has is with van Fraassen’s claim that metaphysics is in some way
continuous with the sciences. Van Fraassen claims, for example that ‘Metaphysicians
who claim continuity with science typically claim that scientists infer to the best
explanation, just as metaphysicians do. So, if scientists proceed by inferring to the best
explanation, and if this sort of inference is also the vehicle that propels metaphysics,
metaphysics is truly the continuation of science by the same means’ (van Fraassen
2002, 13). Lowe claims in response that ‘the fault lies here not with metaphysics as
such, properly conceived, but only with those of its false friends who mistakenly seek
to enhance its credit by assimilating its task to that of empirical science’ (Lowe 2009,
99). While L.A. Paul (2012) argues that metaphysics and science share the same
methods, but not the same subject matter, Lowe claims that metaphysics, and thus
ontology, has a sui generis method and subject matter. Yet his direct approach is very
much like the theory-building approach of L.A. Paul and most other metaphysicians
who seek to build theories to explain phenomena.
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It is rarely explicated in detail what “continuous with” science actually
amounts to. Van Fraassen specifies further what kind of metaphysics he is attacking:
‘The type of metaphysics to which I refer, and which I take to be the enterprise engaged
in by, for example, Descartes and Leibniz, is characterized by the attempted
construction of a theory of the world, of the same form as a fundamental science and
continuous with (as extension or foundation of) the natural sciences’ (van Fraassen
2002, 231). 340 Lowe clearly wants to provide a foundation, an intellectual or
metaphysical foundation, for the sciences. It is, we saw, the subtitle of his most popular
work.341 But he still objects to any sense of “continuous with”, at least any sense that
subordinates ontology to the sciences. 342 While Lowe encourages a symbiotic
relationship between the sciences and ontology, it is arguable that in practice, he’s
closer to the position he critiques than he would wish. Morganti and Tahko (2017),
resting on Lowe’s work, push for a closer connection between ontology and the
sciences while recognising the need for ontology to maintain its autonomous status.
Metaphysics and ontology, they claim, ‘proceed independently of—although in
parallel with—that of science’ (Morganti and Tahko, 2562). But just as with Lowe,
there is a continual tension in their moderately naturalised account between ontology
as an autonomous enterprise and the scientistic approach of the kind elaborated by
Ladyman et al. (2007), whose project was mentioned in Chapter Two.343 To the extent
that ontology is autonomous and removed from the practice of the sciences, it is in
continual danger of falling into mere conceptual analysis.344
Van Inwagen, I mentioned, strongly denounces the use of IBE in ontology. It
is worth quoting him at length on several salient points. In the first instance, he claims:
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Quoted in Rowbottom (2005, 203).
The Four Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science.
342
He claims: ‘It is important to stress, then, that metaphysics should not be in the business of dictating
to empirical scientists precisely how they should categorize the theoretical entities whose existence they
postulate. Metaphysics supplies the categories, but how best to apply them in the construction of specific
scientific theories is a matter best left to the theorists themselves, provided that they respect the
constraints which the categorial framework imposes. So long as the empirical sciences invoke laws for
explanatory purposes and appeal to perception for empirical evidence, the four-category ontology will,
I believe, adequately serve as a metaphysical framework for the scientific enterprise. That some
metaphysical framework is necessary for the success of that enterprise and that its formulation is not
the business of any special science, but only that of the general science of being, or ontology, I hope to
be by now beyond dispute’ (Lowe 2006, 19).
343
Ladyman et al. claim that all metaphysics should be directly motivated by current best science.
Working out what this extreme scientistic claim amounts to is part of their ambitious project.
344
Similarly to Lowe, they claim that ‘the methodologies of the two disciplines, while distinct, are
intertwined to such an extent that we cannot properly pursue one without the other if we want to describe
and understand the structure of reality’ (Tahko and Morganti 2017, 2575).
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I don’t suppose that I shall succeed in convincing anyone who is not already
inclined to agree with me that [the] use of “inference to the best explanation”
is a bad method for metaphysics. In my judgment, it can lead only to quasiscientific theories that (supposing that the words in which they are framed
mean anything at all) fail to explain what they were supposed to explain. (I
distinguish quasi-science from pseudo-science. A pseudo-scientific theory like
astrology makes empirical claims; a quasi-scientific theory does not.). (van
Inwagen 2014, 214)
Linking IBE with his objection to the “theory builder” approach, he says:

It is important to realize that I have not recommended the following method:
treat the theses we accept before we come to metaphysics as data that it is the
business of metaphysics to explain; construct metaphysical theories that
explain those data; compare these theories and find the one among them that
best explains those data… No, I’m recommending only that metaphysicians try
to discover the metaphysical implications of – the metaphysical theses that are
logical implications of – the things they believe on non-metaphysical (and,
more generally, non-philosophical) grounds. (van Inwagen 2019, 22-23)
Van Inwagen is in entire agreement, then, with van Fraassen’s critique of IBE
in metaphysics; he objects only to van Fraassen’s claim that this is an intrinsic feature
of metaphysics.345 He says:

As scientists are said by some to survey a set of empirical data and then try to
come up with a theory that is the best explanation of those data,
metaphysicians, van Fraassen maintains, (think they) proceed by surveying
some set of data (I will not attempt to say what these data might be) and then
attempting to construct theories that explain them. These metaphysicians (so

Rowbottom too objects to this: ‘It remains unclear that abduction is vital for metaphysics, or indeed
for anything else, and if Van Fraassen's “anti-metaphysical” position relies on the idea that metaphysics
is (or particular forms thereof are) impossible without abduction, then he owes us an argument that he
does not seem to have yet provided. After all, to make a demand for explanation, and then to outline
possible explanations, is not to select one of those explanations on the basis that it is “best”’ (Rowbottom
2005, 205).
345
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they suppose) then proceed to compare the theories they have constructed to
explain one of these sets of data with an eye to discovering which one best
explains them. (What the standards of comparison are, I will not attempt to
say.) And it may be that van Fraassen is right to say that this is what some
metaphysicians (think they) are up to – and right in his unflattering comparison
of the fruits of their labors with those of the labors of physicists and geologists
and microbiologists. Van Fraassen errs, however, in supposing that this
“method” (I agree entirely with his low opinion of its fruits) is essential to
metaphysics, and I am doubtful whether it is very commonly employed by
philosophers who call themselves metaphysicians. (van Inwagen 2019, 18-19)

The claim that such a method is infrequently employed by metaphysicians is
curious given the general agreement from philosophers above. 346 Either way, van
Inwagen provides little argument to substantiate his claim. It seems that he articulates
no principle, only the claim that ‘having examined the questions that explanatory
metaphysical theories purport to provide answers to, I have reached the conclusion that
it makes no sense to suppose that these questions have answers’ (van Inwagen 2018,
210). But this is entirely unsatisfactory. He provides no extensive analysis of
explanatory theories and offers no theory of meaning to adjudicate when a question is
meaningful and when it is not. He provides only a quotation from Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus who claimed in proposition 6.5: ‘When the answer cannot be put into words,
neither can the question be put into words. The riddle does not exist. If a question can
be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it. (Wittgenstein 1921, Tractatus 6.5,
transl. Pears/McGuiness)’ (Ibid. 211). We saw in Chapter Three that the problem of
character is one such problem, or one such question, that he considers to have no

However, he seems to shift opinion on this matter at times: ‘I heartily applaud all that he says against
those metaphysicians who ape the practice of scientists– or what they take to be the practice of scientists
– by appealing to “the method of inference to the best explanation.” If I had ever thought that there was
a method called “inference to the best explanation” that could be used as an instrument of metaphysical
discovery (or which could be used to validate a metaphysical theory however it had been discovered),
van Fraassen would have convinced me otherwise. But thank God I never have! I suspect, however, that
use of this “method” is typical of constituent ontologians, and I suspect that at least some relational
ontologians besides myself will ﬁnd it as foreign to their way of thinking as I ﬁnd it to mine’ (van
Inwagen 2011, 396).
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meaningful answer.347 But given the breadth of his claim, and its dramatic nature, as
well as how intimately he links it to his ontological method, far more is required.

5.4.2 Theoretical Virtues, Primitives and Lightweight Explanatory Antirealism.
In this penultimate section, I focus on the role that primitives 348 play in
ontological explanations and their relationship to theoretical virtues. I claim that
primitives bear a large portion of the explanatory burden in ontological theories, yet
the theoretical virtues alone aren’t sufficient in deciding which primitives are best.
That is to say, given the nature of primitives, and how it is we come to postulate them,
I see no decisive way of choosing between competing accounts in which they feature.
It seems that there will be extra-theoretical factors in play and this situation leads me
to an antirealist position.
We might divide perspectives on primitives, following Benovsky (2016, 64)
into the functional view and the content view. According to the functional view, which
Benovsky endorses, we know of primitives by what they do, by their function in an
explanatory theory. On this view, he says: ‘By its very nature, a primitive being
primitive, it is non-analysable and we are not really given any information concerning
its nature; we are told what it does rather than what it is’ (Benovsky 2016, 24). In the
previous chapter, I highlighted the various ontological primitives Lowe proffers that
were relevant to the problem of character. As well as substantial kinds and individual
substances, these included a non-hypostasized concrete particular non-object called a
mode, an abstract universals non-object called an attribute, a substantial kind, an
individual substance and the various formal ontological relations that stand between
the four categories. Such relations include those of instantiation, characterization and
exemplification. This is a lot of theoretical machinery, which is largely commended
due to its purported explanatory power.349 As with grounding above, we seem to get a
semblance of what such primitives are as they function in the overall theory. However,
as Goodman pointed out above, that a primitive is useful does not testify to its clarity,
We recall that he claims: ‘“[N]o meaningful statement among all possible meaningful statements
counts as an answer [to it]”’ (van Inwagen 2018, 211).
348
Dasgupta distinguishes six ways primitives can be distinguished: ideologically, modally, scrutably,
metaphysically, methodologically, and intellectually. While the distinctions are important, the broad
view of a primitive as a hypothetical postulate in a purported explanation will suffice here.
349
Recognising “power” here is metaphorical and rather vague, Ylikoski and Kuorikoski (2010) do
some interesting work articulating its various dimensions.
347

242

but to the importance of clarifying it. There is a further sense in which we want to
know the nature of these primitives, and this amounts to the content view. In this sense,
the primitives differ not merely by their explanatory role, but by what they are. To my
mind, this is an irresistible demand. As Wilfred Sellars famously declared:
‘Universals? Of course there are universals. I just want to know what they are.’350
Similarly, I want to know what Lowe’s modes are and in what way they differ from
L.A. Paul’s tropes, for example. The transcendent universals of Plato have a certain
mystical sense to them, that feels different to the immanent universals of Aristotle.
Each primitive appears to have a personality, so to speak, and we are attracted to some
personalities more than others.
However alluring the content view is, the functionalist view has a lot going for
it. In one sense, it seems clear that primitives are not worldly things that are discovered,
but are rather, the intellectual contributions of the ontologist. As Benovsky elucidates:

A primitive like the relation of instantiation is not like a rock made of gold that
one finds in a mine and whose features one can examine to see how rich one
just got. Rather, such a primitive is a theoretical postulate, whose features are
postulated by the metaphysician who introduced the primitive in the first
place—consequently, she can postulate it to have all the features she wants it
to have. (Benovsky 2016, 89)

He calls these ontological postulates problem-solvers (Ibid., 22) and claims that
because competing theories each postulate primitives to do certain work,351 to explain
certain phenomena, this work is done in the same way; the same primitivist way. Even
if the respective theories are not metaphysically equivalent, when each ontologist is
permitted their primitives and the accompanying theoretical machinery, there is no
objective criteria that will objectively rule one account superior to others.
Perhaps there is not such a strict division between function and content,
however. Lowe, we saw, objects to Armstrong’s immanent universals because he
doesn’t understand their nature; he doesn’t understand what wholly present means
350

Quoted in Kraut (2010, 590).
When speaking of primitives, we must constantly bear in mind that alone, they don’t do much. As
Swoyer claims with respect to properties, ‘Properties alone can’t explain much. What does the
explaining is a theory of properties, an account of what they are like and how they do the things they
are called on to do’ (Swoyer 1999, 104).
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with respect to universals. He does understand what function Armstrong expects his
universals to perform. So it is not merely the function that is relevant, but the features
the primitives have independent of their function; if the primitives have precisely the
same features, then it’s natural to assume that they are equivalent. Benovsky disagrees
and claims that:

If someone insisted that on the top of the functions they play in the theory,
primitives have a non-functional content, this would then amount to insisting
that she postulates a difference that makes no difference—and I can only say
that I see little reason for doing anything like that when building a metaphysical
theory. Such an attitude towards primitives would be having an unreasonable
soft spot for the words one uses – words like “substance”, “substratum”,
“relation”, and so on. (Benovsky 2016, 65)
The objection is interesting, but it doesn’t quite respond to my issue. Perhaps the
disagreement I have with Benovsky is simply that I think he overstates his case. It
seems that one cannot permit a primitive if its features are incomprehensible. But if
we can only know the features of the primitive by its function, and I do profess to know
its function, then I’m not permitted to say I don’t know its features according to
Benovsky. But this can’t be correct. As I said, Lowe objects to Armstrong’s immanent
universals as incomprehensible while understanding what their function is meant to
be, so Benovsky’ s view appears problematic on this point.
Van Inwagen professes not to employ primitives, even though his organicist
views would seem to suggest otherwise (1990). His claim that there are no chairs, but
only particles arranged chairwise, is a consequence, he claims, of looking to the logical
entailments of beliefs he brought to the ontology room. In this instance, it was beliefs
about fundamental physics (even though it is arguable that those beliefs were
somewhat superficial with respect to the details of contemporary fundamental
physics),352 married with a curiosity about composition. Even when he speaks of the
existence of abstract entities, which includes his theory of properties, he does not posit

See Ladyman et al. (2007) for a critique of van Inwagen’s view, a point I mentioned in Chapter
Three.
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them to explain phenomena. He therefore has no need of explanatory power as a
theoretical criterion for theory choice.
Explanatory power, as mentioned above, is just one of the many theoretical
virtues. It is in constant tension with other virtues, most notably, with parsimony.
Swoyer calls this the ‘fundamental ontological trade-off’ (Swoyer 1999, 105). It is a
tension between an abundant ontology that has explanatory breadth, and depth, of what
an explanation can achieve, against the epistemological security of a modest ontology.
While theoretical virtues might impose minimum standards for theory acceptance, I
see no reason to think that they are useful in deciding between competing ontologies;
I see no valid exchange through which the currency of virtues can be traded. That is,
there seems to be no objective measure against which they can be weighed: how
“much” ideological parsimony is worth how “much” explanatory scope? And while
there is a lot of talk of trading theoretical virtues, who is actually convinced by such
displays of virtue? Lowe, for example, knows that his four-category ontology is more
complex than Armstrong’s two-category ontology and L.A. Paul’s one-category
ontology, yet he is not persuaded by their relative simplicity. He has a preference for
explanatory power and while he is parsimonious where possible, parsimonious
scruples don’t outweigh explanatory considerations for him. Thus, even if theoretical
virtues were truth-conducive, and I see little reason to think they are, especially in
ontology, there would still be no objective way to rank the virtues leading to a
principled way to choose amongst competing theories. Why a given philosopher values
one theoretical virtue above another is unclear. 353 Theoretical virtues may be
pragmatically of value when constructing a theory. If a route to a simpler theory is
identified, it may motivate the development of the theory. But that motivation, I claim,
is extricable from truth.
These considerations, as well as the many discussed above, lead me toward
endorsing explanatory antirealism. I don’t want to push this claim too far, however. I
mentioned in the Introduction to the thesis that certain philosophers in the neoCarnapian tradition, Chalmers (2009) for example, claim that there are no objective
answers to (some) ontological disputes. Each ontological theory may be correct within
a particular framework, which has its own context of utterance. The frameworks,
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Benovsky (2017) makes a convincing argument that aesthetics plays a distinctive non truthconducive role in this regard.
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however, are incommensurable. Others, such as Hirsch (2009), claim (some)
ontological debates are unsubstantial verbal disputes, with interlocutors talking past
each other, but ultimately saying the same thing. Bennett (2009), while not endorsing
antirealism, claims that there are objective facts to certain ontological disputes, but
that we have no way of deciding between which theory in the dispute is correct. My
view is closer to Bennett’s than to Chalmers’s and Hirsch’s. I do want to say that,
regarding the nature of universals, for example, that Lowe and van Inwagen can’t both
be correct, or a better comparison might be between Lowe and Armstrong or some
such figure, but I’m unsure we can speak of an objective fact of the matter concerning
the nature of such universals. Lewis says:

If you say flatly that there is no god, and I say that there are countless gods but
none of them are our worldmates, then it may be that neither of us is making
any mistake of method. We may each be bringing our opinions to equilibrium
in the most careful possible way, taking account of all the arguments,
distinctions, and counterexamples. But one of us, at least, is making a mistake
of fact. (Lewis 1983, x; my italics)
As mentioned, pace Lewis, primitives, such as universals, don’t seem to be the kind
things that are substantiable, even in principle, the way gods or God might be.354 So
I’m not willing to say that a mistake of fact is being made in competing theories. I do
however, want to be able to say that a mistake of method is being made. In this regard,
it seems to me that it is van Inwagen, rather than Lowe, that is guilty of methodological
errors.
I have outlined, then, some reasons why I advocate for explanatory antirealism.
The reason I call it lightweight has to do with a comment of Lowe’s which I mentioned
in the previous chapter. Lowe, said in a passing footnote: ‘What is needed for progress
in metaphysics, I believe, is a judicious mixture of the insights of Kant and Aristotle’
(Lowe 2009, 7; my italics). While he never expanded on what he meant by this, and
he clearly identifies with Aristotle’s realism over Kant’s transcendental idealism, I
believe the idea is instructive in highlighting that the relationship between our rational

Perhaps revelation, for example, carries probative force, or perhaps Thomas Aquinas’ various proofs
are epistemically valuable when combined with faith (See his Summa Theologica (1485)).
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faculties and the world about us is a more nuanced matter than the division between
realism and antirealism might suggest. Lowe is seeking to provide an intellectual
foundation for the empirical sciences, and for all disciplines involving rational inquiry
generally. Though this intellectual foundation is fallible, and perhaps un-substantiable,
at least with respect to the pure part (permitting such a division), it doesn’t seem
reasonable to consider the foundation merely conceptual. At least, I’m not entirely sure
what that would amount to. Certainly, there are conventions or social constructions
that appear mind-dependent in an obvious way (perhaps money is such a candidate, or
constellations of stars), but the primitive ontological posits don’t appear to be
conceptual in the same way. Though Lowe is a fervent realist, there is a constant
tension identifiable in his work between realism and antirealism. He wants his four
categories, and the formal ontological relations between them, to be of being and is
markedly critical of positions that claim otherwise. Yet, to all intents and purposes,
according to Lowe, they literally don’t exist, and shouldn’t be counted as part of the
inventory of the world. I recognise this tension, and to the extent that such theories are
capable of explanatory work, I claim that antirealism is the more reasonable position.
However, I do so because, like Lowe, I’m unsure how to delineate precisely what a
judicious mixture of the insights of Kant and Aristotle amounts to.
The various antirealists, discussed above, tend to be sensitive to the fact that
we should not too hastily draw general conclusions from local analysis. I concur. My
claims have been centrally related to the problem of character. That being said, this
problem was intended to be a test case for a broader assessment of competing
metaontological approaches. In this regard, I present my final thoughts in the following
section.

5.5 Conclusion: In Defence of Theory-Building
Explanation in this thesis is relevant to metaontology because of the close
connection that has been identified between explanation and methodology. I am
concerned more with metaontological theory choice than with ontological theory
choice. One’s position on the nature of explanation in ontology, I have suggested, is a
criterion to aid in choosing which metaontological approach is to be preferred.
As mentioned in the Introduction to the thesis, van Inwagen notes that ‘If, for
example, Jonathan’s four-category ontology is anything like right, then all my work in
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metaphysics is fundamentally wrong, wrong from the ground up. And if the positions
I defended in “A Theory of Properties” (2004) are anything like right, then the fourcategory ontology is wrong from the ground up’ (van Inwagen 2018, 144). In a certain
respect, however, van Inwagen and Lowe are engaged in distinct second-order projects
which leads to incommensurability on first-level ontological inquiry. For example, it
seems that van Inwagen’s propertiesPvI are properties only in name, a name he is
willing to give up due to its radical difference from traditional accounts of properties.
But van Inwagen isn’t responding to the problem of character and the theory of
universals he develops as a consequence of his metaontological commitments are not
directly comparable with Lowe’s theory of character housed in his four-category
ontology which is a response to the theory of character, and more besides. The most
defining characteristic of these distinct projects concerns whether ontology is deemed
to be an explanatory enterprise. It is explanatory according to Lowe and is not
according to van Inwagen. Whether or not phenomena in the world demand
ontological explanation, then, appears to be an agent-relative matter with no objective
way of deciding the matter.
There is a choice, then, between metaontological projects: an explanatory
project or a purely descriptive project and accompanying each project is a range of
metaontological commitments. I have argued that van Inwagen has not done enough
to motivate the idea that there can be no kind of ontological explanation. But Lowe
has not demonstrated with sufficient rigour that explanatory realism is the best way to
construe the kind of ontological explanations he provides. Lowe’s traditional theorybuilder approach, I claim, is a preferable way to tackle ontological issues but for the
reasons outlined in this chapter, a lightweight explanatory antirealist view is the most
reasonable position. Either way, explanatory considerations can feature as a criterion
of metaontological theory choice.
Van Inwagen is rueful because there is no term “ontologian” (van Inwagen
2014, 185) to describe an inquirer into the nature of being. Perhaps we should allow
him the term: the ontologian looks to language and logic to discern, not what there is,
but to what a theory says there is; the ontologist looks to the world and provides
theories to explain phenomena. I count myself among the ontologists. I don’t want to
deny that there is value in looking to the logical entailments of our best theories, or of
the beliefs we profess to hold. I only deny that the constrictions imposed by van
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Inwagen’s account are not warranted, and that there is room in the metaontological
house for exploring distinctly ontological matters and building theories to explain
them.

CONCLUSION
This thesis has been an exercise in comparative metaontology. I was concerned
with the viability of ontological inquiry, with how one might conduct ontological
inquiry, and with how one might choose between competing metaontological theories.
To make addressing these questions tractable, I chose to compare two contrasting
metaontological positions currently dominant in the literature: neo-Quineanism (N-Q)
and neo-Aristotelianism (N-A). Given his prominence in the metaontological
literature, Peter van Inwagen was chosen as a representative of N-Q, and E.J. Lowe
was chosen as a representative of N-A, partly because of his vocal objections to N-Q
metaontology. Few have proffered anything like objective criteria that could help
judge the merits of one metaontological approach above another. I claimed that
explanatory considerations were a possible candidate for such a task. The basis for this
was van Inwagen’s claim that there is an intimate connection between his method and
the non-explanatory theories that are developed as a consequence of employing his
method. This contrasts dramatically with Lowe’s traditional neo-Aristotelian
approach, which does develop theories to explain puzzling features of the world. In
the first two chapters, I provided a detailed examination of their respective
metaontologies, claiming that Lowe’s N-A metaontology was a more promising way
to engage in ontological inquiry. I then illustrated their respective approaches to the
first-order problem of character, which magnified the differences in their
metaontological positions. It was demonstrated that van Inwagen’s lightweight
platonism was in various ways wanting, yet Lowe’s four-category ontology, which
houses his theory of character, was shown to employ a significant number of
ontological primitives and it was unclear whether they could bear the explanatory
burden placed upon them. This led to an analysis of explanation in ontology in the
final chapter. There, I argued that van Inwagen had not done enough to motivate the
idea that there can be no kind of ontological explanation. But Lowe has not
demonstrated with sufficient rigour that explanatory realism is the best way to construe
the kind of ontological explanations he provides. Lowe’s traditional theory-builder
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approach, I claim, is a preferable way to tackle ontological issues, but for the reasons
I defended, a lightweight explanatory antirealist view is the most reasonable position
when conducting ontological inquiry. I concluded with the claim that explanatory
considerations can feature as a valid and significant criterion of metaontological theory
choice.
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